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Abstract 
 The publication of The Origin of Species in 1859 raised a host of 
theological issues.  Chief amongst them is the question of how a good, loving, 
and powerful God could create through an evolutionary process that involved so 
much suffering, pain, and violence.  The traditional Christian answers for 
suffering in the natural world are not plausible in an evolutionary world.  We 
cannot blame natural evil on human sin, since earth history shows that non-
human suffering long preceded humans.  Nor can we say that God allows 
suffering because it allows opportunity for moral choice, spiritual closeness with 
God, and the development of virtue, as none of these apply to the non-human 
realm.  A new approach is needed to address the question of suffering and 
violence amongst non-human animals. 
 In this dissertation, I address the question of evolutionary suffering with a 
multi-disciplinary approach of biblical studies, philosophical theology, and 
systematic theology to build a compound theodicy.  After a survey of the various 
scholarly contributions in this area, I begin with biblical considerations of the 
God-world relationship.  I set aside, based on exegetical examinations of 
Genesis 1-9, notions of “fallenness” in the natural world.  I therefore argue that 
evolution was God’s intended process of creation, and that we should not 
attribute it to any kind of corruption.  The rest of the dissertation engages in the 
development of a compound theodicy rooted in a philosophical and theological 
definition of love.  How does a God who loves creatures respond to their 
suffering?  I argue that God’s action in creation is characterised by kenotic 
restraint, the giving of freedom, co-suffering with creatures, and the work of 
redemption. 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Chapter 1: Introduction and Methodology 
“God saw everything that he had made, and indeed, it was very good.”   1
Introduction 
 The most famous biblical creation account concludes with the divine 
evaluation of the goodness of the world.  However, it does not take very much 
experience of the natural world to see that a basic formulation of nature and its 
processes as the “very good” creation of a good God is not unproblematic. 
 I have spent many nights camping in the Canadian Rocky Mountains, 
and on one particular night I remember waking to the sounds of struggle outside 
my tent.  A large predator (I did not get out to investigate what kind) had caught 
some unlucky prey, and I remember hearing the screams of the prey’s last 
moments on earth.  It is a harsh reality that this event was not an aberration or a 
tragic occurrence in the realm of nature.  Rather, the suffering of that creature is 
the very life blood of the evolutionary process.  All complex evolutionary 
development has come at the tremendous cost of the pain, suffering, and often 
untimely death of countless individuals. 
 An insistent question can not be silenced: how could a good and loving 
God have created through this evolutionary process, which necessarily involves 
so much pain, suffering, and untimely death?  Could God, the all-powerful and 
omni-benevolent, really have chosen such somber and terrible tools to create? 
 The pitiless operations of natural selection seem to oppose the doctrine 
of creation by a benevolent and powerful God.  Surprisingly, what has come to 
light ever more forcefully since Darwin’s day is that the very beauty, complexity, 
and functionality of the natural world that we admire are derived specifically 
from the harms that we flinch from.  Teeth rending flesh, parasitic larvae, 
 Genesis 1:31, NRSV.1
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devastating earthquakes, erupting volcanoes, and the erosion of diverse forms 
of life through extinction all seem to speak against the love of God.  Yet, out of 
these very realities emerge the skills, values, and ever-renewed beauty of the 
natural world.   Why would a good and loving God use a process like 2
evolution––with its necessary inclusion of pain, suffering, and death––to create 
our world? 
 The theologian is seemingly left with a difficult choice: to affirm that the 
creation––with all its bloodshed, untimely death, and suffering––is in fact the 
true intention of a good, benevolent, and omnipotent Creator and explain how 
this could be so; to deny one of these classical attributes of the divine; or, to 
deny that the world is in fact the “very good” world of God, and suppose that it 
has been taken off track––fallen––in one way or another.  In this project, I 
intend to explore how a multi-disciplinary approach can provide a new approach 
to the first of these solutions.  My approach will also include a revision of how 
the classical attributes of the divine are expressed in relation to the world, but 
will not deny the ontological existence of those characteristics.  I will firmly reject 
the third solution, that of the fallenness of the world. 
Research Aims 
 There are two major research aims associated with this project.  The first 
is to guide the discussion of evolutionary theodicy along more fruitful lines of 
thought than have been achieved up to now, achieved at least partly by 
providing arguments that limit the scope of discussion.  An example of where 
the discussion can be helpfully pruned is the work emerging out of the 
 See, for example, Holmes Rolston III, “Disvalues in Nature,” The Monist 75:2 (April 1992): 2
250-278.
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assumption of a fallen cosmos ––and the consequent assumption that God did 3
not intend evolution to happen.  If, on exegetical, philosophical, and scientific 
grounds, the idea of a non-human fall can be ruled out, then the energies 
currently being spent defending and developing theologies based on a fall can 
reorient themselves into more fruitful explorations of thought.  In this sense, part 
of my project is about asking better questions at the starting point of theological 
enquiry.   
 Secondly, my work will attempt to develop better answers to the 
questions being asked in theodicy: Can non-human suffering be reconciled with 
belief in a good God?  How is God at work in the non-human world?  What does 
redemption mean in the non-human realm?  To that end, this project will 
develop a compound evolutionary theodicy  grounded in the nature of love.  The 4
definition of love worked out in my fourth chapter, that love is the result of the 
desire for the good of the beloved and the desire for union with the beloved, 
shows how the creation must be marked by freedom, the co-suffering of divine 
presence, some forms of providence, and the combination of several types of 
redemptive divine action, both in the here and now and in a new creation.  A 
further explanation of each of these elements is explored in the chapter outline 
below.  
Research Audience 
 The first audience for this dissertation is the community of scholars who 
work on the question of evolutionary theodicy, for example, Christopher 
 Examples include C. S. Lewis, Michael Lloyd, Paul Griffiths, Gregory Boyd, and others.  See 3
chapter 2 for full references.
 A compound theodicy is a theodicy that does not find any one approach alone to be sufficient 4
as a justification for evil, but which argues for several different strands of argument to be held 
together.  For a complete explanation of what is meant by a compound theodicy, see chapter 2.
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Southgate, Michael Murray, Peter van Inwagen, Wesley Wildman, Denis 
Edwards, Holmes Rolston III, Jay McDaniel, Gregory Boyd, Philip Clayton, 
Steven Knapp, Nicola Hoggard Creegan, Terence Fretheim, Nancey Murphy, 
Celia Deane-Drummond, Robert Russell, Ted Peters, William Hasker, and 
Loren Wilkinson.  My work will focus almost entirely on the contemporary 
debate as it now exists.  A few historical sources will be used, but their 
contributions are very limited.  The cutting-edge of the debate now includes 
elements unavailable to historical authors, such as biological work on altruism 
and suffering, or models of divine action based on quantum mechanics.  In 
addition, any comprehensive look at the historical contributions would expand 
this work well beyond the boundaries of a dissertation. 
 Secondarily, I write also for the wider audience of those who wish to 
bring Christian faith into conversation with the natural sciences.  Van Inwagen 
divides theodicy into two main categories: apologetic and doctrinal.   My work is 5
not primarily apologetic.  It is not meant to convince anyone that the concept of 
God is reasonable;  rather it is an exploration in the theology of creation.   6 7
Nonetheless, some readers may find this work helpful for apologetic purposes, 
particularly in the North American evangelical context where there often exists a 
polarisation between scientific theories and theological beliefs.  My own 
 Peter van Inwagen, The Problem of Evil: The Gifford Lectures Delivered in the University of St. 5
Andrews in 2003 (Oxford: Clarendon, 2006), 5.
 Several of the ventures in theodicy are intended with this purpose: to convince (for example) 6
the open-minded atheist in particular that belief in God is reasonable, or to help Christians 
defend their beliefs against atheist challenges.  Treatments of theodicy from within this 
apologetic frame are advanced by Michael J. Murray, Nature Red in Tooth and Claw: Theism 
and the Problem of Animal Suffering  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 5-6; and van 
Inwagen, The Problem of Evil, 10.
 Van Inwagen remarks that “Doctrinal problems are problems that are created by the fact that 7
almost all theists subscribe to some well-worked-out and comprehensive theology that goes far 
beyond the assertion of the existence of an all-powerful and beneficent Creator.  Attempts by 
theists to account for the evils of the world must take place within the constraints provided by 
the larger theologies they subscribe to.”  The Problem of Evil, 5-6.  An example of a doctrinal 
approach is provided by Christopher Southgate in The Groaning of Creation: God, Evolution, 
and the Problem of Evil (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2008).
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Christian belief is shaped by the concern to integrate the insights of Scripture 
with the discoveries of science, the traditions of the church, and my own 
experiences of the world.  As such, many evangelical readers may find that their 
concerns about the truth and centrality of Scripture in the development of 
theological positions are taken seriously in this work. 
Research Context 
 Is there really a need for yet another project on theodicy?  Oceans of ink 
have been spilled over the question of human suffering, yet there have only 
been three book-length treatments of theodicy in regard to evolutionary non-
human suffering.  The three books specifically on non-human animal suffering in 
evolution are Michael Murray’s Nature Red in Tooth and Claw,  Christopher 8
Southgate’s The Groaning of Creation,  and Nicola Hoggard Creegan’s Animal 9
Suffering and the Problem of Evil.   Southgate and Hoggard Creegan’s are 10
theological works, while Murray’s is analytic philosophy.  Of the many existing 
theodicy books, most only pay passing heed to non-human suffering (if they 
acknowledge it at all).   John Hick, for example, in his classic Evil and the God 11
of Love, spends only 5 pages exploring the question of non-human animal pain, 
and then finishes with the startlingly anthropocentric conclusion: “The more 
fruitful question for theodicy is not why animals are liable to pain as well as 
 Michael J. Murray, Nature Red in Tooth and Claw: Theism and the Problem of Animal Suffering  8
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
 Christopher Southgate, The Groaning of Creation: God, Evolution, and the Problem of Evil 9
(Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2008).
 Nicola Hoggard Creegan, Animal Suffering and the Problem of Evil (Oxford: Oxford University 10
Press, 2013).  Ronald E. Osborn, Death Before the Fall: Biblical Literalism and the Problem of 
Animal Suffering (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2014) also deserves a mention, but its 
primary focus is on the culture of biblical literalism, not on animal suffering.
 Austin Farrer, for example, has a whole chapter devoted to “Animal Pain” in Love Almighty 11
and Ills Unlimited (London: Collins, 1962) which is more than one finds in most.  Yet, the chapter 
is a jumble of different types of argument––some of which appear self-contradicting––because 
the subject required more exposition than it was given.
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pleasure––for this follows from their nature as living creatures––but rather why 
these lower forms of life should exist at all.”   Other theological reflections on 12
natural evil only consider the impact of natural evil on humans.    13
 There are many current ecological works that deal with animal suffering 
due to anthropogenic causes, which raise different sorts of issues.   Ecological 14
works tend to focus on ethical considerations derived from the theology of 
interaction between the human and non-human world, what status and 
privileges or responsibilities humanity carries within creation, and how humans 
should conduct themselves in light of those responsibilities.  Those issues raise 
good questions, but they are not the questions I am interested in.  I am looking 
only at the interaction between God and the suffering of the non-human animal 
world apart from human influence.  There are several article length treatments 
of the suffering of non-human animals (Clayton, Deane-Drummond, Edwards, 
Lloyd, McDaniel, Rolston, Tracy, Wildman ) but because they are constrained 15
by length, they usually only explore one aspect of a possible theodicy and fail 
either to develop a multi-faceted theodicy that recognises the various types of 
issues that need to be addressed,  or cannot deal adequately with the several 16
intertwining theological issues.  
 John Hick, Evil and the God of Love (London: Collins, 1966), 350.12
 David Bentley Hart’s The Doors of the Sea: Where was God in the Tsunami? (Grand Rapids, 13
MI: Eerdmans, 2005) is a book about natural evil, but almost entirely about how it impacts 
humans.  The one mention of non-human animal suffering (p.79) is about how seeing it evokes 
compassion and service from human hearts.  The same anthropocentric concern is true of 
Diogenes Allen’s contribution “Natural Evil and the Love of God,” Religious Studies 16:4 
(December 1980): 439-456.
 See, for example, Andrew Linzey, Animal Theology (London: SCM, 1994).14
 See the full references for these works in chapter 2.15
 The questions raised by the existence of parasites, for example, raise different sorts of 16
questions from the issues raised by cancer.  In the case of parasites, the parasite thrives on the 
sickness of the host, and uses their energy to build for some life beyond the host, either for 
themselves or for their offspring.  In cancer, the cancerous cells may thrive while the host lives, 
but when the host dies, the cancer dies too, without remainder.  Therefore, with cancer, neither 
the cancer nor the host ultimately benefit.
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 The works that do deal with non-human animal suffering can be divided 
into philosophical and theological works.  The major arguments advanced in the 
philosophical realm are: inscrutability, neo-Cartesian, property-consequence 
(i.e. nomic regularity), and developmental defences (e.g. “only way”, chaos-to-
order).   In most philosophical works, different aspects of each of these are 17
combined into a compound defence that is stronger than any one of the 
elements on its own.  18
 Philosophical arguments, however, rarely allow for the affective (or 
practical) side of theodicy, and thus result in what Thomas Tracy calls a “thin 
defense.”   The theological “thick” defence, by contrast, attempts to weave a 19
narrative that explains suffering and the nature of God in a comprehensive 
whole, acknowledging the affective elements of theodicy and holding together 
the rich and complex theological presuppositions of the believer. 
 Theological accounts vary widely, from a Barthian approach based upon 
the concept of das Nichtige (Messer), to blaming Satan (Boyd, Lloyd, Griffiths), 
to Orthodox concepts of shadow Sophia (Deane-Drummond).  Some radically 
redefine God in ways that seek to avoid the problem (Wildman, Cobb, Griffin).  
The rest all acknowledge a traditional view of God and accept the unfallen 
aspect of the world, and use various strategies to account for the apparent 
discrepancies (Attfield, Hewlett, Farrer, McDaniel, Moltmann, Page, Peacocke, 
Peters, Russell, Southgate).  All of these positions will be explored at greater 
length in chapter 2. 
 Developmental defences can be subdivided into instrumental or by-product variations.  17
Explanations of each of these terms is found in chapter 2, p. 30.
 See chapter 2, p. 44-46.18
 Thomas F. Tracy, “The Lawfulness of Nature and the Problem of Evil,” in Physics and 19
Cosmology: Scientific Perspectives on the Problem of Natural Evil, eds. Nancey Murphy, Robert 
Russell, and William Stoeger (Vatican/Berkeley, CA: Vatican Observatory/CTNS, 2007), 152.  
See more in chapter 2, p. 46ff.
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 What is currently needed is work that holds together the insights of these 
arguments and expands upon the theological foundation that they have 
established.  I will write a full-length theological treatment to respond to and 
build upon the current theological proposals, interact with the philosophical 
questions, and establish firmer theological and biblical foundations than the 
article-length treatments provide. 
Methodology 
 Theodicy is a vastly complex subject.  It transcends disciplinary 
boundaries, spans history, and has an impact on everyone.  Every discipline 
that I will make use of in this project offers its own forms of theodicy.   In this 20
sense, theodicy is a “universal” subject; everyone has something to say about it 
from every angle.  In this project I hope to mirror that universality by being as 
universal as I can in receiving input: from philosophy, from theology, from 
biblical studies, and from the natural sciences.  Analysis of the data will occur 
through a theological lens, but I will draw on the resources of biblical theology, 
systematic theology, and philosophical theology to move from a multi-
disciplinary analysis to an interdisciplinary argument. 
 The reason for a multi-disciplinary approach is that any one discipline is 
not wide enough to give the problem its necessary scope.  A theological 
approach that does not listen to the sciences closely will not add fruitfully to the 
 This includes the natural sciences.  Biology, for example, offers its own positive rationale for 20
natural horrors.  One of my favourite examples is Sir David Attenborough’s explanation of 
cordyceps in the series Planet Earth.  The destructive effects of cordyceps, a parasitic fungus 
that targets insects, are graphically displayed.  Once infected the host insect climbs to a high 
place and latches mechanically on to whatever stem is nearest.  Then, the spore of the fungus 
erupts from the head and back of the insect––a real-life mycological version of Hollywood’s 
Alien.  After surveying its virulent spread, which can demolish whole colonies at once, 
Attenborough insists “But these attacks do have a positive effect on the jungle’s diversity, since 
parasites like these stop any one group of animal getting the upper hand.  The more numerous 
a species becomes, the more likely it will be attacked by its nemesis: a cordyceps fungus.”  
Planet Earth, “Jungles,” episode 8, originally aired 19 November 2006.
!16
discussion because it will begin with unhelpful presuppositions: many attempts 
simply label violence or want or even overabundance as “evil”, but do not pay 
attention to the fact that these very realities are generative of the goods that are 
valued.  Equally, philosophical approaches may satisfy the requirements of 
logic, but logic alone is not sufficient to encounter the problem of evil.  
Philosophy rarely acknowledges the affective elements––the full range of 
emotional responses that positions evoke––that inform our thought, and 
therefore lacks a depth that theology brings.  A philosopher is primarily 
concerned with the rational logic of a position, and not whether the conclusion 
reached is emotionally sensitive.   Equally, philosophy cannot engage 21
effectively with theological themes such as redemption or eschatology since 
these belong in the theological realm––but these are necessary themes to 
explore in any adequate venture into theodicy.  Why add biblical studies to the 
mix as well?  Partly this is because existing positions based in theology or 
philosophy often do not give adequate weight to biblical considerations, and 
partly it is because detailed exegesis allows me to critique several existing 
positions from a new––and far more effective––position. 
 In terms of the limitations of the thesis, there will be three major 
“boundary settings.”  The first major boundary to the reach of this project is that 
it will not deal at all with human suffering, nor with anthropogenic non-human 
animal suffering.  This is not a work responding to our ecological crisis, but a 
work which explores the theology of creation. 
 The second major boundary is that I will only look at the contemporary 
discussion of evolutionary theodicy.  Directly after the publication of the Origin of 
Species in 1859 various sophisticated responses to the question of non-human 
 There are exceptions to this general statement, as explored in chapter 2, p. 50-57.21
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animal suffering, the nature of creation, and the nature of divine action were 
produced.   However, subsequent discoveries in evolutionary biology and 22
continual theological developments have changed the terms of the debate 
sufficiently that translating and incorporating their viewpoints into this work 
would be impossible within the scope of this project.  In the same way, some 
early-mid 20th century theologians who engaged with science will not make an 
appearance despite their contribution to the ongoing discussions in science and 
religion.  23
 The third major boundary is that, because this is a multi-disciplinary 
project, my ability to engage in depth through the lens of any one discipline will 
be limited.  For example, I will do detailed exegesis of several aspects of 
Genesis 1-9 in chapter 3, but I will not be able to look with the same depth at 
the rest of the Hebrew Bible, and even less in the New Testament.  However, I 
think it is still important to maintain the brief reflections that are possible in order 
to ensure that the major themes in some passages (such as Romans 8:18-22) 
which may challenge the theological picture being built up are addressed. 
 A different way to think about the endeavour of this project is to see it as 
a voice joining a discussion that is already underway.  Other voices have 
brought blended approaches to the table, and I will respond to them in the same 
language of theological blend, developing my own particular hybrid of 
systematic, philosophical, and biblical theology.  Applied to this project, it means 
that many of the arguments will proceed by a mixed approach.  For example, 
the question “What is the nature of divine love toward non-human animals?” will 
 Asa Gray, for example, published several excellent essays in 1860 in review of The Origin of 22
Species that explore these questions in depth.  See Bethany Sollereder, “The Darwin-Gray 
Exchange,” Theology and Science 8:4 (2010): 417-432.
 Teilhard de Chardin, for example, did write a great deal on evolution and religion, but it is 23
questionable whether he ever developed any kind of theodicy to address the issues raised by 
evolution.  See Southgate, Groaning of Creation, 26-27.
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be worked out both theologically and philosophically.  The combination of these 
elements applied to non-human animal suffering will keep these approaches in 
a dynamic tension that does not belong to either discipline but uses the 
conclusions of both. 
Chapter Outlines 
 The first task of this work is to set out, evaluate, and position the various 
current options in evolutionary theodicy.  Chapter 2, “Theological and 
Philosophical Positions” addresses that task, and acts as the literature review.   
The first half of the chapter will explore the recent developments in 
philosophical evolutionary theodicy through the lens of Southgate and 
Robinson’s “Good-Harm Analyses,”  and the second half will explore the major 24
theological solutions, which include invoking a corruption of the world due to 
fallenness, redefining God, and pointing to redemption as a solution. 
 Chapter 3, “Biblical Considerations,” will exegetically develop one of my 
primary arguments: that the natural world before and after the human fall is 
uncorrupted by any type of cosmic fallenness.  In contrast to Michael Lloyd, 
Paul Griffiths, Gregory Boyd, William Dembski, and Neil Messer,  amongst 25
others, I do not find evidence in the Scriptural accounts to support the idea that 
suffering and death in the evolutionary process is a result of the corruption of 
God’s “very good” world.  Drawing on and building upon the work of various 
 Christopher Southgate and Andrew Robinson, “Varieties of Theodicy: An Exploration of 24
Responses to the Problem of Evil Based on a Typology of Good-Harm Analyses,” in Physics 
and Cosmology: Scientific Perspectives on the Problem of Natural Evil, eds. Nancey Murphy, 
Robert J. Russell, William R. Stoeger, S.J. (Vatican/Berkeley, CA: Vatican Observatory/CTNS, 
2007): 67-90.
 See chapter 2 for references and explanation of each scholar’s position.25
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biblical scholars,  I will show that the notion of the “cosmic fall”  is not present 26 27
in the early chapters of Genesis.  By tracing the themes of curse and pain 
through Genesis 1-9, I argue that there is no lasting, independent effect on the 
natural world from the curse on the ground in Genesis 3:17, but instead the 
curse is lifted in Genesis 8 after the account of the flood.  The chapter ends with 
a reflection on how to interpret the difficult passage in Romans 8 in light of such 
a reading of Genesis.  The outcome of the chapter is to set aside the notion of 
fallenness as the root of natural evil or disvalue and open up the discussion to 
approaches which accept pain, suffering, and death as part of God’s good 
creation. 
 Chapters 4, 5, and 6 constitute a theological and philosophical argument 
about the nature of creaturely suffering that covers three different dimensions: 
the nature of love, special divine action, and redemption.  In contrast to the 
theodicies which attempt to weigh the goods and harms meted out to each 
creature in an attempt to see if the goods outweigh the harms, I begin by asking 
“If God is love, what does a world created in love look like?”  To do so, we must 
investigate what is meant by the concept of “love.”  Chapter 4, “Creation, 
Freedom, and Love,” tackles that problem from both philosophical and 
theological perspectives.   The resultant definition is then worked out in the 28
relationship of God to creation.  The notion of kenosis, the self-emptying or self-
limiting of God, becomes a primary quality of that relationship.  The bestowal of 
 The scholars in question include, amongst others, John Wenham, Claus Westermann, 26
Gerhard von Rad, Iain Provan, David Tsumura, David Clines, Bruce Waltke, Norman Habel, 
Ellen van Wolde, and Carol Meyers.
 By “cosmic fall” I mean the event-based fall theory that blames the existence of violence, 27
suffering, and natural evil in the world on human or demonic sin.
 I draw heavily from three particular sources––one philosophical and two theological: Eleonore 28
Stump, Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of Suffering (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 2010); W. H. Vanstone, Love’s Endeavour, Love’s Expense: The Response of Being to 
the Love of God (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1977); Denis Edwards, How God Acts: 
Creation, Redemption, and Special Divine Action (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2010).
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libertarian freedom is a necessary outcome of the nature of love, not only for 
humans but for all of creation.  The world is a result of what John Polkinghorne 
has called “free process.”  29
 However, the necessary freedom of the world, in light of divine love, is 
not a freedom that excludes special divine activity.  Chapter 5, “Special Divine 
Action,” explores the possibilities of how God can still be active in this world 
inside the constraints of love.  A brief survey of proposed models of how God 
can be active without intervening in the freedoms of the world gives way to a 
depiction of God’s action as characterised by the gift of being, co-presence, 
lure, and participation in the forms of embodiment and the shaping of meaning.  
Together, these approaches to divine action suggest possible ways in which 
God does respond to the suffering of creation, and works towards the comfort 
and healing of those hurt by the always-precarious freedom of creation. 
 Perhaps the most satisfying response to suffering and evil comes in the 
form of the promise of redemption.  Whether it is the realisation that the 
suffering endured was not gratuitous, the personal experience of healing, or the 
final end of suffering, redemption offers hope that the Gordian knot of suffering 
will one day unravel.  In Chapter 6, “Redemption,” I explore four models of 
redemption, two this-worldly and two other-worldly, that attempt to describe the 
hope to be held by a suffering creation.  I then combine three of these models 
together into a compound picture of redemption.  Based on the image of a 
photo mosaic, this picture shows how various models of redemption do not 
necessarily compete with one another, but can be nested together to form a 
richer, multi-level understanding of redemption. 
 John Polkinghorne, Science and Providence: God’s Interaction with the World (London: 29
SPCK, 1989, 2005), 77.
!21
 Chapter 7, “Conclusions” will re-explore the conclusions from the thesis, 
drawing together the arguments from the various chapters into one single 
argument. 
 Overall, this project will present a new interdisciplinary synthesis for the 
development of a compound evolutionary theodicy.  I will hold, throughout, a 
particular interest in the suffering of individuals.  The focus on the individual has 
been pointed out by Christopher Southgate as the place where the problem of 
theodicy becomes most acute: “The crux of the problem is not the overall 
system and its overall goodness but the Christian’s struggle with the challenge 
to the goodness of God posed by specific cases of innocent suffering.”   Not 30
only is the problem of suffering most acutely seen in the realm of the individual, 
but this is also one of the least explored avenues of thought, limited almost 
exclusively to Southgate and Ruth Page.  Preference is instead often given to 
the overall outcomes of evolutionary processes (Holmes Rolston III, John 
Polkinghorne) because they are so easily seen as glorious.  The intricacy of 
ecosystems, the breathtaking diversity of life, the skill and power of many 
animals: all of these are easy to encounter as a theodicist.  The slow starvation 
by neglect of the second-born pelican or shoebill chick, however, is much more 
difficult to justify.  It is in the suffering of the individual that the theories of divine 
love are most strenuously tested.  Can the same divine love which leads the 
creation entire towards its telos also be concerned with the plight of the 
suffering individual?  Other specific contributions of this work include the close 
examination of biblical themes in Genesis 1-9 as applied to evolutionary 
theodicy and a theodicy derived from the philosophical and theological nature of 
 Southgate, The Groaning of Creation, 48-49.30
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love.  To do so, I will develop a combination of special divine action models and 
create a picture of redemption as a fractal photographic mosaic. 
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Chapter 2: Theological and Philosophical Positions 
“I feel most deeply that the whole subject is too profound for the human intellect. 
A dog might as well speculate on the mind of Newton.—   Let each man hope & 
believe what he can.—”  
-Charles Darwin to Asa Gray  1
 Before wading into the marshlands of theodicy, it is helpful to gain a view 
of the terrain to be traversed.  What patches of ground might support one’s 
weight?  How deep is the water?  Can the terrain support life or has it been 
polluted?  Are there insuperable obstacles?  What sort of creatures live here?  
Philosophy, theology, the natural sciences, and personal experience all compete 
and co-exist in the saturated landscape of theodicy.  Some initial groundwork 
will help to situate us in the debate as it exists. 
 This chapter and the next will work together to create a foundation for the 
arguments that will be developed in chapters 4-6.  This chapter will introduce 
and review selected philosophical and theological positions in evolutionary 
theodicy.  Chapter 3 will explore the relevant biblical material.  Therefore, this 
chapter will not be entirely comprehensive in scope. 
 As there are vast oceans of literature regarding theodicy, it would be 
impossible to cover it all.  This chapter will be limited in two ways.  First, it will 
deal almost exclusively with the theodicy literature that covers non-human 
suffering, as opposed to theodicy that explores human suffering.   Second, it will 2
be concerned with the contemporary discussion, rather than exploring all the 
possible historical debates.  The earliest work mentioned here is C. S. Lewis’s 
The Problem of Pain, which was published in 1940.  Almost every other source 
 Charles Darwin to Asa Gray, “Letter 2814,” 22 May 1860, The Darwin Correspondence Project, 1
available online at http://www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2814, accessed 30 September 
2014.
 I say “primarily” because I do at times draw upon sources that look at human suffering when it 2
is a particularly important contribution.
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considered was published within the last 30 years––publications motivated, no 
doubt, by the growing ecological crisis that has brought the question of non-
human suffering ever more to the forefront of theological consideration.   All 3
three extant book-length treatments of evolutionary theodicy are recent, with 
Christopher Southgate and Michael Murray both publishing in 2008, and Nicola 
Hoggard Creegan publishing in 2013.  Most of the relevant articles have all 
been published within the last decade.  The long tradition of Christian theodicy 
is largely not relevant to my work because it either advances arguments that are 
not applicable to non-humans (such as the moral freewill defence) or because 
the particular sharpening of the question through evolutionary sciences (i.e. that 
the disvalues are necessary to the values) was simply not available.  There was 
a sophisticated argument about animal suffering in the late Victorian period 
(post 1859),  which would make an interesting study.  However, the scientific 4
data and theories today have changed and improved so much since Darwin’s 
day that it would take a rather substantial piece of work to translate the 
concepts they were working with into the present debate.  That work is simply 
beyond the scope of this dissertation.  So, staying in the contemporary debate, 
we will survey the philosophical and theological landscape. 
 One earlier exception is the pioneering work of Loren Wilkinson, who wrote in 1976 on ecology 3
and the theological implications of death.  Loren Wilkinson, “A Christian Ecology of Death,” 
319-338.
 Particularly of interest to this topic are the writings of Asa Gray, the Harvard botanist who 4
championed Darwinism in the United States.  Gray and Darwin corresponded several times––
puzzling together over the question of natural evil––and the themes of design and suffering 
entered regularly into Gray’s writings about evolution.  See Bethany Sollereder, “The Darwin-
Gray Exchange,” Theology and Science 8:4 (2010): 417-432; John Hedley Brooke, ‘‘Darwin, 
Design, and the Unification of Nature,’’ in Science, Religion and the Human Experience, ed. 
James D. Proctor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 165-184; Sara Joan Miles, ‘‘Charles 
Darwin and Asa Gray Discuss Teleology and Design,” Perspectives on Science and Christian 
Faith 53:3 (2001): 196–201.  Other thinkers also realised how problematic non-human animal 
suffering was, as evidenced in Lux Mundi and Clement C. J. Webb’s comment that “the problem 
of suffering of the lower animals is the most difficult part of the problem of pain.”  Clement C. J. 
Webb, Problems in the Relations of God and Man (London: James Nisbet & Co, 1911), 268.  
Webb is referenced by Christopher Southgate, The Groaning of Creation: God, Evolution, and 
the Problem of Evil (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2008), 11.
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 This chapter is structured to journey from the clearer, more well-defined 
philosophical positions that hold fewer presuppositions through to the 
increasingly difficult and complex theological positions.  This will allow the 
reader to build layer upon layer of complexity as the arguments become 
increasingly multi-faceted. 
 The philosophical section begins by exploring and rejecting the positions 
that simply evade the problem of reconciling a good God with the existence of 
evolutionary evil, such as the inscrutability response advanced by Martin 
Bergmann, William Alston, and Daniel Howard-Snyder.   The rest of the 5
philosophical positions, most notably those advanced by Michael Murray, but 
also including Peter van Inwagen, Richard Swinburne and Robin Attfield,  are 6
explored through the grid of Christopher Southgate and Andrew Robinson’s 
“Good-harm Analyses.”   Southgate and Robinson’s identification of defences 7
as either property-consequence, developmental, or constitutive helps to reduce 
the complex arguments into their component parts for analysis and evaluation.  
At the end of the philosophical section, there is a bridging section exploring the 
 Martin Bergmann, “Skeptical Theism and Rowe’s New Evidential Argument from Evil,” Noūs 5
35:2 (2001): 278-296; William Alston, “Some (Temporarily) Final Thoughts on Evidential 
Arguments from Evil,” in The Evidential Argument from Evil, ed. Daniel Howard-Snyder 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996), 320-321; Daniel Howard-Snyder, “The 
Argument from Inscrutable Evil,” in The Evidential Argument from Evil, ed. Daniel Howard-
Snyder (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996), 286-310.
 Michael J. Murray, Nature Red in Tooth and Claw: Theism and the Problem of Animal Suffering 6
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Peter van Inwagen, The Problem of Evil: The Gifford 
Lectures Delivered in the University of St. Andrews in 2003 (Oxford: Clarendon, 2006); Richard 
Swinburne, Providence and the Problem of Evil (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996); Robin Attfield, 
Creation, Evolution and Meaning (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006).
 Christopher Southgate and Andrew Robinson, “Varieties of Theodicy: An Exploration of 7
Responses to the Problem of Evil Based on a Typology of Good-Harm Analyses,” in Physics 
and Cosmology: Scientific Perspectives on the Problem of Natural Evil, eds. Nancey Murphy, 
Robert J. Russell, William R. Stoeger, S. J. (Vatican/Berkeley, CA: Vatican Observatory/CTNS, 
2007): 67-90.
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limits of philosophy, followed by a contrast of philosophical with theological 
approaches.  8
 In the second half of the chapter I explore the theological positions in 
evolutionary theodicy.  As with the philosophical section, the theological section 
begins by exploring some positions that evade the problem––this time by 
radical re-definitions of God that eliminate the divine qualities of goodness or 
omnipotence that are central to the question.  Here I use Kenneth Surin and 
Eleonore Stump as foils for the usual type of analytical philosophy that is used 
to address theodicy.   Next, I go on to investigate the theological positions that 9
posit a fall scenario.  This may be due to satanic corruption, human sin, or some 
more mysterious force at work in the world.  Finally, the chapter will investigate 
more moderate redefinitions of God or God’s action in the world. 
 The first aim of this chapter is to critique some positions sufficiently to set 
them aside––clearing the ground for more fruitful debate in later chapters.  
These will not be returned to in the project.  The second aim of this chapter will 
be to introduce positions in order to set them up for further exploration, critique, 
or elaboration later in the dissertation.  For those positions that will be re-
explored later in the project, the footnotes will direct the reader to the relevant 
chapters. 
Philosophical Positions 
No Problem of Evil or Impossible Problem 
 Kenneth Surin, Theology and the Problem of Evil (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986); Eleonore 8
Stump’s Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of Suffering (Oxford: Clarendon, 
2010).
 Championed by Wildman and Griffin.  Wesley J. Wildman, “Incongruous Goodness, Perilous 9
Beauty, Disconcerting Truth: Ultimate Reality and Suffering in Nature,” in Physics and 
Cosmology: Scientific Perspectives on the Problem of Natural Evil, eds. Nancey Murphy, Robert 
Russell, and William Stoeger (Vatican/Berkeley, CA: Vatican Observatory/CTNS, 2007): 
267-294; David R. Griffin, “Creation Out of Chaos and the Problem of Evil,” in Encountering Evil: 
Live Options in Theodicy, ed. Stephen T. Davis (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1981): 101-136.
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 The first two philosophical approaches to the problem of evil are the neo-
Cartesian approach and the inscrutability response.  Both end almost before 
they begin.  The first approach, called by Michael Murray “neo-Cartesianism” 
due to its initial attribution to Descartes, simply states that there is no problem of 
animal suffering because non-human animals do not have the higher-order 
capacities necessary to suffer.   Non-human animals, in this view, only appear 10
to suffer.   Pain-related behaviours are carried out without any conscious 11
awareness of pain or particularly of suffering.  This view has some experimental 
verification, where pain-avoidance behaviour and even simple learning tasks 
were exhibited in the bodies of rats whose spinal cords had been disconnected 
from their brains.   However, the opposing evidence, which shows that all the 12
symptoms of psychological distress which we associate with suffering are 
usually present, is strong and convincing.   Michael Murray explores this topic 13
at length,  and concludes that “few will find the neo-Cartesian position to be 14
compelling or even believable.”   The common-sense argument against neo-15
Cartesianism is simply too strong, and ultimately, since the position cannot be 
conclusively proved or disproved, most people prefer to err on the side of 
 Murray, Nature Red in Tooth and Claw, 42.  “Descartes and the Cartesians are reputed to 10
have been seen torturing animals and marveling how well their behaviour mimicked the 
behaviour of organisms, like ourselves, who really do experience pain and suffering.” Italics 
original.
 This view has been advanced by C.S. Lewis, The Problem of Pain (New York: HarperCollins, 11
1940, 1996), 135-136.
 Michael Domjan and James W. Grau, The Principles of Learning and Behaviour (Belmont, 12
CA: Cengage Learning, 2006), 179-180.
 Evidence extends from very short term-effects of trauma, such as being hunted, to long-term 13
effects similar to post-traumatic stress disorder.  See: Patrick Bateson and Elizabeth L. 
Bradshaw, “Physiological effects of hunting red deer,” Proceedings of the Royal Society London 
B 264 (1997): 1707-1714; K. S. Gobush, B. M. Mutayoba, and S. K. Wasser, “Long-Term 
Impacts of Poaching on Relatedness, Stress Physiology, and Reproductive Output of Adult 
Female African Elephants,” Conservation Biology 22:6 (2008): 1590-1599.  For more general 
discussions of animal distress see David DeGrazia and Andrew Rowan, “Pain, suffering, and 
anxiety in animals and humans,” Theoretical Medicine 12:3 (September 1991): 193-211.
 Murray, Nature Red in Tooth and Claw, 41-72.14
 Murray, Nature Red in Tooth and Claw, 71.15
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greater compassion, giving the benefit of the doubt to the non-human animals.  
At the very least, it is argued, non-human animal pain responses are similar 
enough to human pain responses that it would damage one’s humanity to 
simply ignore it.   Were that not enough, shadows of seventeenth-century 16
vivisectionists laughing about the pained cries of dogs as “mere creaking of the 
animal ‘clockwork’” are enough to scare most people away from contemplating 
such a position.   Furthermore, increasing evidence of non-human animals 17
being “subjects-of-a-life”  and of their experiences of distress should distance 18
people yet further from any contemplation of the neo-Cartesian perspective.  
Non-human animals not only show signs of extreme distress with all the 
physiological changes we would find in humans that suffer, but also other 
animals can display prolonged psychological effects stemming from the 
experience of traumatic events.   We can, then, safely set aside the neo-19
Cartesian approach. 
 The second approach, known as the inscrutability response, says that we 
simply cannot know the reasons for the existence of suffering, and our capacity 
to understand the complexities of the world is too small.  In order to evaluate the 
extent of evil, or prove that one good outweighs another evil, one would have to 
be able to describe all the necessary conditions for both, as well as describe 
 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, trans. by Vernon J. Bourke, (Notre Dame, IN: 16
University of Notre Dame, 1975) III. 112:13.
 Nicolaas A. Rupke, Vivisection in Historical Perspective (London: Francis & Taylor, 1987), 27.17
 Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 18
243-248; Holmes Rolston III, A New Environmental Ethics: The Next Millennium for Life on 
Earth (New York: Routledge, 2012), 64-66.  For Regan, a “subject-of-a-life” is any organism 
capable of felt experience, which is mostly mammals.  For Rolston, it also includes organisms 
like octopi, which have sentient experience but which may be very different from our own.
 Scientific evidence shows not only that animals experience deep distress in circumstances 19
such as being hunted, but also that psychological and physiological impacts can continue for 
more than a decade after a traumatic event.   One innovative clinic for the orphans of poached 
African elephants has found success by treating the young elephants as having post-traumatic 
stress disorder.  Charles Siebert, “Orphans No More,” National Geographic (September 2011): 
40-65.  Accessed online 1 January 2013 at http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2011/09/orphan-
elephants/siebert-text.
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every single outcome emerging from their initial occurrences.  There are simply 
too many variables for a person to make a plausible judgement, even in a 
relatively simple situation.  We are, therefore, not well positioned to make 
arguments about whether or not evils can or cannot outweigh respective goods 
at a cosmic scale.  Defenders of this position include Michael Bergmann, Daniel 
Howard-Snyder, and William Alston.   Shrouded in mystery, the problem of 20
non-human animal suffering remains intractable, and attempts to solve it only 
result in wasted philosophical and theological speculations.  Such speculations 
only keep us from the more important work of discerning and responding to evil 
here and now. 
 The inscrutability response may seem attractive since it begins where all 
theodicy ultimately ends: in mystery.  However, the advocates of this position 
miss many important discussions that emerge from thinking about suffering.  
Theodicy is not only attempting to find an answer to suffering, it also includes 
reflection on the nature of God and on the nature of the world.  To attempt to 
reflect on the nature of God or the world without including suffering would be 
obviously impossible, and so we must continue to wrestle with theodicy, even if 
only for the light it throws on other doctrines.  So while a final comprehensive 
answer to suffering may never be found, we do not take the inscrutabilist’s 
choice of refusing to engage the question.  We turn instead to three sets of 
philosophical approaches that take the plunge in acknowledging and answering 
evil. 
  
Analytical Philosophical Defences 
 Murray, Nature Red in Tooth and Claw, 26;  Nicola Hoggard Creegan, Animal Suffering and 20
the Problem of Evil (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 65;  Bergmann, “Skeptical Theism 
and Rowe’s New Evidential Argument from Evil”, 278-296; Howard-Snyder, “The Argument from 
Inscrutable Evil,” 286-310; Alston, “Some (Temporarily) Final Thoughts on Evidential Arguments 
from Evil,” 320-321.
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 Most philosophical defences attempt to show through analytical thinking 
that God has not built avoidable evil into the natural process of the world, 
thereby rescuing God from culpability for the extent and severity of animal 
suffering.   These defences  are built of several different types of strategies, 21 22
helpfully distinguished by Christopher Southgate and Andrew Robinson.   They 23
distinguish between three different categories of good-harm analyses (GHA), in 
each of which the good is supposed to outweigh the harm.  The three 
categories are defined as: 
Property-consequence GHAs: a consequence of the existence of a good, 
as a property of a particular being or system, is the possibility that 
possession of this good leads to it causing harms. 
Developmental GHAs: the good is a goal which can only develop through 
a process which includes the possibility (or necessity) of harm.  [These 
can be further divided into instrumental or by-product varieties of 
developmental GHAs] 
Constitutive GHAs: The existence of a good is inherently, constitutively, 
inseparable from the experience of harm or suffering.  24
 Southgate and Robinson further divide these categories by three 
different references: human, anthropocentric, and biotic.  As only the 
anthropocentric and biotic references include consideration of the non-human 
animal world, they will be the only two explored here. 
Property-Consequence GHAs 
 Nomic regularity is a good example of a property-consequence GHA.  
The concept of nomic regularity states that the processes of change can be 
 Neil Messer, “Natural Evil After Darwin,” Theology After Darwin, eds. Michael S. Northcott and 21
R. J. Berry (Milton Keynes: Paternoster, 2009), 143.
 I will use the language of defence in this context because most of the philosophical 22
approaches are not attempting to build a theological framework to explain God, and so the 
language of theodicy is inappropriate.  Alternative language, such as Michael Murray’s Causa 
Dei, is acknowledged but seem an unnecessary proliferation of terms.
 Christopher Southgate and Andrew Robinson, “Varieties of Theodicy,” 67-90.23
 Southgate and Robinson, “Varieties of Theodicy,” 70.24
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described in law-like forms with few or no exceptions.   If I drop a large rock, its 25
fall will always adhere to certain law-like descriptions, as will the impact it would 
have on a body below.  Great harms develop out of the fact that the world has 
extremely regular patterns of change and interaction.  Fires do not stop burning 
when fawns are caught in them, nor does water cease carrying its properties 
because it is built into a tsunami.  The world’s physical properties continue to 
stay stable regardless of the suffering they inflict on living beings.  Because 
these law-like forms cause so much suffering Michael Murray argues that 
“theists must accept the claim that nomic regularity is either something that God 
values highly in creation or it is an inevitable by-product of something else 
valued highly.”   What could constitute this highly valued something? 26
 Two varieties of possible goods are derived from nomic regularity: first, 
the anthropocentric perspective, which states that the entire universe is subject 
to law-like forms for specifically human goods, and second, the biotic 
perspective, which argues that nomic regularity is good for non-human animals 
themselves. 
 For Murray, the possibility of a moral universe is one of the outcomes of 
nomic regularity that could form part of an anthropocentric GHA.   It is only in a 27
universe where actions have predictable effects that a person can have a 
chance to make real and effective moral choices.  Without knowledge of what 
might occur if, say, one were to throw a hard object at another person, free and 
effective––and crucially, moral––choice becomes meaningless.   In this case, 28
 Murray, whose definition I use here, is careful to say that the law-like forms can include 25
“chance” as it exists in the quantum world, “as long as the probabilities were well-behaved.”  
Nature Red in Tooth and Claw, 135.
 Murray, Nature Red in Tooth and Claw, 135.26
 Murray, Nature Red in Tooth and Claw, 136.27
 For a theological development of the same point, see the arguments of Clayton and Knapp 28
below, p. 65-66.
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the suffering of non-human animals (who do not have moral capacities ) due to 29
nomic regularities are simply a tragic by-product of the necessity for moral 
human freedom, thus non-human animal suffering serves human ends.   30
Another example of an anthropocentric approach is to argue that nomic 
regularity serves humans by providing intellectual satisfaction through scientific 
investigations.  The 19th century geologist George Frederick Wright, for 
example, wrote happily that in comparison to a trilobite’s whole pleasure in its 
own life:  
a far higher purpose is served in the adaptation of his complicated 
organism and of the position of his tomb in a sedimentary deposit to 
arrest the attention and direct the reasoning of a scientific observer.  The 
pleasure of one lofty thought is worth more, and so more fitted to be with 
the Creator an object of design, than a whole herd of sensational 
pleasures.  A page of Darwin has to a single reader more ‘value in use’ 
than all the elements had to the whole race of Trilobites in Silurian 
seas.  31
  
 The first argument, that nomic regularity is necessary for moral choice, 
and that it necessarily causes non-human animal suffering as a by-product, 
would hold great merit if it could be shown that moral choice could not exist 
some other way that did not involve non-human animal suffering, or if non-
human animals themselves benefited from moral choice.  However, in the form 
that van Inwagen articulates the argument (which denies non-human animals 
any possibility of moral choice), it is hard to accept that billions of organisms’ 
suffering and death is outweighed by the possibility of human moral choice 
 “Since non-human animals presumably do not have free will, and since some (most, in fact) 29
of the sufferings of non-human animals occurred before there were human beings, no extension 
or elaboration of the free-will defense can account for all animal suffering.” van Inwagen, 
Problem of Evil, 113.
 “All past and present human and animal natural evils of which we know thus contribute to the 30
widening of human choice when we learn about them.” Swinburne, Providence, 192. 
 George Frederick Wright, Studies in Science and Religion (Andover: Warren F. Draper, 1882), 31
204-205.  This quotation is used by Murray, Nature Red in Tooth and Claw, 142.
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alone.  Any valid solution must attribute value to the lives of the non-human 
animals themselves.   
 The second argument, that of the intellectual satisfaction of the 
palaeontologist, is even more outrageous to suggest, since all the satisfaction of 
the pursuit of physics and mathematics and present-day biology would have 
been available to investigate without the suffering and death of past non-human 
animals.  Palaeontology would certainly have suffered, but not the scientific 
endeavour as a whole.  Furthermore, the great majority of non-human animals 
have left no trace able to be investigated by science, and so we cannot use this 
argument to explain their travail.  It is morally vacuous to attribute so much 
suffering to no greater good than a particular branch of intellectual satisfaction.   
 A slightly stronger point to be made here is that without nomic regularity 
no science at all would be possible, since science depends on the repeatable 
law-like functioning of the natural world.  Robin Attfield points out that without 
natural regularities:  
There would be no science and no scope for rationality, there would be 
no creatures of the kinds that have evolved by natural selection within 
the framework of the laws of nature to which we are accustomed, and if 
there were any life at all, it would be unrecognizably different, with no 
recognizable goods or ills remaining.  For conscious life, indeed, some 
system of nature not too different from that of the actual world seems 
essential.  32
Two objections can be made in response to this statement.  First, the 
applicability of rationality is almost entirely a human value, and does not ascribe 
worth to the non-human animals themselves.  Second, that an “unrecognizably 
different” life would not necessarily be better or worse than the current state of 
affairs, so pointing out that it would simply be different does not constitute an 
argument.  In a hypothetical “other order” without non-human animal suffering, 
 Attfield, Creation, Evolution and Meaning, 124.32
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there could still remain goods and ills of a different order, and so the question 
would have to land on whether or not those goods and ills outweigh the goods 
and ills currently in operation.  Unfortunately, with no concrete knowledge of 
another world (it will always be hypothetical) and with only a very limited 
knowledge of this world the question remains unanswerable.  It is better to 
argue, as I will below, that nomic regularity gives non-human animals the 
chance to develop skills and abilities, to stretch themselves and form 
themselves in ways that would be unavailable to them without nomic regularity, 
even if the present order does cause suffering. 
 A different sort of anthropocentric argument comes from Peter van 
Inwagen who asserts that the co-creator destiny of humanity requires a world 
with the properties of nomic regularity, because one could not have dominion 
over a world of massive irregularity.   A world constantly interfered with by 33
direct divine intervention could not be handed over to human rule in the 
eschaton because they would not be able to intervene in the same ubiquitous 
and supernatural way.  Although God might be able to constantly intervene to 
prevent harm, for example by transforming a falling tree limb into water so as 
not to hurt the creature below, humans would not be able to do this.  The world 
system, built upon such interventions, would collapse into chaos upon being 
handed over to humans.  This is not a developmental argument because van 
Inwagen does not imply that the regularities are necessary for humans to learn 
their roles as governors of creation, but only that their task would be impossible 
to perform without said regularities.  Once again, there is little in this argument 
that can justify the long past of non-human animal suffering, particularly when 
the eschaton is usually envisioned to work under different “rules of being” 
 van Inwagen, The Problem of Evil, 123.33
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anyways.   In the end, anthropocentric property-consequence GHAs are 34
unsatisfactory, and therefore have little to contribute to the contemporary 
debate. 
 Property-consequence arguments with a biotic reference are also 
possible with a focus on nomic regularity.  Murray points out “embodied 
creatures cannot successfully reproduce, acquire adequate nutrition, constitute 
a suitably interdependent ecosphere, and so on, unless the physical world in 
which they are embodied is appropriately nomically regular.”   Here, at least, 35
the goods of nomic regularity benefit the individual non-human animals 
themselves.  They are enabled to have autonomous and effective lives because 
the reliability of the world opens up the possibility of developmental values such 
as learning, adapting, and responding to the environment.  Nomic regularity with 
a biotic reference forms part of a successful defence. 
 Apart from nomic regularity, a more generalised property-consequence 
argument with biotic reference looks to the consequences of some natural 
processes, such as plate tectonics.  The anguished death of many non-human 
animals swept out to sea by a tsunami––itself caused by plate movement––is 
measured against the innumerable and necessary goods that plate tectonic 
movement provides.  An earth with moving plates means that creatures will 
receive harm from earthquakes, volcanoes, and tsunamis.  Yet, without the 
goods that plate tectonics bring there would be no possibility of life on earth.   36
Property-consequence arguments, particularly with a biotic reference, are 
helpful starting points but they do not address the imbalance of harms: why one 
 See chapter 6, p. 269–286 for various models of redemptive existence.34
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individual suffers more than another.  To answer that, one needs to draw on 
wider theological and philosophical resources. 
Developmental GHAs 
 Developmental GHAs argue that certain processes include the possibility 
(or necessity) of harm for certain goods to develop.  Anthropocentric arguments 
in this category abound.  The moral choice argument explored above can easily, 
and is often, argued from this perspective.  That is, human moral choice can 
only be developed through involvement in a world like ours that involves 
suffering and pain.  Michael Corey concludes with exactly this point in his book 
Evolution and the Problem of Natural Evil: 
Now we are in a position to understand why an omnipotent Deity would 
have opted to create the universe in a gradual, evolutionary manner, 
instead of instantaneously by divine fiat.  He presumably did so in order 
to facilitate the human growth process as much as possible; but in order 
to do this He seems to have been compelled to implement the same 
evolutionary processes in the natural world that appear to be an essential 
part of the Human Definition.  37
 If the scope of value is widened beyond humans to sentient beings, the 
GHA can take on a biotic reference.  Murray does this in his Chaos-to-Order 
argument where he argues that the present state of synchronic order––that is, 
order that is displayed at a given instant by an array of different organisms,  38
including creatures like human beings––could only have emerged from the early 
chaotic state of the universe through a process “which tends to allow for an 
overall increase in organismic complexity over time.”   Murray explores the 39
possibility that the evolution of complex beings necessitates the long chain of 
 Michael A. Corey, Evolution and the Problem of Natural Evil (Lantham, Maryland: University 37
Press of America, 2000), 113.
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!37
creatures beforehand, and the creatures’ suffering finds meaning in the values 
of progress, narrative structure, and the necessity of divine hiddenness.  He 
concludes that none of these instrumental goods adequately stands as a 
defence, but goes on to say that chaos-to-order can be viewed as an intrinsic 
good, and thus succeed as a defence.  The intrinsic good of chaos-to-order is 
found in analogy to the idea that a man who can make a machine that makes 
watches is more worthy of praise than a man who can simply make a watch.  In 
a similar way, God making the world with the ability to carry on creative 
processes of its own––to be seeded with developmental possibilities of 
aesthetic, moral and religious value that emerge over time––“is of greater value 
than creation of the finished project by divine fiat.”   Murray argues that this is 40
not an ad hoc argument in light of evolution because it was attested to by 
Christian thinkers long before Darwin, such as Gregory of Nyssa and 
Augustine.   As such, Murray considers this the most compelling defence in 41
light of non-human animal suffering.  This developmental GHA is only very 
subtly different from the biotic property-consequence GHA above.  The 
difference lies mainly in a longer timeframe for the developmental GHA: it 
argues that a creature has the opportunity to change over its lifetime due to 
nomic regularity, while the property-consequence GHA argues that the creature 
can make a meaningful decision here and now, without the thought of how that 
 Murray, Nature Red in Tooth and Claw, 184.40
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decision might shape its future self.  However, the two arguments are very 
close, and naturally overlap with each other. 
 A philosophical route more focussed on the creature itself is the 
developmental instrumental GHA.  This defence argues that many good goals 
are only developed by use of the harms in question.  Pain is the classic 
example.  Pain is a defensive mechanism that the body uses to protect itself.  
People who do not feel pain, or who do not associate pain with suffering, end up 
seriously damaging their bodies because they do not avoid destructive 
situations.  Paul Brand and Philip Yancey advance this argument in their book, 
The Gift of Pain.   Brand was a doctor in India working with patients with 42
Hansen’s disease (leprosy) and began to suspect that the damage patients 
suffered was from their lack of ability to feel pain rather than from any “flesh-
eating” properties of the bacteria.  Mysterious wounds were investigated, and 
invariably preventable causes were found.   The patients’ inability to feel pain 43
led them into countless situations where their bodies were irreparably damaged 
because they did not learn to avoid harm.   
 From this perspective, every creature that can feel pain, and can 
therefore respond to harmful stimuli in their environment gain far more from the 
harm of pain than the good of its lack.  “That capacity to suffer” writes Attfield, 
“drives the capacity for focussed consciousness; thought cannot happen in 
plants, and emerges in the course of evolutionary history partly so as to secure 
wellbeing while at the same time averting pain.”   The benefit of the pain is 44
attributable directly to the creature who experiences it, so it is considered an 
instrumental harm.  Indeed, the very hurtfulness of pain is what makes it so 
 Philip Yancey and Paul Brand, The Gift of Pain (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1997).42
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valuable: everything else is put aside until the damage is responded to in some 
way.   The benefits that pain bring cannot be separated from its harm.  If pain 45
did not hurt, it would lose its protective function.  Developmental instrumental 
GHAs, in so far as the harms benefit the individual themselves, are very strong 
arguments.  New challenges arise regarding the goodness of God when the 
instrumental argument begins to extend beyond the individual.  For example, 
those who argue that ‘the pain of the one causes the harmony of the whole,’ 
raise questions about why God should use tactics that are so brutal to the 
allegedly-loved individual.  46
 One of the ways the suffering of individuals is accounted for in the larger 
evolutionary scheme is through a developmental GHA known as the “Only Way” 
argument.   The basic argument is that an evolutionary process, with all the 47
harms it possesses, is the only way to create a world with the values we 
cherish.   Christopher Southgate focusses most successfully on the goods of 48
the individual.  He identifies beings capable of “selving” as the desired outcome 
of evolution and argues that the evolutionary process is the “only way” to 
produce such selves.   If there was another way to begin with a Genesis-like 49
de novo creation where animals appeared fully developed with their various 
skills, competition for food and resources would soon come to govern ongoing 
evolution in any case, unless animal interactions were constantly prevented by 
divine intervention.  Attfield argues “Thus, though evolution by natural selection 
 Murray, Nature Red in Tooth and Claw, 117-118.45
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is not logically necessary, it is probably the only kind of non-interventionist 
world-system which could give us those capacities found in nature that we 
value.”   The “Only Way” argument is a developmental by-product approach, 50
where the focus of the good achieved reaches beyond the individual who 
actually suffers and the harms do not affect every creature.    51
 Another example of this type of approach is the example of the second 
white pelican chick.   White pelicans regularly lay two eggs, with the strategy of 52
only raising one chick.  After birth, the second (and usually smaller) sibling is 
pushed from the nest by the older sibling and ignored by its parents until it dies 
of exposure or is eaten by a passing predator.  However, the advantage of this 
evolved behaviour is that in a small percentage of cases, the first chick dies, 
and the parents raise the second chick instead, thus always insuring that each 
reproductive cycle is fruitful.  To find value in the death of an insurance pelican 
chick for the ongoing survival of white pelicans is a developmental by-product 
approach.  The same is true of Holmes Rolston’s observation that “adversities 
make life go and grow.  The pressure, before extremity, for doing better is 
steadily a blessing in disguise.  The cougar’s fang has carved the limbs of the 
fleet-footed deer, and vice versa.”   The suffering of millions of deer as they are 53
painfully brought down by cougars is an unfortunate by-product of a process 
that is strengthening and stretching deer into beautiful forms as a species, 
developing specialised skills and senses.  Without the bite of the cougar, these 
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rich aspects of the deer’s being would soon be lost, just as fish living in dark 
caves eventually lose their eyes from lack of selective pressure.   
 Darwin’s theory of natural selection rests heavily upon a developmental 
argument.  Famously he wrote: “Thus, from the war of nature, from famine and 
death, the most exalted object which we are capable of conceiving, namely, the 
production of the higher animals, directly follows.”   Ruthless competition 54
refines life into “endless forms, most beautiful and most wonderful” yet, Darwin 
assures us, “when we reflect on this struggle, we may console ourselves with 
the full belief, that the war of nature is not incessant, that no fear is felt, that 
death is generally prompt, and that the vigorous, the healthy, and the happy 
survive and multiply.”   According to Darwin, the goods emerge out of the 55
harms, and the goods also heavily outweigh the harms.   
 However the value of Darwinian mechanics can be critiqued by asserting 
that there are other possibilities available; other paths that would have led to the 
same goods without the bloodshed and suffering.  Martin Nowak presents just 
this sort of riposte by showing how altruistic and co-operative strategies of 
survival are beneficial to reproductive success.   Lynn Margulis goes even 56
farther to argue that complex life, as seen in the origin of eukaryotic cells and 
many speciation events, could not have developed by random mutation and 
natural selection alone, but had to have been developed by symbiotic 
relationships.   Indeed, Margulis states “symbiogenesis, while it can clearly 57
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lead to new species, also set up the conditions for speciation itself.”   If it can 58
be shown that the same or similar goods, such as physical skills and 
consciousness, could have evolved without the harms of predation and hurt, 
then the case for the developmental by-product GHA’s is considerably 
weakened.  At the same time, it is difficult to know how this could be shown 
conclusively.  Margulis’ approach ignores the eventual necessity of competition: 
even though a new symbiotic relationship may promote peace between two 
organisms, the two now work as a new unit within natural selection against 
other beings.  Although two organisms might perhaps even merge to create a 
new species, that new species must now compete for resources and 
reproduction rights.  Darwin himself, when confronted with the self-sacrificial 
nature of individual bees and ants that seemed to upset his theory, simply 
assumed that the hive or the nest must now be considered the “unit” of 
selection, as one hive competes against another.   So the essential problem of 59
suffering is not eliminated by symbiotic relationships, only pushed back a step. 
 Developmental GHA’s begin to address the imbalance of suffering, but 
only when focussed on the individual.  Often, developmental arguments get 
swept up into addressing the grand processes of evolution.  They are effective, 
but are in danger of overlooking the central question of the individual suffering 
of creatures.  Both property-consequence and developmental GHA’s are 
necessary for a theodicy, but they are not in themselves sufficient to convince of 
the goodness of God or the universality of God’s benevolence since there are 
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always so many remaining instances of severe suffering which are not 
adequately addressed by these approaches. 
Constitutive GHA’s 
 Constitutive GHA’s find that the goods and harms are linked, not causally 
as in the developmental analyses, but constitutively.  This type of defence is 
often used when ecosystem dynamics are taken into account, such as by 
Holmes Rolston and Loren Wilkinson.   Energy transfer up and down trophic 60
levels through predation and decay emerges into the richness and orderliness 
of the natural world.  The circles of life and death encompass the suffering 
individual, drawing the narrative of their life into a systemic whole that Holmes 
Rolston describes as “a passion play.”   Wilkinson outlines the Christology in 61
Revelation of the Lamb who was slain and writes “worthy are all lambs, all 
victims of the world’s carniveroisty [sic], for out of their death comes life.”  62
 In such considerations, the good is less mechanical and more aesthetic.  
When the outweighing goods proposed are the existence of beauty or harmony, 
one enters into the realm of constitutive arguments.  Murray argues, for 
example, that “there is something grand, beautiful, and artful about a universe 
which contains within it everything that is necessary in order for it to yield the 
results God intends for it.”   In many cases, as with Murray here, the 63
constitutive arguments quickly break down into what are actually developmental 
instrumental arguments: the harm is good for developing such-and-such an 
end.  Most true constitutive positions become almost entirely theological in 
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nature because theological positions do not need to set the weigh scales 
mechanically.  Theology can affirm the mysterious and paradox-laden non-
reductive truths that are found in constitutive arguments.  Philosophical thought 
tends to baulk at what cannot be broken down in to its component reasons and 
analysed, and so there are not any really good examples of a true philosophical 
constitutive position.  In a later section of this chapter I will unpack the extant 
theological positions. 
Compound Positions 
 Most defences do not rest on a single premise, nor on one type of 
philosophical strategy alone.  Philosophers mix together the different 
approaches to try and build a stronger compound case.  Consider Peter van 
Inwagen who builds a compound position.  64
 He begins with the statement that nomic regularity is intrinsically good.  
Or, at least, he says that a world of incongruity or massive irregularity would be 
extremely bad––worse than a world with suffering.  He bases this thesis around 
three main arguments of intrinsic disutility and one of extrinsic disutility.  The 
three intrinsic arguments are as follows: first, he attempts to show that every 
world would (for all we know) have to contain either suffering or massive 
irregularities (a property-consequence GHA).  Second, some good comes from 
the existence of higher-level sentient creatures, and these creatures could only 
have developed through a process that involves suffering (a developmental 
instrumental GHA).   Therefore, the whole ladder of intermediate forms is a 65
necessary good to the full expression of God’s creativity (a constitutive or 
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developmental by-product GHA, depending on how it is elaborated).   Third, 66
massive irregularity would be a defect in the world equally morally problematic 
to the suffering of animals (another property-consequence GHA).  Therefore, 
between the choice of suffering beasts or massive irregularity, the option of 
suffering is possibly the greater good.  Extrinsically, as I mentioned earlier, van 
Inwagen argues that the world is meant to be handed over to human rule in the 
eschaton and that it would be hard to see how a world of massive irregularity 
could be handed over if it continually depended on direct divine intervention.   67
Thus, a world of nomic regularity is good for the sake of the humans who will 
one day rule it (an anthropocentric property-consequence argument).  Argument 
builds upon argument into a whole that is vastly stronger than any one 
argument alone. 
 It is now becoming commonplace to suggest that combined or compound 
defences are the only admissible way to deal with both the complexity of the 
world and the varieties of natural evil which occur.   Both Michael Murray and 68
Christopher Southgate advocate compound theodicies.  Murray writes:  
Indeed, it seems quite implausible to think that an evil as widespread as 
the evil in question here, animal pain and suffering, could or would be 
explained only by appeal to one narrow range of goods.  It seems far 
more likely that there would be a whole host of goods that God aims to 
bring about through creation, and that certain types of permitted evil are 
aimed at securing more than one of these goods.  69
A compound explanation makes a stronger case, and allows for a greater 
strength against arguments that falsify one or two of the cases made.  More 
 Here, van Inwagen echoes Aquinas’ argument that the great diversity of creaturely forms is a 66
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than this, a compound defence allows one to bring a variety of goods into focus, 
not all of them immediately obvious.  The promise of eschatological renewal, for 
example, stands as a great good that can complement many of the other 
positions, but would be hard to defend if it was the only good.  Furthermore, 
there are a variety of harms to address: the harms caused by a tsunami are 
different than the harms caused by a predator.  It is only natural to assume that 
different types of defence might apply to each.  A compound theodicy or 
defence allows for the flexibility of addressing these various issues.  70
 All the GHA approaches hinge on one major turning point: that it is 
possible for humans to effectively judge measures of good and evil, or to make 
compelling arguments about what an outweighing good or evil would look like.   71
We will see in the next section, how these philosophical approaches contrast 
with the theological approaches, and how this central assumption has been 
called into question. 
Philosophical and Theological Approaches Compared and Contrasted 
 Methodologically, philosophers seek to approach the question of theodicy 
with as few theological presuppositions as possible.    They often begin with 72
whether the existence of God is plausible at all.  Because of the focus on logic 
and lack of initial assumptions, a philosophical approach often becomes what 
Thomas Tracy calls a “thin defense,” something that deals only with the logical 
incompatibility of evil with the existence of a god.   By contrast, a Christian 73
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theological approach starts explicitly with foundational assumptions and with 
stated sources of authority, such as the Bible and tradition.  Holding to these 
initial beliefs and commitments allows for what Tracy calls a “thick defense.”  A 
thick defence attempts to weave a narrative that explains how suffering is 
consistent with beliefs held about God.   While a thick defence offers a 74
theodicy limited by certain conceptual constraints (i.e. it cannot explore any 
possibility, since some are ruled out by prior belief), it allows for a more in-depth 
engagement with evidential and existential arguments about evil, and it provides 
richer and more robust (not to mention more existentially satisfying) conclusions 
than philosophy.  
 A thick defence draws directly on the notion that the good which God 
seeks in creation is loving communion with created beings.  The rewards and 
the risks are both higher.  The “reward” of being drawn into the everlasting love 
of the Trinitarian life of God vastly outweighs countering evils.  At the same time, 
the recognition of freedom must be complicated by the corruption of the will 
caused by sin and the shaping of selves by societal forces.  The theodicist must 
look at the “real world” conditions of choice.  A thick defence, grounded in 
theological reflection results in a “much more complex and qualified account of 
human freedom than is usually found in generic philosophical free-will 
defenses.”   The same can be said of the non-human world as well. 75
 Another of the differences between philosophical and theological 
approaches has to do with audience and purpose.  In Peter van Inwagen’s 
Gifford Lectures, he sets up his defence to try and convince a “neutral agnostic” 
that the theistic argument is more compelling than the atheistic argument that 
 Tracy, “Lawfulness”, 152.74
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God cannot and does not exist.   In a similar way, Michael Murray states that 76
his aim is simply to engage the critics of theism on the difficult problem of 
animal suffering.   A theological approach may seek to address critiques from 77
outside a circle of faith or to destabilise atheistic doubts, but its purpose is 
essentially more constructive than that––to engage in an enquiry about the 
nature of the God-world relationship and one’s own being in that world.   78
Theological theodicy seeks to build or reinforce a theological foundation upon 
which faith can build.  In Anselm’s famous line, it is “faith seeking 
understanding.”  The conclusions theology draws may not be any more 
epistemologically verifiable than a philosophical engagement, but its claims will 
be more robust. 
 Sources of authority also differ between the two disciplines.  A Christian 
philosopher may refer to the Bible as authoritative in the course of his or her 
work, but the Bible does not stand as authoritative in and of itself, but only in so 
far as its teachings can be corroborated through philosophical means.  
Tradition, in philosophy, also stands in an ambiguous place.  While 
epistemological traditions are certainly relied upon in philosophical enquiry, the 
tradition of the Church carries weight only in so far as it is pragmatic for the 
philosopher.  In theology, the tradition of the Church stands as an important 
source of truth––the witness to God through the ages––that must be accounted 
for and reckoned with, even if one finally disagrees with it.  Logic and 
experience do not stand alone in theological reasoning, but are joined by 
tradition and Scripture. 
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 Finally, theology and philosophy are separated by different limits and 
responsibilities.  The philosopher is bound only by the constraints of logic and is 
responsible only for following the argument to its conclusion.  The theologian is 
limited by the assertions of Scripture, and is responsible for being faithful to the 
tradition and the needs of the Church, as well as (hopefully) staying inside the 
boundaries of orthodox belief.   Theologians should also be more sensitive to 79
the affective and pastoral nature of their endeavour, while philosophers need 
only be worried about whether or not the problem of evil has been “formally 
satisfied.”  Such an approach can lead to startlingly problematic claims.  Take, 
for example, philosopher Richard Swinburne who claims that his book formally 
satisfies the need for showing that God does everything possible to bring about 
an overall good state of affairs in the evil of the world.   He goes on to illustrate 80
his point by listing the overall goods coming from the eighteenth century African 
slave-trade: 
But God allowing this to occur made possible innumerable opportunities 
for very large numbers of people to contribute or not to contribute to the 
development of this [slave] culture; for slavers to choose to enslave or 
not; for plantation-owners to choose to buy slaves or not and to treat 
them well or ill; for ordinary white people and politicians to campaign for 
its abolition or not to bother, and to campaign for the compensation for 
the victims or not to bother; and so on.  There is also the great good for 
those who themselves suffered as slaves that their lives were not 
useless, their vulnerability to suffering made possible many free choices, 
and thereby so many steps towards the formation of good or bad 
character.  81
Swinburne may “formally satisfy” the strictly logical needs of a defence through 
such argumentation, but he does nothing to satisfy the sense of outrage one 
feels in contemplating human slavery, then and now.  If anything, Swinburne’s 
 Though a theologian may, of course, seek to argue that a particular position should be 79
recognised as orthodox, if it is currently not recognised as such.  For a further expression of my 
methodology, see chapter 1, p. 15.
 Swinburne, Providence, 238.80
 Swinburne, Providence, 245.81
!50
confident description increases the sense of protest and outrage one feels––
that the suffering, persecution, and enslavement of millions of people should be 
considered a great good because it allows rich, free, white people the decision 
to perhaps campaign for the slaves’ freedom––it is not convincing as an 
outweighing good, whatever logical terms it might meet.   
 Compare Swinburne’s approach to Christopher Southgate’s summary of 
a theological approach: 
All theodicies that engage with real situations rather than philosophical 
abstractions, and endeavour to give an account of the God of the 
Christian Scriptures, arise out of protest and end in mystery.  Theodicies 
never ‘work,’ in the sense of solving the problem of suffering in the 
world.    82
A theodicy arising out of protest and ending in mystery allows the whole person, 
mind and heart, to engage with the problem, though theological approaches do 
not produce the tight, neat packages one finds in analytical philosophy.   
 This dissertation is decidedly theological in approach.  I do not set out to 
create a watertight case for the plausibility of God, but rather, from a wide range 
of sources I seek to create a description of the God-world relationship that 
recognises the goodness of God and yet can sustain the burden of suffering. 
 There are other thinkers who also find the analytical philosophical 
approach unsatisfactory.  The next section will explore three critical responses 
to “thin defence” philosophical theodicy: rejection of theodicy, “thick defence” 
philosophy that addresses and engages with the existential issues raised, and 
theological approaches.  These critiques give further rationale for not pursuing 
this question from a strictly philosophical angle. 
Rejection of Theodicy 
 Southgate, Groaning of Creation, 132-33.82
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 The first critique of the analytical philosophy of theodicy is advanced by 
Kenneth Surin in Theology and the Problem of Evil.   In the introduction he 83
shows how the ahistorical approach of post-Leibniz theodicies badly 
misrepresents the theological endeavours of figures such as Augustine and 
Irenaeus.  Augustine, he argues, was concerned with the problem of evil in the 
human heart, and the solution was not to be found in philosophical reasoning 
but in conversion.   For Augustine, “the goal of the true Christian philosophy, is 84
the attainment of blessedness, and there is no way to blessedness except that 
which God has revealed in Jesus Christ.”   In a similar way, Irenaeus’s real 85
goal in historical context was to combat gnosticism and the perversion of the 
human heart, not to solve an abstract philosophical question.  Here it is useful 
to quote Surin at length: 
There is a ‘problem of evil’ for Irenaeus, but it has absolutely nothing to 
do with this kind of ‘soul-making’ or with anything resembling a theodicy.  
For as Irenaeus sees it the real problem concerning evil arises in quite 
another area of theological territory, one occupied by beings who, 
puffed up by the pretence of knowledge, fall away from the love of 
God, and imagine that they themselves are perfect, for this 
reason... they set forth an imperfect Creator... it is therefore 
better... that one should have no knowledge whatever of any 
reason why a single thing in creation has been made, but should 
believe in God, and continue in His love, than that, puffed up 
through knowledge of this kind, he should fall away from that love 
which is the life of man; and that he should search after no other 
knowledge except [the knowledge of] Jesus Christ the Son of 
God, who was crucified for us, than that by subtle questions and 
hair-splitting expressions he should fall into impiety. (Against 
Heresies, II, 26, 1)  86
The individualistic and rationalistic activity that philosophers like Swinburne, 
Hick, and Plantinga are involved in has nothing to do with the holiness-
persuasion writings that formed the tradition of the church.  Furthermore, Surin 
 Kenneth Surin, Theology and the Problem of Evil (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986).83
 Surin, Theology and the Problem of Evil, 10-11.84
 Surin, Theology and the Problem of Evil, 11.85
 Surin, Theology and the Problem of Evil, 18-19.86
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argues, the spiritual formation which consists of the practical defeat and 
overcoming of evil––which was the goal of the Patristic writings––is, in essence, 
a trans-individualist task.  Holiness is a communal quest, and a theodicy with 
the goal of holiness cannot survive within the narrow confines of a solitary 
rationalistic thinker.   Surin even goes so far as to say that the state of 87
philosophical theodicy post-Leibniz “must be reckoned to constitute a grave and 
even insurmountable obstacle” to a theodicy of conversion and holiness.  88
 Surin’s approach can be used not only to critique the ahistorical elements 
of philosophical thought, but also philosophy’s tendency to reduce the 
complexities of the world into thought-experiments that are vastly improbable.   89
Once reduced, philosophers set out criteria to be met that have nothing 
whatsoever to do with either the real world or even theological abstraction, and 
end up in grave troubles of severe anthropocentrism, a myopic view of earth 
history, and an entrenched utilitarian approach to creation that has no relation to 
the God of love.   
 Let us take the article “Open Theism: does God risk or hope?” by James 
Rissler as a case-study.   It is a fairly standard discussion of the questions of 90
providence, evil, and free will explored in relation to an open theist theology.  
Rissler rightly begins by pointing out that the essential logic of open theism is 
 Surin, Theology and the Problem of Evil, 20-24.87
 Surin, Theology and the Problem of Evil, 23.88
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based on love; that freedom in the world is not an end in itself but a means and 
necessary grounding point for love.  So far so good.  Then comes: 
Let us make the simplifying assumptions that God’s sole purpose in 
creating was that we would freely enter into loving relationships with Him, 
and that the proportion of free creatures who enter into loving 
relationships with their Creator relative to those who do not is an 
appropriate measure of the degree to which God’s purpose is achieved.  
I will call this the proportionality measure.  Let us also arbitrarily assume 
that God’s purpose for creation will be achieved if a simple majority of 
persons freely choose to love Him.  91
And with that shift, with these self-admittedly arbitrary assumptions, we are 
quite suddenly in a world quite alien to the God of the Scriptures, or at least, of 
Jesus of Nazareth.  Jesus spoke of God being like the shepherd who leaves the 
ninety-nine sheep behind to chase after the lost one, or of disciples being like 
the treasure-hunter who joyfully sells all he possesses for the pearl of great 
price; of abandoned and scandalous risk-taking.  One cannot imagine the father 
of the prodigal son considering his purposes in fatherhood fulfilled if a simple 
majority of his sons chose to love him.  What of the divine care for the two 
sparrows, sold for a penny?  Or the lilies of the field that God attires more 
splendidly than the great kings of old?  Even if Rissler chose the number 99% 
instead of 50%, it still pictures God in entirely the wrong frame: as a calculating 
God trying to figure out if the bet of creation is worthwhile.  Rissler’s appraisal is 
not faithful to the open theist conception of God, and it starts going wrong when 
creation is only considered worthwhile if it meets certain outcomes in light of the 
risk of love.  
 Keep listening to Rissler, and one hears further snippets of the 
conversation: “Even if the long-term probability of any particular action having 
an overall beneficial or deleterious effect on His goal is very close to 0.5, the 
probability of particular actions having a positive impact in the short term might 
 Rissler, “Does God risk or hope?” 64.91
!54
well be significantly higher...”  or “Eventually, as the end of time approaches, 92
God will be able to increase the odds of the final proportionality measure being 
favourable...”   The reader is left wondering what this discussion could possibly 93
have to do with the God of the Bible who constantly argued, bargained with, 
begged, rebuked, raged at, forgave, and redeemed his people.  The colour and 
dimensions––the very life––of the rich God-world relationship are sucked away 
by the constraining confines of the philosophical laboratory.  The laboratory 
becomes a mortuary.  The irony, of course, becomes even more acute when (as 
with Rissler) the philosophers dissect and calculate at great length to try and 
show the reasonableness of the scandal of a God who undertakes the always-
precarious project of love!  This type of philosophical enquiry misses the point 
entirely. 
   
‘Wandering in Darkness’  94
 There are, however, philosophers who do enter the mysteries, who are at 
home amongst the paradoxes of the complexity of life, and who do not try to fit 
suffering into small logical boxes.  One of these is Eleonore Stump, whose 
magisterial work Wandering in Darkness explores a Thomistic theodicy through 
the frame of four biblical narratives.  Although her work only refers to normally 
functioning human adults, she establishes several important perspectives that 
help her to bridge the usual gap between philosophical and theological 
positions. 
 First, she insists on using narratives as the basis for her philosophical 
reasoning.  She does this for two reasons: First, narratives include 
 Rissler, “Does God risk or hope?” 66.92
 Rissler, “Does God risk or hope?” 66.93
 I borrow this subtitle from Eleonore Stump’s Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the 94
Problem of Suffering (Oxford: Clarendon, 2010).
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uncomfortable complexities and nuances which force the philosopher to engage 
with the three-dimensional full-colour complexities of the world.  Second, the 
narratives include knowledge and situations which cannot be reduced to the 
sorts of simple propositions or just-so stories that analytical philosophers prefer. 
 A second merit of Stump’s work is that it is wholehearted.  If a proposition 
is soundly logical, meeting all the formal requirements of philosophy, but has the 
added effect of making the common person cringe at the cold ruthlessness of it, 
she rejects it.  The use of the Holocaust is a good example.  Where many will 
bandy about arguments with reference to the Holocaust, Stump writes: 
Although it is vitally important for us to remember the Holocaust and to 
reflect deeply on it, taking it simply as one more example or 
counterexample in academic disputation on the problem of evil strikes 
me as unspeakably awful.  It is enough for me that I am a member of the 
species that propagated this evil.  Stricken awe in the face of it seems to 
me to be the only response bearable.  95
The refusal to treat human suffering as simply an interesting datum set for 
philosophical argument is one of the valuable aspects of Stump’s work, and 
draws her work closer to the pastoral and practical concerns of theology.   
 There are two aspects of Stump’s work that will be important for the 
argument I will later develop.  The first is her exploration of Aquinas’ definition of 
love.   The second is Stump’s view of the world’s stories composing fractal 96
patterns of nested narratives, in such a way that each individual is the centre of 
their own story, but is also a contributor to the stories around them.   Both of 97
these will help me formulate a view of God’s work of redemption, based on love 
and focussed on the individual, but allowing for a broader perspective as well. 
 Stump, Wandering in Darkness, 16.95
 Stump, Wandering in Darkness, 85-107.  See chapter 4, p. 153.96
 Stump, Wandering in Darkness, 219-222.  See chapter 6, p. 286-295.97
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 The limitations of Stump’s work are fairly obvious: it is “limited to the 
suffering of unwilling, innocent, mentally fully functional adult human beings.”   98
There is no case made for non-human animals, and the major centre of her 
argument––that suffering opens unique possibilities for a person to achieve his 
or her highest purpose of union with God––is not directly translatable to the 
wider natural world.  Still, her work provides valuable foundational contributions 
which can be extended to the natural world, as will be explored in chapter 4 and 
6.   While Stump’s philosophical approach is a great deal closer to the type of 99
project I am working on than the earlier analytical philosophers, it is still entirely 
philosophical.  My project will include philosophy, but also draw from biblical 
studies and systematic theology.  However, her wholehearted and narratival 
approach will shape my own approach when I draw on philosophical resources.   
 In conclusion, philosophical approaches have a great deal to offer to a 
theodicy.  In particular, the property-consequence and developmental GHA’s 
help support the “only way” argument.  The world needs various types of 
regularities for free creaturely interaction, for the development of skills, and for 
the possibility of creaturely selving.  An evolutionary process may be the only 
sort of process that brings about complex life while maintaining the value of 
creaturely freedom.   Another advantage of some philosophical approaches––100
van Inwagen, for example––is that they show clearly how different types of 
argument could be combined into compound arguments that are stronger than 
their individual components.  Much more, however, is needed if we are to create 
a thick defence; a narrative that holds God and suffering together.  Now we turn 
 Stump, Wandering in Darkness, 378.98
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to explore the available theological approaches to see what resources they 
offer. 
Theological Positions 
 There are various theological positions that seek to account for 
evolutionary suffering.  Some of them would fit well in the organisational grid of 
good-harm analyses used for the philosophical viewpoints above, but several of 
them cannot be easily reduced to those categories of balancing goods and 
harms.  I will proceed, therefore, with a different organisational approach.  I will 
first explore the strategies that seek to dismiss the problem as either non-
existent or intractable.  Then I will explore the theodicies that seek to redefine 
God in such a way that the problem no longer exists.  Third, I will outline the 
strategies that seek to get God “off the hook” by denying, in one fashion or 
another, that the world really is God’s creation.  Finally, I will look at the 
remaining theodicies which argue for various values and constitutive elements 
arising from evolutionary harms and explore them through the grid of different 
creational standpoints.  101
 It should be remembered as I proceed that the process of defining these 
arguments requires an element of reduction.  Many of the arguments stand 
alongside others, and they are not usually proposed alone, as if one argument 
should be expected to hold the full weight of explanation for natural evil. 
Dismissal of the Problem 
 There are some thinkers who, when confronted with the horrors of 
nature, simply shrug their shoulders, and fail to see the problem.  Kenneth 
 For another survey of the theological positions, including many of those outlined below, see 101
Southgate, The Groaning of Creation, 3-39.
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Miller, for example, raises the question of natural evil only to conclude “the 
brutality of life is in the eye of the beholder.”   There is no ontological problem 102
to be solved, only a perspective to be changed.  Viewed from the right 
perspective nature’s most horrific products––from cordyceps and 
ichneumonidae to necrotizing bacteria––are all beautiful creatures, splendid in 
adaptation and complex in developmental strategies.  The wilful destruction of 
one creature by another is simply the way it works.  Nor are non-human animals 
responsible or culpable for their actions.  As amoral agents, to ascribe evil to 
their actions is, as Holmes Rolston points out, a “category mistake.”   103
Therefore, there is no problem of natural evil to be solved, only a certain 
distaste to be overcome. 
 I agree that non-human creatures are either amoral or pre-moral, and 
that natural processes do not reflect rational moral choice, and therefore are not 
“evil” in the same sense as a murder or war would be.  Still, this does not in 
itself excuse the question of why a good and all-loving God would create a 
world in which harms occur, nor why God would allow suffering and death to be 
intrinsic to the process of development.  Even if creatures are amoral, God 
should still be expected to act in moral ways in respect of them.  The vast 
disjunction between the Gospel message that the “meek shall inherit the earth” 
and the wild’s “law of club and fang”  raises many theological questions which 104
  Kenneth Miller, Finding Darwin’s God: A Scientist’s Search for Common Ground Between 102
God and Evolution (New York: HarperCollins, 1999), 246. 
 Holmes Rolston III, “Naturalizing and Systematizing Evil,” in Is Nature Ever Evil?  Religion, 103
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cannot be answered by a simple redefinition of evil.   Ted Peters and Martinez 105
Hewlett write “the tendency among theistic evolutionists to collapse the theodicy 
problem into natural process––to see violence, suffering, and death as merely 
natural and hence value-neutral––represents a failure of theological nerve.  It is 
a sellout to naturalism and a loss to theism.”    106
 Miller and Rolston do, however, raise an important question that makes 
an important distinction: are natural evils really evil or are they simply 
disvalues?  One of the major dividing lines in the current debate over non-
human animal suffering is over the question whether what has been termed 
“natural evil” is in fact evil in the sense of being contrary to the will of God, or 
even the result of a force opposing God, or whether it simply represents 
disvalues in an ambiguous world that is––nevertheless––God’s good creation.  
Christopher Southgate calls this a “key fault-line in theology’s response to 
Darwinism.”   Southgate, along with Arthur Peacocke, Daryl Domning and 107
Monika Hellwig take the latter view that these harms are non-moral disvalues.   108
The distinction between these theologians and Miller above is that they still find 
the suffering of innocent animals to be theologically problematic, and so can 
speak of the “problem of evil” without considering the violence or death inherent 
in the evolutionary process to be itself evil.  I align myself firmly in this camp that 
does not see predation or natural disasters as evil or as signs of a deeper evil at 
work in the world.  It is, it seems, the only consistent way to view the natural 
 The term “natural evil” is sometimes discarded in favour of “harms” or “disvalues” because of 105
its innate moral connotations.
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world.  Those who see the pre-human world as corrupted in some way are often 
unable to coherently describe the origin of this evil, or where in the non-human 
world we see this evil manifested.  Is predation evil?  Or death?  Or entropy?  If 
these things are evil, what is left that is good?  And how can we defend anything 
as good when they are permeated, and often caused, by the so-called-evil?  
Without a clear answer, some simply assert a “mystery response.” 
Mystery Response 
 Celia Deane-Drummond, who views the world as penetrated by a 
mysterious evil, dismisses the problem of evil by naming natural evil as 
creation’s “shadow sophia” and placing the debate in the dark realms of 
mystery.  Arising out of Bulgakov’s Orthodox tradition, the notion of sophia 
(wisdom) and shadow sophia (anti-wisdom) stand as the cosmic goods and 
evils.  Deane-Drummond follows an Augustinian definition of evil as privatio 
boni, the deprivation of good, and therefore shadow sophia is present as a 
possibility simply because true sophia exists in a world where it can be lost or 
resisted.   The shadow sophia is the chaos and non-being of creation, the 109
source of death and opposition to God.  Deane-Drummond writes that one of 
the advantages of the shadow sophia position is that “it resists too ready an 
explanation as to why [shadow sophia] exists.”  In other words, we are not told 
why it is “inevitable that shadow sophia surfaces in creation in the way that is 
envisaged, human wisdom is confronted by its own limitations.”   Deane-110
Drummond denies that this is “an easy escape into the idea of evil as mystery” 
and she insists that “the depth of evil and suffering in the world are ultimately 
 Celia Deane-Drummond, “Shadow Sophia in Christological Perspective: The Evolution of Sin 109
and the Redemption of Nature,” Theology and Science 6:1 (2008), 22.
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beyond human understanding.”   If one accepts her caveat that it is not an 111
“easy escape” into the concept of mystery, her conclusion still lands the 
theologian in a place where no more can be said because reasoning has 
reached its limits.  To some extent this is a necessary admission,  but we 112
cannot move to her conclusion of shadow-sophia too quickly because it lacks 
important nuance.   When it comes to some of the developmental arguments, to 
draw a conclusion of mystery too quickly ends up overlooking very simple and 
persuasive arguments to the contrary.  A good example would be the arguments 
about the necessity of pain for a flourishing life outlined above by Paul Brand 
and Philip Yancey.  They show that pain is a protective element which keeps 
creatures from harm.  If, instead, we concluded with Deane-Drummond that 
pain is the absence of a good, or that it is simply beyond human wisdom, we 
would miss the constructive elements of pain.  In the end, evolutionary harms 
as shadow sophia may be the last step a theologian must take, but there are 
many paths to explore before we get there.  Jumping to the end immediately 
sets the problem too quickly into the realm of intractable mystery, and misses 
accounting for the complex goods emerging out of complex harms. 
 As opposed to these two positions of Miller and Deane-Drummond, I 
maintain that evolutionary suffering is a theological problem about the nature of 
the God who would set up such an apparently brutal system, and that the 
problem is not immediately plunged into mystery.  Rather, the natural sciences 
themselves along with various types of theological reflection can help us gain a 
better understanding of many varieties of natural disvalues. 
 Deane-Drummond, “Shadow Sophia,” 23.111
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Radically Redefining God 
 The second set of theological strategies seek to radically redefine God in 
such a way that the problem of evil disappears.  I call these “radical” 
redefinitions of God because, unlike later strategies we will see, these 
approaches have no issue with totally divesting God of attributes that have long 
been considered central to the divine character and make no effort to retain the 
values that were held by those attributes.  The three strategies are to divest 
God of love, of power, and finally of activity. 
 The first strategy is to totally divest God of love.  Wesley J. Wildman 
forcefully advances this thesis as the logical outcome of observation of the 
natural world and the exhaustion of other theological or philosophical options.  
For Wildman, a loving God who created a world with as much suffering as we 
now see, and who has not yet relieved it, would be guilty of gross neglect or 
incompetence.  Instead of levelling such an accusation Wildman would rather 
see God as the source of all being––the ground of all existence––but not as 
particularly concerned about what form that existence takes.  When Dawkins 
describes the universe as a place of blind, pitiless indifference, Wildman agrees 
and simply states: “God is not in the caring business.”   This does not pose a 113
difficulty for God’s existence––but it does pose a challenge for God’s alignment 
with any particular moral path.  Wildman does not descend into utter nihilism 
though, because he also thinks that goodness and purpose can be found if 
humans look for it.  “The divine particularity” he writes, “is expressed in the 
structured possibilities and interconnections of worldly existence; wanting and 
 Wesley J. Wildman, “Incongruous Goodness, Perilous Beauty, Disconcerting Truth: Ultimate 113
Reality and Suffering in Nature,” in Physics and Cosmology: Scientific Perspectives on the 
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choosing is the human role.”   God meets the righteous in hope and the 114
unrighteous in purposelessness and despair. 
 As interesting as ground-of-being theism is, it cannot be a help to people 
who wish to maintain anything of the character or nature of traditional Christian 
theism.  Wildman’s challenge of divine neglect is an important one, but his 
solution is inadmissible to those who wish to hold any form of Christian faith, 
because God’s love for creatures is intrinsic to that faith (see for example Psalm 
100:5, 119:64, 136:1-26, 145:8; Isaiah 54:10; John 3:16; Romans 5:8, 8:35-39; 
Ephesians 2:4-5, 1 John 4:7-8, etc.). 
 The second option for radical divine re-definition is process theism, which 
divests God of power.  In process thought, God cannot direct any events, nor 
can God unilaterally alter the world or its inhabitants in any way.  The only 
activity available to God is to lure the agents of events by divine love into a 
preferred pathway.  In addition, God is understood as evolving with the world, 
growing in understanding of the world as well as self-understanding throughout 
the ages.  God does not have foreknowledge of any kind,  but simply 115
observes the world and has perfect knowledge of things present and all things 
past. 
 In one sense, process theism offers an elegant solution to the problem of 
evil.  God, having given creation freedom to be,  is powerless to take it along 116
any other track than that which it chooses.  Process theists such as David 
Griffin will extend this freedom not only to living creatures, but even to the 
 Wildman, “Incongruous Goodness,” 282.114
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simplest elements of matter such as quarks and electrons.   Creation is free to 117
explore various possibilities of being, including many that are against the divine 
will and end in harm, and God is powerless to stop those harms from occurring.  
Griffin frankly states “My solution dissolves the problem of evil by denying the 
doctrine of omnipotence fundamental to it.”   Kenneth Surin challenges 118
Griffin’s solution by pointing out that if we take the process description of God 
seriously it fails to actually provide a theodicy at all, since it “cannot legitimately 
claim to have reconciled the proposition ‘There is a God who is omnipotent, 
omniscient and benevolent’ with the proposition ‘Evil exists’.”   Process theism 119
“solves” the problem by redefining God in such a way that the problem does not 
arise in the first place. 
 Still, if we are to engage a process theodicy, it bears pointing out that a 
God who is essentially unable to bring about events or direct history in any 
effective way will not be able to bring about the eschatological re-creation of the 
world either.  There is no guarantee left that good will triumph over evil, for the 
divine lure towards the good has (evidently) already failed many times.  Process 
thinkers are often, troublingly, willing to concede this.  But sacrificing the 
substance of hope for redemption ends up with a greater problem of evil, not a 
lesser one, since there is no clear end to evil.  Evil simply exists, parasitic upon 
the good around it, threatening like a black hole to wipe out purpose and 
meaning, and even God is powerless before it.   
 David R. Griffin, “Creation Out of Chaos and the Problem of Evil,” in Encountering Evil: Live 117
Options in Theodicy, ed. Stephen T. Davis (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1981), 105.  All “actual 
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 Furthermore, as Surin notes, the process approach does little to give 
comfort or courage to the person who suffers.  If we accept that God co-suffers 
with each creature, a key process approach, it gives little hope even to those 
creatures who can understand what divine co-suffering might mean.   “To the 120
person in urgent need of succour, it would conceivably be just as efficacious to 
look to unicorns and centaurs for salvation.”   Instead, the Christian theodicist 121
looks to the cross, to the defeat of evil, and the incoming Kingdom.  “What the 
process theist lacks” writes Surin, “is an eschatology, a resurrection-
perspective, in which the almighty God on the cross of the powerless Nazarene 
is affirmed in faith to have inaugurated a radically new world by this very deed 
on the cross.”   Without an eschatology of hope, no valid theodicy can exist. 122
 The third strategy is to divest God of activity.  If God is all-powerful and 
all-loving, but cannot use that power in the world in any way, God ends up with 
tied hands when it comes to rescuing creatures from harm.  Philip Clayton and 
Steven Knapp claim that if God were to rescue a suffering subject from 
unnecessary harm even once, then God would be morally obliged to do so 
every time.  For God to submit to that moral requirement and rescue creatures 
every time would undermine the ‘nomic regularity’ (Murray’s phrase) that is so 
important to the development of life.  If God turned bullets into flowers when 
they were fired on living targets, or if God transformed stretches of road into 
feather duvets when people stumbled, the world would soon turn into a place 
where no real learning could take place, and thus rational and autonomous 
 Kenneth Surin writes “The merely suffering God might perhaps provide a half-consolation for 120
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beings could not develop.   Clayton and Knapp articulate the “Not-even-once” 123
principle: that even one physical intervention would undermine either God’s 
morality or physical regularity.  Clayton and Knapp allow for God influencing 
thoughts, even on a subconscious level (and thus, presumably with non-human 
animals as well), as long as the creature is not compelled to take action in 
response.   While Clayton and Knapp hold that God might possess the 124
traditional attribute of omnipotence, hope for the future is sacrificed since the 
recreation of the world would certainly require more than mental enticement.  
Also, it raises the question whether the Incarnation would count as a violation of 
the “not-even-once” principle, and what implications that might have if it is.  A 
longer discussion of divine action and the “not-even-once” principle will take 
place in chapter 4.  125
 In the end none of the radical re-definitions of God satisfy.  Either they do 
not even remotely resemble the Christ-like God portrayed in the Bible, or they 
so deeply undermine the basic attributes of God that they sacrifice the future 
hope of redemption as well.  God, in these definitions, may be able to evade 
accusation of the problem of evil, but the emaciated God left over is not the kind 
of God who can be trusted to “make all things well.”  Let us keep looking. 
Fall Scenarios, Satanic and Otherwise 
 A surprisingly popular contemporary option for those who wish to account 
for nature’s brutality comes from a long theological tradition of the fall.  There 
 Philip Clayton and Steven Knapp, The Predicament of Belief: Science, Philosophy, Faith 123
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 47-48.  See also Philip Clayton and Steven Knapp, 
“Divine Action and the ‘Argument from Neglect’,” in Physics and Cosmology: Scientific 
Perspectives on the Problem of Natural Evil, eds. Nancey Murphy, Robert J. Russell, William R. 
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are two basic categories: event-based fall theories, which blame natural evil on 
sinful action, whether that be satanic or human, and mysterious fallenness 
theories, where the origin and even the content of evil is unknown or shrouded 
in mystery. 
 Of event-based fall theories, the most important is the theory that blames 
natural evil on the angelic fall and the consequent corruption of the world.  The 
fall of Satan and the angels as responsible for the human fall, and evil therefore 
present in God’s good creation before a human fall, was a notion developed by 
Augustine and was standard belief in western Christianity until the 
Reformation.   Since Darwin, several thinkers have picked it up as a possible 126
solution to pre-human natural evil, including C. S. Lewis, Wolfhart Pannenberg, 
Michael Lloyd, Stephen Webb, and Gregory Boyd.  127
 The issues with this position are manifold.  First, there is no biblical 
evidence for a satanic fall corrupting the world.  Despite Augustine’s exegesis, 
no modern biblical scholar takes this route because a fall, particularly a satanic 
fall, is simply not present in the Genesis narrative.   Second, despite its 128
presence in the tradition, the ancient thinkers who developed this position did 
not know that many of these processes and harms actually give rise to great 
value.  Would we then be forced to honour the fallen angels for the fleet-
footedness of the deer or the co-ordination and strength of the orca?  Satan 
 For Augustine’s account of fallen angels, see The City of God, books 10 and 11, and 126
throughout The Literal Interpretation of Genesis.
 C. S. Lewis, The Problem of Pain (New York: HarperCollins, 1940, 1996), 138;  Wolfhart 127
Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromily (Göttingen: Vanderhoeck & 
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would end up being the (possibly unintentional) originator of the diversity 
generated by cellular mutation and all the speciation events arising from 
predation or natural disasters.   Finally, this position contradicts the continual 129
biblical refrain that God created the world good.  The goodness of creation is 
affirmed throughout the process of creation, and at the end of the first account 
of creation when all the creatures are present.   Therefore, there is no 130
possibility that God created the universe, and then between that event and the 
development of animals and humans, the cosmos was corrupted.  In its totality, 
even in its more troublesome elements, the natural world in all its complexity 
brings honour and glory to God.  131
 A related event-based strategy to the satanic fall is that of blaming 
disvalues in the non-human world on the effects of human sin. Very few thinkers 
still adopt this move, given the chronological difficulties posed by proposing that 
human sin could affect processes in place millions of years before there were 
humans.  But a version of this argument is still advanced by William Dembski.   132
Instead of blaming Satan for the corruption of the evolutionary world, he wraps 
the blame back around on human sin by saying the effects of the fall were 
retroactively applied at the beginning of time on the created world.  Just as––it 
is sometimes said––the saints before Jesus’ time were saved through Jesus’ 
saving work on the cross in light of God’s foreknowledge of that saving work, so 
 Cf. Southgate “Whatever processes science is able to understand as contributing to the 129
evolution of complexity... must be presumed to be the gift of God in creation... The tectonic 
movement that caused the Indian Ocean tsunami is an example of those processes that have 
made the Earth the lovely place that it is, and should not be regarded as in any way demonic.”  
Groaning of Creation, 34.
 Genesis 1:31.130
 See Psalm 104, Job 38-41.  See also the whole of chapter 3.131
 William Dembski, The End of Christianity: Finding a Good God in an Evil World (Nashville, 132
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too the effects of sin were applied to the world in God’s foreknowledge of 
mankind’s fall. 
 Not only is Dembski’s theory biblically inadmissible––as will be 
demonstrated in chapter 3––but he also utterly fails to convince the reader that 
God is in fact good.  The God who would inflict untold suffering on billions of 
non-human animals over millions of years without any good emerging out of it 
for the creatures themselves (and only a very indirect benefit for humans ) is 133
morally repulsive.  The same is true of Dembski’s thoroughgoing 
anthropocentric focus.  Southgate points out “Dembski’s theodicy is marked by 
an anthropocentrism that is breathtaking to anyone who has followed 
contemporary debates in ecotheology.  His only concern is with humans and 
human sin.”   God allows the pointless suffering of billions of individuals just to 134
make a point.  This will not constitute an adequate theodicy. 
 David Clough makes a unique contribution to event-based fall theories by 
arguing that some particular disvalues, such as predator/prey relationships, are 
actually forms of sinful rebellion amongst non-human animals.   Clough 135
amasses evidence that in the Hebrew Bible and in law courts almost up to the 
present day, non-human animals were regularly treated as responsible and 
therefore subject to the same consequences humans would receive for sinful 
action: stoning for violence toward, or sexual relations with, people (Lev 15-16), 
not fasting during times of repentance (Jonah 3), or death for touching Mt. Sinai 
during a theophany (Exodus 19).   Interestingly, Clough does not assume that 136
 Dembski argues that the benefit granted to humans is that the corruption of the world 133
teaches them of their own need for salvation.
 Christopher Southgate, “Review of The End of Christianity by William A. Dembski,” Reviews 134
in Science and Religion 60 (November 2012), 43.
 Clough, On Animals, 119-127.135
 Clough, On Animals, 109-112.136
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an understanding of God’s moral requirement is necessary for sin.   His 137
primary scientific case study concerns a family of cannibalistic chimpanzees.  
Are their actions right or wrong, sinful or morally neutral, when they slaughter 
and eat each other’s young?  Clough argues convincingly that: 
We might judge the ability of chimpanzees to make considered choices 
about their actions to be closer to a human child than to a human adult, 
but we do not believe that children go from automata to responsible 
subjects at a particular age and so this judgment of degree is not a 
reason for considering chimpanzees outside the boundary of sinful 
action.   138
However, it is a red herring to use a case study of the most intelligent non-
human animal to argue that sin might manifest itself as violence beyond the 
boundaries of humanity.  Clough’s main argument is that the existence of 
violence in general is a result of non-human action against the will of God.  
While there may indeed be proto-moral violence amongst the highest of sentient 
non-human animals, it would be impossible to attribute any sort of moral 
rebellion amongst the creatures extant when predation first occurred, estimated 
to be in the early Cambrian period.   And while there is a biblical tradition of 139
punishing non-human animals for their actions, such as stoning an ox for goring 
a human, this applies only to the most intelligent orders of life.  There is no such 
provision in the law codes for locusts, for example.  Nor does Clough’s 
argument mention the places where God seems only too happy to provide a 
violent creation with the sustenance it needs (Psalm 104:21-27; Job 39:30).  
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Clough draws primarily from sources 
(such as the biblical story of the Garden and medieval law cases) that had no 
 Clough, On Animals, 116-117.137
 Clough, On Animals, 118.138
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understanding of evolution.  In reference to biblical texts, Clough argues that 
“the most obvious reading of these texts concerning the [sic] God’s will for 
peace and harmony between creatures is that relationships of predation where 
the life of one creature is sustained only at the expense of the lives of others are 
not original or final indications of God’s creative and redemptive will.”   140
Biblically, Clough’s argument may seem sound, but it cannot be held together 
with evolution, a point Clough himself acknowledges.    141
 Clough eventually argues that the clearest evidence that creatures have 
turned from God and are mired in sin is that according to Colossians 1:20 Jesus 
came to reconcile “all things.”   In chapter 6, I will make an attempt to build a 142
picture of non-human creaturely reconciliation that does not involve sin, but for 
now, let it suffice to say that in Colossians 1:20 the “all things” referred to is 
defined as all things “whether on earth or in heaven.”  If the line of Clough’s 
logic is that because all things on earth need to be reconciled to God, all things 
on earth are mired in sin, would he say the same about all heavenly things?  Is 
there sin in heaven?  If not, then we must assume that there is some way to be 
reconciled to God through Christ that does not involve sin.  143
 The second category of fallenness is mysterious fallenness.  These 
theories do not clearly state either the origin or effect of evil in the world.  Nicola 
Hoggard Creegan, for example, does not identify natural evil with biological 
selfishness,  but thinks it might have something to do with the second law of 144
 Clough, On Animals, 121.140
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thermodynamics,  and perhaps with predation.   Elsewhere, in complete 145 146
contradiction, she says that evil is not necessarily to be identified with “the 
earthquake and the tsunami and the eating of one animal by the other and 
natural disasters.”   There is no clear way to distinguish the good from the evil 147
in her work, nothing she can point to (apart from moral evil) and say “this is 
evil.”  Instead, her work is punctuated with vague fideist statements such as “I 
believe there is something opposed to God”  or “I am convinced of the reality 148
of this [evil] something and its subtle interplay with life at all levels,”  though 149
not being able to point to any concrete evidence, while also freely mixing natural 
and moral categories of evil.   The result is a theological muddle in which 150
anything aesthetically unappealing becomes “evil” and where the very basis of 
her argument––drawing on the parable of the wheat and tares––is actually 
overlooked.   In her argument, the parable of the wheat and tares (Matthew 151
13) is compared to the way that good and evil are mixed in the natural world.  
However, in the parable, it is not the identification of tares that is the problem 
(the wheat having already borne grain),  but the impossibility of uprooting one 152
without the other as the result of their intertwining roots.   Hoggard Creegan’s 153
 Hoggard Creegan, Animal Suffering, 77.145
 Hoggard Creegan, Animal Suffering, 77.146
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Hoggard Creegan, Animal Suffering, 76.
 The muddle in Hoggard Creegan’s categorisation is perhaps most clearly seen in her 151
identification of the second law of thermodynamics as an element of evil.  Without it, there 
would be no light dispersion, no heat dispersion... in short, there would be no chance for life and 
no history of creation at all.
 No gardener could doubt this.152
 See Matthew 13:24-30.153
!73
arguments, however, do not even allow for a helpful identification of good and 
evil.  Furthermore, the origin of the tares is clearly stated as “an enemy” in the 
parable, a concept that Hoggard Creegan sometimes accepts and sometimes 
challenges.   Also, as we will see in chapter 3, there is little scriptural support 154
for the idea that nature has been corrupted from an outside force, or that the 
earth ever was or is (apart from a brief period in the primordial history 
narratives, recounted in Genesis 3-8) corrupted by evil independently of direct 
human action. 
 Where Hoggard Creegan views evil as having real ontological substance, 
others such as Deane-Drummond and Neil Messer argue that the world is 
pervaded by a mysterious evil which is anti-being.  Deane-Drummond, as seen 
above, argues that evil is the shadow of creation, the necessary counterpart to 
light.  Neil Messer argues that the created world is constantly in conflict with 
“nothingness”––a concept borrowed from Barth.  The nothingness (das 
Nichtige) “is what God rejected, and did not will, in creating everything that 
exists.”   To do this, Messer draws from two of Barth’s concepts: that of 155
‘nothingness’ which threatens the creation, and Barth’s view of history beginning 
with the fall, and therefore placing the ‘golden age’ of goodness beyond any 
history we can investigate.  Critiques of Messer, raised by Southgate, include 
whether he really is as faithful to Barths ideas as he claims, and whether or not 
God can really be the sovereign Creator if God was unable to expunge this 
nothingness which is contrary to God’s will.   I am inclined to agree with 156
Southgate’s critiques, but would also point out the difficulty of advocating that 
 Hoggard Creegan, Animal Suffering, 77, 133, 148-149.154
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the world which God claims is “very good” in Genesis 1:31, was in fact deeply 
corrupted before the process of development ever began. 
 Issues concerning a fall of the natural world will be explored at greater 
length in chapter 3 since it is such a pervasive theme in theodicy literature.  But 
there are plenty of other strategies that do not rely on either a radical 
redefinition of God’s activity or essence and that do not invoke a fall scenario 
either.  Let us explore some of these other paths. 
Redefining God’s Attributes and Actions 
 Rather than completely redefining God in the radical ways described 
above there are attempts to redefine divine attributes, or limit God’s actions, in 
more moderate and subtle ways.  These strategies do not deny God’s 
omnipotence, omnibenevolence, or omniscience, but they do redefine these 
traits in ways that are more amenable to the problem of evil.  A primary example 
of this sort of approach is exemplified by kenotic theology. 
 Kenotic approaches generally do not deny God’s power, knowledge, or 
ability to act in the world.  Rather, they argue that, by merit of God’s love, or 
God’s interest in creaturely freedom, God voluntarily self-limits the expression of 
these attributes.  157
 The idea of kenosis is drawn from the first part of the great Christ hymn 
in Philippians 2:5-7 
Let the same mind be in you that was in Christ Jesus, 
who, though he was in the form of God, 
    did not regard equality with God 
    as something to be exploited, 
 but emptied himself [ἐκένωσεν], 
 A longer discussion of kenosis in relation to divine action will take place in chapter 4, p. 157
171-204. 
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    taking the form of a slave, 
    being born in human likeness.  158
The Christ who emptied himself in the Incarnation stands as the central 
revelation of divine being.  If Christ emptied himself, then self-emptying must be 
a part of God’s nature, and as such would characterise God’s actions in spheres 
other than the Incarnation.  John Polkinghorne sets out four different types of 
kenosis in his contribution to The Work of Love: Creation as Kenosis.   The 159
four types are kenosis of omnipotence, kenosis of simple eternity, kenosis of 
omniscience, and kenosis of causal status.     160
 By the kenosis of omnipotence, God allows creation to be something 
truly other than God.  Creation is free to be itself, and to have independence 
from divine determination.  Therefore, states of affairs may arise in the world 
which are not according to the divine will, leading to the emergence of various 
types of evil.  God is totally free and powerful in that God has no external 
impositions that limit the expression of power (unlike process theology), but God 
can and does self-limit the active expression of power in order not to overwhelm 
or coerce the creaturely other, and to allow it space to be itself.  161
 Kenosis of simple eternity is God’s giving up of simple existence outside 
of time.  Polkinghorne points out that “since Augustine, theologians have 
understood the created nature of time, so that the universe came in to being 
cum tempore, not in tempore.”   God chooses to know the world in the 162
temporal terms that it is limited to: the successive slip of moments from future to 
present to past.  Kenosis of simple eternity allows God to learn from and 
 Philippians 2:5-7, NRSV.158
 John Polkinghorne, “Kenotic Creation and Divine Action,” in The Work of Love: Creation as 159
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respond to the world since God experiences time in similar successive ways as 
we do. 
 If God has given up knowledge of the simple future, the definition of what 
is included in God’s omniscience changes.  Instead of having all knowledge, 
held from one eternal vantage point, the future is not something which is 
conceived as possible to be logically known.  If omniscience is knowing 
everything that can logically be known, the future is not included.  In kenotic 
thought, God has full knowledge of the past and present, and so has the best 
possible vantage point for knowing what is likely to happen in the future, without 
knowing exact details of what will unfold. 
 Finally, Polkinghorne suggests the kenosis of causal status, which he 
defines as the belief that “the Creator’s kenotic love includes allowing divine 
special providence to act as a cause among causes.”   As a cause amongst 163
causes, God is not the ground of all causes, but humbly shares power with 
creation and even enters into the creation as an agent, most notably in the 
Incarnation.   Polkinghorne suggests that God may act along side other 164
causes by inputting energy or information, but does not expand on the 
discussion.  165
 Kenotic theology offers a promising family of solutions to the problem of 
evil: that God could not create others in free relationship without their having 
independence.   Once the decision to make a free creation was chosen, the 166
possibility of those creatures acting apart from divine purposes was also 
 Polkinghorne, “Kenotic Creation and Divine Action,” 104.  Italics original.163
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created (this, therefore, is a property-consequence GHA).  The world displays 
harms that are not in themselves according to divine purpose, but which are the 
inescapable result of a world of free beings.  Yet, unlike process theism or 
Clayton and Knapp’s approach, kenotic theology does not say that God’s power 
and expression are limited in identical ways, in all circumstances, or at all times.  
When the purposes for which they are now limited are fulfilled, the expression of 
God’s power can and will be displayed differently.  John Polkinghorne calls this 
the denial of the kenosis of novelty.   Therefore, future hope for eschatological 167
renewal and salvation are not ultimately at risk in the way they are with the 
radical redefinitions of the being of God explored above. 
 Still, for all its strengths, kenosis does not explain why God does not 
intervene in cases of extreme suffering or gratuitous evil.  Voluntary self-
limitation could conceivably be voluntarily self-renounced for these extreme 
situations.  Thomas Oord is particularly strong on this point, arguing: “A God 
who voluntarily chooses to refrain from controlling others remains culpable for 
failing to prevent genuine evils.  A voluntarily self-limited God should at least 
occasionally become un-self-limited, in the name of love, to prevent the 
suffering and pain that victims of genuine evil experience.”   Oord’s solution is 168
to propose “essential kenosis,” which proposes that God’s kenosis is so 
complete that God could not intervene to prevent suffering.  In this aspect, 
Oord’s theology is very close, if not identical, to process theism’s claim that God 
is powerless to prevent evil. 
 Equally, kenotic theology has come under critique for misrepresenting 
the nature of divine relationship to the world.  Ted Peters and Martinez Hewlett 
 Polkinghorne, “Kenotic Creation and Divine Action,” 105.167
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have, in particular, have levelled the critique that a kenotic argument 
“presupposes a conflict between divine power and creature power; whereas the 
classic Christian view, we contend, emphasizes that God’s power empowers 
and thereby liberates God’s creatures.”   Instead of divine power limiting or 169
diminishing creaturely power, God’s power actually creates the freedom to 
make creaturely power possible.   If a kenotic approach gives a loose rein to 170
natural selection (which, in turn, privileges the ruthless and strong), Peters and 
Hewlett ask, “What could a doctrine of the self-limitation of God in favor of 
natural selection mean other than to give theological blessing to the strong to 
dominate, if not destroy, the weak?”   Finally, while kenosis may explain the 171
origin of suffering, it does not––by itself––offer hope to the individual who 
suffers.  There is no redemption or recapitulation in kenotic theology itself.   172
While kenotic theology will form an important part of my approach to theodicy, it 
does not stand alone, as I will develop a strong theology of redemption.  The 
next section will also explore theological options that focus more closely on the 
individual sufferer and the possible benefits brought to them by the evolutionary 
process. 
The Value of Suffering: Bio-Centric Approaches 
 If individual creatures are to suffer because of evolution, what goods do 
they gain themselves through the harms of evolutionary development?  In one 
sense, each new creature born benefits from the long line of those who suffered 
 Peters and Hewlett, Evolution from Creation to New Creation, 143.169
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before them.  Rolston points out, as we saw earlier, that the “cougar’s fang has 
carved the limbs of the fleet-footed deer.”   The pains of the evolutionary 173
process produce glorious beauty, skill, and power on the part of the cougar and 
the deer.  These goods are experienced by many of the creatures in their 
process of selving. 
 Yet something more than mere development is present in the 
evolutionary process: freedom.   If creatures are to be free, then the biological 174
paths toward some of the desired values will be limited.  Robin Attfield, using a 
property-consequence strategy, shows how biological values––such as 
organisms with quick neural capacities and fleet-footedness––could only have 
developed independently in predator-prey relationships.   Attfield admits that 175
in a totally different created order these skills might have been implanted 
directly by divine action, thus diminishing the need for violence, yet he asserts 
that no other non-interventionist system would provide the skills and attributes 
we value.   Other theologians, such as Russell, Murphy, Southgate, 176
Peacocke, Alexander, and Polkinghorne, have advanced similar arguments.   177
By claiming there is no other way in which God could have brought about these 
values, theologians argue that it is reasonable to assume that although every 
possibility of creation was available to God’s divine power––with regard to 
 Rolston, Science and Religion, 134.173
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dimensions, universal constants, attributes of matter, etc.––God still had to 
create the universe within relatively constrained limits (including the possibility 
of suffering) if God desired physical life, and in particular, sentient life.  Arthur 
Peacocke sums up this type of argument when he writes: 
There are inherent constraints on how even an omnipotent Creator could 
bring about the existence of a law-like creation that is to be a cosmos not 
a chaos, and thus an arena for the free action of self-conscious, 
reproducing complex entities and the coming to be of the fecund variety 
of living organisms whose existence the Creator delights in.  178
Robert Russell surveyed the research assessing the possibilities in determining 
the cosmological constants if the universe was to be fine-tuned for life, and 
concluded that “God had little choice.”   John Barrow has also outlined Gerald 179
Whitrow’s investigation of the possibility of life in the universe with different time 
and space dimensions, and concluded that the universe had to be exactly as it 
is to sustain complex life.  Barrow writes “the alternatives are too simple, too 
unstable, or too unpredictable for complex observers to evolve and persist 
within them.  As a result we should not be surprised to find ourselves living in 
three spacious dimensions subject to the ravages of a single time.  There is no 
alternative.”   If there was no alternative for physical, complex beings to a 180
world where physical values are mixed with disvalues, and the possibility of life 
is mixed with the possibility of suffering, then God cannot be blamed for creating 
the world with the physical constants and properties that it has.  Even creation 
ex nihilo is subject to logical constraints. 
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the Universe (London: Random House, 2002), 223-224.
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 If God has indeed created a world that creates itself through evolution, 
then creatures really do have some autonomy in choosing their own methods of 
survival.  This is not to say that the choices are necessarily rational, but the 
choices made are innovative, or self-generated.   The outworking of 181
processes brings forth varied and novel survival strategies, and God has given 
them the freedom to do so.  John Polkinghorne has called this the “free process 
defence.”  He explains: 
In his great act of creation I believe that God allows the physical world to 
be itself, not in Manichaean opposition to him, but in that independence 
which is Love’s gift of freedom to the one beloved.  That world is 
endowed in its fundamental constitution with an anthropic potentiality 
which makes it capable of fruitful evolution.  The exploration and 
realization of that potentiality is achieved by the universe through the 
continual interplay of chance and necessity within its unfolding 
process.  182
“Love’s gift of freedom” is given to the world with a potentiality for fruitfulness 
which the creation explores in an ongoing way.  The gift of freedom is kenotic in 
so far as God surrenders the ability to determine the outcome of all things.  Free 
process is not a freedom which denies God’s essential ability to act, as Oord or 
the process theists argue above, but a “letting-be” that is essential to the nature 
of love.  Peters and Hewlett define the freedom of continuing creation as “the 
abiding divine activity of continuing to provide the world with an open future.”   183
Ruth Page borrows the term Gelassenheit (active “Letting-be”) from Heidegger 
to make the same point.  Gelassenheit... 
 Celia Deane-Drummond might say that they reflect natural wisdom, rather than human 181
wisdom.  Wonder and Wisdom: Conversations in Science, Spirituality and Theology (London: 
Darton, Longman and Todd, 2006), 66-70.  Equally, it is increasingly being shown that attributes 
and skills that have long been considered rational––and therefore uniquely human––such as 
educability, language, tool-use, number games, and self-consciousness, also exist to varying 
degrees in non-human animals.  Clough, On Animals, 72-73.  Cf. Mary Midgley, Beast and Man 
(New York: Routledge, 1978), 265-272.
 Polkinghorne, Science and Providence, 77.182
 Peters and Hewlett, Evolution from Creation to New Creation, 161.183
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...is a valuable way to understand God in creation, for it is more creative 
and supportive than mere permission, but not determining in the way that 
causation is normally understood.  It therefore expresses freedom 
without loss of power on the part of the one releasing, and a consequent 
freedom to experiment and explore for those let be.  184
To let creatures explore their own potentiality of being is not weakness, or 
neglect, but the necessary starting point for the expression of divine love.   185
Equally, creatures could not be given true freedom to develop valuable 
attributes without also being given the freedom to develop harmful attributes. 
 Yet, there is a strong objection: does God’s letting be in instances of 
horrific evil not undermine all the good of God’s Gelassenheit?  When freedom 
turns to violence, and self-expression victimises the innocent, is not a loving 
God allowing the whole show to go too far?  Many have argued that this is the 
case.   But Page and others have responded that the letting-be of creation 186
must also be paired closely with God’s being-with creation.  Mitsein is another 
Heideggerian term which Page adopts to express this “pansyntheism.”   God 187
not only lets creation be, but is also intimately present with creation in its 
brokenness, its suffering, and also in its healing.  There is no “cost” of 
evolutionary development that God does not also “pay,” and no creature is left 
to suffer alone.  Whether or not this is of comfort to the non-human animals 
themselves is debatable,  but it does imply that God has taken full 188
responsibility for the sufferings which God has also allowed, and it keeps us 
 Ruth Page, God and the Web of Creation (London: SCM, 1996), 7.184
 For John Haught, the “letting-be” of creation is linked with God’s self-restraint or kenosis.  Cf. 185
John F. Haught, God after Darwin: A Theology of Evolution (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2000), 97.
 William Rowe, Richard Dawkins and Wesley Wildman are just a few who have come to this 186
conclusion.  William Rowe, “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism,” American 
Philosophical Quarterly 16:4 (October 1979): 335-341; Richard Dawkins, River out of Eden: A 
Darwinian View of Life (New York: Basic Books, 1995), 154-155; Wesley J. Wildman, 
“Incongruous Goodness, Perilous Beauty,” 277-278.
 Page, Web of Creation, 40-43.187
 Southgate makes an “anthropomorphic guess” that God’s co-suffering may “at some deep 188
level take away the aloneness of the suffering creature’s experience.”  See Southgate, Groaning 
of Creation, 54ff.
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from imagining God as one who sacrifices others without regard for God’s own 
plans and purposes to be benefited.  Niels Gregersen and Christopher 
Southgate in particular go on to stress that it is in the cross of Christ that God 
most clearly takes the responsibility of evolutionary suffering.   Arthur 189
Peacocke also tentatively suggests that God’s co-suffering with creatures 
may––in itself––have creative potential:  
God, we find ourselves having to conjecture, ‘suffers’ the natural evils of 
the world along with ourselves because––we can but tentatively suggest 
at this stage––God purposes inter alia to bring about a greater good 
thereby, namely, the kingdom of living organic creatures, delighting their 
Creator, and even free-willing, loving persons who have the possibility of 
communion with God and with each other.  Indeed, the creation may in 
one sense be said to exist through suffering: for suffering is recognized to 
have creative power when imbued with love.  190
Just as childbirth is suffering with creative purpose, the co-suffering of God may, 
Peacocke suggests, have some creative affect beyond the comfort of co-
presence.  How this might be the case, however, is not spelled out by 
Peacocke. 
 The free process defence and the co-suffering arguments are powerful 
together, but they leave out one important aspect: What is the final fate of 
animals who die? 
Redemption Approaches  191
 Many of the solutions explored so far have focussed on the beginning: 
how God had to set up the universe in such a way that suffering would ensue in 
 Southgate, Groaning of Creation, 76.  Niels Henrik Gregersen, “The Cross of Christ in an 189
Evolutionary World,” dialog 40:3 (Fall 2001), 192-207. God’s co-suffering in Christ is also 
emphasised by Arthur Peacocke, Ruth Page, Jürgen Moltmann, Robert Capon, W. H. Vanstone, 
John Polkinghorne and others, though not all of them advance this thought with specific 
reference to the non-human creation. Cf. Arthur Peacocke, Paths from Science Towards God 
(Oxford: Oneworld: 2001), 85-88; Peacocke, “Cost of a New Life,” 37-42.
 Peacocke, “Cost of a New Life,” 38.  Italics original.190
 See also the further development of the theme of redemption in chapter 6.191
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order to bring the glories of the present.  There is another realm of theological 
approach that begins instead with the future, with the hope that present 
sufferings will bring about, or be solved by, future harmonies. 
 Some redemption approaches are this-worldly, that is, they look to how 
the suffering individual finds redemption either in the midst of its own suffering, 
or in how its suffering will contribute to lives beyond its own, in ecological or 
historical senses.  Ruth Page and Holmes Rolston defend these positions, 
which will be explored in much greater detail in chapter 6.   Other theologians 192
look beyond the grave to find redemption for the suffering creation.  To these we 
now turn. 
 The question of whether or not non-human animals have an existence 
beyond death is one that has long been speculated on by theologians.  Most of 
the early theologians, wedded as they were to certain neo-Platonic views of the 
world, did not think so, usually citing the lack of a rational soul in non-human 
beings.   As the rational soul was the part of humanity that had an ability to 193
endure beyond death, non-human animals simply passed away without 
remainder.  Others, however, were not so sure.  John Wesley preached his 
suggestion that in the resurrection: 
The whole brute creation will then, undoubtedly, be restored, not only to 
the vigour, strength, and swiftness which they had at their creation, but to 
a far higher degree of each than they ever enjoyed... as a recompense 
for what they once suffered, while under the “bondage of corruption,” 
when God has “renewed the face of the earth,” and their corruptible body 
has put on incorruption, they shall enjoy happiness suited to their state, 
without alloy, without interruption, and without end.  194
 Page, Web of Creation, 63; Holmes Rolston III, “Does Nature Need to be Redeemed?” 192
Zygon 29:2 (June 1994): 205-229.
 Paul J. Griffiths, “What Remains in the Resurrection?  A (Broadly) Thomist Argument for the 193
Presence of Nonrational Animals in Heaven”  (Paper presented at Blackfriars, Cambridge, 31 
January 2013).
 John Wesley, “The General Deliverance (Sermon 60),”  The Wesley Center Online, http://194
wesley.nnu.edu/john-wesley/the-sermons-of-john-wesley-1872-edition/sermon-60-the-general-
deliverance/ (accessed 26 February 2013).
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In Wesley’s mind, God’s redemption would be extended to all life, which would 
all also be perfected.  It is interesting to note that Wesley does not think that 
animals will be restored to what he thought was their pre-fallen state, but that 
their eschatological being would be “to a far higher degree” than any earthly 
reality.  He even suggests at one place that their intelligence would increase to 
the present human level, just as human intelligence would reach that of the 
angels. 
 Contemporary theologians also often defend the resurrection of non-
human animals.   Some do so anthropocentrically, such as Paul Griffiths, who 195
thinks that non-human animals will only be included in the resurrection because 
they are necessary for human delight to be made complete.   John 196
Polkinghorne argues that only tokens of the different types of species are 
needed to complete heaven, but not every living creature.  Where John Wesley 
argued that the individuals would be raised in recompense for their suffering, 
Polkinghorne is only concerned with a representation of species.  That 
representation would necessarily be either for human benefit or for God’s 
benefit, but either way the actual case of the individual creatures who suffered 
is ignored.  Polkinghorne makes one exception in regard to animals that have 
had particular significance to humans, such as pets.  Polkinghorne speculates 
that they “could be thought to have acquired enhanced individual states through 
their interactions with humans”  and thus be included in the resurrection in 197
more numbers than needed for mere representation.  In short, there will be 
many dogs, and few dinosaurs. 
 Including but not limited to the thinkers listed below as well as Keith Ward, Jürgen Moltmann, 195
Ted Peters, Robert Russell, and Denis Edwards.
 Griffiths, “What Remains?” (31 January 2013).196
 John Polkinghorne, The God of Hope and the End of the World (New Haven: Yale University 197
Press, 2002), 123.
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 Other contemporary theologians are more concerned about the fate of 
individual non-human animals themselves, regardless of their interaction with 
human beings.  Jay McDaniel and Christopher Southgate in particular are 
convinced of the resurrection of members of the non-human creation.  McDaniel 
delineates four different types of redemption, only two of which concern us here: 
redemption as the contribution to a life beyond one’s own, and redemption as a 
transformation of being.   The first type of redemption sees individuals as 198
contributing to the life and experience of God, and thus their lives are redeemed 
in meaning, though with little advantage to the creature itself.  John Haught 
proposes this sort of “objective immortality” where creatures continue to ‘exist’ in 
“a rock-solid registry that prevents the erasure of all facts.”   The second 199
redemption sees the creature––in McDaniel’s example, a pelican chick––
transformed into a higher state of affairs.  The chick would find itself in “pelican 
heaven;” a place of ultimate satisfaction of its needs and desires.  Yet McDaniel 
does not envision this resurrection to be eternal.  “The hope is not necessarily 
that all living beings live forever as subjects in their own right; rather, it is that 
they live until they enjoy a fulfillment of their needs as creatures.”   Once the 200
individual has found fulfilment and recompense for their suffering, they can pass 
out of existence without a problem.  Compensation for the lack of earthly 
fulfilment is the central tenet of McDaniel’s redemption. 
 Southgate advocates redemption in several more ways.   While he 201
does hold that resurrection for the suffering individual who has not experienced 
flourishing is important as compensation, he also grounds non-human 
 Jay B. McDaniel, Of God and Pelicans: A Theology of Reverence for Life (Louisville, KY: 198
Westminster John Knox, 1989), 42.
 John Haught, Deeper than Darwin (Cambridge: Westview, 2003), 152.199
 McDaniel, God and Pelicans, 45-46.200
 Southgate, Groaning of Creation, 82.201
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redemption as part of the full work of Christ.  Not only do biblical passages such 
as Isaiah 11 and Romans 8 hint at the whole creation being present in the new 
life, but humans themselves are always understood in their relationship to 
creation.  Full redemption would require the fulfilment of all those relationships.  
Also, it would be curious if a Cosmic Christ only actually redeemed a small part 
of the cosmos.  Finally, Southgate argues that for a theodicy to be complete, the 
importance of non-human resurrection must be included to maintain the 
goodness of God.   
 Yet, despite his focus on the individual and insistence on divine care for 
each creature, Southgate also admits that redemption for “simple organisms” 
who “possess little distinctive experience or agency... may be represented in the 
eschaton as types rather than as individuals.”   Creatures without sentience, 202
in his view, do not suffer, and so do not need individual compensation for 
suffering, though they may still be represented in the final new creation.  Still,  
he advises that theologians ought not to be frugal in their speculations on the 
inhabitants of the new creation.  Southgate writes that along with the elimination 
of the second law of thermodynamics in the new creation “must surely go the 
implication that there is no competition for resources, no shortage of space in 
heaven.  We should therefore be bold in our trust of the redemptive grace of 
God that will populate it.”   Southgate argues that there may not need to be a 203
redemption of every creature, but as there is no extrinsic limitation to how many 
creatures may populate the new creation, there is therefore no reason to 
exclude any of them in our speculations.  Later in this work, I will argue that the 
nature of divine love will necessitate the resurrection of every creature, even 
those who have little personal agency, or do not seem to vary much one from 
 Southgate, Groaning of Creation, 84.202
 Southgate, Groaning of Creation, 85.203
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another.   Particularity is essential to love, and perhaps not even bacteria can 204
be substituted one for another by the God who loves them. 
 We have thus explored several different possibilities for the resurrection 
of individual non-human animals.  What about wider-scope schemes?  What 
other forms are there for redemption? 
 Southgate also argues that whilst creatures will be resurrected on their 
own merit, redemption for them can also come through the work of humans.  As 
humanity takes up its priestly role, it will offer up creation’s praise to God and 
use human ingenuity to act as partners with God in bringing the creation into its 
own.   Humanity as priests and created co-creators act in the now-present 205
eschatological age to bring relief to creation’s groaning and liberate it from its 
bondage to decay.   This particular approach of Southgate’s is interesting 206
because it is anthropocentric, but it is so for the sake of wider life.   Most 207
anthropocentric schemes worry only about the cost and benefit to humans and 
the place of humans as agents in eschatological fulfilment.  Southgate assumes 
the place of humanity is central, but that they are to live out this central role in a 
Christ-shaped way, as servants who give themselves up for the good of the 
wider creation.  If Southgate is anthropocentric, he is at least redeemingly 
anthropocentric. 
 See chapter 4 on the particularity and non-substitutability of love and chapter 6 on the 204
universality of resurrection.
 Southgate, Groaning of Creation, 111-112.205
 Southgate, Groaning of Creation, 126.206
 Southgate makes a distinction drawn from Lukas Vischer between anthropocentrism and 207
“anthropomonism.”  It is anthropomonism which sees humans as the only objects of concern in 
God’s redemptive purposes, and every other creature as disposable or instrumental.  However, 
Southgate and his co-authors “hold that a chastened and humble anthropocentrism, which 
strongly resists anthropomonism, can appropriately remain key to an ecological theology”.  
David G. Horrell, Cherryl Hunt, and Christopher Southgate, Greening Paul: Rereading the 
Apostle in a Time of Ecological Crisis (Waco, TX: Baylor, 2010), 124.
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 Theocentric approaches to redemption come from thinkers such as 
Moltmann, Rahner, and Edwards.  For them, God will tie up all of cosmic history 
through the work of Christ.  Humans will be part of that redemption, but will not 
be key to it.  In Rahner’s thought, redemption is tied to God’s self-bestowal to 
the world.  As God gives Godself to the world, the world then finds in itself 
through the indwelling presence of God the capability for self-transcendence.   208
Thus God’s work in the world in self-giving will be consummated in the self-
transcendence of world history.   Edwards, drawing conclusions from 209
Rahner’s theology, argues for the companionship and co-suffering of God in 
creation, and “sees the resurrection as a promise that creaturely suffering and 
death will be redeemed and healed as each creature finds its meaning and 
fulfillment in God’s self-bestowing love.”   Moltmann, by contrast, does not see 210
history as moving forward into the eschatological period, but rather sees the 
eschaton as breaking back into the present.  The culmination of creation is 
coming––the adventus––not as something that will proceed out of the past and 
present, but as something which exists already and will meet the present.   211
Heaven is not simply a future reality, but “the beginning of heavenly bliss is 
already present––and is also already experienced––in the grace of Christ and in 
the church of Christ; and this means that heaven has already been thrown open 
here.”   The outpost of heaven created here in the church is the promise to the 212
wider cosmos of the redemption that will come. 
 See Denis Edwards, “Why is God Doing This? Suffering, The Universe, and Christian 208
Eschatology,” in Physics and Cosmology: Scientific Perspectives on the Problem of Natural Evil, 
eds. Nancey Murphy, Robert J. Russell, William R. Stoeger, S. J. (Vatican/Berkeley, CA: Vatican 
Observatory/CTNS, 2007), 255-256.
 Edwards, “Why is God Doing This?” 262.209
 Edwards, “Why is God Doing This?” 266.210
 Jürgen Moltmann, God in Creation: A New Theology of Creation and The Spirit of God, trans. 211
by Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1993), 133-135.
 Moltmann, God in Creation, 169.212
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 Peters and Hewlett do not hold to the in-breaking eschatology of 
Moltmann.  By contrast they assert that the future as it is will change the 
meaning of the now. “It is the divine act of redemption that determines what 
creation will have meant, and this can be determined only eschatologically.”   213
God’s redemption actually creates the meaning of what is past, and the whole 
of creation cannot be understood before that moment, for its meaning is not yet 
determined.   Theodicy for individuals, then, is an issue only resolved in the 214
eschatological age, as the meaning of suffering is forged in light of the whole 
work of God.  Robert Russell claims with Peters and Hewlett that: “It is only 
when the new creation is the starting point for reflecting on evil that we can 
hope to give a response to its origin and meaning in this present, broken 
world.”  215
 Each of these teleological schemes does find a solution for the individual 
creature who suffers.  Whether resurrection is seen as recompense or as 
fulfilment, the creature finds that all things have been made well.  Yet, this 
places an enormous weight of meaning on the creature’s being that does not 
directly relate to its life on earth.  Celia Deane-Drummond rightly asks whether 
or not teleological explanations are used too quickly “to escape the conundrum 
of suffering and evil?”   If we are too quick to point to the eschaton as the 216
residing place of all value and meaning, it makes the lives lived here vapid and 
hollow. 
 Peters and Hewlett, Evolution from Creation to New Creation, 160.213
 I will explore this concept further in chapter 5.214
 Robert John Russell, “Physics, Cosmology, and the Challenge to Consequentialist Natural 215
Theodicy,” in Physics and Cosmology: Scientific Perspectives on the Problem of Natural Evil, 
eds. Nancey Murphy, Robert Russell, and William Stoeger (Vatican/Berkeley, CA: Vatican 
Observatory/CTNS, 2007), 111.
 Deane-Drummond, “Shadow Sophia,” 24.216
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 Ruth Page objects strenuously to future-oriented redemption models, 
arguing that they prioritise a distant God and a lack of concern for present 
suffering or present creaturely value.  Her particular objection is to those who 
consider non-human lives as unimportant stepping-stones to the development 
of humans as the teleology of creation.  Her pattern of thought, however, would 
equally object to those who place the true value of a creature in its “completion” 
in a final state of redemption.   Page writes “A distant teleology goes with 217
belief in a distant God who will sort everything out at the end.  But when God is 
believed to be present, then every moment becomes eschatological, an end in 
itself, so to speak.”   Instead of a distant teleology, Page advances an 218
argument of “Teleology Now!,” where the value of creatures is found as they live 
and participate in relationship to God and in relationship to the world around 
them.  As opposed to David Ray Griffin, who asks “why a God whose power is 
essentially unlimited would use such a long, pain-filled method, with all its blind-
alleys, to create a world,”  for Page there are no blind-alleys.  There are 219
simply creatures who did not pass on their DNA to successive generations, but 
who were nonetheless delighted in by God and who participated in relationships 
around them in meaningful ways.   Relationships are the primary purpose of 220
creation for Page, and nothing separates a creature from its primary relationship 
with God.  Thus, natural evils do not and cannot speak against the love of God 
 This objection would stem from her not thinking that creatures, as a whole, are either entirely 217
saved or entirely lost, but rather that “only those parts of lives which please God, which bear the 
desired fruit from the seed of possibility, are saved.” If a creature’s life had no value in this 
world, it would be entirely lost.  Page, Web of Creation, 170.
 Page, Web of Creation, 63.218
 Griffin, “Creation Out of Chaos,” 106.  Italics mine219
 The varieties and the shaping of meaning will be discussed later in chapter 4, p. 261-266, 220
and chapter 6, p. 286–295.
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because even the worst disaster cannot separate a creature from its primary 
purpose of having participated in relationships.  221
Theocentric Approaches to Suffering 
 There are also a few additional perspectives that are essentially 
theocentric rather than biocentric in their treatment of evil and suffering.  Two 
examples here will suffice.  The first sees the cross as the central moment 
where God takes responsibility for the suffering of the world, the second places 
the meaning of creaturely lives (and indeed of all creation) in God and not in 
creation. 
 The cross of Christ is perhaps the most difficult and paradoxical concept 
in Christianity.  This, perhaps, makes it also one of the most powerful concepts.  
At the cross, extremes meet together.  The God of life dies.  Perfect innocence 
carries sin.  Good triumphs over evil by submitting to death.  Love is found in 
the domain of hate.  The greatest expression of God’s power comes through the 
experience of entire weakness.  Although precisely what happened at the cross 
is widely debated, Southgate and Gregersen argue that at the cross God took 
responsibility for all the evil in creation.   Gregersen in particular remarks how 222
Jesus, who died without descendants, identifies with the losers of the 
evolutionary race, and thus “co-carries the costs of creation.”   Certainly, the 223
idea of God meeting the creation in the cross, and fully experiencing its worst 
aspects does much to help us see God’s moral justification in allowing evil.  At 
the same time, the mysteries of the cross will never be fully pierced by 
 See also my discussion of extinction and teleology in Bethany Sollereder, “The Purpose of 221
Dinosaurs,” The Christian Century 130:20 (October 2013).  Available online at http://
www.christiancentury.org/article/2013-09/purpose-dinosaurs.
 Southgate, Groaning of Creation, 76; Gregersen, “Cross of Christ,” 204.222
 Gregersen, “Cross of Christ,” 203-204.  Italics original.  See also the discussion of biological 223
telos in chapter 5.
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theological inquiry, though we will return to it throughout this study.  Instead of a 
focus on the suffering of the individual, the focus here is on the God willing to 
suffer for creation. 
 Moltmann’s theocentric approach is quite different.  Moltmann places all 
the value of creation in its meaning, and finds that meaning in God.  He writes: 
Theologically speaking, the meaning and purpose of human beings is to 
be found in God himself, like the meaning and purpose of all things.  In 
this sense, every single person, and indeed every single living thing in 
nature, has a meaning, whether they are of utility for evolution or not.  
The meaning of the individual is not to be found in the collective of the 
species, and the meaning of the species is not to be found in the 
existence of the individual.  The meaning of both is to be found in God... 
We have to overcome the old anthropocentric world picture by a new 
theocentric interpretation of the world of nature and human beings.  224
If the meaning of a creature is not found in itself––neither in its evolutionary 
contribution nor its own fulfilment––but in God, then every life has meaning and 
value regardless of its circumstances or suffering.  Utility, on any conceived 
level, is no longer a measure for worth. 
Compound Approaches 
 Just as Murray was the main advocate for articulating a compound 
defence in the philosophical realm, so Southgate is the most clear expositor of 
the need for compound approaches to theodicy in the theological realm.   225
While he recognises the power and necessity of each argument, he attests that 
no one position alone is sufficient.  Rather, various positions must be drawn 
together in order to address the problem of natural evil.  For Southgate, 1) God 
must be seen as originally creating a good world: a good world with constraints 
that provide values that can come about in no other way (the “only way” 
argument).  2) God must also be seen as responding to, companioning, and 
 Moltmann, God in Creation, 197.224
 Southgate, Groaning of Creation, 15-17.225
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suffering with each creature, taking the responsibility for suffering most 
especially at the cross.  3) God works redemption in, and for, and through 
creatures––providing for them either fullness of life here, or in a life to come.  4) 
Finally, humanity has a particular role in redemption as co-redeemers of the 
world, and so suffering cannot be divided from the work of humans.   226
Together, Southgate argues, these lines of argument help us account for non-
human animal suffering. 
 I follow Southgate and Murray in thinking that for a theodicy to be robust 
and satisfying it has to be a compound of various different lines of approach.  
Our understanding of creation needs to be complex and multi-faceted if we are 
to nuance the various natural disvalues we encounter.  An entire population 
wiped out by a volcano requires a different sort of approach than a baby seal 
skinned alive by an orca.  Holding various strands of argument together allows 
the flexibility to account for different values and disvalues, without simply 
painting all disvalues with one brush or looking for only one source of disvalue. 
Conclusion 
 We have now explored the various resources available to the study of 
non-human animal theodicy.  We have traversed the lay of the land.  First 
crossed was the ground of analytical philosophy.  We began with rejecting the 
Neo-Cartesian and inscrutability arguments because they do not engage the 
question of evil, but only evade it.  Property-consequence GHAs (such as the 
necessity of nomic regularity) with anthropocentric references were rejected as 
inadequate, while those property-consequence GHAs with biotic reference were 
accepted as necessary, but not sufficient on their own.  Developmental 
 Southgate, Groaning of Creation, 16.226
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defences also were shown to be strong arguments, but not strong enough to 
stand in isolation.  A compound defence, allowing for varieties of goods and 
harms, was deemed the strongest approach.   
 Then, the analytical philosophical positions were compared and 
contrasted with theological positions, and three critiques were explored.  Some 
simply refuse to engage in theodicy.  Some philosophical approaches did not 
retreat behind unfeeling logic, but chose to engage the affective realm and are 
comfortable with mystery and theological concerns.  Surin’s refusal of traditional 
philosophical theodicy in favour of practical theodicies and Stump’s example of 
sensitive philosophical engagement with theodicy will both stand as examples 
of how analytical philosophy will be drawn upon in this project.  Finally, some 
chose theological approaches instead, which allow for more sources of input, 
and require a certain amount of pastoral concern.   
 The exploration of theological approaches began with the attempts to 
radically re-define God in order to dissolve the theodicy problem.  These 
solutions were rejected largely for their lack of hope.  A god divested of 
goodness, power, or activity could not satisfy a Christian theodicy.  Theodicies 
centred on the fall, by contrast, were critiqued as too simplistic, ignoring that 
much good and value emerges out of the harms that those theodicies condemn 
as the result of sin.  Finally, the various theodicies stemming from theological 
considerations, whether theocentric or biocentric, were explored.  The 
usefulness of kenotic and relational theologies was noted. 
 The rest of the project will concentrate on just one small piece of this vast 
landscape: the attempt to develop a compound theological approach which 
does not radically redefine God or incorporate a theology of the fall, but which 
will draw on the resources of relational and redemptive theologies. 
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 I noted earlier that one of the major dividing lines in the current debate is 
whether the process of evolution was intended by God or whether its violence, 
competition, and scarcity are the result of some kind of world corruption.   The 227
next chapter, focussing on biblical considerations, is designed to set me firmly in 
the first camp.  It will critique from a biblical perspective several theologians who 
advance the idea of a fall causing human suffering.  I argue that by investigating 
Genesis 1-9 on exegetical grounds, it is possible to set aside the idea that the 
world is in any way corrupted apart from the direct sinful action of humans.  This 
conclusion will pave the way for the development of a compound theology in 
chapters 4-6 which will not consider fallenness or corruption as part of the 
problem in an evolutionary creation. 
 This is a “fault-line” pointed out by Southgate, “Re-Reading Genesis, John, and Job,” 378.227
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 Chapter 3: Biblical Considerations 
“Of Man's first disobedience, and the fruit 
Of that forbidden tree whose mortal taste 
Brought death into the world, and all our woe.” 
-John Milton, Paradise Lost 
Introduction 
 In the last chapter we explored various approaches outlining how 
theologians and philosophers have addressed the problem of natural evil.  One 
of the prominent disagreements was over whether the world was made “good” 
in the sense of peaceable, harmonious, and suffering-free and then was 
corrupted by sin (human or angelic), or whether the world was made with the 
possibility of natural evil as a result of the creative process itself.  In the latter 
case, the goodness of the world still exists, but “good” holds different 
connotations from the static perfection of the first picture.  Goodness includes 
realities like death, pain, and predation.   
 While almost no theologians endorse the notion that death and violence 
entered the world through the human fall because of the chronological issues 
involved,  a growing contingent of theologians point to the corrupting influence 1
of Satan or some other shadowy spiritual reality as the origin of disvalues in 
nature.   The aim of this chapter will be two-fold.  First it aims to show that the 2
fallenness of the natural world is not a concept that can be derived from the 
 William Dembski being a notable exception, who argues that the effects of the human fall were 1
applied retroactively to the creation. William Dembski, The End of Christianity: Finding a Good 
God in an Evil World (Nashville, TN: B&H, 2009)  I exclude outright those young earth 
creationists who do not accept that evolution happened.
 C. S. Lewis, The Problem of Pain (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1996), 138; Michael Lloyd, 2
“Are Animals Fallen?” in Animals on the Agenda, eds. Andrew Linzey and Dorothy Yamamoto 
(London: SCM, 1998): 147-160; Stephen H. Webb, The Dome of Eden: An New Solution to the 
Problem of Creation and Evolution (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2010), 139-180; Paul J. Griffiths, 
“Impossible Pluralism” First Things (June/July 2013): 44-48; Nicola Hoggard Creegan, Animal 
Suffering & The Problem of Evil (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 10; Gregory Boyd, 
“Evolution as Cosmic Warfare: A Biblical Perspective on Satan and ‘Natural Evil’,” in Creation 
Made Free, ed. Thomas Oord (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2009): 125-145; Gregory Boyd, 
Satan and the Problem of Evil: Constructing a Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy (Downers Grove, IL: 
InterVarsity, 2001).
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opening chapters of Genesis (1-9), and therefore critique and set aside the 
models that rely upon such a reading.  Discussion will include a look at Romans 
8 as a key New Testament passage relating to the interpretation of Genesis.  
Second, this chapter will aim to establish a foundational theological principle of 
approach for the rest of the project: that apart from human sin and its direct 
effects, the world remains God’s “very good” creation. 
 A note on terminology: the term “fall” is elusive as there are several 
different meanings of “fall” that can be intended.  I explored in chapter 2 how 
there are both event-based fall theories and mysterious fallenness theories.  3
“Event-based” fall theories usually refer to the “human fall” and the “satanic fall.”  
The human fall, sometimes called the “relational fall,” refers to the event that 
marks the entrance of sin into the world through human action.   The effect of 4
the human fall is the severing of harmonious relationship between human 
persons and God, between one person and other persons, and between 
humans and the non-human creation.  However, apart from the direct result of 
sinful human action in the world, such as pollution or exploitation of natural 
resources, the human fall does not independently affect the wider cosmos but 
only humans and their relationships.  In the same way, the satanic fall refers to 
the event of some of the heavenly host deciding to rebel against God, and 
becoming “fallen angels.”  The satanic fall was primordial, meaning that it 
 See chapter 2, p. 66-74.3
 The term “fall” here is still not the best, since it assumes an original “height” from which to fall, 4
which inevitably pictures an Augustinian-type fall from moral perfection, rather than allowing for 
an Irenaean-type “fall forward” from innocence.
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occurred either before time, or at least, that it was in effect from the very origin 
of physical creation.  5
 Closely linked to these two fall events is what is sometimes known as the 
“cosmic fall.”   The cosmic fall refers to the effects of sin on the wider cosmos, 6
but independent of the direct action of the sinful party, either human or angelic.  
It defines the concept that when either humans or angels fell, the rest of the 
cosmos was pulled down from an original perfection or uncorrupted state, and 
made subject to natural evil.  Yet, these evils are usually not related to the direct 
action of the agents in the way that demonic possession, for example, or human 
environmental degradation would be.   Instead, these natural evils––such as 7
death, pain, predation, and suffering––entered the non-human creaturely 
experience as part of the punishment for human or angelic sin. 
 I think these are important to distinguish because they are often 
conflated, but are conceptually distinct.  Most historical Christian thinkers 
accepted a primordial satanic fall, but did not think that a cosmic fall occurred 
because of it.   Contemporary advocates of a satanic fall, including Boyd, 8
Griffiths, Lloyd, and Webb, usually link it with a cosmic fall.  I accept both a 
 Other primordial fall narratives include William Dembski’s retroactive applications of the effects 5
of the human fall, Origen’s pre-material fall, Neil Messer’s ambiguous creation with 
“nothingness”, and Celia Deane-Drummond’s shadow sophia.  Dembski, The End of 
Christianity; Neil Messer, “Natural Evil after Darwin,” in Theology after Darwin, eds. Michael S. 
Northcott and R. J. Berry (Milton Keynes: Paternoster, 2009), 149; Celia Deane-Drummond, 
“Shadow Sophia in Christological Perspective: The Evolution of Sin and the Redemption of 
Nature,” Theology and Science 6:1 (2008): 13-32.
 See, for example, John J. Bimson, “Reconsidering a ‘Cosmic Fall’,” Science & Christian Belief 6
18 (2006): 63-81.
 The cosmic fall is never seen as caused by direct human action, as if humans could force lions 7
to become carnivorous, but some of the satanic fall scenarios do imagine this kind of effect.
 This is a view most famously enshrined in John Milton’s Paradise Lost.  The view that the fall 8
of Satan had no effect on the goodness of the world was held by most Christian thinkers during 
the Patristic period.  Bernard J. Bamberger, Fallen Angels: Soldiers of Satan’s Realm 
(Philadelphia, PA: Jewish Publication Society, 1952), 82.
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satanic and a human fall,  but I do not think a cosmic fall ever occurred; a 9
conclusion I argue for in this chapter. 
 The idea of a primordial cosmic fall can be contrasted with the category 
of mysterious fallenness theories.  As opposed to a cosmic fall, where natural 
evil is caused by explicit sin, these mysterious fallenness theories do not give a 
clear picture of the origin of evil.  Instead, they simply claim that the world 
includes natural evil which God never intended, but have different perspectives 
on the origin of that evil.  Messer links the origin of evil to a “nothingness” that 
opposed God from the beginning.   Deane-Drummond finds the origins of 10
natural evil in “shadow-sophia” which is constitutively linked with the creation of 
“sophia,” just as the possibility of darkness is constitutively linked with the 
creation of light.   Hoggard Creegan only allows that “there is something 11
opposed to God, which must in some sense be God’s creation, and that this 
something is beyond our story; it doesn’t fit easily into any narrative that makes 
sense.”   Then she adds, “It is too mundane to speak of a prehuman ‘fall.’”   12 13
Each of these mysterious fallenness theories are primordial, since they do not 
think that there ever was a time when the world was not fallen in this way. 
 Although these fallenness theories are not cosmic fall scenarios, they 
share one of the major weaknesses of other primordial cosmic fall theories, 
which is that––biblically speaking––the creation is so often affirmed as good.  If 
it can be shown that the non-human creation is considered uncorrupted at any 
point in real history, these mysterious fallenness theories as well as other 
 Or, at least, if we accept for the sake of argument that angels and demons do exist, I would 9
accept the plausibility of a satanic fall.
 Messer, “Natural Evil after Darwin,” 149.10
 Deane-Drummond, “Shadow Sophia,” 13-32.11
 Hoggard Creegan, Animal Suffering, 77.12
 Hoggard Creegan, Animal Suffering, 77.13
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primordial fall theories will face a serious challenge.  For this reason, I will 
concentrate primarily on critiquing the cosmic fall theories, which are most 
commonly argued on biblical grounds, with the intention of drawing similar 
critiques against the mysterious fallenness theories. 
The Cosmic Fall in Scripture 
 Historically, placing the blame for natural evil on a cosmic fall due to 
human sin was not the default position of the early church, despite the possible 
reading of such thought in Paul’s writings.   When Augustine, for example, 14
wrote about the curse in Genesis 3, he made a distinction between the bare 
existence of thorns growing in a field, and thorns growing in the fields “to” 
humans in a way that would afflict them.  He wrote: 
Concerning thorns and thistles, we can give a more definite answer, 
because after the fall of man God said to him, speaking of the earth, 
Thorns and thistles shall it bring forth to you. But we should not jump to 
the conclusion that it was only then that these plants came forth from the 
earth. For it could be that, in view of the many advantages found in 
different kinds of seeds, these plants had a place on earth without 
afflicting man in any way. But since they were growing in the fields in 
which man was now laboring in punishment for his sin, it is reasonable to 
suppose that they became one of the means of punishing him. For they 
might have grown elsewhere, for the nourishment of birds and beasts, or 
even for the use of man. 
Now this interpretation does not contradict what is said in the words, 
Thorns and thistles shall it bring forth to you, if we understand that earth 
in producing them before the fall did not do so to afflict man but rather to 
provide proper nourishment for certain animals, since some animals find 
soft dry thistles a pleasant and nourishing food. But earth began to 
produce these to add to man’s laborious lot only when he began to labor 
on the earth after his sin. I do not mean that these plants once grew in 
other places and only afterwards in the fields where man planted and 
harvested his crops. They were in the same place before and after: 
formerly not for man, afterwards for man.  15
 Jon Garvey, “Creation Fell in 1500: The Theological History of a Fallen Creation,” 14
unpublished, forthcoming in Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith, 2015.
 Augustine, The Literal Meaning of Genesis, vol. 1., bk. 3, ch 18., trans. J. H. Taylor (Mahwah, 15
NJ: Paulist Press, 1982), 93-94.
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Augustine thought that it was only the subsequent state of affairs of thorns 
growing “to” humans that was due to the curse placed on the ground in Genesis 
3:15-17.  Augustine even allowed for orderly predation before the human fall, 
since “one animal is the nourishment for another,” and he argued for orderly 
decomposers, thus presuming the existence of death.   In contrast, later in the 16
history of interpretation emerged the now more recognisable interpretation of 
the curse on the ground as a cosmic fall, summed up by John Calvin who wrote: 
All the evils of the present life, which experience proves to be 
innumerable, have proceeded from the same fountain. The inclemency of 
the air, frost, thunders, unseasonable rains, drought, hail, and whatever 
is disorderly in the world, are the fruits of sin. Nor is there any other 
primary cause of diseases.  17
   
The history of how the doctrine of the cosmic fall has grown and developed from 
the scant text in Genesis and a few New Testament references to a defining 
understanding of the natural world in Western thought is long and interesting,  18
but the primary intention of this chapter is to investigate the Scriptural support 
for this notion.  I hope to show that the relevant chapters in Genesis do not 
allow an interpretation that finds a cosmic fall linked either to a satanic or a 
human fall.  Instead, I hope to show that there is no initial corruption in the world 
(ruling out the possibility of a primordial fall) and that the curse laid down in 
Genesis 3 is lifted after the flood narrative, and therefore any cosmic curse 
associated with the human fall was only temporary.  The world, apart from 
humans, remains the “very good” creation of God. 
 Augustine, The Literal Meaning of Genesis, I:3:16., trans. J. H. Taylor (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist 16
Press, 1982), 92.  Augustine goes on to argue “To wish that this were otherwise would not be 
reasonable.  For all creatures, as long as they exist, have their own measure, number, and 
order.  Rightly considered, they are all praiseworthy, and all the changes that occur in them, 
even when one passes into another, are governed by a hidden plan that rules the beauty of the 
world and regulates each according to its kind.”
 John Calvin, Commentaries upon the First Book of Moses called Genesis (1554) in Calvin’s 17
Bible Commentaries: Genesis, Part I, trans. by J. King (Forgotten Books, 1847, 2007), 113.
 See N.P. Williams, The Idea of the Fall and of Original Sin (London: Longmans, Green and 18
Co., 1927).
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Genesis 1: The Very Good Creation 
 Why did pre-human animals suffer in the evolutionary process?  Those 
theologians who hold to a primordial fall maintain that it is because the pre-
human world was already corrupted or otherwise compromised.  Thus, although 
God never intended their suffering, they were caught up in a cosmic struggle as 
unfortunate casualties.  Thomas Oord, Gregory Boyd, and Stephen Webb, in 
particular, claim that hints of the primordial fall are found in Genesis 1.   In this 19
first section, I want to investigate the first chapter of the Bible to see if there is 
room for such an interpretation. 
            The Hebrew Scriptures begin with the world pictured as a watery 
depth.  “The earth was a formless void and darkness covered the face of the 
deep [םוהת], while a wind from God swept over the face of the waters.”   This 20
deep, this םוהת, is common to the creation myths of other ancient Near Eastern 
(ANE) mythologies.   Instead of a creation described ex nihilo, the “formless 21
and void” (והבו והת) nature of this watery world does not picture a lack of 
material existence, but rather describes a place that is uninhabitable, or 
unusable, like a desert wasteland.   The absolute origins of matter are not a 22
 Thomas Oord, “An Open Theology Doctrine of Creation,” in Creation Made Free: Open 19
Theism Engaging Science, ed. Thomas Oord (Eugene, Or: Pickwick, 2009), 28-49; Boyd, 
“Evolution as Cosmic Warfare,” 125-145; Webb, The Dome of Eden, 144-146, 165-166;.
 Genesis 1:2, NRSV.20
 Gordon J. Wenham, Genesis 1–15, Word Biblical Commentary 1 (Nashville, TN: Thomas 21
Nelson, 1987), 16. 
 The only other place the exact same phrase is used is in Jeremiah 4:23 to describe a ruined 22
land.  The words tohu and bohu are also found together in Isa 34:11 where they describe the 
confusion and emptiness of a land under God’s judgment.   Examples of tohu being used to 
describe a wilderness include Deuteronomy 32:10 and Psalm 107:40.  An extensive etymology 
of both words, and their use in the Hebrew Bible, can be found in David Tsumura, Creation and 
Destruction: A reappraisal of the Chaoskampf Theory in the Old Testament (Winona Lake, IN: 
Eisenbrauns, 2005), 10-35.
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concern of the author of Genesis.   Norman Habel writes: “Clearly Erets [the 23
earth] exists, but as yet has not assumed its final shape or function and has not 
yet been filled with life forms.”   The six ordering and creative days of Elohim’s 24
work will form it into a place that is useful and habitable for all creatures.  At the 
end of the days of creative activity, Elohim surveys all that has been made and 
blesses it, and recognises its goodness, calling it in 1:31 דאמ בוט, “very good.” 
            The questions about the absolute goodness of this completed 
creation revolve around whether the existence of the םוהת or the description of 
the world as והבו והת opens the exegetical possibility of reading in some sort of 
conflict, resistance, or corruption.  Let us explore some of the various 
possibilities in turn. 
Thomas Oord’s ‘Creation out of chaos’ 
             Oord claims that a model of creation out of chaos, based on the םוהת of 
Genesis 1, is a better answer to the problem of natural evil than either kenotic 
or traditional notions of creatio ex nihilo allow.  The first question is whether 25
Genesis 1 is open to such an interpretation.  Can we, as Oord does, hold that 
the initial chaos of the םוהת overwhelmed God’s possibility of creating a truly 
good and peaceable world?  Did the chaotic nature of the world refuse co-
operation with divine intention in such a way that natural evil was an inevitable 
result? 
 To begin answering these questions we must set Genesis 1 in its cultural 
context and evaluate its form.  Is the chapter an example of converted 
 John H. Walton, The Lost World of Genesis One: Ancient Cosmology and the Origins Debate 23
(Downer’s Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2009), 47.
 Norman Habel, The Birth, the Curse and the Greening of the Earth: An Ecological Reading of 24
Genesis 1-11 (Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix, 2011), 29.
 Oord, “An Open Theology Doctrine of Creation,” in Creation Made Free, 28-49.25
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Chaoskampf literature––a struggle between the ordering God and chaos (or 
other possible spiritual forces)––or is it another genre of literature? 
            Hermann Gunkel was the first to suggest that the mention of םוהת was a 
veiled reference to the Babylonian goddess Tiamat, and thus hints at 
oppositional forces in the creative work.   Yet, when comparing Genesis to 26
other ANE mythologies, Gunkel himself notes: 
The pagan myths tell of gods whose relationships in reproduction and 
battle give rise to the world.  Gen 1, however, knows of a sole God, not 
begotten and not begetting, at whose feet lies the world.  There is no 
greater contrast, then, than between the colorful, fantastic mythology of 
these peoples and the intellectually clear, prosaic supernaturalism of Gen 
1.  27
Whatever once might have been the source material in Genesis 1 of ANE 
mythological influence, commentators generally agree that there are no remains 
of oppositional forces in the current form of the text.    28
 Oord tries to garner support for his idea of creation out of chaos by 
attributing the idea that there is such an opposition to Jon D. Levenson.  Oord 
writes “Levenson and other biblical authors argue that Genesis 1 suggests that 
even in the first moments of creation, God encounters other forces.  These 
forces oppose, at least partially, God’s creative will.”   Yet in the book Oord is 29
drawing from, Levenson clearly states: “First, in Genesis there is no active 
opposition to God’s creative labor.  He works on inert matter.  In fact, rather than 
creatio ex nihilo, ‘creation without opposition’ is the more accurate nutshell 
statement of the theology underlying our passage.”   Oord could claim that he 30
 Hermann Gunkel, Genesis, trans. by Mark E. Biddle (Macon, GA: Mercer University, 1997), 26
126-132.
 Gunkel, Genesis, 127.  See also Wenham Genesis 1-15, 16.27
 Jon D. Levenson, Creation and the Persistence of Evil: The Jewish Drama of Omnipotence 28
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1994), 122.
 Oord, “An Open Theology Doctrine of Creation,” 40.29
 Levenson, Creation and the Persistence of Evil, 122.  Oord, in his article, has a direct 30
quotation from page 121.
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does not think the chaos actively––but only passively––opposes God (nearer, 
perhaps to Messer’s position), but it still leaves the contradiction between some 
sort of opposition in creation and Levenson’s “creation without opposition” 
unsolved. 
 Instead of a struggle with evil chaos, what is seen in Genesis 1 is simply 
the existence of the chaos: of unordered water that has no boundaries.  God’s 
creative work brings some order and limitations to this watery chaos so that the 
world can become habitable and useful.  However, as Levenson points out, 
even though God is not opposed in any way by the chaos, “God has not 
annihilated the primordial chaos.  He has only limited it.  The same holds for the 
other uncreated reality, darkness.  Light, which is God’s first creation, does not 
banish darkness.”   Instead, light and darkness alternate, as each is useful for 31
different things.  So too, the land and the seas alternate, and neither holds 
dominance over the other.  The chaos, therefore, is not something that God 
could not subdue, but rather something that God did not subdue.   The 32
Genesis account does not leave room for Oord’s idea that this chaos has in any 
way inhibited God’s creative endeavour.  Instead it claims that even the waters 
and the darkness form a necessary part of creation.  We are left with the 
interesting exegetical reflection that the (literally) dark and dangerous elements 
of creation were left precisely because they were good and useful; fit to the 
purposes of God’s very good creation.  33
Satanic Opposition? 
 Levenson, Creation and the Persistence of Evil, 123.31
 This claim about the divine ability is reinforced by the hope that God can and will entirely do 32
away with dark and chaotic elements in the new creation.  See Revelation 21:1-4.
 That throughout the Hebrew Bible God regularly claims responsibility for these darker aspects 33
of creation will be explored in the next section.
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 What, then, of another possibility––the possibility that the problem was 
not a chaotic force that hindered God, but a malicious one that corrupted God’s 
world?  As noted in chapter 2, various theologians have come to the conclusion 
that the world was corrupted with the fall of the angels.  C.S. Lewis wrote: 
It seems to me... a reasonable supposition, that some mighty created 
power had already been at work for ill on the material universe, or the 
solar system, or, at least, the planet Earth, before ever man came on the 
scene...If there is such a power, as I myself believe, it may well have 
corrupted the animal creation before man appeared.    34
Gregory Boyd is more specific when he writes: 
God wasn’t the only agent involved in the evolutionary process: Satan 
and other malevolent cosmic powers have also been involved.  I will 
contend that the process of evolution may be seen as a sort of warfare 
between the life-affirming creativity of an all-good God, on the one hand, 
and the on-going corrupting influence of malevolent cosmic forces, on 
the other.    35
Paul Griffiths agrees, but extends the corruption beyond the process of 
evolution to the very fabric of creation: “Among these [created] creatures are 
angels; (almost) simultaneously with creation (in ictu), some among these rebel 
against their creator and introduce thereby deep damage into the otherwise 
harmoniously beautiful space-time fabric of the cosmos.  All creatures, material 
and immaterial, living and nonliving, are damaged by this fall.”  36
 While an angelic rebellion causing the cosmic fall solves the 
chronological problem of pre-human animal suffering, it raises two other serious 
questions: First, why is God’s creation (including humans and all living 
creatures) called “very good” and continually attributed to God’s work later in 
 C. S. Lewis, The Problem of Pain (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1996), 138.34
 Gregory Boyd, “Evolution as Cosmic Warfare: A Biblical Perspective on Satan and “Natural” 35
Evil,” in Creation Made Free, 127.
 Paul J. Griffiths, “Impossible Pluralism” First Things (June/July 2013), 48.  When I challenged 36
him on the biblical difficulties of his view, he responded: “I do think that Scripture tells the story 
of an angelic fall.  I recommend a close reading of books eleven and twelve of Augustine’s City 
of God, together with the scriptural texts he engages.  It’s an invigorating exercise.”  “Good from 
Evils,” First Things (October 2013): 13-14.
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Scripture, if in fact it has been deeply corrupted all along?  Second, how does 
one account for the lack of Scriptural evidence for such a view?  Where is this 
story of nature’s satanic corruption recounted in clear terms? 
 That the earth is considered God’s good work, and continues to operate 
under God’s sovereign dominion, is a common theme in the Bible: 
“ God saw everything that he had made, and indeed, it was very good.”  37
“The earth is the Lord’s and all that is in it, 
    the world, and those who live in it; 
  for he has founded it on the seas, 
    and established it on the rivers.”  38
“O Lord, how manifold are your works! 
    In wisdom you have made them all; 
    the earth is full of your creatures.”  39
“In his hand are the depths of the earth; 
    the heights of the mountains are his also. 
  The sea is his, for he made it, 
    and the dry land, which his hands have formed.”  40
            The whole of the divine dialogues in Job are an eloquent attribution of all 
the most problematic parts of creation to God’s handiwork, from carnivorous 
birds and giant sea monsters to hail and whirlwinds.   If we set aside readings 41
of Genesis 3 weighted by later tradition (or set aside the chapter itself for a 
moment), we would never arrive at the idea that the natural world was deeply 
corrupted by God’s curse from the texts in the Hebrew Bible.  Moreover, if there 
had been a profound corruption of the earth, if these aggressive elements of 
creation were against the divine will, why is it not mentioned?  Gregory Boyd 
would protest that it is mentioned, that the struggle between God and 
 Genesis 1:31a, NRSV.37
 Psalm 24:1-2, NRSV.38
 Psalm 104:24, NRSV.39
 Psalm 95:5-6, NRSV.40
 Job 38-41.41
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oppositional forces is reflected in the Old Testament passages where God 
rebukes the hostile waters of the םוהת or fights sea monsters, such as Psalm 
29:3-4; 18:15; 74:10-13; 89:9-10; 104:3-9; 106:9; Proverbs 8:27-29; Job 9:13; 
38:6-11; Habakkuk 3:8-15.   Boyd acknowledges that this opposition is not 42
present in Genesis 1,  but crops up throughout the Hebrew Bible.  He goes on 43
to elaborate that: 
The point of these passages is clearly to stress that Yahweh (and no 
other god) reigns supreme over the “proud” chaotic waters that threaten 
the foundation of the earth.  Indeed, unlike Baal, Tiamat, Enki or any 
other Near Eastern hero who is said to have controlled the chaos, 
Yahweh’s sovereignty is such that he can master these destructive forces 
by his mighty voice alone.  44
But if God is utterly sovereign over these chaotic forces, then, what is the 
problem?  Boyd argues “A very real battle took place when God created the 
world, and is still taking place as Yahweh (not Baal or Marduk) preserves the 
world from chaos.”  However there is no biblical justification for the second 
clause of Boyd’s claim.  All the passages that Boyd references celebrate God’s 
past and ultimate defeat of these chaotic elements.  There is no mention of their 
ongoing harassment of creation.  Quite the opposite, the past defeat of these 
mythological enemies is invoked as the reason that God should be able to save 
people from their current human enemies,  as is seen in Psalm 74:10-14:   45
How long, O God, is the foe to scoff? 
    Is the enemy to revile your name forever? 
 Boyd, “Evolution as Cosmic Warfare,” 134-35.42
 Gregory Boyd, God at War: The Bible & Spiritual Conflict (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 43
1997), 84-85.
 Boyd, God at War, 86.44
 That the Chaoskampf motif has more to do with the present appeal of Israelites to work in 45
history than God’s work in creation is argued by Dennis McCarthy and Andrew Angel over 
against John Day.  Dennis McCarthy, “‘Creation’ Motifs in Ancient Hebrew Poetry,” Catholic 
Biblical Quarterly 29: 393-406; Andrew R. Angel, Chaos and the Son of Man: The Hebrew 
Chaoskampf Tradition in the Period 515 BCE to 200 CE (London: T&T Clark, 2006), 9; John 
Day, God’s conflict with the Dragon and the Sea: Echoes of a Canaanite myth in the Old 
Testament (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 3-4.
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Why do you hold back your hand; 
    why do you keep your hand in your bosom? 
Yet God my King is from of old, 
    working salvation in the earth. 
You divided the sea by your might; 
    you broke the heads of the dragons in the waters. 
You crushed the heads of Leviathan; 
    you gave him as food for the creatures of the wilderness. 
The God able to crush Leviathan should surely not hold back against those who 
now scoff at God’s name.  Boyd suggests that the “foe” referred to in this Psalm 
is the ongoing presence of these chaotic spiritual forces in creation,  but the 46
actions of the foe (which include roaring within the holy place, setting up 
emblems, hacking the wooden trellis at the upper entrance with axes, and 
smashing the carved works with hatchets and hammers before setting the 
sanctuary on fire) rule out the possibility that it is spiritual forces that are here 
being considered: it is plainly referring to human soldiers.   The sea, the 47
dragons in the waters, and the Leviathan appear only as already defeated 
enemies.  They are not only defeated, but they fail to put up any kind of 
resistance to God’s attack.  Rebecca Watson notes “it appears that although 
Leviathan and Rahab are sometimes portrayed as recipients of Yahweh’s 
antagonism, the lack of resistance (or even acknowledged provocation or 
hostility) precludes speaking of a ‘combat’ proper.”   There is no indication that 48
there is any sort of an ongoing struggle with them.  Similarly, Boyd’s claim that 
“these hymns express the authors’ perception that the cosmos is besieged at a 
 Boyd, God at War, 87.  “This passage, which is possibly echoing  another Canaanite hymn, 46
seems to identify yām with “the dragons of the sea,” and the monster is clearly a mocking 
enemy of Yahweh....In short, even though God is in an ultimate sense sovereign, for the 
psalmist his battles with evil are not on this account in any sense a sham.  In contrast to 
Augustine, the psalmist sees that evil and thus warfare are absolutely real for God just as they 
are for his creation.”
 See Psalm 74:4-7.47
 Watson, Chaos Uncreated, 376.48
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structural level with forces of evil that God himself must battle”  is simply not 49
borne out by the biblical content.  Everywhere the total victory of God over 
chaotic forces and creatures is announced, proclaimed, and celebrated.  Where 
the chaotic forces or sea creatures do appear as currently existing, they are 
universally seen as one of God’s good created creatures or well within the 
boundaries of God’s current control.   In Genesis 1:21, the great sea creatures, 50
םנינתה, are simply considered creatures that Elohim created along with the rest.  
In Psalm 104:26 the Leviathan that God formed (the text emphatically reminds 
us) frolics in the sea.  In Job 41:1-11 the Leviathan is pictured as God’s servant, 
whom God can lead on a leash and play with like a pet bird.   The character of 51
Satan is also noticeably absent in the creation stories.  God, and God alone, is 
the Creator.  52
            Finally, Boyd (like Oord) points to the existence of the םוהת in 
Genesis as having “ominous overtones” or “indicating a lingering element of the 
 Boyd, God at War, 89.49
 E.g. Job 41:25; Genesis 1:21; Psalm 104:26, 146:6.50
 There is only one passage, Isaiah 27:1, that could contradict the idea that the monsters of 51
creation were utterly defeated: “On that day the Lord with his cruel and great and strong sword 
will punish Leviathan the fleeing serpent, Leviathan the twisting serpent, and he will kill the 
dragon that is in the sea.”  Here alone in the Hebrew Bible is there a sense that a brooding 
chaos monster might have been allowed a continued existence, and one that merits 
“punishment”.  The passage, however, forms part of the “Isaiah Apocalypse”, is highly figurative 
and describes the eschatological event of Leviathan’s defeat alongside the prediction that 
“Jacob shall take root, Israel shall blossom and put forth shoots, and fill the whole world with 
fruit.” (Isa 27:6)  As an idealised future order, it pictures redemption in a similar way to how 
Revelation 21:1 pictures the new heaven and the new earth without a sea.  The author of 
Revelation does not picture no sea because it was against the ability of God to subdue or 
eliminate the sea, but because the time for the disorder caused by the sea is finished and a new 
order is to take place.  Indeed, strong thematic links between Isaiah 24-27 and the book of 
Revelation have been pointed out.  See Day, God’s Conflict with the Dragon and the Sea, 
143-144.
 The one exception to the absence of Satan in these narratives might be Genesis 3 and the 52
snake in the garden.  However, identification of the snake in Genesis 3 with Satan has long 
been rejected by biblical scholars.  “The serpent which now enters the narrative is marked as 
one of God’s created animals (ch.2.19).  In the narrator’s mind, therefore, it is not the symbol of 
a ‘demonic’ power and certainly not of Satan.”  von Rad, Genesis: A Commentary (London: 
SCM Press, 1961), 87.
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Chaoskampf creation stories.”   Increasingly, however, exegetes are moving 53
away from even the initial identification of the םוהת with elements of chaos.   54
Whereas older exegetes regularly identified the םוהת with chaos,  Ellen van 55
Wolde and Norman Habel both conclude that chaos is not the primary aspect of 
the pre-created waters  and David Tsumura’s intensive exploration concludes 56
“The Hebrew term těhôm is simply a reflection of the common Semitic term 
*tihām- “ocean,” and there is no relation between the Genesis account and the 
so-called Chaoskampf mythology.”   More colloquially, William Brown writes 57
“But not to worry: the “deep” (těhôm) and the “waters” (mayim) lack the 
combative chaos that raged in Enūma elish, the Ba’al Epic, and for that matter 
Psalm 74:12-17... Rather, the curtain of creation rises to reveal a benign 
primordial soup.”    While the Genesis account may have been written in 58
response to Canaanite, Ugaritic, and Mesopotamian stories that contained such 
divine forces of watery chaos, an element of chaotic opposition in Genesis 1 is 
 Boyd, “Evolution as Cosmic Warfare,” 141.  Reflecting on the history of interpretation, 53
Rebecca Watson concludes “The term ‘chaos’ is unclear, inconsistently applied––and from the 
first, it was contested whether it accurately described the situation in Genesis 1.”  Chaos 
Uncreated, 18.
 David Tsumura, Creation and Destruction: A Reappraisal of the Chaoskampf Theory in the 54
Old Testament (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2005).
 See von Rad, Genesis, 49; John Day, God’s Conflict with the Dragon and the Sea, 4; Susan 55
Niditch, Chaos to Cosmos: Studies in Biblical Patterns of Creation (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 
1985),18.
 Habel, The Birth, The Curse and the Greening of the Earth, 29.  Ellen van Wolde, “Facing the 56
Earth: Primaeval History in a New Perspective,” in The World of Genesis: Persons, Places, 
Perspectives, ed. Philip R. Davies (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1998), 25.  Van Wolde writes 
“This is the primaeval situation: no ‘nothing’, nor a chaos that needs sorting out, but a situation 
of ‘before’ or ‘not-yet’ in view of what is coming.” 
 Tsumura, Creation and Destruction, 56-57.  The refusal to see chaos in the creation 57
narratives is not simply a recent phenomenon though: it was characteristic of the Patristics 
(Clement and Hippolytus), and many post-enlightenment writers as well (Herder).  See Rebecca 
S. Watson, Chaos Uncreated: A Reassessment of the Themes of “Chaos” in the Hebrew Bible 
(New York, NY: Walter de Gruyter, 2005), 14-15.  Watson also adds that “the association of the 
supposed ‘Chaoskampf’ theme with creation seems not to be original or central in the Hebrew 
Bible.” Chaos Uncreated, 379.
 Brown, Seven Pillars of Creation, 36.  Watson’s voice can also be helpfully added: “The 58
notion of combat with or the suppression of the sea is nowhere clearly expressed in the Old 
Testament and indeed there could be no place for such a notion within the monotheistic 
framework of which is it ultimately an expression.”  Chaos Uncreated, 398.
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noticeable only by its absence.   Formless matter is present, but not 59
oppositional chaotic forces.   Elsewhere, we are told “The Lord sits enthroned 60
over the flood;”  even the mighty flood waters are not a threat, but a foundation 61
for enthronement. 
The Dome of Eden 
 Stephen Webb proposes that between Genesis 1:1 and 1:2 stands a 
large narrative gap, and that the effect of the Satanic fall is indirectly attested to 
by the “chaotic” state of the world in 1:2.   Not only does all the evidence about 62
the non-chaotic nature of the primordial seas, explored above, contradict 
Webb’s thesis, but even he admits that the Gap Theory “is not widely accepted 
even among evangelical and fundamentalist theologians.”   None of the other 63
theologians who defend a satanic corruption of the world, even those such as 
Boyd who are convinced that the Scriptures do tell of Satan’s fall, reference this 
passage as a plausible source.   Michael Lloyd, who defends a cosmic fall 64
caused by the satanic fall, made a careful study of the origins of the angelic fall, 
but never mentions Genesis 1:1-2.   Webb’s use of this highly implausible 65
argument to root his theory already puts his account into question. 
 Brown, Seven Pillars of Creation, 31-32, 36.59
 In place of the chaos myth, Habel suggests a birth metaphor: the earth is surrounded by 60
waters just as an infant in the womb is surrounded by fluid.  Habel defends that primal birth 
images also emerge elsewhere in Scripture: the earth as mother is found in Psalm 139:13-15 
and Job 1:21, and the birth of the sea is pictured in Job 38:8, and of the mountains in Psalm 
90:2.  Habel, The Birth, The Curse and the Greening of the Earth, 31.  I do not agree that this is 
primarily what is going on (one would expect birth-type language to appear in Genesis 1, with 
words such as דלי, if that were the case), but it is a helpful way to re-imagine this text without the 
chaos motifs.
 Psalm 29:10, NRSV.61
 Webb, Dome of Eden, 143-145.62
 Webb, Dome of Eden, 143.63
 Boyd, as we saw above, admits that no divine battle motifs are found in Genesis 1, p. 109.64
 Michael Lloyd, “The Cosmic Fall and the Free Will Defence.”  (D.Phil Dissertation, Worcester 65
College, University of Oxford, 1996), chapter 5.
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Far more important to Webb’s theory, however, is the idea that the 
“firmament” or “dome” (ע’קר) created on the second day (Genesis 1:6-8) was a 
protective dome surrounding the Garden of Eden, excluding Satan’s otherwise 
ubiquitous corrupting effect on creation.  Inside the dome, according to Webb, 
was a world of peace and plenty, while outside it evolution took place, leaving 
all the physical evidence of strife we see today.  Webb therefore claims that his 
position accounts for the violence and suffering evidenced by the fossil record, 
while still maintaining a historical Eden where harmony and cooperation 
prevailed.  Webb’s exegesis is profoundly questionable when it comes to the 
construction of the firmament.  It is perhaps best to quote him at length: 
The dome is an arching vault that covers the Earth, or at least one part of 
the Earth.  I say one part of the Earth because it is not clear what 
cosmology the writer of Genesis is using...  On the one hand, if the sky or 
heaven is an immense vault that rests upon the Earth, then the Earth 
must be flat; otherwise, the dome could not encompass all of the Earth.  
The land left out of the dome would then have no sky.  On the other 
hand, if the dome was not the sky but some kind of symbol of God’s 
protective providence and if the Earth was not considered flat, then the 
Dome would cover only part of the Earth, and the earth that was left out 
of the Dome would indeed be waste and void.  Even if the Genesis writer 
thought the Earth was flat, he still could have conceived of the Dome as 
covering only part of the Earth, with parts of the Earth left out at the 
fringes of the Dome.  66
First, Webb does not address the ancient Near Eastern texts which 
regularly attest to a firmament covering the whole earth and separating it from 
the heavens, a concept Wenham calls “a familiar theme in ancient 
cosmologies.”   It is more plausible to assume that the author of Genesis 1 is 67
adopting the common cosmological construction of the time (i.e. that the dome 
 Webb, Dome of Eden, 166-167.66
 Wenham, Genesis 1-15, 20.  Actually, where Webb does mention ancient depictions of the 67
world, it is to say that the depiction of the earth as flat with a hard dome above it is “widespread 
in the ancient world.”  Webb, Dome of Eden, 214.
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covers the whole earth) than to assume that he is radically innovating on it while 
giving so little indication that he is doing so.  68
Second, there is absolutely no indication in the Genesis text that the 
dome only covered part of the earth, or that there were lands excluded from it.  
Not only is there not the slightest hint of lands existing outside the dome, but the 
internal coherence of the text would be hugely compromised if that were the 
case.  In Genesis 1:16-17 Elohim sets the heavenly lights––the sun, the moon, 
and the stars––“in the firmament,” ע’קרב, to give light to the earth.  If the dome 
only covered part of the earth, so too would the light of the sun, moon, and 
stars.  Since this is clearly not the case, Webb’s thesis that the dome only 
covers part of the earth is highly implausible. 
 Third, Webb’s case assumes that the dome which made Eden a paradise 
is inaccessible in present times.   Yet David praises God for the existence of 69
the firmament in Psalm 19:1, and recounts how day by day it “pours forth 
speech.”  If God had removed it after the fall, how can David refer to it as still 
existent in his day? 
 Finally, the dome theory leaves serious theological questions.  If God 
could so easily exclude Satan’s corrupting influence from a part of the earth, 
why would God not choose to do the same for all the rest of the earth?  Why 
allow creatures to suffer needlessly when it was so obviously preventable?  
 For more on the firmament and ancient cosmology, see Denis O. Lamoureux, Evolutionary 68
Creation: A Christian Approach to Evolution (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2008), 120-131.
 Webb, Dome of Eden, 225.  Confusingly, at one point, Webb seems to imply that the dome is 69
still in existence around the whole earth: “Scientists have long puzzled about the increasing rate 
of the universe’s outward expansion, and physicists have posited a dark energy to account for it.  
The latest thinking, however, is that the earth might be located in a kind of space-time bubble 
that is particularly void of matter.  This domically shaped bubble would explain why things look 
further away than they actually are, because light is distorted in a void.  The bubble of low 
density matter surrounding the Earth would thus make speculations about dark matter 
unnecessary.”  Webb, Dome of Eden, 215.  If the dome were still in existence around the world, 
one would expect the Edenic conditions underneath that Webb attributes to its presence in 
Genesis.
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Webb’s theory simply does not hold up on either biblical or philosophical 
grounds. 
 From the considerations explored in regard to Oord, Boyd, and Webb, 
we can conclude that the identification of natural evil as the result of malicious 
corruption, including satanic or chaotic ANE entities, which opposed God’s 
creative activity simply cannot be maintained on exegetical grounds.  70
Other Fallenness Scenarios 
 We should remember at this juncture the various other positions which 
advocate for a mysterious fallen cosmos without specifying more carefully what 
is meant, or where the evil in the cosmos originates.  The mysterious fallenness 
scenarios include Nicola Hoggard Creegan’s “wheat and tares” analogy, Celia 
Deane-Drummond’s “shadow sophia,” and Neil Messer’s Barthian 
“nothingness.”  Their approaches differ in important ways.  Hoggard Creegan’s 
approach, for example, is closer to the Satanic opposition theory since it admits 
some sort of opposition against God’s works in creation.   Deane-Drummond’s 71
approach is far more constitutive in nature: the goodness of creation necessarily 
creates shadows of evil, not as opposition, but as privatio boni.   Messer’s 72
approach is closer to Oord’s position, as it holds that an active principle of 
chaos, or “nothingness” has threatened God’s creation since before recorded 
history.   Violence and want are evidence of this non-being. 73
 Indeed, when highly destructive events happen in the Hebrew Bible, whether whirlwinds, 70
earthquakes, fire, or lightning storms, they are usually associated directly with God’s presence: 
Exodus 19:18; Psalm 77:18; Isaiah 29:6; Habakkuk 3.
 Hoggard Creegan, Animal Suffering, 77-78.71
 Deane-Drummond, “Shadow Sophia in Christological Perspective,” 13-32.72
 Messer, “Natural Evil after Darwin,” 139-154.73
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 Yet, none of these positions can account for God calling the creation 
“very good” once it rests in completion at the end of Genesis 1.  Nor can they 
account for the biblical tradition where God claims the violent aspects of 
creation as particular points of pride––particularly in the book of Job.  We must 
adopt a different paradigm, leaving aside the notion of fallenness.  To further 
support this move, I will explore the most important biblical texts that were 
developed into the Fall story, and argue that a fallen cosmos is not a required 
interpretation of the Scriptural witness. 
Genesis 3-9: The Curse 
 If we have ruled out the possibility that the primoridal creation was 
somehow corrupted by either chaotic or non-human agents, there still remains 
the traditional story of the human fall instigating a cosmic fall that has left 
creation cursed and ontologically crippled with violence.  I will show in this next 
section that the story in Genesis does not envision an ongoing immutable 
corruption of the earth due to human sin, such that it could be construed as a 
cosmic fall. 
 First, let us investigate the curse language in Genesis 3:14-19, which is 
the source story for the cosmic fall myth:   
The Lord God said to the serpent, 
 ‘Because you have done this, 
  cursed are you among all animals 
  and among all wild creatures; 
 upon your belly you shall go, 
  and dust you shall eat 
  all the days of your life. 
 I will put enmity between you and the woman, 
  and between your offspring and hers; 
 he will strike your head, 
  and you will strike his heel.’ 
 To the woman he said, 
 ‘I will greatly increase your pangs in childbearing; 
  in pain you shall bring forth children, 
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 yet your desire shall be for your husband, 
  and he shall rule over you.’ 
 And to the man he said, 
 ‘Because you have listened to the voice of your wife, 
  and have eaten of the tree 
  about which I commanded you, 
  “You shall not eat of it”, 
 cursed is the ground because of you; 
  in toil you shall eat of it all the days of your life; 
 thorns and thistles it shall bring forth for you; 
  and you shall eat the plants of the field. 
 By the sweat of your face  
  you shall eat bread 
 until you return to the ground, 
  for out of it you were taken; 
 you are dust, 
  and to dust you shall return.  74
Genesis 3:16: The Birth Pain Myth  75
 Before considering the main argument of the nature of the curse on the 
ground, let us investigate the seemingly tangential question of pain in childbirth 
which will act as a small scale argument for the main argument I wish to convey, 
namely, that a long tradition of one particular reading of these texts has 
influenced theology beyond the proper emphasis of the text. 
 The curse of increased pain for women in childbirth is a helpful way to 
look at one of the problems of the classic cosmic fall argument.  In short, 
throughout the history of interpretation, the curse language was understood to 
reflect some sort of physiological change in women that caused childbirth to be 
especially painful.   Developmental anatomists, however, tell us that the pain in 76
childbearing results from the large size of the human brain, and therefore of the 
 Genesis 3:14-19, NRSV.74
 I am grateful to Iain Provan for first pointing out the linguistic discrepancies that led to this 75
work.  His own developed work, published after this chapter was written, can be found in “Pain 
in Childbirth? Further Thoughts on ‘An Attractive Fragment’ (1 Chronicles 4:9-10),” in Let Us Go 
Up To Zion: Essays In Honour of H.G.M. Williamson on the Occasion of his Sixty-Fifth Birthday, 
Supplements to Vetus Testamentum 153, eds. Iain Provan and Mark Boda (Leiden, Brill, 2012): 
285-296.
 This is maintained even in contemporary commentaries:  Habel, The Birth, The Curse and the 76
Greening of the Earth, 61, 131.
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human head, conflicting with hips that are ever-narrowing due to an upright 
walking position.  Birth pains are not a result of the punishment of sin, but of 
conflicting anatomical endeavours.  There seems, therefore, to be a conflict 
between the biblical and scientific aetiologies of suffering in childbirth.  I will 
show, however, that this reading of the text is not the best available, and that in 
this particular instance, that there is no conflict because the biblical account 
does not actually make claims about physical pain in childbearing in the first 
place.  77
 The first thing to acknowledge is that modern English translations stand 
almost entirely against the interpretation I will try to make.  Here is a brief scope 
of the English translations of Genesis 3:16a: 
NRSV: “I will greatly increase your pangs in childbearing; in pain you shall bring 
forth children” 
TNIV: “I will make your pains in childbearing very severe; with pain you will give 
birth to children.” 
NASB: “I will greatly multiply Your pain in childbirth, in pain you will bring forth 
children;” 
CEV: “You will suffer terribly when you give birth.” 
ESV: “I will surely multiply your pain in childbearing; in pain you shall bring forth 
children.” 
 Early translations, either because they are more comfortable with the 
woodenness of the Hebrew text, or because they feel less need to interpret for 
their readers, translate the Hebrew more literally: 
 That is not to say that there are not other places where there is real conflict between the 77
biblical text and a contemporary scientific world-view.  Examples such as the existence of a 
firmament or the special creation of separate kinds of species pose serious conflicts for those 
who want to hold a very literal reading of the text.
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KJV: I will greatly multiply thy sorrow and thy conception; in sorrow thou shalt 
bring forth children. 
Wycliffe: I shall multiply thy wretchednesses and thy conceivings; in sorrow thou 
shalt bear thy children. 
The Hebrew phrase in question is: 
םינב ידלת בצעב ךנרהו ךנובצע הברא הברה  
 The first obvious difference between the early and the new translations is 
that the phrase ךנרהו ךנובצע,‘iṣḇônēk wehārōnēk, is treated as a hendiadys in the 
modern translations and left as a conjunctive phrase in the older versions.  As 
Hebrew meter allows for both enhancing parallelism, which would suggest the 
use of a hendiadys here, and contrasting parallelism, which would favour a 
contrasting conjunctive phrase, there would be little reason to choose one 
reading over another, all other things being equal.  However, the use of the 
word ןובצע, ‘āṣaḇôn, in the first part of the line and its root, בצע, ‘āṣaḇ in the 
second is significant because, as Wenham points out “Neither the word used 
here for “pain,” בצע, nor the earlier one, ןובצע, is the usual one for the pangs of 
childbirth.”   Hebrew has several different ways of expressing specifically the 78
pains of childbirth,  so why does the author use this particular word for pain 79
here?  Nowhere else is this word or its derivatives used in the context of birth 
pains.   Indeed, the word ןובצע is exceedingly rare, occurring only three 80
times––twice here in the curse formulation of Genesis 3 and once in Genesis 5 
 Wenham, Genesis 1-15, 81.78
 Such as דלי השק, or לוח.  79
 The one possible exception is in 1 Chronicles 4:9 where the mother of Jabez names him 80
“sorrow” because she bore him “with sorrow” (KJV) or “in pain” (NRSV): בצעב.  However, 
considering this to be specifically his birth pains is problematic, since in the next verse Jabez 
prays to be delivered from evil so that he would be “kept from hurt and harm” using the same 
root word for pain: יבצע יתלבל. It would be a strange man indeed who would be motivated to pray 
for deliverance from birth pains!  Even in this passage, the implication is toward a generalised 
circumstance of pain into which the woman gave birth.
!121
at the beginning of the flood narrative.  We shall come to a full discussion of the 
implications of this in the next section.  בצע, which is far more common, usually 
refers to mental or emotional distress.   It can mean hard labour in a physical 81
sense, but it never means physical pain.  Indeed, the Theological Dictionary of 
the Old Testament makes a special case about the use of this word in Genesis 
3:16. 
The traditional translations render both terms [בצע and ןובצע] with words 
for physical pain.  Since ‘ṣb II refers more to mental than to physical pain, 
however, this traditional interpretation must be called into question... In 
the nuanced biblical lexical field of pregnancy and birth (→הרה hārâ), that 
latter does not refer to the actual process of childbirth... The second 
clause of v. 16 deals with the theme of “having children”; it does not 
necessarily refer to the process of childbirth itself, for → דל’ yālaḏ can 
mean simply “have” or “produce” children and is used of both men and 
women.  Having many children was a desirable and fundamental aspect 
of the labor-intensive agricultural society, albeit not without difficulties: 
parenting had its own special “pain.”  Thus the meaning of ‘eṣeḇ in this 
text is ambiguous: it can mean “labor” and “work” and intensify that 
statement of the preceding clause; it can refer to the psychological stress 
of family life; or it can mean both.  But it does not mean physical pain.  82
            These considerations move one away from interpreting 
the phrase ךנרהו ךנובצע as a hendiadys meaning “birth pains” and towards 
separating the two words into being represented individually, as in “your pains 
and your conceptions I shall greatly increase.” 
 What difference does this make?  The punishment laid on the woman is 
not an increase in physical labour pains as the modern translations imply, but 
rather a warning that the general circumstances surrounding the birth of a child 
will become extremely painful.  Where childbirth ought to be a joyful occasion––
bringing new life into a world of relational peace and harmony––now children 
are introduced into a world of pain and uncertainty.  Yet, despite human sin, the 
 C. Meyers, “asab,” Theological Dictionary of the Old Testament, eds. G. Johannes 81
Botterweck, Helmer Ringgren, and Heinz-Josef Fabry (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2001), 11: 
279.  
 Meyers, Theological Dictionary of the Old Testament, 280.82
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promise of increased conceptions also gives hope of God’s continued work with 
humans.   Life will continue, and people will still multiply and fill the earth.  83
Thus, even in this larger textual passage of curse formula (though no curse is 
laid directly on the man or the woman, only on the snake and the ground), the 
promise and blessing of God is found to continue. 
 In summary, we see how a close reading of the text reveals that there is 
no conflict between the modern scientific understandings of birth pangs and the 
aetiological account of child birth and pain in the Scriptures.  This is not 
because, as some might have it, the Hebrew authors had an understanding of 
the natural necessity of labour pains, but simply because the text does not 
actually claim what the popular imagination has, because of modern 
translations, assumed it does.   Genesis 3 makes no claims at all about the 84
origins of physical labour pains, but only of the sorrow-filled world into which 
children are born. 
 In a similar way, I will argue, the opening chapters of the Bible make no 
negative claim about the ongoing nature of the created world.  There is no 
cosmic fall in the Hebrew Scriptures.  I will argue that the curse laid in chapter 3 
is lifted in the Noahic flood episode, leaving the ground released from its curse. 
בצע Use of  
Part of constructing the argument that Genesis 3 and Genesis 5-8 form 
one story about the laying down and the lifting of the same curse involves 
finding lexical links that draw the narratives together.  I want to return for a 
 Alternatively, and more darkly, it may mean that more conceptions will be needed because of 83
increased child mortality rates.
 There are, of course, other etiological claims made by the Hebrew author that would conflict 84
with science, such as the monogenesis of humanity and the lack of evolutionary development of 
life forms.
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moment to the repetition of those strange words in Genesis 3:16, בצע and ןובצע. 
Why does the author use these two rare words in this passage?  ןובצע is used 
only three times in the entire Hebrew Bible.  Twice it is used in the Genesis 3 
curse formula, once of the man and once of the woman, creating a parallel 
between their punishments.  The final time it appears is in Genesis 5:29, in the 
Noahic episode that we shall soon consider.  Is there any other reason for the 
author to use this particular word for pain when other, perhaps more clear 
words, were available? 
            I want to suggest that the author’s use of בצע, ‘āṣaḇ, in this 
context is due to a play on words being created with the phonetically similar 
word בזע, ‘āzaḇ.  Meaning “to forsake” or “to leave,” בזע has already shown up 
in the garden episode in 2:24 in which a man “will leave his father and mother in 
order to cleave to his wife.”  Used once in a positive sense of normal human 
relations, a play on the words showing up in the context of the disruption of 
human relations, particularly between the husband and the wife, seems apt. 
Elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible the two terms show up together, most 
notably in Isaiah 54:6a: 
For the Lord has called you 
    like a wife forsaken and grieved in spirit 
הוהי ךארק הור תבוצעו הבוזע השאכ־יכ 
The description is of a woman who is both abandoned (בזע) and in pain 
(בצע) of spirit.  The prophet uses both these words together in the context of 
speaking of the marriage bond between Yahweh and Israel, and it seems to 
indicate that in the covenant context these words could have a close lexical 
link.   In 2 Samuel 5:21 and 2 Chronicles 24:18, these same Hebrew roots 85
 Helpfully, for my case, the link between the marriage covenant between Israel and Yahweh 85
and the covenant between Yahweh and Noah is made evident by the following lines in 54:9 
“This is like the days of Noah to me: Just as I swore that the waters of Noah would never again 
go over the earth, so I have sworn that I will not be angry with you and will not rebuke you.”
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show up together again, although here a slightly different word with the same 
root בזע,‘āṣāḇ is used, which means “idol.”   The use of these two related 86
words together, particularly as we find them once again in the context of 
covenantal themes, reinforces the possibility that the writer of Genesis used בצע 
in order to evoke its similarity to בזע, and having used בצע, would then in turn 
use the rare but related word ןובצע.  Word play of this sort is not unfamiliar to the 
author of the garden narrative.  Indeed, wordplays run throughout this passage, 
the most obvious of which are the play between םדא,‘ādām, and המדא, 
‘ādāmah, in 2:7 and 3:17 and the play between םורע, ‘ārôm, and םורע, ‘ārum, in 
2:25 and 3:1.  While a link between בצע and בזע is by no means certain, it may 
help us understand why the very rare word ןובצע is used twice of the human pair 
in the context of their self-alienation from God and from each other, particularly 
in light of their marital and covenantal bonds. 
Genesis 3, Noah, and ררא  
                   As mentioned earlier, the word ןובצע only 
shows up in three places: twice in the curse formula of Genesis 3, and once just 
before the Noahic narrative in Genesis 5:29.  Immediately the reader ought to 
be alerted to possible links between the two narratives.  Comparing Genesis 
3:17 and 5:29 gives a clear picture of the similarities: 
Gen 3:17 “And to the man he said, ‘Because you have listened to the voice of 
your wife, and have eaten of the tree about which I commanded you, “You shall 
not eat of it”, cursed [רוררא] is the ground [המדאה] because of you; in toil [ןובצע] 
you shall eat of it all the days of your life.’” 
 On occasion, though, it is ambiguous which root is meant.  Wellhausen, in Psalm 16:4 argues 86
that ‘aṣṣāḇôṯ should be connected with ‘ōṣeḇ instead of with ‘aṣṣeḇeṯ.  Graupner, TDOT, Vol. XI, 
281.
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הרורא ונממ לכאת אל רמאל ךיתיוצ רשא ץגה־נמ לכאתו ךתשא לוקל תעמש יכ רמא םדאלו 
ךייח ימי לכ הנלכאת ןובצעב ךלרובעב הדראה 
Genesis 5:29 “He named him Noah [חנ], saying, ‘Out of the ground [המדאה] that 
the Lord has cursed [הררא] this one shall bring us relief [םחנ] from our work and 
the toil [ןובצע] of our hands’” 
הוהי הררא רשא המדאה־ןמ ונידי ןובצעמו ונשעממ ונמחני הז רמאל חנ ומש־תא ארקין 
The related themes between these two passages are clear: the ground, 
the curse, and the toil.  Nowhere else do these three terms come together.  In 
between these two narratives, in 4:1-16, is the account of Cain, who is cursed 
[ררא] from the ground on account of his brother’s blood, and so the theme of the 
curse weaves like a thread through the early Genesis narratives, linking the 
stories together. 
            When the reader arrives in Genesis 5:29, the curse has been laid 
down and the prophetic statement that Noah will relieve people of the toil of the 
curse has been received.  In 5:29 there is a play on words between Noah’s 
name, חנ, nōaẖ, and the relief םחנ, naẖam, that he is to bring.  Then follows the 
flood narrative in which the world is uncreated and the chaos of the seas rules 
over the earth.  But as the flood subsides (ללק), the earth re-emerges and God 
reaffirms his covenant with all living creatures in chapter 9 and assures Noah 
that a similar destruction will never overtake the earth.  Just before the new 
covenant is established, Noah builds an altar and offers a sacrifice: 
Genesis 8:21, NRSV 
And when the LORD smelt the pleasing odour, the LORD said in his heart, “I will 
never again curse the ground because of humankind, for the inclination of the 
human heart is evil from youth; nor will I ever again destroy every living creature 
as I have done. 
יכ םדאה רובעב המדאה־תא דוע ללקל ףסא־אל ובל־לא הוהי רמאיו חחינה חיר־תא הוהי חריו 
יתישע רשאכ יח־לכ־תא תוכהל דוע ףסא־אלו ןירענמ ער םדאה בל רצי 
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I mentioned earlier the play on words between Noah and the relief he was to 
bring.  A similar play on words occurs here between Noah, the relief of chapter 
5, and God’s response of finding the offering soothing.  Noah, חנ, is to bring 
relief, םחנ, and offers a sacrifice which God finds “soothing”, חחינ.  These 
sacrifices are restful, חונ, to God.  As Gordon Wenham writes: 
Here however, it is also a deliberate pun on Noah’s name.  We might 
even paraphrase it, ‘The LORD smelt the Noahic sacrifice.’  Lamech 
called his son ‘Noah’ because he hoped he would bring him rest from the 
labor of his hands (5:29): here God implies that Noah’s sacrifice has 
soothed him.    87
God, being soothed by the sacrifice, relieves the people of their curse through 
the ground.   Lamech’s hope for his son is fulfilled and the curse on the ground 88
is resolved.  “Now,” writes Norman Habel, “with the revoking of this curse, 
nature will no longer suffer divine curses because of human sinfulness.... The 
natural order is declared safe from divine acts of judgment provoked by human 
deeds.”   So far, the removal of the curse seems like a fairly easy argument to 89
sustain: the curse narrative is a typical Hebraic inclusio encompassing creation 
and re-creation. 
A Problem 
            There is however a problem.  Let us look again at the lexical links 
that draw the passages together.  The use of the word ררא for “curse” in both 
3:17 and 5:29 is of particular interest as a link, since ררא is only otherwise used 
of Cain and of Canaan in the primordial Israelite myths that comprise the first 
eleven chapters of Genesis.    In Cain’s case, there exists a strong lexical 90
 Wenham, Genesis 1-15, 189.87
 Ellen van Wolde, Stories of the Beginning: Genesis 1-11 and Other Creation Stories, trans. by 88
John Bowden (London: SCM, 1996), 127.
 Habel, The Birth, The Curse and the Greening of the Earth, 105.89
 Genesis 4:11 & 9:25.90
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current in favour of linking the curse in chapter 4 with the curse in chapter 3 and 
5 since both ררא and the ground, המדא, show up together: “And now you are 
cursed [ררא] from the ground, which has opened its mouth to receive your 
brother’s blood from your hand.”   The cursed ground extends its curse up to 91
Cain. 
             When Canaan is cursed in 9:25 after the flood, he is cursed 
independently of the ground, on account of his own (or rather, his father’s) evil 
action.  This is the first time the word ררא is used independently of the ground, 
המדא.  Indeed, after 5:29 and the Noahic flood, the ררא curse is never again 
used in conjunction with the ground, המדא,  indicating perhaps, that in the new 92
world order established after the flood people are cursed only by their own 
actions (most obviously laid out in Deuteronomy 27:15-26) and no longer on 
account of, or through, the ground as Adam and Cain had been––the same 
curse that Lamech recognised he toiled under.  Again, this reinforces the case 
that the ררא on the ground was lifted.  Yet a wrench enters the argument when 
we look at 8:21 more closely.  When the LORD proclaims that he will never 
again curse the ground, the same word, ררא, is not used of the curse, but rather 
the much milder curse word ללק.  
            If there is a case to be made for the lifting of the Genesis 3 curse 
on the ground in Genesis 8:21, we must ask why the author did not again use 
ררא but changes to the milder curse word ללק?  Gordon Wenham argues that 
the author changed words because we should not understand the original curse 
 Genesis 4:11, NRSV.91
 The closest to the ground being cursed after this is in Deuteronomy 28:16-18 when the 92
people are assured that if they fail to keep the law they will be cursed in the field, and the fruit of 
the ground.
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on the ground to be lifted, but rather that God only promises not to add to it.   93
“The flood was a punishment over and above that decreed in 3:17... it is simply 
the threat of another flood that is lifted.”  94
Wenham, however, does not seem to take into account that the flood is 
never referred to as a curse.  What other curse could the author be referring to 
in 8:21 if not the curse that has been wending its way through the last five 
chapters?  Scharbert asks  “But what is the meaning of lᵉqalēll in Gen. 8:21, 
since there is no mention of any actual curse in the whole deluge narrative?  
Here too we can probably follow the early versions (katarásasthai, maledicere) 
in translating the verse: ‘I will never again curse the earth.’”   Sharbert argues 95
that even with no other mention of a curse in the deluge narrative, we can take 
it to be referring to the stronger notion of curse already familiar to the reader. 
While I agree with Scharbert that no curse is mentioned in the deluge 
narrative itself, there is as we have seen the mention of ררא in 5:29 in reference 
to Noah, before the formal beginning of the deluge narrative in 6:9.   The play of 
words on Noah’s name, the relief of the sacrifice, combined with the emphasis 
on the ground and the curse seems a significant enough link to hold the two 
passages together.  We are to see the promise of God fulfilled as the lifting of 
the curse; it is the looked-for rest from the ןובצע, the toil and pain, resulting from 
the curse on the ground.  The relief is made tangible, when, after the flood Noah 
 Wenham, Genesis 1-15, 190.  David Clines also thinks this is the case, but argues that it is 93
because of the parallelism with God promising not to destroy all living things again.  David J. A. 
Clines, The Theme of the Pentateuch, 2nd ed. (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1997), 77.
 Wenham, Genesis 1-15, 190.94
 J. Scharbert, “qll,” Theological Dictionary of the Old Testament, Vol. 13 (Grand Rapids, MI: 95
Eerdmans, 2001), 40.
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plants a vineyard that is so abundantly fruitful that he becomes magnificently 
drunk.    96
            Why does the author not use ררא in 8:29?  Perhaps it is because 
ללק has already appeared twice in the 8th chapter, referring to the abating of the 
water, and the author wishes to include a pun about the abating sea and the 
end of the curse.  In the end, it is not certain why the author moves over to this 
other, as yet unused word.  Still, it is significant that the word ררא occurs four 
times in quick succession in these chapters all in close proximity to the word 
המדא and then the two never occur together again in the remaining 59 
occurrences of the word ררא in the Hebrew Bible.  It seems strongly to suggest 
that the curse on the המדא is no longer in effect in the Hebraic mind. 
Conclusion to Genesis 1-9 
            We have seen now how there is good reason to see the curse laid 
on the ground in 3:17 as having been lifted in the new order of creation after the 
flood.  Norman Habel concludes “The removal of the curse means that nature is 
fully alive once again, fully green and vibrant.  Now there is no fallen creation, 
no dark side to nature because of human sin.  Nature is free of the curse, 
liberated to become lush, green and plentiful.”    97
Drawing out the lexical connections between 3:17, 5:29 and 8:21 we 
have seen how there runs a simple narrative thread: curse, prophecy of the 
relief of the curse, and then the lifting of the curse.  The difficulties in this story, 
particularly the use of ללק rather than ררא in 8:29, do not pose insurmountable 
objections to this interpretation.  Rather, the ending of the curse lends 
 W. M. Clark also links this fruitfulness to the lifting of the curse.  “The Flood and the Structure 96
of the Pre-patriarchal History,” Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft 83:2 (1971), 
208.
 Habel, The Birth, The Curse and the Greening of the Earth, 111.97
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coherence to the story: chaos has receded, the curse is lifted, and a new 
covenant is made with all living creatures as the creation gets off to a fresh 
start.  Where, in the cursed earth, thistles and thorns were brought forth to man, 
now they have resumed their proper order, only to be renewed in disorder if 
people actively disobey the law, as the Israelites are warned in Deuteronomy 27 
& 28.  The particular type of toil referred to as a result of the curse, the ןובצע, is 
never again brought up in the Hebrew Bible.   
 As in the example of childbirth pain above, we have a tradition of reading 
into the curse narrative cosmic effects that are not evident from the text.  Weeds 
and thistles were not necessarily introduced to the world because of the curse, 
only given a new relationship to humanity through humanity’s misdeeds.   98
Predation and natural disasters, traditionally also assigned to the cosmic effect 
of the human fall, are not even mentioned.  Instead, what we see is that the 
ground is cursed in relation to humanity in Genesis 3, and the curse is lifted in 
Genesis 8.  The cosmic fall as a result of the human fall, which is also the 
traditional narrative explaining the existence of natural evil, simply does not 
exist in the opening chapters of Genesis.  We cannot look here for an 
explanation of the abundant suffering of the non-human world. 
Romans 8 
 In addition to the text of Genesis, however, there is often an appeal to 
Paul’s writing in Romans 8:18-23 as the reason a Christian worldview must hold 
an anthropogenic cosmic fall.   The passage in question reads:   99
I consider that the sufferings of this present time are not worth comparing 
with the glory about to be revealed to us.  For the creation waits with 
eager longing for the revealing of the children of God; for the creation 
 See Augustine’s point on p. 101 above.98
 E.g. Boyd, “Evolution as Cosmic Warfare,” 139.99
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was subjected to futility, not of its own will but by the will of the one who 
subjected it, in hope that the creation itself will be set free from its 
bondage to decay and will obtain the freedom of the glory of the children 
of God. We know that the whole creation has been groaning in labor 
pains until now; and not only the creation, but we ourselves, who have 
the first fruits of the Spirit, groan inwardly while we wait for adoption, the 
redemption of our bodies.  100
Most interpreters hear in Paul’s veiled references to “the subjection of nature to 
futility” and its “bondage to decay” an allusion to the Adamic narrative of sin in 
Genesis 3 and the subsequent curse on the ground.   The difficulty of the 101
passage is contained, according to James Dunn, in the fact that “Paul was 
attempting to convey too briefly a quite complicated point: that God subjected all 
things to Adam, and that included subjecting creation to fallen Adam, to share in 
his fallenness.”   If these commentators are right, and Paul is alluding to the 102
curse narrative in Genesis, then (apart from the type of exegesis shown earlier 
in this chapter) those who wish to take the Bible seriously would be hard 
 Romans 8:18-23, NRSV.100
 This is the usual interpretation in the standard commentaries: Ernst Käsemann, Commentary 101
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C.E.B. Cranfield, The Epistle to the Romans Vol. 1, International Critical Commentary 
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38a (Dallas, TX: Word Books, 1988), 469-471; Joseph A. Fitzmyer, Romans, Anchor Bible 
Series 33 (New York, NY: Doubleday, 1993), 505-507; Thomas R. Schreiner, Romans, Baker 
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do emphasise that a broader background than just Genesis 3 is likely in view; Ben Witherington 
III, Paul’s Letter to the Romans: A Socio-Rhetorical Commentary (Grand Rapids, MI: 2004), 
223.  Andrew Linzey, “Good News for the World?”, Third Way 26:6 (2000), 24;  Harry A. Hahne, 
“The Birth Pangs of Creation, The Eschatological Transformation of the Natural World in 
Romans 8:19-22,” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Evangelical Theological 
Society, Nov. 1999; available at http://www.balboa-software.com/hahne/ BirthPangs.pdf, 
accessed 18 Sept 2013; Harry A. Hahne, The Corruption and Redemption of Creation: Nature in 
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history of interpretation, see Horrell, Hunt, and Southgate, Greening Paul: Rereading the 
Apostle in a Time of Ecological Crisis (Waco, TX: Baylor University, 2010), 65-70.
 Dunn, Romans 1-8, 471.  Hahne shares this view: not that creation fell because of rebellion, 102
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pressed to deny the strength of the human fall causing a cosmic fall––or at least 
that Paul thought it was so.  103
 However, there is another perspective on this passage which avoids this 
problem.  Laurie Braaten suggests instead, and Richard Bauckham agrees, that 
Paul is alluding to the Hebrew Bible’s motif of the earth going into mourning 
found in the prophets, rather than to Genesis 3.   Hosea 2:3-14; 4:3; Jeremiah 104
4:23-28; 12:1-11; 23:9-12; and Amos 1:2 all use the motif of the mourning earth 
to describe the disfunction of the earth as a direct result of human sinfulness 
and often of subsequent divine punishment.  Their argument begins by dividing 
up the terms συστενάζει καὶ συνωδίνε in verse 22 and refusing to see the 
phrase as a hendiadys (“groaning in labour”) but rather as two separate terms 
“groaning” and “travailing.”  Separated in this way, the terms do not seem to 
point together to a one-time event in the past, such as the Genesis 3 curse, but 
rather point to two different spheres of meaning.  The groaning refers to––based 
on Paul’s use in 2 Corinthians 5:2 and the regular use in the LXX ––mourning 105
and lament.   The travailing is associated with Hebrew Bible images of divine 106
judgement.   There are nine passages in the Hebrew prophets where the 107
earth is said to mourn in response to human sin or divine judgment on sin.   In 108
 Some scholars are willing to say both that Paul thought the cosmic fall was incited by a 103
historical Adam, and that Paul was mistaken in this respect.  Lamoureux, Evolutionary Creation, 
324.
 Laurie J. Braaten, “All Creation Groans: Romans 8:22 in Light of the Biblical Sources,” 104
Horizons in Biblical Theology 28 (2006): 131-159;  Richard Bauckham, Bible and Ecology: 
Rediscovering the Community of Creation (London: Dartman, Longman & Todd, 2010), 92-101.
 See Braaten, “All Creation Groans,” 138-141.105
 Braaten, “All Creation Groans,” 152-154.106
 Jeremiah 4:31, Isaiah 21:2-3.  See also Conrad Gempf, “The Imagery of Birth Pangs in the 107
New Testament,” Tyndale Bulletin 45:1 (1994), 122-125.
 Amos 1:2; Hosea 4:1-3; Jeremiah 4:23-28, 12:1-4, 12:7-13, 23:9-12; Isaiah 24:1-20, 33:7-9; 108
Joel 1:5-20.  See Katherine M. Hayes, “The Earth Mourns”: Prophetic Metaphor and Oral 
Aesthetic, Academia Biblica 8 (Leidin: Koninklijke Brill, 2002).
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Hosea 4:1-3, for example, the earth languishes because of the sin of the 
people: 
Hear the word of the Lord, O people of Israel; 
    for the Lord has an indictment against the inhabitants of the land. 
There is no faithfulness or loyalty, 
    and no knowledge of God in the land. 
Swearing, lying, and murder, 
    and stealing and adultery break out; 
    bloodshed follows bloodshed. 
Therefore the land mourns, 
    and all who live in it languish; 
together with the wild animals 
    and the birds of the air, 
    even the fish of the sea are perishing.  109
In Jeremiah the suffering caused by the demise of the earth stands as one of 
the outcomes of divine judgment:  
I looked on the earth, and lo, it was waste and void; 
    and to the heavens, and they had no light. 
 I looked on the mountains, and lo, they were quaking, 
    and all the hills moved to and fro. 
I looked, and lo, there was no one at all, 
    and all the birds of the air had fled. 
I looked, and lo, the fruitful land was a desert, 
    and all its cities were laid in ruins 
    before the Lord, before his fierce anger.  110
In other prophetic passages the absence of fruit on the vines (Isaiah 24:7) or 
the departure of birds (Jeremiah 4:25) are the outcomes of human abuse and 
the sentence of punishment.  In each of these instances the earth mourns and 
“what the Earth mourns is the withering and destruction of inhabitants, flora and 
fauna, and so Paul’s phrase ‘bondage to decay’ or ‘bondage to a process of 
destruction’ (v 21) is an appropriate description of the state to which God has 
assigned creation because of human sin.”   Yet these are localised responses 111
to localised human sins, not a cosmic fall scenario where all of nature is 
 Hosea 4:1-3, NRSV.109
 Jeremiah 4:23-26, NRSV.110
 Bauckham, Bible and Ecology, 97.111
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inherently bound to decay because of a one-time curse.  Instead, because all 
the earth is filled with people, and “all have sinned” (Romans 3:23), so too Paul 
can say the “whole creation” is subject to the effects of sin.   
 Perhaps the link between Romans 8 and the Hebrew Bible prophets is 
most clearly seen in Isaiah 24-27.  Although this passage is primarily one of 
lament and judgement, it contains prophecies of hope for the deliverance of 
both humanity and the wider creation.  The most important aspects are the 
lexical links.  In Isaiah 24:1, we are told that in response to sin the earth will be 
“utterly laid waste and utterly despoiled,”  or more literally, “destroyed with 112
decay (φθαρησέται φθορᾷ)—the same term used by Paul in Rom 8:21 to 
characterize the decay to which creation has been subjected.”   Note that the 113
term φθορᾷ, or decay, is absent from the LXX of Genesis 3 yet here it is used of 
the future judgment that will occur in response to sin.  The decay is associated, 
too, with a curse on the earth (Isaiah 24:6 “Therefore a curse devours the earth, 
and its inhabitants suffer for their guilt”), but it is obviously distinct from the 
curse pronounced in Genesis 3 since it has just come into effect.  So too, 
waiting in hope is not mentioned in Genesis 3, but waiting on the future 
deliverance of the LORD is made explicit in Isaiah 25:9: 
 It will be said on that day, 
     Lo, this is our God; we have waited for him, so that he might save us. 
     This is the Lord for whom we have waited; 
     let us be glad and rejoice in his salvation.  114
 Isaiah 24:3, NRSV.112
 Braaten, “All Creation Groans,” 145.  Note that φθορᾷ in this context does not mean the 113
instantiation of all decay that has ever happened, as might be imagined in a cosmic fall 
scenario.  It means undue decay, or lack of fruitfulness from expected sources, such as the 
languishing vine (v.7) causing a lack of wine (v. 7 & 9), or the earth enduing up “polluted under 
its inhabitants” (v.5).
 Isaiah 25:9, NRSV.  Waiting on the LORD’s deliverance is also mentioned in Isaiah 26:8.114
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Other thematic and lexical links draw the two passages together.  Jonathan Moo 
in particular has found strong parallels between Isaiah 24-27 and Romans 8.   115
He notices that the common themes include: 
the suffering of the earth due to the Lord’s punishment of human sin, the 
personification of creation’s response to judgment, the promise that 
God’s glory will be revealed, the present waiting of the righteous in 
expectant hope, the use of birth-pang imagery, the defeat of death, and 
the possibility of life beyond death.    116
However Moo, unlike Braaten and Bauckham, does not deny that Paul was 
referencing Genesis 3.  In fact, he considers it “nearly certain” that Paul has 
been influenced by the Genesis narrative, but finds that “though Paul indeed 
links the subjection of creation back to Adam, he interprets this narrative in such 
a way that the effects of the subjection of creation continue to be worked out in 
the context of a dynamic and ongoing relationship between God, Adamic 
humanity, and the rest of creation.”   I agree that the Adam event is central to 117
Paul’s thought in Romans as a whole, and it is probable that some echo of it is 
in view here.  Yet, the uniqueness of the language of the groaning creation and 
travail (Paul does not use this language in the rest of Romans) may indicate 
that he is drawing from a different source, the prophetic literature, instead of the 
Adamic myth.   Moo’s final conclusion, with which I agree, is that “if Rom 118
8.19-22 is to be read in light of Paul’s possible use of Isaiah 24-27, the effects 
 Jonathan Moo, “Romans 8:19-22 and Isaiah’s Cosmic Covenant,”  New Testament Studies 115
54:1 (2008): 74-89.
 Moo, “Romans 8:19-22,” 84.116
 Moo, “Romans 8:19-22,” 84.117
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of creation’s subjection may not have entailed for Paul a once-for-all ontological 
change in the created order, or a ‘fall of nature’ in the traditional sense.”  119
 There is also a very positive outcome to the idea that Paul is drawing 
from the prophets: the prophets focus also on salvation for those who mourn 
and the eventual release for the mourning earth.  The mourning of the land in 
Isaiah 33:7-9 and the mourning women in Isaiah 32:11-13 are promised the 
peaceful reign of God in Isaiah 32:15-20, including the animals who live in 
peaceable relationship with humans: 
Until a spirit from on high is poured out on us, 
    and the wilderness becomes a fruitful field, 
    and the fruitful field is deemed a forest. 
Then justice will dwell in the wilderness, 
    and righteousness abide in the fruitful field. 
The effect of righteousness will be peace, 
    and the result of righteousness, quietness and trust forever. 
My people will abide in a peaceful habitation, 
    in secure dwellings, and in quiet resting places. 
The forest will disappear completely, 
    and the city will be utterly laid low. 
Happy will you be who sow beside every stream, 
    who let the ox and the donkey range freely.  120
The devastated and withering fields will be fruitful, the ox and donkey will range 
freely.   Similarly in Joel, the destruction of the earth sends the land and 121
animals into mourning: 
The fields are devastated, 
    the ground mourns; 
for the grain is destroyed, 
    the wine dries up, 
 Moo, “Romans 8:19-22,” 89.  Italics original.  Emil Brunner is more emphatic: “The Bible 119
knows nothing of a ‘fallen world’... We have no right to turn the divine promise that things will 
one day be different from what they are now, in to the conclusion that ‘once they were not.”  The 
Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, Dogmatics: Vol. II, trans by. Olive Wyon 
(London: Lutterworth, 1952), 128. 
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    the oil fails.  122
How the animals groan! 
    The herds of cattle wander about 
because there is no pasture for them; 
    even the flocks of sheep are dazed... 
Even the wild animals cry to you 
    because the watercourses are dried up, 
and fire has devoured 
    the pastures of the wilderness.  123
Yet, as the inhabitants join in the mourning and repent (1:11-15) fruitfulness is 
restored to the people, to the land and to the animals: 
In response to his people the Lord said: 
I am sending you 
    grain, wine, and oil, 
    and you will be satisfied; 
and I will no more make you 
    a mockery among the nations. 
Do not fear, O soil; 
    be glad and rejoice, 
    for the Lord has done great things! 
Do not fear, you animals of the field, 
    for the pastures of the wilderness are green; 
the tree bears its fruit, 
    the fig tree and vine give their full yield.  124
The curses brought upon the earth by humans’ sin are not irreversible or 
immutable, but subject to repentance and restoration: hints of the restoration 
that Paul refers to as the creation being made subject “in hope.”  125
There is a correlation between the redemption of humanity and the 
release of creation from sin’s damaging effects.  Until that day of full 
redemption, the creation is made subject (by God) to µαταιότης, to a frustrated 
state, where the world displays the “ineffectiveness of that which fails to attain 
 Joel 1:10, NRSV.122
 Joel 1:18, 20.123
 Joel 1:19, 21-22, NRSV.124
 For further work on the theme of Paul’s hope, see Horrell et. al., Greening Paul, 175-176.125
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its goal.”   The frustration of the created order echoes the book of 126
Ecclesiastes, with its continual refrain that all is לבה, hebel, subject to frustration 
and fleeting good.   C. E. B. Cranfield likens this frustration to the members of 127
a concerto group being frustrated by the soloist failing to play his or her part.   128
It is an analogy that may be worth some further exploration. 
 If the whole creation can be likened to a symphony of praise, we can 
begin to parse out the meaning of creation’s µαταιότης, its futility and frustration.  
Imagine a symphony orchestra arranged to play one of Mozart’s concertos.  The 
horns and woodwinds and large stringed instruments all begin in unison and in 
harmony, and the sound builds into a beautiful melodic theme.  But, suddenly, 
the violins––brashly ignoring the conductor and the music––interrupt on 
untuned instruments with whatever comes into their fancy.  One starts with a 
loud rendition of “Happy Birthday,” another with “God save the Queen,” and a 
third simply emits a series of cacophonous squeaks.  The performance is utterly 
ruined because a key set of players have refused their part and gone their own 
way.   
 If we were to imagine the same scene with the theology of the traditional 
cosmic fall, the violins’ rebellion would cause all the other instruments to go out 
of tune, so that they could no longer play in harmony with each other, or 
produce in-tune music themselves.  In my suggested alternative scenario, the 
rest of the instruments all continue to follow the music, and through gritted teeth 
continue the performance until its conclusion.  In this case, all the instruments 
 C. E. B. Cranfield, “Some Observations on Romans 8:19-21,” in Reconciliation and Hope: 126
New Testament essays on atonement and eschatology presented to L. L. Morris on his 60th 
birthday, ed. Robert Banks (Exeter: Paternoster, 1974), 227.
 Chris Wright, “Theology and Ethics in the Old Testament,” Transformation 16:3 (1999), 82; 127
Cranfield, The Epistle to the Romans, 413.  Hahne, The Corruption and Redemption of 
Creation, 190.
 Cranfield, “Some Observations on Romans 8:19-21,” 227.128
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apart from the violin have performed their duties and have fulfilled what they 
could fulfill of their potential: their music was well-played and their ability to emit 
good sound to the audience was not compromised.  However, the performance 
was still ruined by the errant violin section, and the gathered purpose of the 
orchestra (to perform Mozart’s concerto) is brought to meaningless futility by the 
interruption.  The purpose of each individual player is therefore two-fold: to 
perform their own part well, and for their own efforts to be gathered with all the 
others into a pleasing performance for the audience.  If either one of these 
objectives is lost, the other is lost as well.  A good personal effort is made 
almost meaningless if the overall performance is ruined by another.  Equally, if 
the personal performance is poor (as in the case of the violins) it will result in 
the overall performance being ruined.  Simply by being part of one orchestra, 
the fate of the two is tied together. 
 In a similar way, the individual purpose of each non-human animal to 
glorify God in its participation in life is not necessarily compromised by human 
sin because of some ontological shift in the nature of its being.  That is, non-
human animals have not “gone out of tune” due to a cosmic fall.  However, the 
effects of sin are still such that the corporate purpose of the non-human creation 
is frustrated, both through the languishing of the creation due to the direct action 
of humans, but also through the playing out of divine judgment, as seen in the 
prophetic material. 
 Paul’s statement in Romans 8, then, does not necessarily require that 
the exegete adhere to a cosmic fall scenario.  Once again, this has implications 
for those theologians who want to hold the ontological corruption of creation by 
human sin.  If creation’s work is futile, it is not necessarily so because of an 
immutable condition tied to the initial sin of Adam, but it may be because of the 
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ongoing sin of humanity which causes discord and dissonance in the work of 
creation. 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter I set out to show that there is not sufficient biblical merit 
for the often proposed notions of the fallen or corrupted creation.  We started by 
looking at the initial state of creation in Genesis 1.  Was the earth, as Oord’s 
proposal suggests, created out of a chaos that resisted divine shaping?  Oord, it 
seems, did not sufficiently acknowledge the utter sovereignty and power of God 
displayed in that chapter: God seems thoroughly in control of the limits and 
boundaries of the chaos, and is satisfied with the “very good” finished work.  
Second, we investigated the proposal that some malicious force may have 
intentionally ruined the creation, as argued by Boyd, Griffiths, Lewis, 
Pannenberg, and Lloyd.  Once again we found the proposal to be lacking in 
Scriptural support.  The creation is ubiquitously attributed to God’s work, and 
even the violent and dangerous elements are claimed by God.  Third, we 
investigated Webb’s proposal that the firmament was a dome to protect Eden 
from the effects of a satanically corrupted cosmic fall.  However, we rejected 
this due to its adherence to the questionable Gap Theory of Genesis 1:1-2 and 
the dubitable exegesis surrounding the firmament. 
 Approaches which claim that a primordial cosmic fall occurred, whether 
by satanic origin or mysteriously, all have to meet the challenge that the world is 
pronounced “very good” and that it is continuously attributed to God’s work. 
 After setting aside primordial fallenness theories, we looked exegetically 
at the language of the curse in Genesis 3-8 to see if the garden narrative could 
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lexical similarities and narrative structure of Genesis 1-8 pointed toward the 
curse being lifted after the flood and the world being given a new beginning.  
The new beginning meant that although future human sin could still damage the 
creation, as it is portrayed as doing in the prophetic books, the non-human 
world was not bogged down by an ontological shift due to a curse from the 
entrance of human sin in Genesis 3.  Finally, we looked at Romans 8 and the 
groaning of creation.  I argued, in line with exegetes Braaten, Bauckham, and 
Moo, that this enigmatic passage could be understood as drawing primarily from 
the prophetic literature where the earth is seen to mourn in response to 
localised human sin.  This interpretation removes the necessity of accepting a 
cosmic fall scenario, either due to the human fall or some primordial fall. 
 Neil Messer has written: “the biblical witness, in short, requires us to say 
of the world we inhabit both that it is created and that it is fallen; both that it is 
the work of God, pronounced ‘very good’, and that it is badly astray from what 
God means it to be.”   While this might be true of the human element of 129
creation, there is no necessary reason why a person who desires to take the 
biblical witness seriously has to hold to a version of the cosmic fall scenario for 
the non-human creation, or think that evolution as God’s method of creation is 
in any way corrupted.  We will therefore set aside the fallenness tradition and its 
variations for the rest of the dissertation.  Instead, the way is now clear to see 
God’s “very good” creation in its full evolutionary form, and ask the inevitable 
question “why?”  The next three chapters will begin to unfold why a good God, 
without opposition, may have chosen to create through the long, arduous, 
dangerous, and often painful process of evolution. 
 Messer, “Natural Evil after Darwin,” 149.129
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Chapter 4: Creation, Freedom, and Love 
“The external restraint which love practices is often a mark of its freedom from 
internal limit.” 
-W. H. Vanstone  1
Introduction 
 The end of the third chapter marks a change in the direction of this work.  
So far we have largely been exploring “the lay of the land,” discovering what 
roads have been built in philosophical and theological approaches, and have 
begun to mark some of these roads as dead ends.  Our original question was 
“How can a good and loving God have created through a process like evolution, 
which necessarily involves so much pain, suffering and untimely death?”  
Implied in the question are assumptions about the attributes of God, particularly 
omnipotence and omni-benevolence.  The unlimited power of God combined 
with the universal goodness of God seems at odds with the existence of natural 
evil.  After a preliminary survey of approaches in chapter 2, we set aside the 
notion that the evolutionary process is a result of fallenness in chapter 3.  The 
cosmos is not fallen or corrupted, but remains the good creation of God.  Now 
we embark on the more constructive part of the project: building a compound 
theodicy. 
 With Christopher Southgate and Michael Murray, I propose that only a 
compound theodicy which draws on several different approaches at once, will 
be up to the task of addressing non-human animal suffering.   There are six 2
different and essential components to my proposed approach.  They are: 
1) God was limited by the logical constraints imposed by creating a physical 
world.  There was no way to create a physical world and advanced sentient 
 W. H. Vanstone, Love’s Endeavour, Love’s Expense: The Response of Being to the Love of 1
God (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1977), 44.
 See the sections on compound theodicies and defences in chapter 2, p. 44-46.2
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beings inhabiting that creation without the possibility of suffering.  This is the 
“only way” argument, sometimes also called the “package deal” argument.  3
2) While there is no opposing force acting against God’s purposes in creation, 
the nature of God’s love involves kenotic self-limitation and granting the 
possibility of creaturely autonomy, resulting in a creation that does not always 
reflect God’s own loving character.  The paths of evolutionary development 
were open to creaturely innovation which, as in the case of parasitism, may 
capitalise on disvalues. 
3) The work of God does not leave suffering unaccompanied or unredeemed, 
but continues to make gratuitous suffering not gratuitous after all.  4
4) The nature of God’s love means there are only limited ways in which the 
unlimited divine power can be exercised, which prevents God’s unilateral 
annihilation of evil and disvalue. 
5) The meaning, and therefore the value, of a life is only determined 
eschatologically.  What value we ascribe to a life is an intrinsic part of the 
venture of theodicy, since great suffering with great value is usually 
considered reasonable for God to allow.  Therefore, God works to redeem 
every life in such a way that its life is considered worthwhile even in light of 
the suffering the creature has undergone. 
6) Redemption for creatures, in the ongoing outworking of history and in new life 
after death, is a key component of what makes suffering comprehensible.  
Various models of redemption can be held together in the image of 
 C.f. Niels Gregersen, “The Cross of Christ in an Evolutionary World,” dialog 40:3 (Fall 2001), 3
197-199.
 Two different conclusions that might be drawn from this particular point are that either there is 4
no suffering so horrendous that God cannot redeem it, or if such an evil were about to occur, 
God would actively prevent it.  It is more difficult to find examples of the second example, but 
one example might be the possibility of a universe without life.  See the discussion on gratuitous 
evil below, p. 199-203.
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redemption as a fractal mosaic, composed of nested layers of redemptive 
meaning.  5
 My compound approach to theodicy speaks more about the nature of 
God and God’s love than it does about the traditional endeavour of theodicy: 
weighing the goods and harms experienced by a particular creature.  Theodicy 
is always (at least tacitly) a two-part process.  It first asks, “How is God good or 
loving?” and then, second, applies that definition of God’s goodness or love to 
the suffering world.  The next three chapters are, in essence, a treatise on the 
nature of God.  How does God love?  How does God act?  How does God 
redeem?  The suffering creatures will appear, and applications will be made, but 
much of the work is spent setting a firm grounding in the nature of God.  The 
next three chapters cover the following themes: 
 This fourth chapter explores the nature of divine love.  What is love?  
Does God’s love differ from ours?  What implications does love have for God’s 
activity in, and relationship with, creation?  It is the aim of this chapter to argue 
that God’s love involves several implications, including: divine temporal 
experience of the world, creaturely freedom, kenotic relationship, and a 
limitation of God’s ability to impose God’s will on the world. 
 In chapter five, I will carry forward the basic conclusions of chapter four 
into an argument concerning divine action.  In light of God’s love, how is God at 
work in the world?  Here I will focus more on the second part of theodicy: 
applying the outcomes of God’s loving nature directly to God’s activity amongst 
the suffering creatures. 
 The sixth chapter will explore the nature of the final work of God in 
redemption.  It will argue that redemption is radically individual as well as 
 See chapter 6.5
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communal, and that it combines the personal and universal narratives of history 
into a coherent and redemptive whole in such a way that no suffering is 
gratuitous.   The focus is a blend of the first and second parts of theodicy: the 6
question ‘How does God’s love shape God’s redemption?’ is then applied to the 
suffering individual. 
Logical Constraints and Package Deals 
 The first element of the proposed theodicy––that God had limited options 
in the original configuration of a physical creation––will not be explored at length 
in this work because it has been explored extensively in other writings.   7
Essentially the argument can be summed up as: many things in a physical 
world are a “package deal.” 
 If you want rock to have the physical property of hardness so that it can 
form stable planets, it will also maintain that hardness when the rock falls and 
crushes a softer creature below it.  If animals are to evolve by a process of 
random genetic variation, then the process which produces beneficial variations 
will also be able to produce harmful variations, such as cancers.  If animals are 
to be mobile (and therefore exposed to constantly changing environments) and 
need to regulate some sort of internal homeostasis, they need a warning to tell 
them when outside elements are doing harm to them and upsetting their ability 
to maintain homeostasis.  Pain is that essential warning system: it informs in 
 By “gratuitous” I mean the standard definition of “instances of evil which neither serve as 6
means for bringing about a greater good, nor for preventing a greater evil.”  William Hasker, 
Providence, Evil and the Goodness of God (London: Routledge, 2004), 42.  Parsed more 
carefully, it means that harms are not instrumental in the GHA scheme explored in chapter 2 (p. 
30) though they may still be part of a property-consequence GHA.
 For more on this topic, see C. S. Lewis, The Problem of Pain, (New York: HarperOne, 2009), 7
16-27; Denis Alexander, Creation or Evolution: Do we have to choose?  (Oxford: Monarch, 
2008), 279-281; Gregersen, “The Cross of Christ in an Evolutionary World,” 197-199; Bethany 
Sollereder, “Evolutionary Theodicy: Towards an Evangelical Perspective” (MCS Thesis, Regent 
College, 2007), 19-39; See also Southgate’s critique of why the package deal is not enough to 
solve the problem in Christopher Southgate, The Groaning of Creation: God, Evolution, and the 
Problem of Evil (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2008), 12-13, 42-48.
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urgent terms that damage is being done to an individual, and generally 
increases in proportional painfulness in relation to the damage being done.  
Where an individual does not feel pain, as in rare cases of congenital pain 
insensitivity or Hansen’s disease (leprosy), the individual does not flourish, but 
perishes quickly from the lack of warning of harmful elements in their 
environment.    8
 It is the very “badness” of pain that makes it a great biological good.  The 
same “package deal” could be made for countless other elements of the natural 
world, from earthquakes and competition, to death itself.   The primary outcome 9
of the package deal argument is to limit the scope of the problem from all 
suffering down to the most theologically problematic suffering.  There are 
various elements of disvalue in the world that do not constitute a theological 
problem because they are actually the foundation upon which the possibility of 
life is built in the first place.   Without them, there would be no life, and 10
therefore no suffering to discuss.  There simply is no alternative, this is the “only 
way,” in the development of life and in its ongoing existence.  What is suffering 
that goes beyond the “package deal” and becomes theologically problematic?  It 
is the suffering that does not aid a creature, but instead severely or completely 
limits flourishing.  In extreme cases, the value of the life as a whole is called into 
question. 
 See Philip Yancey and Paul Brand, The Gift of Pain (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1997).8
 See works noted above in note 7, p. 145.9
 See also the discussions of nomic regularity and physical constraints in chapter 2, sub-10
headings “Property-Consequence GHA’S” and “The Value of Suffering: Bio-Centric 
Approaches,”  p. 30-36, 78-83.
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 David Clough makes the critique that “only way” or “package deal” 
arguments set aside creatio ex nihilo.   Clough writes: “This is a God who is 11
either unable to create in any other way––and is therefore not omnipotent––or 
chooses to create through suffering and predation when creating without these 
evils was a possibility––and is therefore not good.”   Clough misses the point 12
that even an omnipotent creatio ex nihilo is subject to the laws of logic as 
applied in a physical universe.  Such a denial has nothing to do with God’s 
power.  Once God chooses to make a physical world with particular values, 
some physical realities will make it impossible, even for God, to avoid certain 
outcomes. 
 When discussing the limits of creation, we are never arguing simply 
about whether God could have created a world without suffering, which certainly 
would have been easy enough––it need only be fauna-less.   Instead, we are 13
always discussing whether God could have created a world without suffering, 
given that God desired X.  X could represent any number of attributes, such as 
creaturely independence, moral freedom, sentience, physical regularity, loving 
relationships, or any combination thereof.  The argument of package deals 
(which encapsulates all the arguments about nomic regularity explored in 
chapter 2) is simply the most scientific example of God ‘creating in light of the 
desired thing, X.’  It is not clear that God could have created, ex nihilo, a 
physical world with anything like the physical qualities it has now, and have that 
world develop sentient and autonomous creatures, and avoid suffering.  These 
 David Clough, On Animals, vol. 1 of Systematic Theology (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2012.), 11
126-27.  Clough’s argument is responding in particular to Christopher Southgate’s version of the 
“only way” argument, which focusses on evolution as the only way to give rise to the values of 
beauty, diversity, and sentience.
 Clough, On Animals, 124.12
 Before the development of central nervous systems, our world was painless.  When algae 13
were the primary life forms on earth, there was abundant life and abundant peace and no 
suffering at all.
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necessary disvalues are physical limits, of course, and no one can show 
whether or not they are logical limits.  A world based on completely different 
physics, for example might be able to avoid the disvalues.  However, as 
Southgate claims, these limits make “common sense to a scientist.  It is hard to 
imagine a universe not governed by the Second Law of Thermodynamics... [or] 
an evolutionary process in which natural selection is not a significant factor.”   14
In addition, neither Clough, nor any other objector to the package deal 
argument, has ever been able to propose a consistent world system that would 
allow for the values of the package to be retained without the disvalues.  Neither 
side can prove whether this question is possible or impossible.  The best we 
can do is argue that––given that God desired X––it is seems impossible that 
God could have created a world without the suffering and disvalues we see. 
 The major argument of the rest of this chapter follows a similar “package 
deal” argument, except that instead of arguing about the physically constrained 
nature of the world, the focus is on the limits inherent in the nature of God’s 
love.  After the first point of theodicy above, all the others––apart from the fifth 
(that meaning is derived eschatologically)––are derived from the nature of 
divine love.  To establish a foundation for them, we must first investigate the 
nature of love.   
  
The Philosophical Nature of Love 
 In the eleventh book of his Confessions, Augustine complains about time: 
What is time?  Who can explain this easily and briefly?  Who can 
comprehend this even in thought so as to articulate the answer in words?  
Yet what do we speak of, in our familiar everyday conversation, more 
than of time?  We surely know what we mean when we speak of it.  We 
also know what is meant when we hear someone else talking about it.  
 Christopher Southgate, “Cosmic Evolution and Evil,” in The Cambridge Companion to the 14
Problem of Evil (Forthcoming).
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What then is time?  Provided that no one asks me, I know.  If I want to 
explain it to an inquirer, I do not know.  15
A similar complaint arises when one thinks about the nature of love.  Despite 
thousands of years of songs, poems, books, and experiences of love, there is 
still little agreement as to what constitutes its nature.  Jules Toner remarks “It is 
a strange and striking fact that even those who write best about love devote 
very little space to considering what love is.”  16
 In traditional philosophical thinking, two divergent camps emerge in 
regard to the nature of love.  Here, I follow Eleonore Stump’s excellent survey in 
Wandering in Darkness, and expand upon the basic outlines of her 
exploration.   The first camp conceives of love as a response to characteristics 17
in the beloved.   This is what Niko Kolodny calls “the quality theory” of love.   18 19
As Gabriele Taylor writes: “if x loves y then he does so in virtue of certain 
determinate qualities which he believes y to have.”   David Velleman nuances 20
this by saying that it is not only the qualities themselves, but attention to the 
valuation of the qualities of the beloved that evoke love: “I am inclined to say 
that love is likewise the awareness of a value inhering in its object; and I am 
also inclined to describe love as an arresting awareness of that value.”   For 21
Velleman it is the rational nature of the beloved that is to be loved, not any 
 Augustine, Confessions, trans. Henry Chadwick, Bk.11, ch.17 (Oxford: Oxford University 15
Press, 1991), 230.
 Jules J. Toner, The Experience of Love (Washington, DC: Corpus Books, 1968), 8.16
 Eleonore Stump, Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of Suffering (Oxford: 17
Clarendon Press, 2010), 85-107.
 This argument reaches as far back as Plato, who understood love as a response to beauty.18
 Niko Kolodny, “Love as Valuing a Relationship,” The Philosophical Review 112:2 (Apr, 2003): 19
135-189, 135.
 Gabriele Taylor, “Love,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 76 (1975-76): 147-164, 153.20
 J. David Velleman, “Love as a Moral Emotion,” Ethics 109:2 (Jan 1999): 338-378, 360.21
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particular qualities that nature might bring forth.  It is the choosing capacity itself 
which is to be loved, not the choices that are made. 
 However, two objections emerge which seem to overturn this responsive 
definition: the first objection is that those values might change in the beloved,  22
and the second is that there is no reason why love should not be transferred 
immediately to some new object upon recognition of equal or superior values.   23
Yet, intuition would tell us that (while sometimes this may happen) love which 
changes objects when a person of superior value walks by, or love which 
ceases to love the beloved after an accident or illness changes the valued 
characteristics, is not real love but somehow defective.  By this definition of love 
alone, we would certainly not want to be the recipients of love. 
 In response, the second philosophical camp defines love as an act of the 
will by the lover, what Eleonore Stump calls the “volitional account” of love.   24
Harry Frankfurt defines love this way, pointing out that his love for his children is 
precisely what causes them to have value, not vice versa.   In the classic work 25
by Anders Nygren, Apage and Eros, he identifies agape (the Christian love par 
excellence) as this sort of value-creating, spontaneous love that arises entirely 
out of the character of the lover.   “We look in vain,” he writes, “for an 26
explanation of God’s love in the character of the man who is the object of His 
love.  God’s love is ‘groundless’... the only ground for it is in God Himself.”   27
 A person might very well lose their attributes, or even their power of choice, due to an 22
accident, dementia, or other misfortune.  This objection only applies if we see love as a current 
response to attributes.  If we continue to love someone for attributes they used to have, it falls 
under the historical category of love that is developed below.
 Stump, Wandering in Darkness, 86.23
 Stump, Wandering in Darkness, 87.24
 Harry G. Frankfurt, The Reasons of Love (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 25
39.
 Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros, trans. by Philip S. Watson (New York: Harper & Row, 1953), 26
75-77.
 Nygren, Agape and Eros, 75.27
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While this solves the problem of the beloved facing competition from someone 
with superior virtues, it creates its own problems.  Stump points out that if the 
beloved asks the reasonable question “why do you love me?” the volitional lover 
must answer “Oh, there is no reason, at least no reason having anything to do 
with you.”   The love of volition can give no reason for its existence in respect 28
to the beloved.  In which case, any choice or particularity of love––say, to love 
one’s husband more than the stranger on the street––is completely arbitrary.  29
 In light of the unsatisfactory nature of both these definitions, there have 
been several attempts to find other ways to conceptualise love.  Thomas Oord 
has proposed the definition “to love is to act intentionally, in sympathetic 
response to others (including God), to promote overall well-being.”   The 30
aspect of sympathetic response in this definition overcomes the problem of the 
volitional account being unable to explain itself.  If asked “why do you love me?” 
the answer would be “because I see your need for well-being, and I choose to 
respond.”  Oord’s definition removes part of the arbitrariness of the volitional 
account of love––we can now account for why it is this beloved and not another, 
because the particular attributes or needs of this person call forth our 
sympathetic response––but locating love in an act still holds many problems.  It 
does not, for example, solve the problem of substitutability.  If the lover sees 
another object worthy of sympathetic response, there is no reason not to move 
to a new beloved.  If we try to use the volitional part of his definition to say that 
 Stump, Wandering in Darkness, 87.  Italics original.  David Bentley Hart critiques the 28
monopoly of agape love in his own way when he writes of beauty evoking desire.  “Here 
Christian thought learns something, perhaps, of how the trinitarian love of God––and the love 
God requires of creatures––is eros and agape at once: a desire for the other that delights in the 
distance of otherness.”  David Bentley Hart, The Beauty of the Infinite: The Aesthetics of 
Christian Truth (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2003), 20.
 Nygren follows this logic to its end by saying that any real love has to be universal in order to 29
avoid the charge of arbitrariness, and therefore any love that chooses a specific object is not 
real love.  See the discussion of Nygren’s cat below, p. 155.
 Thomas J. Oord, Defining Love: A Philosophical, Scientific, and Theological Engagement 30
(Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos, 2010), 15.
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the faithfulness rests only in the lover’s choice, then it is the faithfulness rather 
than the love that is now without explanation. 
 To solve the problem of faithfulness, philosophers have added the notion 
that a historical component is necessary to love.   Kolodny argues simply that 31
“one’s reason for loving a person is one’s relationship to her: the ongoing history 
that one shares with her.”   We love because we have historical experience 32
which draws out attachment to the particular individual.  An identical twin or 
even a superior person cannot be loved in the place of the beloved because 
there is no shared history to make that love authentic.  Love is not situated only 
in the attributes of the beloved (which may change) nor solely in the character 
or intentions of the lover (which ends up ignoring the beloved), but in the 
relationship between them.  Here is an explanation for the faithfulness of love in 
response to changed attributes and an explanation for why a substitute of the 
beloved is not good enough. 
 However, the historical position is open to critique: as Stump points out, it 
denies the reality of unrequited love.   There is no place for Dante’s famous 33
love for Beatrice, for example, a love that Dante held for decades (and even 
after her death), despite only meeting her on two occasions.  There was no 
shared history, and no hope for a future shared history––no relationship  (by 
Kolodny’s standards, at any rate) to justify Dante’s love.  For Kolodny, this 
simply is not love.  As Stump points out: 
 Niko Kolodny, Christopher Grau, and Robert Kraut all add a historical dimension to their 31
definition of love.  Cf. Kolodny, “Love as Valuing,”; Christopher Grau, “Love and History,” The 
Southern Journal of Philosophy 48:3 (Sep 2010): 246-71; Robert Kraut, “Love De Re,” Midwest 
Studies in Philosophy 10 (1986): 413-30.
 Kolodny, “Love as Valuing,” 135-36.  32
 Stump, Wandering in Darkness, 88-90.  Kolodny presents shared history as an essential, and 33
not simply an important, component of love.  If it was only an important component, Stump’s 
objection would not stand, since one could simply say that Dante’s love lacked a component 
that would make it ideal, rather than non-existent.
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On Kolodny’s account, we have to say not that there is something 
defective or deplorable about Dante’s love for Beatrice, but just that he 
did not love her.  Dante did not suppose that he had a relationship (in 
Kolodny’s sense of ‘relationship’) with Beatrice, and so he also did not 
believe that there was such a relationship between him and Beatrice that 
rendered his love of her appropriate.  34
The implications of this conclusion if extended to divine love would be 
disastrous: it would mean that God could not love those who did not return 
God’s love.   The unrequited nature of much of God’s love for humanity would 35
meet Kolodny’s criticism that God should (in these cases) “get over it, and move 
on.”   Again, Kolodny’s conclusion would be that in the light of a profound 36
inequality of positions or without the prospect of reciprocated concern, concern 
is likely inappropriate and love is simply absent.   This is obviously an 37
inappropriate conclusion when it comes to divine love, so whatever our 
definition of love, it must include the possibility of one-sided, unrequited love 
that is still love. 
 In Wandering in Darkness, Eleonore Stump presents a Thomistic 
definition of love that seems to meet all the required conditions.   According to 38
Stump’s interpretation, Aquinas defines love as the product of two 
interconnected desires: the desire for the good of the beloved, and the desire 
for union with the beloved.   These two desires, when they are truly desires of 39
love and not some other desire disguised as love, will always converge.  This 
 Stump, Wandering in Darkness, 89.34
 In the case of Dante, if one agreed with Kolodny, one could at least appeal to the option that 35
Dante’s love was a fantasy completely invented in his own mind.  Dante was not so much 
perverse, as simply misled.  Such a defence could not be used of God, because God really is in 
relationship with every creature at every moment.
 Kolodny, “Love as Valuing,” 171.36
 Kolodny, “Love as Valuing,” 170-71.37
 Stump, Wandering in Darkness, 90-107.  The same content is also found in her 2006 article 38
“Love by all Accounts,” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 
80:2 (Nov. 2006): 25-43.
 Stump, Wandering in Darkness, 90.39
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means that the desire for union with the beloved will always contribute to the 
good of the beloved, and the desire for the good of the beloved will always 
contribute (ultimately)  to union with the beloved. 40
 Now, desire for the good of the beloved can be a general, universal 
desire––one can desire the good of many, and desiring good for others does 
not require any particular attribute or trait in the beloved.  Desire for the good of 
the beloved would explain why love does not falter when encountered with 
change, or is faithful when others with similar or superior values emerge.  
However, from this desire only, we would end up with the same problem as the 
volitional lovers: when asked “why do you love me?” the answer is “it has 
nothing at all to do with you,” which is unsatisfactory.  Furthermore, there is no 
particular reason to love any person uniquely, since one can equally desire the 
good of many.  However, the desire for union with the beloved introduces a 
specificity and particularity to love that is responsive to the beloved.   If I desire 41
union with John or Valerie, they cannot be replaced by Peter or Karen, because 
I desire union with this person and not with another, based on their 
characteristics, our shared history, and our relationship: it is a response to the 
beloved.  The specificity solves the problem that so antagonised Nygren: it 
seemed to him that to love one beloved in a particular and special way was to 
mistreat every other individual of that type.  Nygren’s logic leads one to say, for 
 It needs to be said, however, that sometimes the truest act of love for the good of the 40
beloved, temporarily, is to hold back from the union that is desired because to pursue that union 
would be to overwhelm the beloved.  (See the discussion of self-willed loneliness below, p. 168)  
However, this would always be done in hope that the beloved (in having their freedom) will 
develop and grow to the point where the expressions of love would be received and returned.  
Even the withdrawal of acts of love out of interest for the good of the beloved can be in pursuit 
of an ultimate union with him or her.
 It should be noted here that the first desire of good for the beloved will regulate both the type 41
and the action of union: as mentioned in the note above, it may be that there are cases where 
the best option for the beloved is not to have significant union with the lover.  The self-restraint 
of love will be explored at greater length below.
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example, that for him to feed his cat would be to do an injustice to every other 
hungry cat that he was not feeding.  Stump, in contrast, writes: 
On Aquinas’s account of love, a person can have an impartial love of all 
human beings.  But Aquinas also supposes that some loves are and 
ought to be greater than others.  A person ought to love all human 
beings, but not equally.  She should love some people more than others 
in virtue of having certain relationships with them, which ought to make 
her love for them greater than her love for humanity in general.  42
The same could be said of other non-human objects of love, such as pets.   
 Since the desire for union must also converge with the good of the 
beloved, the union desired must be of an appropriate type.   For Stump, desire 43
for union is closely tied to what she calls the “offices of love.”   The office of 44
love is, quite simply, the type of relationship one holds with another.  This might 
be mother, friend, lover, teacher, patient, or something else.  What is important 
to note for my purpose here is that offices are partly dependent on the 
characteristics of the beloved.  We can, for example, take an office like “mother” 
which seems general and universal enough, but realise that no one is only 
“mother.”  Everyone who is a mother is a “mother to so-and-so.”  The limits and 
boundaries of the office change depending on who the beloved is.  A woman 
may be mother to both Julia and Steve, but if her relationship to both was 
exactly the same, something would be wrong.  Circumstances, needs, and 
inherent abilities all shape how the love of the mother for the child will be 
expressed, and how far––as well as what type of––union will be achieved.  
Stump uses the example of a man who composes music trying to share his joy 
with a very beloved but tone-deaf sister.  Her capacity to share in his music, and 
 Stump, Wandering in Darkness, 97.42
 It should be noted that “union,” in this context, is not a euphemism for sexual relations.  It 43
means to share oneself, be accepted by the other, and to accept what the other shares of 
themselves in return.  That sharing could involve conversation, skills, gifts, or any other type of 
sharing one’s self with another.
 Stump, Wandering in Darkness, 98.  She uses the term in a similar way to Kraut’s definition in 44
“Love De Re,” 425-426.
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thus her ability to be united with him in that aspect of their love is dependent 
upon her innate qualities and abilities (or lack thereof).   Each relationship is 45
unique, and each relationship must be weighted on all the considerations of 
office, inherent qualities of the lover and the beloved, and the circumstances in 
which love is to be expressed. 
 Love, then, as the desire for the good and for union with the beloved 
holds together the qualities of the beloved, the relationship of the lover to the 
beloved, and the volition of the lover into a unified whole.  It also allows for 
unrequited love.  Since the desires are centred in the lover, it simply says that in 
the case of unrequited love the desires will not be fulfilled, accounting for love’s 
painfulness.  With this definition we move forward into our discussion of God’s 
particular love. 
The Nature of God’s Love 
One Love or Two Loves? 
 Before we engage the question of God’s love for the non-human world, 
one more task remains: it is important to decide whether there is only one kind 
of love, or whether there are two, namely, divine and human.   For some, 46
divine love is of a completely different essence than human love and so we 
should not talk about the two with the same language.  Nygren, for example, 
 Stump, Wandering in Darkness, 99.45
 A great deal of theologians mention God’s love but make no exploration of what it means or 46
what might constitute it.  An example of this is Thomas G. Weinandy, who talks about God’s “all-
loving” nature, and says that this is expressed through the Cross, but never defines what is 
meant by love.  “God and Human Suffering: His Act of Creation and His Acts in History,” in 
Divine Impassibility and the Mystery of Human Suffering, eds. James F. Keating and Thomas J. 
White, O.P. (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2009), 99-116.  In a similar way, in Kathryn Tanner’s 
book God and Creation in Christian Theology: Tyranny and Empowerment? (Minneapolis, MN: 
Fortress, 1988) divine love is mentioned only six times, and each time it is used as a simple 
attribute of God, without any explanation of its nature.  It seems to me a serious problem to 
insist that God is timeless and immutable in love while not presenting a definition of love that 
makes those claims coherent.
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divides up love into eros and agape.   Human love is almost always eros.  47
Nygren believes that humans can participate in a form of agape, though even 
that human agape is better described as “faith” since it is a response to God’s 
love and not something existent entirely on its own.  True agape for Nygren is 
self-existent and independent of any motivation or response, and therefore can 
only exist entirely in God.   The definition of love we have been exploring 48
above, involving desire as it does, would be equally suspect since it implies a 
lack in God.   
 Does desire imply a lack in God?  Can God desire?  Keith Ward, in 
Religion and Creation, argues that desire is necessary to any notion of God’s 
creativity.  As opposed to seeing desire as a lack in God, Ward sees it as “the 
good of creative activity itself, in which the creator realises new and imaginative 
forms of beauty and intellectual complexity.”   In order to engage in creative 49
activity, something like desire, and something like a temporal movement toward 
the realisation of goals is necessary.   There is no reason why the desire of 50
God for creation should diminish the being of God.  Proposing any sort of desire 
within the divine nature, however, does lead to an adjustment of the classical 
attributes of God, as will be discussed below in much greater detail. 
 For now, I argue that there is only one love: expressed across a 
spectrum of ability and with varying degrees of success.  Proposing only one 
real type of love, rather than dividing it as Nygren does into a human type and a 
divine type, also means that I am making an assumption that our being is 
 A significant critique of Nygren’s division is found in Thomas Oord, The Nature of Love: A 47
Theology (Atlanta, GA: Chalice Press, 2010), 39-51.
 Nygren, Agape and Eros, 99, 140, 218.48
 Keith Ward, Religion and Creation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 185.49
 For an excellent argument on the temporal nature of God see Ryan Mullins, “In Search of a 50
Timeless God” (Ph.D. diss., University of St. Andrews, 2013).  God’s temporal experience will be 
explored below.
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significantly like God’s.  Univocity of being, a concept worked out significantly by 
Duns Scotus, means that when we speak of the similarities between our own 
nature and God’s nature, we can do so by more than mere analogy.   While I 51
cannot make a full argument about the necessity of the univocal rather than 
analogical nature of God’s being here, it is a proposition that I assume.  I 
assume univocity because it allows us to say something substantially true about 
who God is––even analogical language presupposes some degree of similarity 
of nature or else the analogy could not be made at all (or all analogies would be 
equally relevant).   In relation to love, univocity is required to make sense of 52
the biblical commands to love.  Jesus says “This is my commandment, that you 
love one another as I have loved you.”   There would be little coherence to this 53
commandment if the love we were meant to bear to one another was in fact 
something utterly and ontologically different from what Jesus brought to us. 
 One might observe that human love does not often look like divine love.  
Divine love is necessarily perfectly formed and perfectly expressed: it is 
unalloyed by either selfishness or hatred, nor hampered by unforgiven hurt.  In 
humans, although the essence of love is the same, it cannot be expressed the 
same way.  Love is simply unable to be expressed in its full, unlimited nature 
through finite beings.  The master chess player and the novice are playing the 
same game by the same rules, but the expression of a chess game will be 
vastly different.  The finiteness of expression in humans does not make the love 
 There is a long history of philosophers and theologians who accept the univocity of God’s 51
nature.  See Colin Gunton’s exploration of univocity in Act and Being: Towards a Theology of 
the Divine Attributes (London: SCM, 2002), 69-75; Philip Tonner, “Duns Scotus’ Concept of the 
Univocity of Being: Another Look,” Pli 18 (2007): 129-146.  There are also plenty of theologians, 
particularly those who are part of the Radical Orthodoxy movement, who utterly reject univocity 
of being.  See Hans Boersma, “Accommodation to What?  Univocity of Being, Pure Nature and 
the Anthropology of St. Irenaeus,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 8:3 (July 2006): 
266-293. 
 Tonner, “Duns Scotus’ Concept of the Univocity of Being: Another Look,” 130.52
 John 15:12, NRSV.53
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in question any less true or rigorous, it simply means that love as expressed by 
humans will not carry the unlimited nature of the phenomenology of divine love. 
 Now we can finally ask how our definition of love as the desire for the 
good of the beloved and desire for union with the beloved affects the discussion 
of suffering in the natural world. 
“For God so loved the worms” 
  First of all, Aquinas’s definition deals with some common objections to 
evolutionary theodicy.  The first of these is that God cannot or does not love the 
non-human world.  For some, the non-human world is not a proper object of 
divine love.  Without the complex brain structures that humans have, worms (for 
example) are not capable of sentient brain states, and therefore are unable to 
love God back.  From a relational view of love, this would be a fatal objection.  
For Kolodny and his fellow theorists, the possibility of love for worms is already 
ruled out.  However, for the Aquinas/Stump thesis of love, God’s desire for the 
good of each and every worm is plausible, as is God’s desire for union with 
each worm––as long as we include the caveat that the union must be 
appropriate to the office of love.  In the case of worms, the office of love that 
exists between God and a worm is that of Creator and “wormly creature” 
respectively.  The form that relationship of love takes will also be appropriate to 
the inherent abilities and limitations of the worm: the love will be “wormish” in 
nature.  And since it is “wormish,” the love shared between God and the worms 
need not be perceivable or understandable to any other species.   
 The Aquinas/Stump definition of love helps solve another objection: that 
God has to treat all creatures completely equally in every respect.  The nature 
of love does require that God desire union with each beloved and desire the 
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good of each beloved.  However, since each beloved has unique 
characteristics, experiences, and potentials that determine the shape of the 
good and the type of union available to God, there can be variation in how God 
loves each creature.  God can love the adult chimpanzee with a different sort of 
love than God loves the worm, because the adult chimpanzee is sentient, has 
memory, and experiences suffering.   The adult chimpanzee also has the 
capacity for altruism and aggression.  The worm, as far as we know, has none 
of these things.  The good for the chimpanzee and the worm will therefore be 
different.  Although both will ultimately (as with all created things) find their good 
in union with God, the chimpanzee will have far more specified needs to fulfil 
than the worm.  In fact, as we set out a theodicy with regard to the worm, there 
is no particular reason that even being trod underfoot should be inimical to the 
good of the worm, if we consider the following: 
 -the worm does not have the sentient capacity to experience suffering 
 -the worm has the ability to participate fully in the divine gift of life 
 -the simple stretching out of the worm’s life for longer does not           
necessarily equate to value for the worm because of its lack of sentience 
 -the worm shares in the hope of redemption with all of creation and           
therefore the “self” of the worm is not lost in death 
 -the manner of the worm’s death and the subsequent outcomes of the           
worm’s death (its feeding a passing bird, for example) may all be 
reflected back to the glory of the worm  54
 In so far as the worm exists in relationship with God and the world, the 
worm is pursuing its greatest good  with as much intention and capacity as it is 55
 I expand upon this argument a great deal in chapter 6.54
 The goods I have proposed here are necessarily speculative.  What the true good of the 55
worm (alluded to here as “union with God”) is not something one could know without being a 
worm or being God, as we have no access to the inner content of the divine-worm relationship.
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able.   The death of the worm is a simple result of those relationships having 56
consequential integrity.  For the chimpanzee the matter of life and death 
becomes more complicated, because there is more ability to choose and more 
ability to suffer.  For that highly intelligent primate, Homo sapiens, in whom 
mutual loving relationship with God finds its greatest potential, things become 
the most complex.  Nonetheless, there is no reason that God cannot love the 
worms, even though they do not (in our current understanding) have the 
capacity to love back.  In so far as the existence of worms adds to the fullness 
of creation, God loves worms out of God’s own volitional desire and in response 
to a worm’s ability to be a worm. 
 An objection related to the conclusion that God loves every creature is 
that if God loves and knows every sentient creature, then God cannot act in a 
way to relieve the suffering of one sentient creature without being morally 
obligated to respond in a similar way to every other sentient creature.  To do so 
would seem to make God morally arbitrary––a point raised by Wesley J. 
Wildman.   In response, Philip Clayton and Stephen Knapp have proposed 57
what they call the “not-even-once” principle: “A benevolent God could not 
intervene even once without incurring the responsibility to intervene in every 
case where doing so would prevent an instance of innocent suffering.”   58
However, the Thomistic definition of love gives us another option because it 
 Readers may immediately jump to the ethical question of “then is there any way that I can 56
harm the worm by treading it underfoot?”  In the case of the worm, I would say “probably not” 
but in the case of more sentient animals, the answer would be “probably/certainly.”  In the case 
of the trod-upon worm, the greatest damage would likely be to the soul of the person, if the 
person––by cruelty or malice––intentionally set out to destroy another living creature.  But there 
is no room to pursue the ethical treatment of animals here.  See Southgate, Groaning of 
Creation, 92-115.
 Wesley J. Wildman, “Incongruous Goodness, Perilous Beauty, Disconcerting Truth: Ultimate 57
Reality and Suffering In Nature” in Physics and Cosmology: Scientific Perspectives on the 
Problem of Natural Evil, eds Nancey Murphy, Robert J Russell & William R Stoeger (Vatican 
City/Berkeley, CA: Vatican Observatory/CTNS, 2007): 267-294.
 Philip Clayton & Steven Knapp, The Predicament of Belief: Science, Philosphy, Faith (Oxford: 58
Oxford University Press, 2011), 49.  Italics original.
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does not propose that God’s relationship to each creature is equal.  Quite the 
opposite.  Every creature has a unique relationship to God based on the 
givenness of its species, abilities, personality, environment, and history.  And 
God’s concern is radically individual: how to promote this creature’s greatest 
good.  Therefore, God would not be automatically morally obligated to intervene 
in every other situation of suffering, but only to act in each individual’s life in a 
way that is consistent with its own greatest good.  Since every situation is 
different, each choice of divine action will be uniquely considered under the 
surrounding circumstances and in light of the particular suffering subject.  An 
example will help illustrate this point. 
 Aron Ralston made headlines in 2003 when, after a large boulder 
crushed and pinned his right arm, he self-amputated the limb and walked to 
help.  He spent 127 hours alone with his life in the balance.  How does he 
reflect on this horrific accident?  “It was the most beautiful moment of my life... 
that was the moment I stepped out of my grave and into my life.  I don’t regret 
losing my arm.”   For Ralston, the experience of extreme suffering acted as a 59
catalyst for growth and joy.  For many others, a similar situation would simply 
have destroyed them, body and spirit.  We could understand, then, that in this 
situation God might be justified in allowing the rock to fall on Ralston’s arm 
while not allowing it to fall on another person’s arm for whom the experience 
could have no redemption.  I want to emphasise that this example cannot be 
applied to all cases of suffering, since many instances of suffering are in fact 
life-destroying.  However, it can be raised usefully as a caution in invoking 
 Interview by Vincent Graff, “Trapped again for 127 hours: After cutting off his own arm in a 59
climbing accident Aron Ralston is ready for another wild adventure,” accessed 11 November 
2013, available from http://www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-2043213/After-cutting-arm-
climbing-accident-Aron-Ralston-ready-wild-adventure.html#ixzz2kLCq5xXb.
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something like a “not-even-once” type argument because it paints all 
circumstances of suffering with the same brush. 
 With humans, we can talk to a person afterward and understand what 
impact an event of suffering had on their inner experience.  With non-human 
animals, we have no access to this sort of communication, nor would we even 
necessarily recognise what might be considered beneficial or harmful in their 
own inner experience.  I cannot, therefore give any specific illustrations to show 
how this might be true in a non-human animal without the accusation of overly 
anthropomorphising the circumstances.  However, to God, who would know the 
inner experience of each creature, a justification could be made that one 
creature might be able to bear suffering differently to and better than another 
creature.  Equally, on a macro-scale, the increased complexity, power, and skill 
of diverse species in response to eons of adverse conditions gives more than a 
hint that there certainly have been responses to suffering that have brought 
about a glorification rather than a diminution of the selfhood of creatures.  In 
turn, the possibility of glorification through suffering as likely for some and 
impossible for others allows for the justification of different treatment of 
creatures depending on various factors.  The observation that God can treat 
individuals differently in response to their unique needs does not get us much 
closer to answering the question “why does God allow the innocent to suffer?” 
in particular circumstances,  but it does avoid Wildman’s charge that a God 60
who would intervene in some cases and not in others is totally inconsistent 
without dropping all possibility of physical interaction with the world as Clayton 
and Knapp do.  61
 Some attempt will be made in chapter 5 to explore divine responses to particular 60
circumstances where God does allow suffering.
 Please refer to chapter 2, subsection “Radically Redefining God” for the explanation of 61
Wildman, Clayton, and Knapp’s views, p. 62-63, 66.
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 It might be asked, “How far into creation can God’s love extend?”  If God 
can love worms, what about a smallpox virus, a tree, or a mountain?  There are 
no clear-cut, satisfying answers to this question, because it is impossible at 
some levels to discern what the “entity” is that is to be loved.  A tree may be a 
distinct unit, but how is the mountain to be divided from the plate below?  
Should slime mould be considered one organism or an aggregate of 
organisms?  For a process theist, every unit conceivable, down to the 
components of an atom, are unique entities and therefore recipients of the love 
of God.  However, I think that something has to have life in order to “have” a 
good.   Anything that can adapt––that is, exhibit behaviour and respond to 62
external stimuli in a way that benefits itself––can have both a definable good 
(e.g. “reach more sunlight” or “exchange DNA with a fellow bacteria”) and some 
means of pursuing that good (e.g. “grow taller” or “move over there”).   While 63
the existence of a mountain might be good, it has no good of its own to pursue, 
and no ability to adjust or adapt to a good.  Therefore, while we might have a 
desire to see or possess something inanimate, and our desire might imitate the 
desires of love, those things are not proper objects of love.  God can love the 
smallpox virus, but not the mountain.  64
 In this section we have explored some of the most common objections to 
the idea that God could love the non-human animal world.  The Aquinas/Stump 
definition of love was useful in demonstrating that God could love the part of 
 Cf. Holmes Rolston, “Naturalizing and Systematizing Evil,” in Is Nature Ever Evil? Religion, 62
Science and Value ed. Willem B. Drees (New York: Routledge, 2003), 67-86, 70-71, 76-80.
 Of course, there are times when life itself is fairly ambiguous.  A virus outside of a host does 63
not act like a living organism.  Some might consider inanimate objects to have a “good” as well, 
for example, the “good” of a river to reach the sea.  But we can only be speaking metaphorically 
if we speak of the river’s “good” in this way.  The water in the river is not harmed by being 
dammed up or otherwise prevented from achieving this “good.”  However, living creatures are 
harmed, even destroyed, if they are prevented from achieving their various goods.
 On this definition, a human cannot love the mountain either.  While we might use the 64
language of love in regard to inanimate objects, we can only mean it analogously.
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creation that could not love God back.  We also saw that God’s love for all of 
creation does not mean that God is forced to treat every creature in exactly the 
same way.  Quite the opposite, the uniqueness of each relationship and its 
circumstances means that there is almost endless flexibility in Creator-creature 
relationships.  In practice, there might be little difference in how God treats a 
worm, a beetle, and a spider.  The lack of difference does not arise out of moral 
limitations on God, or out of lack of love entirely, but because none of these 
creatures have needs that require particularly different treatment. 
The Theology of Love 
 So far we have explored primarily philosophical definitions of love.  Now 
we will investigate the nature of God’s love from theological perspectives, and 
merge them with the outcomes of the philosophical study.   
 W. H. Vanstone has been an influential theological voice reflecting on the 
nature of love.  His now-classic Love’s Endeavour, Love’s Expense: The 
Response of Being to the Love of God offered a highly-regarded treatment of 
God, love, and the risk of creation.  His thought deeply impacted later 
theologians, and the 2001 edited volume The Work of Love: Creation as 
Kenosis,  which explores the engagement of love and creation, was dedicated 65
to Vanstone, with each chapter beginning with a quotation from Love’s 
Endeavour.  66
 Vanstone does not, like Stump, positively define love’s nature in his work.  
Instead, he defines the boundaries of love through three phenomenological 
 The Work of Love: Creation as Kenosis, ed. John Polkinghorne (Grand Rapids, MI: 65
Eerdmans, 2001).
 The volume contains essays from many of the foremost scholars in science and religion, 66
including Arthur Peacocke, John Polkinghorne, Sarah Coakley, Holmes Rolston III, Keith Ward, 
Paul Fiddes, and Jürgen Moltmann.
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markers.  He proposes three marks that show the inauthenticity of love.  They 
are the marks of limitation, control, and detachment.   If these are present, love 67
is not.  I will use these three marks to organise my thoughts in the coming 
section. 
 Another influential voice reflecting on the nature of love is Denis 
Edwards.  In How God Acts, this Roman Catholic theologian explores an 
understanding of divine love based on God’s actions in the Christ event.  By 
looking at Jesus’ life, Edwards comes to the conclusion that the love of God will 
lead God to wait upon the creation, be vulnerable to it, and participate with it.   68
He develops a theological view of love that is deeply consonant with Vanstone’s 
vision, but defined positively instead of negatively.  In the next few pages, I will 
weave the approaches of Edwards, Stump, and Vanstone together into a 
theological picture of divine love in creation. 
The Mark of Limitation 
 If love is limited, according to Vanstone, it is not love in its truest form.  
Love, in its ideal form, must be unconditional and endless.  It cannot depend 
upon a certain response or a certain set of characteristics (though it can, as we 
have seen, respond to certain characteristics).  In Stump’s definition, the 
limitlessness of love is derived from the unlimited desire for the good of the 
beloved.  If the lover loves the beloved, then the lover necessarily desires the 
good of the beloved, and there is no point at which that desire ceases.  For 
Edwards, the limitlessness of love is demonstrated by God’s startling patience: 
God does not force or coerce creation, but waits through the billions-year-long 
 Vanstone, Love’s Endeavour, Love’s Expense, 42-50.67
 Denis Edwards, How God Acts: Creation, Redemption, and Special Divine Action 68
(Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2010), 24.
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process of star and element formation and then through the long ages of 
evolutionary development for life to mature into sentience.   In light of such 69
patience for cosmological processes, the patience extended to individual 
creatures is impossible to exhaust. 
 Furthermore, if God loves the creation, then regardless of the outcomes 
or cost, God must commit to the project of creation without hesitation and 
without calculation.  Limitlessness means that God will never turn away from the 
desires of love for creation.  No amount of disvalue, pain, or even of rebellion 
will turn God away from desiring the creation’s good and seeking union with the 
creation.  Because God’s desire will not be turned away, the patient action of 
God (even if only in actively waiting) will never end until the full resources of 
God are expressed.  God’s love is limitless: “it bears all things, believes all 
things, hopes all things, endures all things.”   Hope for creation is not grounded 70
in God’s ability to unilaterally decide the whole of history, but in the unlimited 
faithfulness and creativity of divine love.   Too often, hope has instead been 71
placed in the ability of God to overpower and control any and all resistance to 
God’s kingdom.  But control, as we will see, is anathema to love. 
The Mark of Control 
 Vanstone’s second mark of inauthentic love is the mark of control.  
Vanstone writes “When one who professes to love is wholly in control of the 
object of his love, then the falsity of love is exposed.”   We cannot both love 72
and control because love necessarily involves respect for the will and being of 
 Edwards, How God Acts, 51.69
 1 Corinthians 13:7, NRSV.70
 Vanstone, Love’s Endeavour, 63.71
 Vanstone, Love’s Endeavour, 45.72
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the other.   Stump discusses the question of control in relation to a tendency in 73
the beloved toward “self-willed loneliness.”   Self-willed loneliness is the 74
internal isolation of an individual––the refusal to accept or return love.  This 
chosen loneliness by the receiver of love is driven by shame, and cannot be 
overcome until internal fragmentation within the person is drawn back together 
and the person allows another near them.  Even God cannot force someone out 
of their self-willed loneliness, for to do so would be to do violence to the very 
self that needs integration.  To intrude without invitation would be to drive that 
already fragmented self further apart.   
 I don’t think the non-human world necessarily shares in the shame and 
self-willed loneliness that undergirds Stump’s argument.   However, the 75
principle is the same even without self-willed loneliness: for God to control the 
creation entirely would be to determine and therefore destroy its capacity to 
develop self-being in so far as it possesses that capacity.  Since creation’s 
“selving” is good and God desires the good of creation, then if God loves the 
creation, God will not control and thereby short circuit that process of 
development.   For Edwards, God’s respect for creaturely autonomy is most 76
 Some might think that parental love is a counter example: that parents who let their children 73
do anything are bad parents, not loving parents.  However, there is a confusion here between 
coercive control and loving parenting which involves setting boundaries (whether physical or 
otherwise) and giving guidance.  I argue, in chapter 5, that God’s action does involve setting 
boundaries and constraints and giving guidance.  What God cannot do, if love is genuine, is 
prevent all harm by wholly controlling the choices of individuals.  Neither can good parents 
decide every outcome of their children’s choices.
 Stump, Wandering in Darkness, 129-150.74
 Although, similar patterns of self-induced isolation, fear, and fragmentation of personality can 75
be seen in abused cats, dogs, and horses.  Reintegration of those selves in rescue situations 
are also observed.  How far this reflects the internal journey that Stump sketches in humans is 
beyond the scope of my work.
 If, as I have argued earlier, stepping on a worm is not necessarily inimical to the good of the 76
worm, how can God’s control be inimical to its good?  This seems inconsistent until you 
consider that by stepping on the worm, I as a human am only able to affect its external freedom, 
but not its internal freedom of being.  If God were to intervene it would be, we assume, by 
changing the internal impulses of the worm toward something else, and God would therefore be 
controlling its internal powers of choice.  How far down the ladder of sentience does any 
meaningful choice extend?  This is a question I cannot answer completely, but the important 
thing to be able to say for my argument is that it extends beyond the human world at all. 
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fully expressed in the event of the cross, where God chooses to suffer the 
rejection of God’s own creation, and therein reveal the full extent of divine 
love.   Instead of overwhelming or coercing, God accepts the limited 77
understanding and love of people.  Through the cross the divine nature is 
revealed.  “This nature,” writes Edwards, “is revealed in the Christ-event as 
radical self-giving love.  This is a divine and transcendent love, a love that has 
an unimaginable capacity to respect the autonomy and independence of 
creatures, to work with them patiently, and to bring all things to their 
fulfillment.”  78
The Mark of Detachment 
 The final mark of inauthentic love according to Vanstone is that of 
detachment.  A lover who is untouched by the trials of the beloved does not 
actually love.  In Stump’s appropriation of Thomist theology, God’s detachment 
is denied by the desire for certain outcomes for the beloved.  If God has desires 
for creation which creation itself has the power to resist (such as the desire for 
unity, which can be rebuffed by the self-willed loneliness of creatures), then God 
cannot be unaffected by creation.  For classical theists, the conclusion of 
vulnerability has been troublesome since it challenges the notion of God’s 
aseity and God’s immutability, that is, God’s ability to be totally self-existent, 
self-reliant, and unchanging.  If God responds to the world, then the world has 
the power to affect God, beyond God’s own choice.  God’s vulnerability seems 
problematic: after all, it appears as if there is nothing to prevent God from being 
overwhelmed by suffering just as people often are.  One philosopher wrote, 
“Love takes us hostage to fortune; it binds us to the weal and woe of the 
 Edwards, How God Acts, 31.77
 Edwards, How God Acts, 51.78
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beloved in ways we could not have anticipated and cannot reject.”   But surely 79
God cannot be taken hostage to fortune!  Moltmann tries to avoid the challenge 
to God’s aseity by arguing that even God’s suffering in response to the world is 
God’s own action on God’s self, and is therefore controllable.  However, as Paul 
Fiddes points out, in Moltmann’s system, “God seems less the supreme victim 
than the supreme self-executioner.”   Fiddes, along with Edwards and Walter 80
Kasper,  finds a middle way between refusing God the ability to suffer and 81
refusing the uncontrollable nature of suffering by suggesting instead that God 
“chooses that suffering should befall him, rather than making himself suffer.”   82
God chooses to be vulnerable, and chooses to be open to the suffering that 
love brings.  Fiddes’s conclusion coheres well with Vanstone’s observation that, 
“Where love is authentic, the lover gives to the object of his love a certain power 
over himself –– a power which would not otherwise be there.”   Of itself, the 83
creation has no power to affect God: in this sense God is immutable and 
impassible.  As an object of love, however, the creation gains that power 
because God gives God’s self to it.  Yet, since the ability to suffer is freely 
chosen by God, God is not ruled or overwhelmed by it.  Suffering remains both 
 Jeanette Kennett, “True and Proper Selves: Velleman on Love,”  Ethics 118:2 (Jan 2008), 79
217.
 Paul S. Fiddes, The Creative Suffering of God (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988), 137.80
 Edwards, How God Acts, 31-32; Walter Kasper, The God of Jesus Christ: New Edition (New 81
York: Continuum, 2012), 194-195.  Kasper writes “God’s self-emptying, his weakness and his 
suffering are not the expression of a lack, as they are in finite beings; nor are they expression of 
a fated necessity.  If God suffers, then he suffers in a divine manner, that is, his suffering is an 
expression of his freedom; suffering does not befall God, therefore, rather he freely allows it to 
touch him.  He does not suffer, as creatures do, from a lack of being; he suffers out of love and 
by reason of his love, which is the overflow of his being. To predicate becoming, suffering and 
movement of God does not, therefore, mean that he is turned into a developing God who 
reaches the fullness of his being only through becoming; such a passage from potency to act is 
excluded in God.  To predicate becoming, suffering and movement of God is to understand God 
as the fullness of being, as pure actuality, as overflow of life and love.  Because God is the 
omnipotence of love, he can as it were indulge in the weakness of love; he can enter into 
suffering and death without perishing therein.  Only thus can he redeem our death through his 
own death.”
 Fiddes, Creative Suffering of God, 108.  Italics original.82
 Vanstone, Love’s Endeavour, 51.83
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uncaused by God and voluntary. 
 Also, because love is a desire for something in the state of the beloved, 
love is either fulfilled or not fulfilled in its desires by the beloved him or her or 
itself.  There is, therefore, no way that the lover can be untouched by the 
choices of the beloved; no way for God to stand apart from the suffering of the 
world.  Here, we find the co-suffering argument advanced by theologians such 
as Ruth Page and Christopher Southgate: no creature suffers alone because 
God suffers with it, and God takes on the full consequences of the risk of 
creation.   There is no pain that God does not share. 84
 The three theological marks of love’s inauthenticity are limitation, control, 
and detachment.  The exploration of these marks led to a description of God’s 
love as unlimited, patient, committed, respecting the freedom of the other, 
vulnerable, and co-suffering. 
The Kenosis of the God Who Loves 
 If we accept that “God is love” (1 John 4:8) and work from the 
philosophical definition and theological description of love just developed, there 
are certain outcomes for God’s relationship with creation.  A God who loves the 
world according to the definition above will not be able to relate to the world in 
the way the classical tradition has described the Creator-creation relationship––
characterised by the expression of omnipotence, omniscience, eternity, and 
immutability.   While God might posses these traits within Godself, God cannot 85
relate to the world with these attributes and maintain the desires of love 
 Page, The Web of Creation, 53-54; Southgate, Groaning of Creation, 50-54.84
 Some of these attributes are only incompatible with love if they are expressed.  Omnipotence, 85
God’s ability to do anything that is logically possible, is compatible with love as long as God 
does not do everything.  Immutability however, is simply impossible, because there is no 
difference between its existence and its expression.
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according to the definition above.  Love requires the vulnerability, 
precariousness, and freedom of the other.  Even the classical tradition has 
acknowledged the mutual exclusiveness of some of the classical attributes of 
God and the love of God as expressed in the Incarnation.  Classical theology 
solves this problem through the distinction between the economic Trinity (how 
God appears as God relates to the world) and the immanent Trinity (how God is 
within God’s own being).  God acts in the economic Trinity in ways impossible to 
the immanent Trinity, allowing for the acts of love to be genuine––at least, at 
some level.  86
 Unsatisfied with a God where the effects of love do not reach to the core 
of the divine being, relational theologians have instead offered the model of 
divine kenosis as the organising principle of the God-world relationship.   As 87
mentioned in chapter 2, John Polkinghorne proposes four types of kenosis in 
relation to creation that are necessitated by love.   They will serve as an 88
organising matrix for the rest of this chapter.  Polkinghorne suggests that in 
creation God voluntarily gives up the traits of omnipotence, simple eternity, 
omniscience, and causal status.  89
Kenosis of Omnipotence 
 Traditionally, there is a great deal of theological strain around the concept of the immutability 86
of God in light of the Incarnation.  Bulgakov, for example, held that Christ’s divine nature was 
not impassible in Jesus, but that the immanent Trinity was untouched by the kenosis of the 
Incarnation.  How the Incarnation should have failed to touch the inner being of God is beyond 
me.  See Gilles Emery, “The Immutability of the God of Love and the Problem of Language 
Concerning the ‘Suffering of God’,” in Divine Impassibility and the Mystery of Human Suffering, 
trans. by Thomas J. White, eds. James F. Keating and Thomas J. White, O.P. (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Eerdmans, 2009), 46-47.
 Relational theologians is a broad grouping, which includes both process theists and open 87
theists.  See particularly the essays in The Work of Love, ed. John Polkinghorne.
 Polkinghorne, “Kenotic Creation and Divine Action,” 102-105.88
 An introduction to Polkinghorne’s meaning of each of these types of kenosis is found in 89
chapter 2, p. 75-77.
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 This section will investigate how God’s kenosis of omnipotence allows for 
an indeterministic world, which––I will argue––is the only foundation for a world 
created in love.  To do so requires an investigation of the various philosophical 
positions on freedom, and how each impacts the relationship of God to the 
world.  Some of these positions, as we will see, deny the possibility of a world 
created with the love that we have described as vulnerable and freedom-
granting. 
 Kenosis as the emptying of divine attributes, and particularly of 
omnipotence and omnipresence, has been most notably developed by Jürgen 
Moltmann.  Linking his position with the Jewish kabbalistic doctrine of zimsum, 
Moltmann argues that for creation to be truly an “other,” it requires room––a sort 
of ontological vacuum or nihil that is not God––in which creation can expand 
and have its own existence.   Thus God, before creation, contracted into God’s 90
self in order to make room for creation.  That room was necessary for creatures 
to be able to have causal effectiveness in the world. 
 Moltmann’s understanding of space and creation have been strongly 
critiqued, most notably by Colin Gunton, for his mechanical view of space (as if 
God existed in space and could be withdrawn from any part of it) and for the 
lack of biblical support for the notion of sacrificial self-limitation in the act of 
creation.  Gunton writes “there is no suggestion in the Bible that the act of 
creation is anything but a joyful giving of reality to the other.”   Christopher 91
Southgate joins Gunton in critiquing what he calls a “questionable spatial 
metaphor for the God-world relation”  and also raises an objection against 92
 Jürgen Moltmann, God in Creation (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), 86-89.90
 Colin Gunton, The Triune Creator: A Historical and Systematic Study (Grand Rapids, MI: 91
Eerdmans, 1998), 141.
 Southgate, Groaning of Creation, 58.92
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Moltmann’s “commitment to incompatibilism.”   Sarah Coakley, in her critique 93
of various kenotic theologians, raises the same point about incompatibilism.   94
Coakley argues that various compatibilist options are also available, and she 
offers a model of divine empowerment of creation, rather than seeing divine 
action as a zero-sum game that limits creaturely action.   Southgate and 95
Coakley raise an important objection, and one well worth investigating at length.   
There are two major types of compatibilism: those that think determinism is true 
and those that think it is false.  Coakley, as we will see, defends the truth of 
determinism, while Southgate does not explain which position he takes.  We will 
therefore concentrate on Coakley’s objection, since it is clear she accepts 
determinism.  96
 I agree with Gunton’s and Southgate’s objections to Moltmann’s spatial 
metaphor.  I do not, however, think that Coakley’s objections to his 
incompatibilist position is valid.  Instead, I think that a commitment to 
incompatibilism is usually necessary.  I agree with Moltmann, Barbour, 
Peacocke, and Polkinghorne  that indeterminism, which is usually associated 97
with an incompatibilist position, is a necessary step to true creaturely freedom.  98
 Southgate, Groaning of Creation, 58.93
 Sarah Coakley, “Kenosis: Theological Meanings and Gender Connotations,” in The Work of 94
Love, ed. John Polkinghorne (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2001), 202-206.
 Ted Peters and Martinez Hewlett also offer a model which allows for openness but without 95
kenosis.  They claim that God’s gift of an open future is not to be seen “as a divine self-
limitation; but rather as an expression of divine power in creation.”  Peters and Hewlett, 
Evolution from Creation to New Creation: Conflict, Conversation, and Convergence (Nashville, 
TN: Abingdon, 2003), 160.
 These terms are all more closely examined on p. 178-180.96
 See each of these writer’s essays in The Work of Love, ed. John Polkinghorne.97
 Nor are these thinkers, who contributed to The Work of Love, alone in thinking that 98
indeterminism is necessary.  They are joined by Philip Clayton and Robert Russell in rejecting 
determinism.  Clayton writes “Indeterminacy seems to be a necessary condition for free will.”  
Philip Clayton, “Tracing the Lines: Constraint and Freedom in the Movement from Quantum 
Physics to Theology,” in Quantum Mechanics: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action, eds. 
Robert Russell, Philip Clayton, Kirk Wegter-McNelly, and John Polkinghorne (Vatican City/
Berkeley, CA: Vatican Observatory/CTNS, 2001), 221.
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 I set out here into much-contested territory.  The reason I do so is two-
fold.  First, there is a significant theological gain for parsing out God’s 
relationship to creation.  Second, I aim to broaden the terms of the philosophical 
debate into a form that is useful for discussing the non-human creation. 
 The theological gain has to do with assumptions about the relationship of 
God to creation.  A common assumption about God creating through evolution 
is voiced by Stephen Webb when he writes:  
If God designed evolution, then he must endorse it.  If it is his tool, then it 
must fit his hands––if it is his creature, then it must do his bidding––and 
thus it must say something about what he is.    99
Behind Webb’s statement is an assumption about a type of determinism.  God’s 
design and endorsement of evolution, in Webb’s mind, means that evolution 
“must do his [God’s] bidding.”  Yet that is only true in a world where the 
creatures who evolve have no significant freedom in their physical or 
behavioural choices.  In a deterministic world, and by “deterministic” I use 
Wildman’s definition that determinism means “given that the world is a particular 
way at one moment, its unfolding thereafter is fixed and inflexible,”  the whole 100
of history is determined by the initial conditions of the universe.  Like the 
movement of a good clock, each event in the world is a direct outcome of the 
state of the world preceding it.  If that is the case, Webb’s argument that the 
“tool” of evolution must do God’s bidding would be correct.  Any other 
conclusion would mean that God’s craftsmanship was terribly flawed. 
 However, I think Webb’s analogy is entirely the wrong sort to illustrate the 
God-world relationship.  Instead, we must think of an organic analogy.  (An 
organic analogy is more appropriate since, as I have argued, the relationship 
 Stephen H. Webb, The Dome of Eden: A New Solution to the Problem of Creation and 99
Evolution (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2010), 104.
 Wesley J. Wildman, “The Divine Action Project, 1998-2003,” Theology and Science 2:1 100
(2004), 39.
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between God and creation is one of love, and only living things can be proper 
objects of love. )  Imagine, for a moment, an organic entity in Webb’s 101
argument, and it becomes clear how non-intuitive his argument and its 
outcomes really are.  Let us substitute God and evolution for parent and 
child:  102
In other words, if a mother [voluntarily] gives birth to a son, then the 
mother must endorse him.  If he is her tool, then he must fit her hands––
if he is her creature, then he must do her bidding––and thus he must say 
something about what she is. 
   
We can clearly see both the truth and the falsity of Webb’s statement.  If a 
mother chooses to bring a child into the world, then she does indeed endorse 
that child.  But that does not mean that the son is her tool, or that he necessarily 
does her bidding.  It is true that the son will tell us something about the mother 
(at the very least, genetically), but he will not tell us many things and may 
indeed embody traits quite opposite from his mother, since he is his own 
creature.  It is the same with God and the evolutionary process.  I argue that 
God chose a creative process with self-generative capabilities, which means 
that it will both reflect and not reflect who God is in its outcomes. 
 I am not saying that God cannot hold any purposes in relation to 
evolution.  A mother may well have some purposes in mind, such as having a 
relationship with her child.  Other outcomes will be strongly influenced or even 
determined by the mother, such as what language the son will initially speak.  
But having a strong guiding influence, or even determining certain broad 
parameters within which freedom is at play is a vastly different thing from the 
sort of control implied in one “doing the bidding” of another.  Similarly, the 
 See chapter 4, p. 164.101
 If the reader is concerned about the personification of “evolution” here, let him or her be 102
reminded that evolution is a process that describes the change of countless living beings.  If 
those beings are not God’s “tools,” then the process that describes their changes cannot be 
God’s tool either.
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evolutionary process can serve God’s purposes without being determined as 
long as God’s purposes are broad and flexible.  103
 My organic analogy only stands if evolution has not been determined to 
have certain outcomes because of God’s establishment of the initial ordering of 
conditions of the universe.  The reason we all know the son will not 
automatically do the bidding of his mother is because we also know the mother 
lacks the necessary power to cause the son to do her bidding.  She may have 
all sorts of influence over him, and he may willingly choose to follow her 
instruction, but in the end, her gift of life to him also gives him a freedom that 
she cannot ultimately supersede.  An omnipotent God, by contrast, would have 
the power that the mother lacks to determine another’s action, but my argument 
in this section is that God’s love for the world necessitates God’s giving up the 
type of power that could determine all future events and actions.  I will argue for 
this by deconstructing Coakley’s critique of indeterminism. 
 What is it that Coakley actually argues in her critique of indeterminism?  
She makes three arguments tied up with determinism, creaturely freedom, and 
divine atemporalism.  Her charge is that Moltmann et. al. picture “determinism 
as the inappropriate and restrictive control of individual humans by some sort of 
divine dictator.”   Elsewhere, she similarly chastises theologians for modifying 104
the traditional attributes of God and rejecting determinism because they think 
determinism reduces human action to “mere ‘puppetry’ or ‘ventriloquism.’”   105
Her argument, it is important to note, is about determinism, and not necessarily 
about compatibilism.  A compatibilist could believe that indeterminism is true, 
since compatibilism is a position regarding the nature of free choice and not of 
 See p. 182 below on the purposes of God in creation.103
 Coakley, “Kenosis: Theological Meanings and Gender Connotations,”  206.104
 Sarah Coakley, “Feminism,” in A Companion to Philosophy of Religion, 2nd ed., eds. Charles 105
Taliaferro, Paul Draper, and Philip L. Quinn (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 691.
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the truth of the metaphysical question of determinism or indeterminism.   106
Because Coakley critiques the other thinkers’ rejection of determinism, though, 
it can be inferred that her sort of compatibilism is one that also thinks 
determinism is true.  If that is the case, and we rule out the indeterministic-
compatibilist,  there are four major positions available: 107
1) Hard Determinist - The hard determinist holds that “with respect to any type 
of event and to any token of that type, that an omnipotent being have power 
over them in the sense that he positively governs them.”  Positive 
governance means “government in which the governor bring about whatever 
he governs.”   Every event is determined by God, and significant freedom is 108
considered incompatible with that determination.  This is the position that, in 
Coakley’s depiction, is only one that libertarian free choice advocates 
 In relation to determinism, Kirk Wegter-McNelly’s suggests three distinctions of in/106
compatiblism: 
1) Anthropo-physical in/compatibilism: human freedom is in/compatible with physical 
determinism; 
2) Anthropo-theological in/compatibilism: human freedom is in/compatible with divine 
determinism; and 
3) Theo-physical in/compatibilism: objectively special divine is in/compatible with physical 
determinism. 
The first and second can easily be linked.  If God sets the initial conditions of the universe, then 
physical determinism is the same thing as divine determinism.  Yet even without full physical 
determinism, theological determinism could be true.  It is theological determinism (roughly 
similar to 2) that is in question in this part of my argument.  See Kirk Wegter-McNelly, “Does 
God Need Room To Act?  Theo-Physical In/Compatibilism in Noninterventionist Theories of 
Objectively Special Divine Action,” in Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action: 20 Years of 
Challenge and Progress, eds. Robert J. Russell, Nancey Murphy, and William R. Stoeger, S.J. 
(Vatican/Berkeley, CA: Vatican Observatory/CTNS, 2008), 305.
 Kirk Wegter-McNelly is an example of this position, since he argues for anthropo-theological 107
compatibilism while denying anthropo-physical compatibilism. Either way, he is clearly 
distinguished from Coakley when he writes “Determinism might be compatible with the God of 
theism... but I believe it is deeply incompatible with the Christian God.”  See his classification of 
these terms in note 106 above.  Wegter-McNelly, “Does God Need Room to Act?” 306-307, 313.
 Paul Helm and William Hasker, “Does God take Risks in Governing the World?,” in 108
Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion, ed. Michael L. Peterson and Raymond J. 
VanArragon (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004): 218-41, 231, 229.  See also Paul Helm, Eternal 
God: A Study of God without Time (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 98 and 127.  This 
theological determinism should be distinguished from philosophical determinism which states 
that “every event has a cause. The usual explanation of this is that for every event, there is 
some antecedent state, related in such a way that it would break a law of nature for this 
antecedent state to exist yet the event not to happen.”  Simon Blackburn, "Determinism," In The 
Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) Accessed 17 Jan 
2014, available from http://0-www.oxfordreference.com.lib.exeter.ac.uk/view/10.1093/acref/
9780199541430.001.0001/acref-9780199541430-e-905.  Philosophical determinism asks only 
about if there are causes to events, not if and how God might be involved.
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acknowledge.  She wants to point out the existence of soft-determinism/
compatibilism.  109
2) Soft-Determinist/Compatibilist - The person who holds this position accepts 
that determinism is true, and that all future events will happen according to 
the unfolding of present realities.  However, this person will still accept that 
creatures have responsibility for their own actions since they acted according 
to their own desire, even if those desires were entirely determined.  110
3) Molinist/Middle Knowledge - This person does not think that the world is 
determined, but believes that all the indeterministic factors (such as the 
libertarian free choice of creatures) can be perfectly predicted by God.  
Therefore, God can choose to create a world where God can perfectly predict 
that every creature will freely choose the divine will in any given situation. 
William Hasker writes: “The majority of philosophers who have considered 
these and similar arguments have concluded that there are serious questions 
about the coherence and logical possibilities of middle knowledge.”   Since 111
Coakley does not argue for it, and because most philosophers find the 
position incoherent, I will not investigate Molinism further below.    112
 Although, few would argue (even amongst strong determinists) that God determines 109
absolutely every event, because real evil also occurs.  Since positive governance of evil is 
incompatible with God’s nature, God must only willingly permit evil rather than stand as the 
efficient cause of it.  So even strong determinist positions do not usually argue that every event 
is determined by God.  Instead, as Paul Helm argues, there is sometimes only the willing 
permissiveness of God for evil to occur––a position held also by Augustine.  This 
permissiveness works together with God’s foreknowledge so that God can “negatively govern” 
certain events by not allowing specific evils to occur that could otherwise overturn God’s plans.  
Helm writes “God foreknows everything, and unconditionally governs everything, but does not 
causally determine everything in the sense that he is the efficient cause of everything.  
Nevertheless, nothing happens that God is unwilling should happen.”  See Helm, “Does God 
take Risks?” 234; Augustine, Enchiridion, ch. 100 & 102, trans. by J.F. Shaw, accessed 3 
November 2013, available from http://www.leaderu.com/cyber/books/augenchiridion/
enchiridion97-122.html.
 Nicholas Saunders, Divine Action & Modern Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University 110
Press, 2002), 44.
 William Hasker,“A Philosophical Perspective,” in The Openness of God: A Biblical Challenge 111
to the Traditional Understanding of God, ed. Pinnock, et al., 126-154 (Downers Grove, IL: IVP, 
1994), 144-146.  The basic argument is that Molinism is built around a system of God knowing 
the various possibilities of freedom, also known as counterfactuals.  Yet, to know one 
counterfactual as the event that will definitely occur, means that one knows that all the other 
possibilities will definitely not occur.  The whole system of knowing counterfactuals collapses 
into simple foreknowledge, which leads back into the determinist problem of God controlling 
outcomes.  On the other hand, if God knows all the possibilities of the future, but not which ones 
will actually take place, then there is no room for the control and assurance that the Molinist 
system strives for, and in practice you have libertarian freewill.  Middle knowledge always either 
collapses into incoherence by trying to defend an impossible view of foreknowledge, or it does 
not provide the desired outcome.  In addition, for God to choose to create creatures who God 
knows will freely choose to do all the tremendous amounts of harm that do actually occur, and 
not to choose to create ones that do not choose those harms, makes the question of theodicy 
even more problematic.
 For more on the incoherence of Molinism from both determinist and libertarian perspectives, 112
see: Robert M. Adams, “Middle Knowledge and the Problem of Evil,” American Philosophical 
Quarterly 14:2 (Apr 1977): 109-117; William Hasker, God, Time, and Knowledge (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1989), 19-52; Helm, “Does God Take Risks?” 229.
!180
4) Libertarian free choice -  The person who holds this position believes that 
free choice is incompatible with determinism, but also believes that free 
choice exists.  Therefore, determinism must be false.  In terms of choice, an 
agent can hold certain desires and choose to pursue them (which, alone, 
would be a compatibilist position), but the agent can also choose to desire 
something else or to refrain from pursuing action altogether.  They make 
choices that are “causally originated” within themselves.   Their actions are 113
“not causally determined but not random either.”   The sum of a creature’s 114
choice, therefore, is more than the personality, history, and desire of the 
chooser: there is some deciding agent involved that acts in the moment and 
that self-determines the outcome.  115
Part of the problem with using the regular terms of philosophical debate is that 
they have been developed for discussing human moral freedom.  Since I am 
interested in the freedom within evolutionary development, most of which was 
pre-human, and much of which was not consciously chosen, I am not primarily 
concerned with the rational, autonomous, or moral choices of humans.  I am 
interested in a non-human creature’s ability to have what might be called 
“freedom of behaviour.”  John Polkinghorne has used the term “free process” to 
refer to the freedom of the evolutionary world, and Coakley has used the term 
“evolutionary contingency,”  but since these terms includes non-living 116
processes as well as the choices and behaviours of living creatures, I will not 
use them.  Instead, when I talk about “freedom” or “freedom of choice” I mean 
the sort of “freedom of behaviour” that living creatures have.  This is not always 
conscious choice, and not moral, but it is still choice.  We might think of a trivial 
choice, such as a caterpillar choosing which pile of equidistant food to go after, 
 Nicholas Saunders, Divine Action, 44.113
 Blackburn, "Libertarianism," In The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, accessed online 17 Jan 114
2014 at http://0-www.oxfordreference.com.lib.exeter.ac.uk/view/10.1093/acref/
9780199541430.001.0001/acref-9780199541430-e-1834.
 Some might argue that libertarian choice is generated randomly, and therefore is no more 115
free than compatibilist choice since it is not really chosen, but rather ‘generated’.  If this were 
the case, though, we would expect people’s choices to be far less in line with their history and 
moral commitments than we find them.  Behaviour itself would become random.  But we do not 
observe this, so choice cannot be entirely random.
 Coakley, “Evolution, Cooperation, and Divine Providence,” in Evolution, Games, and God: 116
Principles of Cooperation, eds. Martin A. Nowak and Sarah Coakley (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2013), 378.  The same argument was formerly used by Coakley in “God and 
Evolution: A New Solution,” Harvard Divinity Bulletin 35:2 & 3 (Spring/Summer 2007): 8-13.
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or a more significant choice, such as the choice of a grizzly bear to hunt a deer, 
and therefore kill, or simply to forage for berries and tubers.  Many small 
choices, or a few large ones, will have an impact on a creature’s life.  Many 
creatures’ lives will have an impact on their ecosystem.  The ecosystem will 
have an impact on life’s history, and therefore on the paths that the evolutionary 
process takes.  So the question is, how can we parse this freedom of behaviour 
in relation to God’s love and presence in the world? 
 When Coakley argues for her compatibilist notion, she writes: 
The intuition pump I want to propose here is what Peter Geach once 
called the chess-master model (Geach 1977).  The basic idea is this: 
God is like a chess master playing an eight-year old chess novice.  There 
is a game with regularities and rules, and although there are a huge 
number of different moves that the child can make, each of these can be 
successfully responded to by the chess master––they are already 
familiar to him.  And we have no overall doubt that he is going to win.  117
The illustration is a surprising one for a compatibilist.  The first reason it is 
surprising is that we do not expect that someone who is trying to emphasise the 
notion of cooperation between God and the world should use an analogy that is 
inherently competitive.  Two chess players are always necessarily competing 
against each other, even when one is a master and the other a novice and there 
is no question of the outcome.  Perhaps some better analogies would be Tom 
Settle’s suggestions of a shepherd and a sheepdog working together, ballroom 
dancing partners, or a horse and rider in the dressage ring.   In these 118
instances, the “following” partner expresses his or her own creativity and 
agency, but always in cooperation with, and in submission to, the “leading” 
partner. 
 Coakley, “Evolution, Cooperation, and Divine Providence,” 378.  The analogy does not 117
originate with Geach.  It stretches all the way back to William James in 1884 who proposed it in 
“The Dilemma of Determinism,” in The Will to Believe: And Other Essays in Popular Philosophy 
(London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1897), 181.
 Tom Settle, “The Dressage Ring and the Ballroom: Loci of Double Agency,” in Facets of Faith 118
and Science, Vol.4, Interpreting God’s Action in the World, ed. Jitse van der Meer (Larham, MD: 
University Press of America, 1996), 17-40.
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 The second reason I find Coakley’s analogy surprising is that it is one 
that is very familiar in philosophical circles, but it is usually always used to 
support those who defend a libertarian interpretation of free choice.  The free 
choice advocates use it to show how a creature can have libertarian freedom 
without God’s overall purposes in creation being thwarted.   A player has 119
complete freedom to choose any action within the rules of the game,  and the 120
choice he or she makes is not determined in any way (for most of play, at any 
rate ) by the other player.  While it may not be a skilful move, a player could 121
choose, for example, to sacrifice a queen in order to capture a pawn.  The 
salient point is that whatever choices a player makes in his or her freedom to 
move, none of them will significantly alter the outcome of the game.  It will, 
however, have a very significant effect on the course of the game.   
 In terms of evolution, I think the chess-master analogy means that the 
ultimate purposes of creation, such as the Incarnation, and redemption through 
Christ, have always been assured.  However, the course of evolutionary 
pathways have been largely free.  Libertarian freedom allows the real chance 
that creation could take paths where the harms and disvalues were not chosen 
by God.  Many biological disvalues, such as predation and parasitism, proceed 
from the free behaviour of creatures, not the design of God.   I am not saying 122
 See John Saunders, The God Who Risks: A Theology of Divine Providence.  2nd Edition 119
(Downer’s Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2007), 243-44; Gregory Boyd, God of the Possible: A Biblical 
Introduction to the Open View of God (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 2000), 127-128; William 
Hasker, God, Time, and Knowledge, 195-96.
 One common misunderstanding about libertarian freewill is to think it means that a creature 120
can always make absolutely any choice.  But there are plenty of choices that are not open to 
me, even if I have freewill.  I cannot choose to fly, for example.  So staying “within the rules” 
means acting freely within the constraints and limitations of my being and environment.  But, 
significantly, there is more than one choice available to me within those constraints.
 At the late stages of a chess game, a player may in fact have all their choices determined by 121
his or her opponent.  Although, even in that case, the player could still choose to resign at any 
point, and therefore always has two significant options open to him or her.
 Many of the goods of creation, such as cooperation and symbiosis, also proceed from the 122
freedom of creatures.
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that the occurrence of these disvalues are evil, or that God holds predators and 
parasites culpable for their actions.  What I mean is that God did not choose for 
the tiger to have sharp teeth.  A long line of undetermined creaturely actions 
combined with chance mutations and environmental constraints led to a tiger 
that has sharp teeth and an instinct to hunt.  So the violence in the tiger’s 
hunting reflects God’s freedom-giving character, while not reflecting God’s own 
moral character.  Another way to understand this is to say that while God would 
not directly cause one creature to attack another, God did create a world in 
which giving freedom allowed creatures to use violence against each other.  
God is culpable for setting up a system with such significant freedoms that 
grave harms may occur, but such a system is essential to the nature of love. 
 Perhaps the reason Coakley uses the chess-master analogy to defend 
compatibilism is because she is using Peter Geach as her source.  The chess-
master analogy has, I think, been extended too far in Geach’s 1971-72 Stanton 
Lectures, where he writes that God can so outplay the opponent as to choose 
the exact manner of the victory, down to “on that square I will upgrade my pawn 
to a queen.”   I think such a view is counterintuitive.  There are simply too 123
many possible moves in chess, too many contingencies, to play a game with as 
much certainty about specific outcomes as Geach proposes.   The same, I 124
think, is true of the countless contingencies of evolutionary history. 
 Coakley defines her challenge for both libertarian and hard-determinist 
incompatibilist positions as a lack of loving imagination.  She writes: “what is 
palpably missing is a sustained or positive reflection on the nurturing and all-
 Peter Geach, Providence and Evil (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 58.123
 Ironically, the sort of control Geach thinks is possible is probably more likely if the master is 124
playing another advanced player.  Another master will always make reasonable plays that are 
more easily predicted, whereas a novice is more likely to make startlingly unpredictable moves.
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encompassing dimensions of divine love.”    Reflection on God’s love, she 125
thinks, allows for compatibilist models of freedom.  She notes Eleonore Stump 
as a “striking recent counter-instance”  to the rule of power-dominated 126
philosophical dialogue because Stump describes life as existing “under the 
mothering guidance of God.”    127
 It is, however, yet another puzzling move for Coakley to lionise Stump’s 
views, because Stump is one of the stronger advocates of the incompatibilist, 
libertarian freedom that Coakley rejects.  Stump’s reflection on nurturing love 
leads her to adopt a libertarian freewill position; the very thing that Moltmann, 
Barbour, Peacocke, and Polkinghorne also find imperative.  Stump even tries 
“to show that Aquinas cannot be classed as a theological compatibilist but has 
to be taken as a libertarian of a certain sort”  and hangs the success of her 128
theodicy on the rejection of compatibilism.   The reason for Stump’s 129
conclusion regarding indeterminism is that she insists that God’s “mothering 
guidance” presupposes a freedom of the will to accept, reject, or simply be 
quiescent under such guiding influence.    130
 Now, Coakley is right to object to seeing a human as a perfectly 
autonomous choosing being who rationally makes every decision.  She is right 
to emphasise that life involves dependence in all sorts of ways, and that life is 
limited, constrained, and guided by divine care.  Yet none of this requires a 
compatibilist view of the world.  Incompatibilism does not require that every 
 Coakley, “Feminism,” 691.125
 Coakley, “Feminism,” 691.126
 Eleonore Stump, “The Mirror of Evil,” in God and the Philosophers, ed. Thomas Morris 127
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 242.
 Stump, Wandering in Darkness, 165.128
 Stump, Wandering in Darkness, 454.129
 Stump, Wandering in Darkness, 165-168.130
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choice be entirely uninfluenced; it only requires that creatures have some 
behavioural freedoms, some choices where the outcomes are not determined 
by prior states of the universe.   
 When it comes to elements that affect evolutionary processes, my 
position would be to say that all non-living elements of the universe are 
deterministic.  I accept the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, 
and so I think that there are still indeterministic events that occur in the non-
living world, but these only occur at the quantum scale, the outcomes of which 
are deterministic at the classical scale.  So God could reasonably predict 
universal history perfectly until the emergence of life.  Living things, however, 
will have various levels of freedom depending on their capacities.  Very simple 
organisms will have very few freedoms.  Complex organisms will have more 
freedoms.  Humans will exercise complex moral freedoms.  It is these outcomes 
of freedom, I argue, that cannot be known before they actually occur.  They 
must be indeterministic, or else the control that God would exercise over them 
would exclude the possibility of love.  Even, I think, God being able to predict all 
future creaturely actions is enough to exclude the possibility of divine love. 
 The last significant argument Coakley makes for her deterministic 
compatibilism rests on divine atemporalism and divine omniscience.  She writes 
of her chess analogy that “God timelessly knows what will happen on any 
different scenario depending on what moves occur.  But there is a crucial 
difference here between God knowing what will occur and God directly causing 
what occurs.”   However, an atemporal God cannot know what “will” happen 131
on any different scenario, as Coakley suggests, since an atemporal God would 
have to eternally “know” what scenario actually occurred.  Atemporality makes 
 Coakley, “Evolution, Cooperation, and Divine Providence,” 379.  Italics original.131
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tense inappropriate.  Divine atemporality also makes the notion of divine 
response inappropriate.   In a classical understanding of God, which Coakley 132
explicitly claims it is her desire to assume,  God is pure act, and therefore 133
cannot respond, because action is already and always being fully expressed.  
David Burrell, in trying to express this classical understanding of God, writes: 
It makes no sense to ask how pure-act acts, since it is ipso facto in act.  
So God’s acting involves no mechanisms, no process (from potency to 
act), no powers by which divinity acts.... Moreover, pure act must be 
eternal (or better, must exist eternally) for reasons internal to the 
conception of pure act; there is no way it can be ‘in time’.  134
God’s actions and God’s knowledge are eternal.  Coakley cannot defend the 
classical understanding of God and suggest that God can respond to creaturely 
choice, or know what to do “depending on” what moves are made, for the 
classical God cannot depend on creation in any way, shape, or form. 
 If we take the classical understanding of omniscience seriously, and 
accept that God has eternal knowledge of creaturely choice, does God’s 
(fore)knowledge rule out creaturely freedom and force a determinist view (either 
hard determinist or compatibilist)?  Many thinkers have come to this conclusion.  
Jonathan Edwards, for example, held a strong theological determinist position, 
which ruled out significant human freedom because of God’s foreknowledge.   135
Alvin Plantinga commented on Edwards’s conclusion: “If Edwards’s argument is 
 The reader will note that Coakley, in using the chess-master analogy above, talks about the 132
chess master “responding” to the moves made in the game.
 She writes: “I am assuming a classical understanding of the Christian God––that is, a God 133
who is Being itself, creator and sustainer of all that is, eternal (i.e. atemporal, omnipresent), 
omniscient, omnipotent, all-loving, indeed the source of all perfection.”  Coakley, “Evolution, 
Cooperation, and Divine Providence,” 376.
 David B. Burrell C.S.C., “Divine Practical Knowing: How an Eternal God Acts in Time,” in 134
Divine Action: Studies Inspired by the Philosophical Theology of Austin Farrer, eds. Brian 
Hebblethwaite and Edward Henderson (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1990), 93-94.  See also David B. 
Burrell C.S.C., Knowing the Unknowable God (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame, 
1986).
 Jonathan Edwards, A Careful and Strict Inquiry into the Modern Prevailing Notions of that 135
Freedom of the Will, which is supposed to be essential to moral agency, virtue and vice, reward 
and punishment, praise and blame (Albany: Whiting, Backus & Whiting, 1804), 153-163.
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a good one, what it shows is that if at some time in the past God knew that I will 
do A, then it is necessary that I will do A––necessary in just the way in which 
the past is necessary.  But then it is not within my power to refrain from doing A, 
so that I will not do A freely.”   Compatibilists normally acknowledge this sense 136
that the future is just as necessary as the past, which rules out any possibility 
that some other future might occur, or that a creature could ever choose in any 
other way than it is already foreknown that they would.   God’s eternal 137
knowledge determines that future events will occur, even if it may not cause 
them (as Coakley points out).    138
 The outcome of God determining such action in a hard determinist way 
seems to rule out the possibility of divine love.  On the basis of the nature of 
love developed above as vulnerable and non-controlling,  God cannot love 139
creatures if God determines them so completely.  Without vulnerability to the 
creation, there is no love because there is no effective freedom.  Where God 
eternally knows all events, there is no vulnerability.  Furthermore, there are 
conclusions in the determinist position that stand completely contrary to the 
desire of love for the good of the beloved.  Augustine, for example, wrote that 
since all people do not find salvation, then God cannot possibly will that all 
people find salvation: 
[We are] to understand the Scripture, "Who will have all men to be 
saved," [1 Timothy 2:4] as meaning that no man is saved unless God 
wills his salvation: not that there is no man whose salvation He does not 
will, but that no man is saved apart from His will...Or, it is said, "Who will 
have all men to be saved;" not that there is no man whose salvation He 
does not will (for how, then, explain the fact that He was unwilling to work 
miracles in the presence of some who, He said, would have repented if 
He had worked them?), but that we are to understand by "all men," the 
 Alvin Plantinga, “On Ockham’s Way Out,” Faith and Philosophy 3:3 (July 1986), 238.136
 Helm, “Does God Take Risks?” 229.137
 Coakley, “Evolution, Cooperation, and Divine Providence,” 379.138
 See discussion above, p. 167-171.139
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human race in all its varieties of rank and circumstances,––kings, 
subjects; noble, plebeian...For which of all these classes is there out of 
which God does not will that men should be saved in all nations through 
His only-begotten Son, our Lord, and therefore does save them.  140
By this argument, Augustine admits that there are those who God chooses not 
to save (I read “to save” to mean “to draw into eternal union with God”).  If God 
does not desire and act toward their greatest good––which is indeed union with 
God––then God cannot love them.  Therefore, the hard determinist position 
seems to fail the test of love. 
 Can either of the compatibilist positions pass the test of love?  They are 
a little more tricky to parse, since they allow for the freedom of choice in a 
limited way, despite that choice still being determined.  Since the choice of 
action is centred in the person––their personality, knowledge, and history––it 
can be maintained that the freedom of love is granted, since God is not making 
a choice for them.  They could have done differently if they had chosen, or 
desired, differently.  However, this would depend at least somewhat on whether 
the development of those desires came about freely.  There are two different 
options. 
 The first option is that of the determinist-compatibilist, Coakley’s position, 
where the elements of personality that determine creaturely choices were 
themselves determined or foreordained by God.  In this case the forces that 
were predetermined by God determined their choice and the agent was not 
really free to choose.  The argument over what constitutes a truly “free” action 
has, of course, raged for centuries, and will not be solved here.  Yet both 
determinist positions fail the test of love since only one outcome was possible 
and therefore God is never vulnerable to the choice of the other. 
 Augustine, Enchiridion, ch. 103.140
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 The second option is that of the indeterminist-compatibilist.  In this case 
the personality was formed by the undetermined interaction of the agent with its 
environment, in which case a more coherent argument could be made that 
compatibilist freewill is possible to be held alongside God’s love, since the 
production of the desire that makes the choice is outside of God’s direct control, 
even if those desires then determine the agent’s choices.  The second option 
can more easily be reconciled with love’s gift of freedom.  However, this second 
type of compatibilism loses the very advantage that theologians want from 
compatibilist positions, namely that God can determine the outcomes of 
creation.  So while one might hold this position, it still requires God’s kenosis of 
omnipotence such that God does not determine every event.  It equally 
necessitates either a temporal experience for God or a kenosis of omniscience.  
A longer discussion of time and eternity is pertinent here, but I will leave it for 
later in this chapter.  141
 To sum up these arguments, in relation to creation, a hard determinist 
position does not allow for freedom, and therefore makes the problem of natural 
evil very severe, for it seems that God intends every instance of suffering.  
Every natural disaster and every venomous or parasitic creature emerges 
directly from the will of God.  There is no kenosis of omnipotence at all.  
 The determinist-compatibilist position rules out the possibility of love, not 
necessarily by compelling the creature, but by refusing the vulnerability of love 
from the divine side.  There is no divine vulnerability in the compatibilist picture 
because God still determines every outcome, and therefore there is no love of 
the type described above.  Love would not involve any risk or response for God.  
It might be argued that a God who gave up omniscience and simple eternity 
 See the section subtitled “Kenosis of Simple Eternity and Kenosis of Omniscience” below, p. 141
298-203.
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alone could have the right relationship to the beloved with determinism being 
true.  However, this God could perfectly predict all future events from present 
states, and therefore would regain the omniscience and would then lose the 
proper relationship to the beloved, since being able to perfectly predict the 
future puts one in essentially the same place as having simple foreknowledge.  
 In contrast, a position based on the kenosis of God’s omnipotence will 
imply that God does not, ultimately, determine all events and thus room is left 
for libertarian creaturely choice.  In their freedom, creatures can then choose to 
act with or against divine invitation or lure.  The true empowerment of creaturely 
action that Coakley desires can only come about through a prior commitment to 
indeterminism.  When Coakley says that free creaturely action is not a zero-sum 
game she is both right and wrong.  It is only in a situation where the zero-sum 
game of determinism is first surrendered that the possibilities of cooperation 
open up.  I will use an analogy of a creature walking to try to illustrate this point 
more clearly. 
 Imagine God placing a creature at the bottom of a narrow crevasse, with 
a wall directly behind it.  There is a path stretching out before the creature, 
between the narrow and unclimbable walls.  For the creature to rise up and walk 
that path freely is the sort of non-zero-sum action that Coakley supports.  The 
creature has been enabled to rise and walk by the indwelling Spirit who 
empowers all movement, and so the walking creature is expressing freewill and 
autonomy while working with divine empowerment.  None of this is a problem.  
What is a problem is that God has placed the creature in a narrow crevasse in 
which all of that autonomy and freewill can only be used toward one end: 
walking along the path in the determined direction.  The creature has no 
effective choice about where to move.  Not only that, but the very moment that 
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the creature decides to rise up and walk is determined by God as well.  In a 
determinist-compatibilist scheme, the creature may have freedom to act, as 
Coakley says, but the creature does not have the necessary freedom to make 
effective choices with those actions.   
 In the libertarian scheme, the creature is placed by God on an open 
plain.  The creature chooses its own direction, which it pursues in concert with 
God’s empowerment of movement.  In addition, the creature can choose to 
move in concert with the divine lure in a particular direction, but does so willingly 
rather than because that is the only direction in which the creature can move.  
So the creature still expresses the sort of cooperative action that Coakley 
argues for, both in being empowered and in cooperating with divine intention. 
 With libertarian freewill, the creature has freedom to choose its own path 
across the open plains.  Sometimes those paths include great suffering for that 
creature or for others.  God experiences the full cost of love when that freedom 
is used to cause suffering by co-suffering with those who hurt as a result of 
creation’s freedom.  Of the three positions we have investigated at length 
here,  only the libertarian freewill perspective is consonant with the nature of 142
love as freedom-bestowing and vulnerable because it does not control the path 
of creation by determinist all its outcomes.  A libertarian freewill position 
alongside a temporal view of God, both of which I adopt, gives the creation 
freedom to explore the options of equally plausible futures without God 
controlling which outcomes develop.  It means that God did not determine or 
design the snake’s painful venom or the alligator’s bite, or the suffering they 
cause.  However, libertarian freewill raises problems of its own.  Does the 
freedom envisaged here overthrow God’s sovereignty?  The most important 
 Again, there is the possibility of an indeterminist-compatibilist position, but as that is not what 142
Coakley was arguing for, I did not develop it at length.
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objection to libertarian freewill is that the kenosis of omnipotence in this sense 
offers no guarantee that God can bring about a good outcome from creation.  
The risk of creation is too great.  Process theists accept this risk: in process 
thought the outcome of creation is unknown, even to God, and evil may triumph 
over good in the end.   
 However, there is another way forward.  I would argue that although 
freewill causes events that are not according to God’s will, the creativity and 
responsiveness of God will allow any action to find ultimate redemption.  No 
event, no action is so evil as to be able to overthrow the possibility of 
redemption because the creativity of God’s work for life is as infinite as God’s 
own being.  Everything other than God is finite, and therefore evil must also be 
finite.  In contrast to evil, God’s goodness and mercy are unlimited.  God does 
not need to control each evil event in order not to be triumphed over: God’s 
goodness can simply out-create evil. 
 If God can bring redemption through resurrection out of the worst evil of 
human history––the slaughter of the perfectly innocent Christ––how much more 
can God bring good out of the disvalues of the natural world that do not arise 
out of moral wrongdoing?   The scope and nature of redemption will be further 143
explored in chapter 6, but here the salient point is that libertarian free choice 
need not overturn God’s sovereignty over creation’s outcomes, as long as there 
is more than one path that can lead to redemption, or more than one 
redemptive state that will satisfy all suffering.  This goes back to what was said 
at the beginning of this section about the purposes of God for creation 
 I do not mean that it is better that an evil event, A, happened rather than didn’t happen 143
because it will one day contribute a better perfection to the realised eschaton than the 
alternative less evil event, B.  If A happens rather than B, then it is because of the freewill of 
creatures.  Both A and B would be redeemed, and result in equally perfect though different 
eschatological realities.  Therefore the event of A really is gratuitous, but is not beyond the 
scope of redemption.
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necessarily being broad and flexible.   If creation is free to choose its own 144
paths, and therefore its own disvalues and evils, redemption will have to be a 
creative response to those particular realities.  Redemption will be brought 
about, and the eschatological vision of creation will be realised, but the details 
of that new creation will be in part dependent upon the free action of creatures 
throughout history.  Had a different path been chosen, redemption would also 
be realised in a different way. 
   The kenosis of God’s omnipotence means that God gives up the 
possibility of determining all events in order to allow for the freedom that love 
requires.  That freedom is most coherently realised within a libertarian 
understanding of free choice. 
 To what extent can free choice be extended to the natural world?  Some 
theologians try to implement a classic freewill defence to the non-human world 
by extending morality beyond humans.  Nicola Hoggard Creegan writes that in 
instances such as chimp cannibalism, “something like sin can be pushed further 
down into the evolutionary tree.”   Her position seems to be based simply on 145
the fact that some chimps perform cannibalistic acts and the analogy that if a 
human were to perform a cannibalistic act it would be sinful.  However, it is 
theologically difficult to consider a chimp’s actions as sin since they have no 
conscious recognition of God’s laws, and therefore cannot be held culpable on 
a moral level, whatever proto-moral concepts of fair and unfair they might have.  
A theological definition of sin as conscious rebellion against God’s standards is 
important if sin is to have any substantial meaning apart from aesthetic whim.  
Pannenberg, writing on the concept of sin in the Hebrew Bible, finds that the 
 See p. 177.144
 Nicola Hoggard Creegan, Animal Suffering & The Problem of Evil (Oxford: Oxford University 145
Press, 2013), 77.
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understanding of God’s law is central: “the idea of the heart that is intent upon 
evil and that of the new heart that is in harmony with God’s command refer 
always to our relation to the command of God, whether in the form of breaking it 
or keeping it.”   In the New Testament, a text of central importance is Paul’s 146
discussion of sin in Romans 7, where he is teasing out the place of law in 
relation to sin.  He allows that sin was not created by the law (7:7) but that 
through the law sin becomes active.  Thus Paul writes:  
Yet, if it had not been for the law, I would not have known sin. I would not 
have known what it is to covet if the law had not said, “You shall not 
covet.”  But sin, seizing an opportunity in the commandment, produced in 
me all kinds of covetousness. Apart from the law sin lies dead.  I was 
once alive apart from the law, but when the commandment came, sin 
revived and I died, and the very commandment that promised life proved 
to be death to me.  147
So, “sin expresses itself in desires that are against the commands of God and 
therefore against the God who issues them.”   Sin seems to require some 148
knowledge of the moral law to be “alive.”  If non-human animals are to be 
ascribed “something like sin” it could––at most––only be the sin that Paul here 
calls “dead.”  The argument by analogy to human sin simply does not provide a 
strong case for assuming either sin or a freewill defence for the non-human 
world. 
 A much more satisfying account of non-human sin comes from David 
Clough who contends that “the primary evidence for the [non-human] fall is that 
Christ came to effect reconciliation between all things and God.”   If Christ’s 149
reconciling work is for all of creation, as passages such as Romans 8 and 
Colossians 1 suggest, then there must be something left to reconcile beyond 
 Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, Vol.2, trans. by Geoffrey W. Bromiley 146
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994), 239.
 Romans 7:7b-10, NRSV.147
 Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, Vol. 2., 240.148
 David Clough, On Animals, Vol.1 (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2012), 125.149
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human sin.  In what sense must the cosmos be reconciled?  I will explore my 
own response to this question in chapter six, proposing how Christ might be a 
reconciler for those without sin.  For Clough, however, the alleged estrangement 
from God is shown in predator/prey relations and the violence throughout 
creation.  The consequent reconciliation needed is one of creating peaceable 
relations between predators and prey.   However, Clough’s foundation for 150
such an argument is open to serious challenge.  He draws primarily from 
prophetic passages anticipating a peaceable nature (Isaiah 11:6-8) as evidence 
that violence was not intended in the original creation, but these passages are 
not sufficient evidence for his claim.  First, there are many passages where God 
points to the violent creation with approval and even emphasises God’s own 
part in orchestrating it (Job 38:39-41; Psalm 104:21, etc.).  Second, although 
there are certainly prophetic passages that envision the end of predator/prey 
relationships––most notably that the wolf will lay down with the lamb and the 
calf and the lion will be bedfellows in Isaiah 11:7, and the lion will eat straw in 
Isaiah 65:25––these must be read together with the images in Isaiah 35:9 which 
state: “no lion will be there, nor any ravenous beast.”   Should we believe that 151
there will be no lions in the new creation, or that there will be lions but that they 
will be vegetarian?   
 The contradictions between the passages forbid the literalistic readings 
that Clough suggests.  Rather these passages, highly symbolic as they are, 
should be understood as exalted imagery of peacefulness and harmony.  None 
of the images should be taken as concrete photographs of the new creation, nor 
should we read their imagery back into our evaluation of the non-human world 
 Clough, On Animals, 127.150
 Another similar issue is raised with Revelation 21:1 and the vision that “there will be no sea.”  151
Should we perhaps think that the existence of the sea itself is a result of the mysterious 
fallenness of creation and contrary to the will of God?
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today.  There is no reason to think from these passages that the creation was 
initially meant to lack predator/prey relations or other types of violence.   152
Instead, we must see the redemption and reconciliation of all creation in Christ 
as something that is more than the simple recovery of something once lost, as 
the gathering up of all of existence into a new creation that is radically different 
from any past historical reality.  We should not assume that because predator/
prey (or parasitic) relationships exist, that they are necessarily directly willed by 
God in all their present forms.   Predator/prey relationships are one of the 153
possibilities of creation’s freedom that have been productive of a great goods 
such as complexity, diversity, and a quickening of the evolutionary process, but 
also productive of great and sometimes needless suffering.  As Southgate says, 
“creation, then, is both ‘good’ and ‘groaning.’”   The good process, by its very 154
nature, involves the inevitability of unintended groanings.  How can this be? 
 The freedom of creation is the freedom for agents to act with real 
causative effect on earth history without that effect being determined by God.   155
If God loves all created beings, then God will not wilfully withdraw the 
“otherness” of those creatures by determining their behaviour; their freedom is 
part of their status as beloved.  The same is true at the larger scale of the 
pathways of evolutionary development.  If God has made creation to be an 
object of love, then God will not control the ways in which creatures choose to 
live, or how evolutionary tactics emerge.  Darwin famously exclaimed to Joseph 
Hooker “What a book a Devil's chaplain might write on the clumsy, wasteful, 
 Indeed, the inclusion of the great sea monsters (Genesis 1:21) in the original creation 152
suggests just the opposite.
 See the discussion above, p. 182-183. 153
 Southgate, Groaning of Creation, 15.154
 That is not to say that there is no providence at work in creation.  I think there is, in the ways 155
which I will describe in chapter 5.  However, that providence does not determine earth history.  It 
only guides, and perhaps sometimes protectively constrains.
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blundering low & horridly cruel works of nature!”   From parasitic wasps to the 156
devastating fungal cordyceps, nature is full of survival techniques that inspire 
horror.  If God had specifically designed these mechanisms to function as they 
do, Darwin’s horror-filled reaction would be justified.  However, in a creation 
established by the freedom of love, the creator does not choose for the 
creatures how they must live.  Instead, creatures make their own choices (to 
whatever level is within their capacity) in order to survive and reproduce, and 
descendants stand in the genetic and cultural traditions passed on to them 
which they themselves innovate on.   There is no path set out by God for 157
creatures’ development.  God works with creation, but as Vanstone writes, “the 
activity of God in creation must be precarious.  It must proceed by no assured 
programme.  Its progress, like every progress of love, must be an angular 
process––in which each step is a precarious step into the unknown.”   The 158
path of creation is improvised; a dance between God and creation, and between 
creatures themselves.  No creature has complete and unencumbered freedom, 
including humans.   Every creature is limited by its own innate capacity and by 159
environmental factors, but it is free to develop within its physical environment 
 Charles R. Darwin to Joseph D. Hooker, “Letter 1924,” 13 July 1856.  Accessed 19 October 156
2013, available from http://www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1924.  
 Peter and Rosemary Grant, ornithologists at Princeton, have beautifully demonstrated the 157
interplay between genetic inheritance and the effect of innovative behaviour during a thirty-four 
year study on Darwin’s finches in the Galapagos islands.  Particularly after a drought in 1977, 
finches with large and powerful beaks who were able to feed on hard seeds (that are regularly 
ignored by all finches) survived, while the medium sized finches starved.  The relevance of this 
story is that the birds, in order to survive, had to choose to eat foods outside their normal diet.  It 
is evident that the birds normally choose to ignore the large, hard seeds.  It was not part of their 
instinct to eat those seeds if only they had the physical capability.  When the regular food ran 
out, those finches who had the physical ability (genetically passed on) innovated and chose to 
eat the once-ignored seeds.  Innovation and creaturely choice are sometimes dismissed too 
easily.  Peter R. Grant and B. Rosemary Grant, How and Why Species Multiply: The Radiation 
of Darwin’s Finches (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 52-55.
 Vanstone, Love’s Endeavour, 62-63.158
 God’s intention, in this sense, is not to simply maximise freedom, which might be done in 159
various others ways, from increasing intelligence, to providing unlimited resources to each 
creature.  God’s intention is to live in free relationship with self-developing creatures in 
community.
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with internal freedom and teleological openness.  There is no eternal decree of 
God toward which a creature is invariably drawn: rather there are fields of 
possibility (with boundaries ) within which the creature explores.  These fields 160
of possibility include outcomes that inspire our horror, and as such are not 
spaces only of idealistic perfection.  This is not the best of all possible worlds in 
the sense that only the best possible choices, given all relevant circumstances, 
are ever realised.  It is a world where value and disvalue, including gratuitous 
disvalue, are intermingled.  In order to ontologically have such freedom, two 
other forms of kenosis are necessary: the kenosis of simple eternity and the 
kenosis of omniscience. 
Kenosis of Simple Eternity and the Kenosis of Omniscience 
 The kenosis of simple eternity means that God does not stand outside of 
time, viewing all of time and space as a single instant of experience.  Instead, 
God gives up this timeless vantage point and enters into an experience of time 
in order to facilitate responsive relationship with creatures.   There is a 161
“present” moment in God’s experience, a bright line in the time-space 
continuum that marks what is happening now.   The content of that present 162
moment is created by creaturely and divine action.  For that creaturely action to 
be free, it must be undetermined.  If undetermined, it must be unpredictable.  If 
 See the discussion of the constraints on initial conditions in divine action in chapter 5.160
 John Polkinghorne, “Kenotic Creation and Divine Action,” in The Work of Love: Creation as 161
Kenosis, ed. John Polkinghorne (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2001): 90-106, 103-104.  Some 
theologians do not conceive of this lack of future knowledge as a kenosis, but think that God 
cannot know the future since it does not ontologically exist: Peter Geach, “The Future,” New 
Blackfriars 54:636 (May 1973): 208-128; Clark Pinnock, “Systematic Theology,” in The 
Openness of God: A Biblical Challenge to the Traditional Understanding of God (Downer’s 
Grove, IL: InterVarsity,1994), 121.
 For a philosophical treatment of how this bright line could exist in light of the Minkowski 162
interpretation of Special Theory of Relativity, which would seem to make such a line 
meaningless, see David M. Woodruff, “Presentism and the Problem of Special Relativity,” in 
God in an Open Universe: Science, Metaphysics, and Open Theism, eds. William Hasker, 
Thomas Jay Oord, and Dean Zimmerman (Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2011): 94-124.
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unpredictable, creaturely action cannot be foreknown.  Therefore, God’s 
omniscience, like God’s experience of simple eternity must be laid aside.   163
God knows the past and present perfectly, but in so far as the future depends 
on free creaturely action, it is knowable only as varieties of possibilities.  The 
inclusion of God in time means that God will be able to act in creation in ways 
that are impossible in the classical tradition: most notably, God can respond to, 
co-suffer, and act directly upon the creation.  164
 Another result of God’s temporal experience is that it lends a different 
perspective to the question of gratuitous evil.   In 1979 William Rowe famously 165
challenged the theistic world to respond to the question of gratuitous natural 
evil.  His example of extreme and unnecessary animal suffering comes from 
what must have been a reasonably common experience throughout the long 
ages of evolutionary development: 
Suppose in some distant forest lightning strikes a dead tree, resulting in 
a forest fire.  In the fire a fawn is trapped, horribly burned, and lies in 
terrible agony for several days before death relieves its suffering.  So far 
as we can see, the fawn’s intense suffering is pointless.  166
 The typical theodicy response is to say that the fawn’s suffering is not at 
all pointless, but is actually a working out of the essential qualities the world 
must hold if there are to be greater goods such as moral choice or physical skill.  
In chapter 2 we explored how C.S. Lewis, Michael Corey, Philip Clayton, 
Michael Murray, argued that physical regularity––what Murray called “nomic 
regularity”––was absolutely necessary for the capacity for moral choice.  
 Alternatively, one could simply assert that the definition of omniscience is that God knows all 163
that is logically possible, and since the future does not exist, it is not predictable.  Therefore God 
cannot logically know it.  With this strategy, God remains omniscient, but with a limited 
omniscience in comparison to the classical tradition’s definition.
 See chapter 5 for more on divine action in creation.164
 See the definition of gratuitous above, p. 145.165
 William Rowe, “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism,” American Philosophical 166
Quarterly 16:4 (October 1979): 335-341, 337. 
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Actions must have reliable consequences for choices to have effective force.  If 
no harmful or ill-intentioned action was effective, moral choice would be cut off.  
Only good actions could be effective, while harmful actions would only isolate a 
person further and further into a world where irregularities would cut off the 
effect of every action he or she tried to take.  No moral choice would be 
possible, and the worth of all love and altruism would be completely ruled out 
because altruistic action would be the only effective choice.  Similarly, for the 
non-human world, any physical skill or action would be made obsolete in a 
world where feather mattresses appeared every time something fell from a tree, 
or where a lion cub’s claw softened upon touching a brother’s ear. 
 Yet, think again of the fawn convulsing in agony for days in the forest and 
consider whether the arguments above answer the problem.  The various 
arguments that propose that the fawn’s suffering is not gratuitous have a sound 
logical basis, but they do not ultimately satisfy.  While the overall system that 
leads to the fawn’s suffering may not be gratuitous, this particular instance is 
gratuitous since the suffering does not directly lead to a greater good or prevent 
a greater harm.  If a human were present they would undoubtedly and rightly 
relieve the suffering of the fawn in whatever way possible.   Allowing it to 167
continue to suffer leads to no greater good.  So why does God allow it to 
continue to suffer? 
 One implication of the combined kenosis of simple eternity and of 
omniscience is that God can experience events as gratuitously evil.  An event at 
the time of its occurrence may be without any further teleology: it is an event 
that happens simply due to the chance meeting of natural forces.  Gratuitous 
disvalue, or natural evil, means that the harm was not something that God 
 William Hasker notes the difference between thinking about a class of events, such as 167
gratuitous evil, and particular events themselves in Providence, Evil and the Openness of God 
(London: Routledge, 2004), 68.
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intended with the outcomes being necessary to some greater purpose.  There 
was no reason that the fire had to burn that particular fawn, or that it should fail 
to burn enough for a quick death; the horrific result simply happened.  So, when 
God allows the fawn to suffer, God is not allowing it with some greater purpose 
in mind that is directly reliant upon that event happening––the fawn’s suffering is 
not in any way instrumental in a good-harm analysis.   Claiming gratuitous evil 168
exists represents a significant challenge to what Jeff Jordan has called “the 
Standard Claim” that “among both atheists and theists... no possible world 
contains both God and pointless evil... [but that] every evil is necessary for 
divine purposes, or God does not exist.”   In one sense, there is no event that 169
is totally without any value, totally pointless, because every event does point to 
nomic regularity or creation’s freedom.  William Hasker, in particular has argued 
for what he calls the “necessity of gratuitous evil.”   However, Hasker’s 170
argument deals primarily with moral evil, and where it deals with natural evil it 
does so with an unapologetically anthropocentric bias.  To prevent gratuitous 
natural evil, he says, would be to either diminish the goods that natural evils 
produce in humans, such as promoting foresight and courage, or to perpetrate a 
“disinformation campaign” by seeming to allow natural evil without actually 
allowing it.    However, there seems to remain a great many events in the pre-171
human world that contain vast amounts of gratuitous disvalue or natural evil to 
which Hasker’s arguments do not apply.  There is a great deal of suffering that 
 See chapter 2 for a full description of the instrumental good-harm analysis.168
 Jeff Jordan, “Divine love and human suffering,” International Journal for Philosophy of 169
Religion 56 (2004): 169-178, 170.
 Hasker, “The Necessity of Gratuitous Evil,” in Providence, Evil and the Openness of God, 170
58-79.
 Hasker, Providence, Evil and the Openness of God, 74.171
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did not specifically have to happen for God’s purposes in the world to be 
achieved.   
 Does it help theologically to say that the suffering of the fawn in the fire 
was gratuitous from God’s perspective as well?  At the very least, it rids us of 
the image of God as an abusive being who causes horrendous suffering in 
order to work out a master plan.  The theologian does not have to try and 
squeeze meaning out of gratuitous events through logical gymnastics in order to 
make them seem non-gratuitous.  Second, it allows the theologian to advance 
co-suffering arguments with greater force: God’s experience of the evil is 
unmitigated by the knowledge of how the suffering will one day be re-woven into 
the new creation’s harmony, and so God feels the full brunt of the evil with 
creation.  Third, it turns the theologian ever more forcefully toward that creative 
redemption which can give new meaning to events.  The only answer to 
gratuitous evil is the creative and redemptive response of God. 
 One of the challenges of acknowledging gratuitous harms and the 
kenosis of omniscience is that if God does not know what harms might arise out 
of the evolutionary process, how can one be sure that they will eventually be 
brought to harmony?   How can God be sure that they are actually redeemable?  
The response to this challenge must be that trust is not in God’s overwhelming 
power to force every event into the form God wants, but in God’s limitless skill 
and abundant creativity to reshape events into redemptive outcomes.  Perhaps 
there are some “rules” or initial constraints in place in the very makeup of the 
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cosmos, so that the possibilities of evil are limited to things which are 
redeemable.  172
 When it comes to gratuitous suffering, Thomas Merton wrote that “the 
grace of Christ is constantly working to turn useless suffering to something 
useful after all.”   The ability to reformulate past events in light of future events 173
is another advantage of a God who takes on a temporal aspect.  A God outside 
of time either cannot fully co-suffer with creation––because the foreknowledge 
of how the suffering will be resolved already alleviates the suffering––or God is 
guilty of using horrific suffering as a means to an end.  Instead, if God 
experiences the world in a temporal way, God co-suffers with the creature fully, 
and can act responsively to the evil or suffering in order to redeem it.  We can 
say that God did not intend evil or particular instances of suffering to happen, 
but can and will redeem all suffering and evil.   New meaning is brought to old 174
events in light of new realities, a concept I will discuss further in chapter six.  
For God to act in the world with such effective power, but without the 
advantages of omniscience and eternity requires John Polkinghorne’s fourth 
kenosis: the kenosis of causal status. 
Kenosis of Causal Status 
 Vernon White proposes this caveat in The Fall of A Sparrow, 144.  The very fact that all life is 172
inevitably mortal may be one such constraint.  Nothing suffers forever, and nothing can cause 
suffering forever.  Christopher Southgate also suggests that the “only way” argument might 
equally be applied to redemption: “that the sort of world we live in is the only sort of world that 
could make possible that redemption to which the Christian gospel testifies––reconciliation to 
God through the incarnation, death, and resurrection of the divine Son.” in “Does God’s Care 
Make Any Difference?  Theological Reflection on the Suffering of God’s Creatures,” in Christian 
Faith and the Earth: Current Paths and Emerging Horizons in Ecotheology, eds. Ernst M. 
Conradie, Sigurd Bergmann, Celia Deane-Drummond, and Denis Edwards (London: T&T Clark, 
2014): 97-114,110.
 Thomas Merton, No Man is an Island (Tunbridge Wells: Burns & Oats, 1955), 80.173
 It is a very different thing to create a world where there is the possibility, even the inevitable 174
possibility, of suffering and to will a specific instance of suffering.  If I someday choose to bring a 
child into the world, for example, I could only do so knowing that the child will experience 
suffering.  That is very different from willing them to experience a particular instance of suffering.
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 The kenosis of causal status, according to Polkinghorne, allows “divine 
special providence to act as a cause among causes.”   If all events are not 175
predetermined, and God can respond in causally effective ways, then God must 
have some part in acting in creation that opens up new possibilities and 
therefore inaugurates new chains of causality.  For God to do so requires that 
God become a cause among causes.  The Incarnation is the most obvious 
example of God’s kenosis of causal status, and the possibility of the Incarnation 
opens the door to other forms of divine action. 
 The types of divine action in the world and in redemption will form the 
content of chapters 5 and 6, so I will not further investigate them here.  Instead, 
let us move on to some of the difficulties of this kenotic characterisation of the 
divine-world relationship. 
Does God Need Creation? 
 One struggle of speaking of divine responsiveness and vulnerability to 
creation is that it seems God becomes dependent upon creation.  Needs are 
formed in the divine person that may or may not be satisfied depending upon 
the response of creation.  It is, as Paul Fiddes says “a dangerous kind of 
theology” to propose “that a God who creates ‘out of love’ has needs to be 
satisfied.”   Does the concept of divine need overthrow God’s self-sufficiency 176
or threaten God’s perfection?  It might, depending on how they are conceived.  
Robert Jenson, for example, realises the worst fears of the classical theists 
when he proposes that through creation God develops a narrative of self-
discovery.  That is, God’s own identity is found through interaction with creation, 
 Polkinghorne, “Kenotic Creation,” 104.  Italics original.175
 Fiddes, “Creation out of love,” in The Work of Love: Creation as Kenosis, ed. John 176
Polkinghorne (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2001), 169.
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or as Jenson writes, God “can have no identity except as he meets the temporal 
end toward which creatures live.”   God’s own character and abilities are tied 177
essentially with creation.   
 David Bentley Hart rails against Jenson’s notion of divine temporality, 
passibility, and mutability with good reason: namely that it makes evil part of the 
development of the character of God.   Encounter with evil becomes the place 178
where God grows into God’s ultimate self by overcoming evil, and thus the 
fullness of God’s goodness becomes dependent upon the existence of evil.  As 
Hart suggests, this cannot be tolerated.   
 Rather than making God dependent upon evil, I suggest––with Keith 
Ward––that there is only mutability within certain parts of God’s existence, and 
not within the central attributes of God’s character.   God can add to the store 179
of knowledge by moving through time, for example, but God cannot grow in love 
or goodness, since God already contains the perfect fullness of these attributes.  
God can change in act, but not in character.  Creation, then, becomes a place 
where God finds room for the manifestation and expression of the divine 
character in dynamic relationship to creation, but creation is not a place for the 
development of God’s identity.  The same is true of divine needs in relation to 
creation.  If the needs aroused by creation are necessary and essential to the 
being of God, then creation can pose a devastating threat to God.  However, the 
danger can be avoided if the needs are seen as contingent rather than 
necessary needs to the essential being of God, although this still constitutes an 
important change to the classical list of divine attributes. 
 Robert W. Jenson, Systematic Theology, vol.1, The Triune God, (Oxford: Oxford University 177
Press, 1997), 65.
 Hart, Beauty of the Infinite, 165.  Cf. David Bentley Hart, “No Shadow of Turning: On Divine 178
Impassibility,” Pro Ecclesia 11:2 (Spring 2002): 184-206, 191.
 Keith Ward expresses it as: “God possesses both necessary and contingent properties.”  179
Religion and Creation, 190.
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 The choice of God to humbly take on need in creation––rather than 
having an intrinsic need that compels God to create––makes all the difference.  
Fiddes, for example, writes: 
God does not ‘need‘ the world in the sense that this is some intrinsic 
necessity in his nature, binding his free choice (thus far Aquinas is right); 
but he does need the world in the sense that he has freely chosen to be 
in need.  180
The need aroused by creation arises out of the previous free choice to create, 
and therefore the need is self-chosen by God.  Vanstone illustrates the 
difference between the two types of need with the example of a happy family.   181
All their essential needs are met.  Yet, out of the fullness of their love, the family 
chooses to adopt a child.  Now, when the family gathers together, if the adopted 
child is missing, something from the whole of the family is missing as well: the 
circle is no longer complete without the additional member.  A new need has 
been created by the very act of love, and the fulfilment of the family’s needs 
now rests also in the adoptee’s hands.  This need was not essential, but 
contingent upon the previous act of love.  In Vanstone’s words “Love has 
surrendered its own triumphant self-sufficiency and created its own need.  This 
is the supreme illustration of love’s self-giving or self-emptying––that it should 
surrender its fullness and create in itself the emptiness of need.”    182
 In the same way, we can think of God as having no necessary needs: 
there existed no lack, nor was there need for fulfilment beyond what was 
 Fiddes, Creative Suffering, 74.180
 Vanstone, Love’s Endeavour, 69.181
 Vanstone, Love’s Endeavour, 69.  Walter Kasper makes the same point: “The lover allows 182
the other to affect him; he becomes vulnerable precisely in his love.  Thus love and suffering go 
together.  The suffering of love is not, however, a passive being-affected, but an active allowing 
others to affect one.”  Kasper, The God of Jesus Christ, 196.
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existent in the society of the divine persons.  However, God freely chose  to 183
undertake the activity of creation with the knowledge that it would create a need 
that previously did not exist, and the fulfilment of that need now lies within the 
power of creation by its response of love or resistance.   184
 Even strict classical theists cannot seem to avoid the language of goal 
and fulfilment, and the desire and needs that lay behind goals.  Gilles Emery, for 
example, writes that: “God does not create so as to acquire the good that he 
lacks, but acts freely in order to communicate a participation in his own 
perfection.”   So although God creates out of a superabundance of being and 185
not out of necessity, God still creates with a goal: “to communicate a 
participation...”  Although creation is freely made it is still made with a purpose 
toward which God and creation must journey, and therefore there must be 
something like desire in God to see the outcomes of that purpose realised, and 
a need in God to find that participation in order to be satisfied.   God could 186
only be free of any desire or need if God had no purpose or goal in creation at 
all.   
 As soon as we infer a purpose that has not yet been achieved, even if 
that desire is not to fill a lack in God, it implies desire.  The existence of desire, 
though, does not necessarily mean the imputation of lack, as was explored 
above.  A desire could be a further good, an added perfection.  Keith Ward 
writes that “divine desire is a good, the good of creative activity itself, in which 
 God’s freedom in choosing to create has been hotly debated.  Standard in Christian theology 183
has been that God chose to create freely, whereas others propose that God had to create.  See 
Keith Ward, Religion and Creation, 178.  Since I adhere to the idea that God was complete 
without creation, then I do not (as Fiddes and Jenson do) think that God needed to create in 
order to self-realise the divine nature.
 Any such proposal of a “before” and “after” creation must also include a temporal aspect to 184
God’s character.  This I freely acknowledge and support.
 Emery, “The Immutability of the God of Love,” 72.185
 See Wendy Farley’s reflections on divine desire in The Healing and Wounding of Desire: 186
Weaving Heaven and Earth (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2005), 101-103.
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the creator realises new and imaginative forms of beauty and intellectual 
complexity... God wants to have the desires God has, desires for future goods... 
it would be contradictory to wish to have them already realised without creative 
action.”   Even God cannot shortcut the process of creation, and since God’s 187
desires are desires rooted in the fullness of God’s being and God’s free kenotic 
acts, God’s desires do not collapse into the essential necessities that the 
classical theists fear. 
 God’s self, then, is given freely and vulnerably to the world in creative 
engagement, and it is this self-giving that brings about the fullness of creaturely 
existence.  Southgate describes kenosis by drawing on Hans Urs von 
Balthasar’s concept of “that movement of the inner life of the Trinity that enables 
us to understand God as the creative, suffering origin of all things.”   188
Southgate calls this understanding “deep intratrinitarian kenosis.”  Moltmann, 
too, argues that God’s kenotic actions toward creation are a picture of the inner 
life of the Trinity: marked by self-surrender, self-limitation, and obedience.   189
The origin of the movement of creation, then, begins deep in the personhood of 
God: in the giving of the Father to the Son, through the Spirit––the self-
abandoning love that is the template for all creative endeavours.  The nature of 
the Trinity, the nature of love, is toward self-giving union with the other, which 
extends to creation.   Arthur Peacocke writes “there is a creative self-emptying 190
and self-offering (a kenosis) of God, a sharing in the suffering of God’s 
 Ward, Religion and Creation, 185.187
 Southgate, Groaning of Creation, 58.188
 Jürgen Moltmann, “God’s Kenosis in the Creation and Consummation of the World,” in The 189
Work of Love: Creation as Kenosis, ed. John Polkinghorne (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 
2001):137-51, 140.
 Kasper, The God of Jesus Christ, xxiii.190
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creatures, in the very creative, evolutionary process of the world.”   The effect 191
of this kenosis, as Moltmann points out, is that the inner-trinitarian kenosis 
“premises that the world of human beings and death does not exist outside 
God, but that from the very beginning it lies within the mystery of the Trinity.”   192
The world is based upon the surrendered self-giving of one self in love to 
another modelled first within the being of God.   
 The journey toward that self-giving for creation, however, is a long and 
arduous process.  Andrew Elphinstone proposes an elegant link between the 
development of creation’s capacity for self-giving love and the ubiquity of 
violence and suffering in his book Freedom, Suffering & Love.   For 193
Elphinstone, the key to understanding disvalue in nature is to pay attention to 
the whole evolutionary narrative.  As opposed to the familiar Garden of Eden 
narrative where love and wisdom coincide with or even precede pain and 
violence, the evolutionary story sees creaturely love as a very new development 
on the world stage.  Against the background of evolutionary suffering, he writes 
“we now see love slowly dawning, a newcomer amid the tougher ingredients of 
the evolutionary scene... It kindled and struggled to existence when pain had 
long been indigenous to life.”   Yet those tougher aspects are indeed 194
“ingredients.”  Central to Elphinstone’s argument is that the pain and violence of 
the world are the very components of love in their raw form.  By a process 
which Elphinstone calls “divine alchemy” the base materials of selfishness, pain, 
and aggression are transmuted into the stuff of love.  If we think of love as the 
 Arthur Peacocke, “The Cost of a New Life,” in Work of Love: Creation as Kenosis, ed. John 191
Polkinghorne (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2001): 21-42, 38.  Italics original.
 Moltmann, “God’s Kenosis,” 141.  See also Fiddes on the concept of the death of God: 192
Creative Suffering of God, 189-206.  He argues that we can, in a sense, understand God as 
“perishing” but not as having “perished.”  God can fully enter into the experience of death, and 
thus defeat and redeem it.
 Andrew Elphinstone, Freedom, Suffering & Love (London: SCM, 1976).193
 Elphinstone, Freedom, Suffering & Love, 30.194
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interaction of certain desires, this actually makes quite a coherent picture: 
selfishness, fear, aggression; all can be thought of as desires.  They are desires 
for safety, security, or power––usually for oneself.  Love, by contrast, is desire 
focussed on the good of the other.  It is altruistic.  If Elphinstone is right in his 
theological construction, then a world with love and without suffering, violence, 
and aggression can no more exist than a diamond can exist in a world without 
graphite.   Here the argument shifts slightly from the defence that God will not, 195
in love, control the evolutionary pathways which we were following, to a 
developmental argument that the end product of love requires the process of 
suffering and violence.  Because love must, by definition, be free it cannot be 
created in final perfection.  It must grow.  Elphinstone helps us see that love’s 
base materials are selfish and aggressive desires which metamorphose into 
love through the work of the Spirit and the pressure of evolutionary selection.   196
The hope in this picture is that the very strength of the selfish desires, which 
cause so much suffering, are directly proportional to the magnitude of love 
possible once the desires have been transmuted.   A human can suffer much 197
and love much; a worm cannot do very much of either.  The greater capacity for 
suffering and selfishness is in direct correlation to a greater capacity for love. 
 The contribution of Elphinstone helps us see that the freedom of creation 
given in love has resulted in the strengths of certain disvalues, certain 
inclinations that seem to be at odds with the very love that created it.  However, 
 Desire itself being, in this case, the carbon atoms that make up both diamonds and graphite.195
 For more on Elphinstone, see Bethany Sollereder, “From Suffering to Love: Evolution and 196
the Problem of Suffering,” The Christian Century 131:19 (September 2014), available online at 
http://www.christiancentury.org/article/2014-08/survival-love. 
 More will be said about the nature of redemption emerging from our understanding of love in 197
chapter 6.
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with the promise of redemption, even the disvalues of violence and selfishness 
become the foundation of hope and love. 
Conclusion 
 I have attempted in this chapter to show that divine love is the proper 
starting point for a theodicy, instead of the weighing scales of goods and harms 
in either an instrumental or developmental way.  The starting place of theodicy 
is a property-consequence GHA, where the primary property is that of divine 
love.  If love is (as Aquinas argues) the result of a desire for the good of the 
beloved, and the desire for union with the beloved, then the freedom of action of 
the beloved creation is a necessary consequence.  The freedom of life, or even 
of the evolutionary process itself, can result in methods of survival that do not 
necessarily reflect God’s design or purpose, but are coherent from within a 
perspective of the freedom extended by divine love.  Therefore, to use a 
concrete example, God did not design the parasitic Ichneumonidae to lay eggs 
within a living host, but God’s love created a free process in which the 
Ichneumonidae would have the freedom to develop that survival technique.  
The love of God, by this definition, means that God can act towards different 
creatures in different ways, and so the “not-even-once” principle does not apply. 
 I then explored how the Thomist definition of love can be integrated with 
theological concerns about love’s limitlessness, precariousness, and 
vulnerability, and how these considerations affect traditional notions about the 
attributes of God.  Through a kenotic approach, I argued that the nature of love 
suggests that concepts such as divine need, passibility, and vulnerability are 
necessary to the divine nature and a central component of the God-world 
relationship.  I explored different possibilities of creaturely freedom, and argued 
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that a non-deterministic world with creaturely free choice, was necessary to the 
nature of love I had explored.  Gratuitous events were also argued to be 
possible in light of a God who takes on a temporal experience of the world.  
Finally, I explored the question of whether God, in taking the risk of love and 
therefore creating needs that could only be satisfied by creaturely action, 
created an insurmountable challenge to God’s nature.  God’s unique 
transcendent character can be reconciled with the vulnerable nature of love 
through a self-assumed act of kenosis. 
 One of the trickiest parts of beginning with the nature of love is that the 
nature of love does not make economic sense.  Love does not reach its goals 
economically or efficiently.  It is not always rational, and seldom fair.  Think of 
the parables of the kingdom that Jesus tells.  In the parable of the lost sheep, 
the shepherd is willing to leave ninety-nine sheep exposed on the hills to go 
after the one.   In the same way, the parable of the labourers in the vineyard 198
strikes at our sense of fairness.   Those who work only one hour are given the 199
same compensation as those who worked throughout the whole day.  Neither 
parable makes economic sense.  Yet both, when viewed from the vantage point 
of love have a certain logic.  The shepherd is unwilling to lose one of his 
precious sheep, because it is unique and irreplaceable in its particularity.  The 
landowner has compassion on the labourers who could find no work and gives 
generously to fulfil their daily needs.  Love takes extraordinary risks, and its 
limitless nature does not calculate the costs of its own existence.  Therefore, 
although we may construct partial theodicies based on GHA approaches, they 
will never fully satisfy because the logic of love is not one of efficient calculation.  
Any theodicy rooted in love will have to make an account of the seemingly 
 Matthew 18: 10-14.198
 Matthew 20:1-16.199
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illogical nature of love’s endeavour, a task I try to address most fully in the sixth 
chapter on redemption. 
 In terms of the theodicy I am beginning to construct, four points can be 
drawn from the contents of this chapter.  First, some disvalues are simply part of 
a biological package deal and therefore are not theologically problematic.  Pain 
systems in the body, for example, are necessary for sentient, mobile creatures 
to survive and flourish.  Second, many of the disvalues in the evolutionary 
process are attributable to the freedom that is a result of divine love for creation.  
Third, the love of God for each creature is individually particular.  God’s 
treatment of each creature is uniquely considered, and each creature is unable 
to be substituted for another.  Finally, God is vulnerable to creation in God’s 
love, which means that we can understand God as co-suffering with the 
creation, and thus participating in and accompanying the pain of the non-human 
world. 
 In the next chapter, I will explore how the kenotic love of God, and the 
limits placed on divine power by the nature of love, shape our models of divine 
action in the world. 
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Chapter 5: Special Divine Action 
“We know that, if the love of God is authentic, God is not ‘detached’ from His 
creation.” 
-W. H. Vanstone  1
 In the last chapter, I built a case that the starting place of theodicy is in 
the nature of divine love.  Love was described as vulnerable, limitless, and 
freedom-bestowing.  This chapter will explore how God, characterised by such 
love, is active in the world.  Divine action will be explored both on its own terms 
and in reference to the suffering of the non-human world.  The first half of this 
chapter will comprise a survey of various different proposed models of divine 
action in evolutionary development.  The second half will advance a multi-
faceted (or compound) view of divine action that will use and build upon 
previous models of divine action as well as develop a new proposal on how 
special divine action can be understood as the shaping of meaning in events.  
The latter proposal will be part of the mosaic picture of redemption that I will 
develop in chapter six. 
Introduction 
 God’s action has traditionally been divided up into two different 
categories: general divine action (GDA) and special divine action (SDA).  For 
this chapter, I will use the distinction made by Nicholas Saunders in his 
noteworthy book, Divine Action & Modern Science:  
General Divine Action (GDA): Those actions of God that pertain to the 
whole of creation universally and simultaneously.  These include actions 
such as the initial creation and the maintenance of scientific regularity 
and the laws of nature by God. 
 W. H. Vanstone, Love’s Endeavour, Love’s Expense: The Response of Being to the Love of 1
God (London: Dartman, Longman and Todd, 1977), 67.
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Special Divine Action (SDA): Those actions of God that pertain to a 
particular time and place in creation as distinct from another.  This is a 
broad category and includes the traditional understanding of ‘miracles’, 
the notion of particular providence, responses to intercessionary prayer, 
God’s personal actions, and some forms of religious experience.  2
 One of the major questions about SDA is whether it ought to be 
conceived of as an overthrow of the laws of nature.  The definition offered 
above does not demand that it does, but if we include the concept of “miracle” in 
SDA, or even if we only concede that SDA is action which opens up possibilities 
for new lines of causation, we must find some way to describe why that effect 
took place.  For David Hume, emerging out of the mechanistic worldview of the 
eighteenth-century, a miracle (or SDA in general) could only mean a violation of 
the laws of nature.   Hume’s definition has become the layperson’s definition 3
both of miracle and SDA: an intervention contradicting the regular working of 
the natural in order to produce a desired result.  Paul Davies, for example, picks 
it up when he defines intervention as those times when “God acts like a physical 
force in the world.  God moves atoms and other microscopic objects about, but 
to do so, God must violate the physical laws studied by science.”     4
 There are three concepts with definitional overlap here: SDA, miracle, 
and intervention.  SDA is the broadest of these terms, encompassing the other 
two, and more.  In no way should the term “special divine action” be understood 
to mean “non-naturalistic event.”   Rather, SDA is a general category that 5
 Nicholas Saunders, Divine Action & Modern Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University 2
Press, 2002), 21.  Italics original.
 For a discussion of Hume’s critique of miracles, see Christopher Southgate, “A test case: 3
divine action,” God, Humanity and the Cosmos, 3rd ed., ed. Christopher Southgate (London: 
T&T Clark, 2011), 293-294.
 Paul Davies, “Teleology Without Teleology: Purpose Through Emergent Complexity,” in 4
Evolutionary and Molecular Biology: Scientific Perspective on Divine Action, eds. Robert J. 
Russell, William R. Stoeger, S.J., and Francisco J. Ayala (Vatican City/Berkeley, CA: Vatican 
Observatory/CTNS, 1998), 152.
 Double agency, NIODA, and all the other models below which we will explore later, apart from 5
“No SDA” are examples of special divine action that do not involve intervention.
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contains all divine action that is not universally and uniformly performed by God.  
Miracle has been defined in various ways that do not involve the overthrow of 
natural laws, so we cannot use it in Davies’s limited way.   Intervention alone, 6
for now, will be defined in Davies’ sense of events occurring outside the course 
of nature.   Let us explore this third concept a little further.  Does God intervene 7
in such a way as to violate the natural laws of the world? 
 There are various reasons scientists and theologians do not find the 
concept of interventions in the world order appealing.   Such a violation is 8
problematic on at least two counts: first, science cannot recognise such action 
since it lies outside the ability of science to study.  The scientific endeavour can 
only study natural causes.  If something has a supernatural cause, as the case 
would be with an intervention, it is beyond the ability of science to investigate.   9
Second, it raises questions about the character of a God who would set up 
natural laws and then violate them.  We can classify these as either the 
scientific and theological objections, or the mechanistic and the moral. 
 The claim that interventions are anti-scientific ––that they cannot be 10
explained or studied by science––is less problematic than the second objection.  
If interventions happen at all they would be expected to be extremely rare.  We 
 See Alan G. Padgett, “God and Miracle in An Age of Science,” in The Blackwell Companion to 6
Science and Christianity, ed. J. B. Stump and Alan G. Padgett (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012): 
533-542.  See also Southgate’s definition of miracle: “an extremely unusual event, unfamiliar in 
terms of naturalistic explanation, which a worshipping community takes to be specially 
revelatory, by dint of the blessing or healing it conveys, of the divine grace.” Southgate, “A test 
case: divine action,” 294.
 For a much longer discussion of various definitions of intervention (depending as it does on 7
one’s conception of natural laws), see Saunders, Divine Action, 48-60.
 See Arthur Peacocke’s discussion in Theology for a Scientific Age: Being and Becoming––8
Natural, Divine, and Human, enlarged edition (London: SCM, 1990,1993): 141-143.
 One might be able to study the effects of miraculous action, but not the cause, since the cause 9
is outside the realm of nature.
 Gordon D. Kaufman, “On the Meaning of ‘Act of God’,” Harvard Theological Review 61 10
(1968): 175-201; John Polkinghorne, Science & Theology: An Introduction (London: SPCK, 
1998), 92; Robert J. Russell, “Does ‘The God Who Acts’ Really Act?  New Approaches to Divine 
Action in Light of Science,” Theology Today 54:1 (April 1997), 49-51; Peacocke, Theology for a 
Scientific Age, 139-142; Southgate, “A test case: divine action,” 279.
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should not expect scientists to find them, or be able to study them, in any sort of 
systematic way because they do not fall under the regular operations of the 
world.  If an intervention occurred on the 100th occurrence of a repeated event, 
a scientist could not expect it to happen the next 100th time, and so he or she 
could not make predictions regarding the intervention, nor prepare to observe it 
again.  Yet, while interventions would not be able to be studied by science, that 
does not mean that they could not occur.   They would simply have to be 11
studied by other disciplines, or through other means.  The scientists (or 
scientific theologians), then, can have little to say about the occurrence of 
intervention except that the reliable predictions that science can make of the 
world seems to discourage one from making claims that such events are 
common, particularly in poorly-understood areas of natural phenomena.  Yet, 
there has been a great deal of work to develop non-interventionist ways of 
conceiving divine action that do not require the overthrow of natural law, and so 
are open to scientific discussion.   To these we will presently turn. 12
 The second reason why thinkers do not want to countenance an 
intervening God is for moral reasons: because it strikes at God’s character.  
One moral argument is that interventions create a contradiction in the 
understanding of God’s faithfulness: why would a God who creates and 
sustains the laws of nature then flout them?   Another argument is that 13
interventions challenge the traditional notions of God’s omnipotence, perfection, 
impassibility, and atemporality.   An omnipotent and perfect God would not 14
 John Polkinghorne writes “strictly speaking, science cannot exclude the one-off, though the 11
more it discerns a regular world, the more problematic become the claims for such unique 
occurrences.”  Science & Theology, 92.
 The most important research programme in this regard was the 20-year CTNS/Vatican 12
Observatory cooperative project that produced 5 volumes subtitled Scientific Perspectives on 
Divine Action, edited by Robert J. Russell, et. al.
 Polkinghorne, Science & Theology, 92; Peacocke, Theology for a Scientific Age, 142.13
 See descriptions of Maurice Wiles, David Burrell, and Denis Edwards below. p. 219-232.14
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create a world with such obvious flaws that God had to intervene to correct 
them.  God’s impassibility would mean that God could not be affected or 
changed by worldly occurrences and, therefore, there would be no motivation to 
intervene.  Finally, for an atemporal God, no intervention would be possible 
because it would be impossible for God to relate to the world in time-bound 
ways.  For classical theists, an intervention would also make God one agent 
among others in creation, rather than the source of all being––a serious 
diminution of God’s being.   A different type of moral argument is raised by 15
Clayton and Knapp’s “Not-even-once” principle, which argues that if God 
intervened even once to save a creature from innocent suffering, God would be 
morally obliged to do so in every case, which would lead to the collapse of the 
regularities of our world.  If God did avert evil in some circumstances, it would 
seem to make God capricious or neglectful in all the situations in which God did 
not respond.   In the last chapter, I spent some time challenging both the 16
traditional attributes, and the underpinning assumptions of the “not-even-once” 
principle.  Nevertheless, for all these reasons, interventionist divine action has 
been largely rejected by theologians.   Indeed, it is so out of favour, that it does 17
not even appear as a possible model of divine action in one introductory text 
book.   Instead scientists and theologians have developed various models of 18
 Davies, “Teleology Without Teleology,” 152; Elizabeth Johnson, Ask the Beasts: Darwin and 15
the God of Love (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), 168; Denis Edwards, How God Acts: Creation, 
Redemption, and Special Divine Action (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2010), 63; David B. 
Burrell C.S.C., and Isabelle Moulin, “Albert, Aquinas and Dionysius,” Modern Theology 24:4 
(October 2008), 642.
 Philip Clayton and Steven Knapp, The Predicament of Belief: Science, Philosophy, Faith.  16
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 44-52; Wesley J. Wildman, “Incongruous Goodness, 
Perilous Beauty, Disconcerting Truth: Ultimate Reality and Suffering in Nature,” in Physics and 
Cosmology: Scientific Perspectives on the Problem of Natural Evil, eds. Nancey Murphy, Robert 
Russell, and William Stoeger, S.J. (Vatican/Berkeley, CA: Vatican Observatory/CTNS, 2007), 
267-275.  See also my critique of this position in chapter 4, p. 163.
 Polkinghorne, Science & Theology, 93.  Peacocke, Theology for a Scientific Age, 142.  17
Southgate, “A test case: divine action,” 294.
 Alister E. McGrath, Science & Religion: A New Introduction, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 18
2010), 93-101.
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non-interventionist divine action that propose how God can be objectively active 
in the world without the need for overriding natural laws.  19
 There are many models of divine action.  Some only allow for GDA, 
some only for SDA, and some for a mixture of both.  The following section will 
explore various available models and explore how they might be useful or not in 
addressing the question of the suffering of the non-human creation. 
Models of Divine Action 
No Special Divine Action 
 One model is that there simply is no SDA.   Maurice Wiles, for example, 
understands all of the world and all of creation to be one great, primary act of 
God.   Wiles specifies “the proposal that I want to make is that the primary 20
usage for the idea of divine action should be in relation to the world as a whole 
rather than to particular occurrences within it.”    21
 To make this collapse of SDA into GDA more concrete, Wiles borrows an 
analogy from John Lucas, who points to the language of Solomon building the 
temple.   While we might say “Solomon built the temple” we do not mean that 22
Solomon placed every stone, or wove every curtain.  Instead, Solomon had an 
intention and a goal that a temple should be built.  He made provision for others 
to carry out the actual building of the temple, without micromanaging the 
workmen's strokes.  In fact, the temple building did not even require Solomon’s 
direct presence, despite the building being attributed to his action.  In saying 
“Solomon built the temple” we point out one unified act which, in practice, was 
 Russell, “The God Who Acts,” 51; Southgate, “A test case: divine action,” 285.19
 Maurice Wiles, God’s Action in the World (London: SCM, 1986), 28-30.20
 Wiles, God’s Action, 28.21
 Wiles, God’s Action, 61-62.22
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made up of many other actions by many other agents.  In the same way, the 
whole world and its history is, for Wiles, a single act of God. 
 Gordon Kaufman, who inspired Wiles, makes a similar distinction 
between master-acts of God and sub-acts.   All of history is one master-act of 23
God with a set purpose and goal, while the first instantiation of any new events 
that bring history toward that goal (whether it be the creation of stars or the 
emergence of life) are sub-acts of God.   Therefore, there is no reason to say 24
that God acts further in “special divine acts” since to do so would be to make 
God into a causal agent alongside other causal agents and raise the paradox of 
God intervening in what is already God’s action.  Instead, God’s primary action 
of creation allows all other actions to be and directs them toward the ultimate 
goals of history.   Creatures are free to act, and their actions are made more 
intelligible in light of higher realms of meaning, in the same way that the specific 
act of a carpenter hammering a nail is made more intelligible in light of an 
architect’s vision. 
 Wiles does not recognise any particular or special divine interaction 
within creation, such as the answering of prayer, or any sort of directive agency.  
All such notions of divine action are “to be firmly rejected”  because, according 25
to Wiles, they propose a trivial and inconsistent view of divine action and, 
crucially, they seem to oppose the consistency with which science describes the 
world.  Instead, if all divine action is conceived as one act, there is room for 
interpreting portions of that act as special acts of God.  There may be moments 
where one part of the divine act seems to become especially significant, but the 
 Kaufman, “On the Meaning of ‘Act of God’,” 175-201.23
 Kaufman, “On the Meaning of ‘Act of God’,” 197.  Kaufman avoids talking about whether 24
these sub-acts were determined by previous events and were inevitable or if some other history 
might have emerged if God had acted differently.
 Wiles, God’s Action, 100.25
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action itself does not become special in such a way that it could be 
distinguished from the original act of creation.    26
 If creation is one act, then there is no special response to evil or 
suffering; no special care of the suffering creature.  In Kaufman’s blunt words: 
“This is no God who ‘walks with me and talks with me’ in close interpersonal 
communion... this is the Lord of heaven and earth, whose purposes we cannot 
fully fathom and whose ways are past finding out.”   Redemption, so far as it 27
exists, is tied up with the initial action of creation.  “Evil was part of the risk 
taken by God in bringing a world into being out of the triviality of the pre-existing 
chaos,”  writes Wiles, and the process of overcoming evil is part of the overall 28
movement of creation.  There is no divine response, and therefore no divine 
comforting, or relating to the pain or suffering of creatures.  In the end, although 
Wiles describes his view as being founded on the nature of the love of God, his 
conclusions end up denying the very love he first espouses because, without 
significant union and empathy, there is no love. 
 To illustrate that there is no love in Wiles’s system let us look at when 
Wiles claims that any response of God to human prayer is highly unsatisfactory 
because “the picture follows too closely the analogy of one human person’s 
relation with another.”   This is a confusing objection, since Wiles also puts a 29
great deal of emphasis on the character of God as personal––as defined by 
love.  It is contradictory to use personal analogies of relationship and also to 
reject them.  Another contradiction arises when Wiles objects to views that see 
human action and divine providence as mutually exclusive: “The value of using 
 Wiles gives the example of redemption history as a place where the one act of God in 26
creation-redemption becomes specially significant.  God’s Action, 93.
 Kaufman, “On the Meaning of ‘Act of God’,” 200.27
 Wiles, God’s Action, 45.28
 Wiles, God’s Action, 101.29
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the personal analogy of love or friendship is that it can help us form a false 
conceptuality in which divine grace and human freedom are seen as competing 
explanations, so that the more one ascribes to the former, the less can be 
ascribed to the latter.”   Later, the very same concept is rejected, and the very 30
existence of any special divine action is seen as a threat to the unity of the 
world and the freedom of the human agent.  In Wiles’s final description of divine 
action, to go back to the temple analogy, Solomon may only order the temple to 
be built, but can no longer pick up a hammer and a chisel or talk to the workers.  
This view of providence ends up losing any sense of engagement or divine 
response to the creation––notions that are central to the type of love I argued 
for in the previous chapter.  In the end, Wiles concludes his treatise with a 
highly unsatisfactory notion of divine action: “This then is the fashion of God’s 
acting in the world––making possible the emergence, both individually and 
corporately, of a genuinely free human recognition and response to what is 
God’s intention in the creation of the world.”   Alone, this manner of acting in 31
the world would not allow for the Incarnation, or other important acts of God in 
the Christian tradition. 
Everything is Special Divine Action 
 On the other side of the theological spectrum Denis Edwards and Niels 
Gregersen collapse the category of GDA altogether into the category of SDA.   32
Instead of seeing God’s action as something that is always and everywhere 
 Wiles, God’s Action, 76.30
 Wiles, God’s Action, 103.31
 Niels Gregersen, “Special Divine Action and the Quilt of Laws: Why the Distinction between 32
Special and General Divine Action Cannot be Maintained,” in Scientific Perspectives on Divine 
Action: Twenty Years of Challenge and Progress, eds. Robert J. Russell, Nancey Murphy, and 
William R. Stoeger, S.J. (Vatican City/Berkeley, CA: Vatican Observatory/CTNS, 2008): 
179-199; Edwards, How God Acts, 37-39.
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repeated without variation, they argue that we should see each particular event 
as a special divine act which (because of the consistency of God’s character) 
has many similarities with all the other particular acts of God, and therefore 
looks patterned.  What we have taken to be GDA in its faithful regularity is in 
fact multiple instances of SDA: there is no ontological difference.  
 While preferable to Wiles and Kaufman’s collapse of SDA into GDA, the 
collapse of GDA into SDA raises serious problems for theodicy.  Every 
occurrence in history becomes something brought into being by the special, 
willed act of God.  When this includes destructive and horrific suffering, it raises 
further questions about the goodness of God.  If, on the contrary, occasionalism 
is not being argued for by this position, as Gregersen would suggest,  and God 33
is simply working with natural agents, then the position is open to the same 
critiques as the “SDA in Secondary Causes” model explored below, which 
includes its own problems for theodicy. 
Constraint on Initial Conditions 
 Even in a world of spontaneity and randomness, if the initial conditions of 
creation could be carefully ordered, it would have a marked effect on the 
outcome of later natural processes.  By constraining, ordering, and sustaining 
certain initial conditions God could create a universe that would substantially 
create itself toward certain ends through chance, law, and creaturely agency.  
The definite outcomes need not be defined, but the propensity for life to emerge 
could be made to be overwhelmingly probable.  Paul Davies advocates a view 
where the initial action of creation can be sustained by uniformitarian divine 
action and still result in a complex and emergent world.  For him, God continues 
 Gregersen, “Special Divine Action and the Quilt of Laws,” 194.33
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to be involved in the world through sustaining action, but God is not involved in 
any way to move creation toward certain ends that were not inherent in natural 
laws instilled in the original moment of creation.  The laws of creation are of 
such a particular sort that “though nature’s complexity gives every appearance 
of intentional design and purpose, it is entirely the result of natural processes.”   34
Davies likens the natural world to a chess game: the rules are set by God to 
encourage some sorts of action, discourage others, and limit some altogether, 
in order to facilitate rich and varied play by the free agents or “chess pieces” of 
creation.    In one way, this view seems to ease the theological burden of 35
suffering, since God is not directly to blame for any suffering: any particular form 
of disvalue in nature is the outcome of chance or freewill.  Nor is God 
responsible for alleviating suffering, for God does not generally have any direct 
engagement with the world.  However, God is still culpable for setting up the 
system in such a way that suffering would be an inevitable outcome.  The cost 
paid, however, for the advantages of Davies’s system is very dear: any hope of 
direct eschatological action is dissipated since God has no direct contact with 
the world, and there is no personal notion of God’s direct relationship with 
creatures. 
 In a different way, Christopher Knight also advocates for a uniformitarian 
view, though his approach allows for the appearance of SDA.   He uses the 36
analogy of children appealing to their parents for money while away at school, 
and gives three options of parental action.  First, a parent could set up regular 
 Davies, “Teleology Without Teleology,” 151.  34
 Davies, “Teleology Without Teleology,” 155.35
 Christopher Knight, “Divine Action: A Neo-Byzantine Model,” International Journal for 36
Philosophy of Religion 58 (2005): 181-199.  Knight identifies his own position as “theistic 
naturalism” and sometimes speaks in the language of secondary causes (see the next section 
below).  Yet, since he closely associates with 18th century deism and eschews the concept of 
“special providence,” he does not belongs in the same camp as the Neo-Thomists.
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standing orders that would give a certain amount of money at certain times: 
roughly equivalent to GDA.  Second, a parent might occasionally deposit money 
in the child’s account because of a special appeal: likened to SDA.  Third, a 
parent might set up a trust fund that gives regular payments, but can also have 
stipulations in which, under particular situations, extra money will be deposited.  
This third option has the non-interventionist reality of the first option, with the 
appearance of responsive or interventionist engagement of the second.  Thus, 
Knight can defend a non-interventionist approach while maintaining that our 
experience might sometimes point toward what seems like interventions.  
Knight is insistent that there is no real-time divine response to creation: about 
prayer he writes that theistic naturalists cannot “see intercessory prayer as 
having any purpose––other, perhaps, than that of refining the religious 
sensibilities of those who indulge in it.”   All divine action has been set from 37
eternity into the initial conditions of the world.   
 While this model is appealing if one wants to defend an unchanging, 
untouched Aristotelian God, it has little appeal for those who see vibrant 
relationship at the heart of being.  To take Knight’s analogy: would it be a good 
parent who simply sets up a watertight trust fund and does not actually interact 
with their child?  What does this tell us about the nature of the parent?  Of the 
nature of the parent’s love?  What would we think of a parent who preferred to 
simply set up a trust to be invoked with every new need of his or her child rather 
than actually interact with his or her child?  As in the models of Kaufman and 
Wiles, God remains a distant figure, far removed from the suffering creation.  In 
attempting to draw the problematic thorn of suffering from the neck of theology, 
these theologians have decapitated their theology instead.  Their solutions do, 
 Knight, “Divine Action,” 185.37
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in one sense, solve the problem: the thorn can be extracted without difficulty.  
But living forms of theology die when too great a chasm is made between the 
intimately personal God we see in Christ and the theological abstractions we 
create in response to philosophical quandaries. 
Special Divine Action in Secondary Causes 
 A very different approach to SDA in physical events is held by Neo-
Thomists, including Denis Edwards, William Stoeger, Elizabeth Johnson, and 
David Burrell.   These theologians maintain that God works in and through 38
secondary causes; this upholds “both God’s transcendence and creaturely 
autonomy.”   Basing their model on the Aristotelian division of primary and 39
secondary causation, Neo-Thomists recognise God as the primary cause of 
events in the world, while creatures are the secondary cause.  The advantage 
to this approach is that it does not see God as one agent amongst others––thus 
maintaining God’s distinction from creation––and it maintains a clear view of 
divine action without intervention.  A disadvantage is that there is no way to 
explain how God is at work in the world.  The work of God will never be able to 
have any sort of scientific explanation or “causal joint” since the (secondary) 
causes are already evident.   It also means that divine work is impossible to 40
“find” since it is perfectly hidden in the secondary causes.  John Polkinghorne, 
who finds this apparent paradox unsatisfactory, calls Austin Farrer’s version of 
 Edwards, How God Acts, 62-66; William R. Stoeger, S.J., “Conceiving Divine Action in a 38
Dynamic Universe,” in Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action: Twenty Years of Challenge and 
Progress, eds. Robert J. Russell, Nancey Murphy, and William R. Stoeger, S.J. (Vatican/
Berkeley, CA: Vatican Observatory/CTNS, 2008): 225-247; Johnson, Ask the Beasts, 154-180; 
Burrell and Moulin, “Albert, Aquinas and Dionysius,” 642; David B. Burrell C.S.C., “Creation, 
Metaphysics, and Ethics,” Faith and Philosophy 18:2 (April 2001), 204-221.
 Edwards, How God Acts, 62.39
 The term “causal joint” was first used, pejoratively, by Austin Farrer in Faith and Speculation: 40
An Essay in Philosophical Theology (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1967), 65.
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secondary causation, known as double agency, a kind of “theological 
doublespeak.”  41
 Another critique of the model of secondary causation comes directly out 
of the problem of suffering.  If God works in and through secondary causes, is 
God the primary cause of evil events as well?  Some defenders say “yes,” and 
hold that in every evil event can be found deeper good.  Vernon White is a good 
example of a theologian who attempts to approach theodicy from this 
perspective.   White does not accept that some events are only permitted as 42
instrumental to other goods.  For White every event, and therefore every activity 
of God in every event, has a self-contained meaning.  Nothing is reduced to a 
means to an end.   Nicholas Saunders raises the objection that on this view 43
there can be no distinction in importance between various divine acts: “The 
problem is that not only are the falling rain or any other natural events and the 
resurrection similar accounts of God’s action, but they must be given an equal 
status in our theological understanding.”   Any distinguishing, when all actions 44
are equally caused by God, become instances of special pleading.   This is 45
especially problematic when it comes to evil––a problem White tries to evade by 
saying that evil events should not follow the rule of being events in themselves, 
but need to be understood in their wider context where they lose ontological 
reality.   “Evil only exists in a certain configuration of events which can always 46
be seen from a different perspective, and as such may never have an ultimate 
 John Polkinghorne, Science and Christian Belief: Theological Reflections of a Bottom-up 41
Thinker (London: SPCK, 1994), 81-82.
 Vernon White, The Fall of a Sparrow: The Concept of Special Divine Action (Exeter: 42
Paternoster, 1985), 125-142; particularly 134-136.
 White, Fall of a Sparrow, 128-132.43
 Saunders, Divine Action, 31.44
 White’s attempts to make these distinctions is found in Fall of a Sparrow, 139-142.45
 White, Fall of a Sparrow, 133-136.46
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hold on reality.”   If this is true, then either there is no reason for the action of 47
God in redemption because there is no ontological reality of evil to be redeemed 
(one need only wait to see apparent evil resolved), or the model becomes 
absolutely tied to an atemporal understanding of God, meaning, and history, 
where the resolution of the wider context is eternally real.   However, since my 48
concept of love and freewill is tied to temporal understandings of God, I cannot 
accept this solution. 
 Other defenders of the model will not accept the unpalatable notion that 
White is willing to engage, and would say “no, God does not cause evil.”  It is 
unclear how they can defend themselves without ending up in various 
difficulties.  They might say that God is the primary cause behind only good 
events, which leaves evil events without a primary cause, or sets up a personal 
dualism of some sort to cause the evil events.  Both solutions end up with 
problems: the origin of a dualism, or an incoherent world where evil actions are 
without a cause.  In White’s solution, God becomes one for whom the ends 
justify horrific means.  In the other solution, one has a world full of actions with 
no explanation. 
 Edwards tries to avoid these problems by saying that God’s primary 
causation, God’s will and intention in creation, is limited by the creaturely agents 
who act as secondary causes.  God accepts creaturely limits, and those 
creaturely limits are the source of natural evil.   The problem with this is that 49
those very same natural evils are often deeply productive, and Edwards would 
want to ascribe that productivity to God.  It seems an inescapable fact that 
natural evils are necessary for the emergence of valuable goods.  If the 
 White, Fall of a Sparrow, 136.47
 A point White acknowledges.  Fall of a Sparrow, 144. 48
 Edwards, How God Acts, 63.49
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cougar’s carnivorousness, for example, is a result of creaturely limitation, then 
so is the skill and agility of the fleet-footed deer.  Taken to the extreme, very little 
in the world would be attributable to God’s creation.   
 Edwards tries to uphold both creaturely autonomy and SDA toward 
desired ends, but it doesn’t seem to hold together logically.  When Edwards 
explores the question of evolution, he writes: 
In the approach I am advocating, [the emergence of life] can be seen as 
a special act of God in the sense that God chooses, eternally, that the 
universe would bring forth biological life on our Earth by means of 
emergence and increasing complexity.  What makes this act special is 
that (1) this action of God has a specific effect in creaturely history, the 
emergence of life in the universe, and (2) this specific effect is intended 
by God.  50
Edwards goes on to note other things that had to occur for this intended 
outcome: the formation of stars, the placement of our planet from the sun, the 
formation of the atmosphere, and so on.  “In all these events,” writes Edwards, 
“God is acting in specific and special ways.”   Edwards is defending something 51
more robust than God creating by simply upholding and sustaining the natural 
processes: there is an ordering to the course of history that had to be what it is 
in order to produce the intended outcome of the emergence of life.  Yet there is 
no explanation of how God might have achieved God’s aims had the autonomy 
of the creation gone down routes unfavourable to life.  Instead of proposing that 
God might protect the possibilities of life, as Southgate does,  Edwards only 52
affirms after the fact––in light of the emergence of life––that this is the creative 
work of God.  The argument is circular in the same sense as the Weak 
Anthropic argument: it is an argument made after-the-fact, once the results are 
already in place.   
 Edwards, How God Acts, 64-65.50
 Edwards, How God Acts, 65.51
 Southgate, “A test case: divine action,” 301-302.52
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 If I take a highly improbable situation, for example, that in a hundred 
throws of a die I roll a six over fifty percent of the time, and then announce “I 
have acted in such a way that I would roll a six about 50% of the time” I am 
simply stating the obvious.  I could only say something significant about the 
intentionality of my action if I announced beforehand “I intend to roll a six in 
more than half these throws,” and then am able to do so, rather than the likely 
statistical outcome of rolling 17 sixes.  In another scenario, if I were happy with 
any outcome, I could show intentionality by saying “I will roll for any amount of 
sixes.”  But Edwards insists that God has specific intended outcomes (a life-
bearing universe) in a system that easily could have produced other results, as 
the fine-tuning arguments show us.   God, to use my analogy, was rolling for a 53
significant amount of sixes against staggering odds.  Edwards’s strong 
emphasis on the freedom of the individual combined with the non-directionality 
of secondary causation does not give sufficient reason for why the intended 
outcome (“a life-bearing universe” or “plenty of sixes”) should have emerged 
amongst the many other probabilities.  Nor––even if such a thing were to be 
found, if the universal die was found to be “loaded”––does the argument have 
any metaphysical force in determining whether the outcomes are the result of 
divine action.  Polkinghorne points out: 
If the evolution of life is seen to be almost inevitable, the atheists say that 
naturalism reigns and there is no need for a Creator, while the theists say 
that God has so beautifully ordained the order of nature that creation is 
indeed able to make itself.  If life is so rare as to make its occurrence on 
Earth seem a fortuitous event, the atheists say that it shows that humans 
have emerged by chance in a world devoid of significance, while theists 
are encouraged to see the hand of God behind so fruitful but 
unpredictable an occurrence.  Science influences metaphysical 
 Whether we attribute the fine-tuning of the universe to God or some other cause is a different 53
question.  However, the startling exactness of our universe is explored in Martin Rees, Just Six 
Numbers: The Deep Forces That Shape the Universe (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1999).
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understanding but it certainly does not simply determine it.  In the end, 
metaphysical answers are given for metaphysical reasons.  54
In the end, all Edwards offers the reader is a set of fideistic statements. 
 The other point to consider in Edwards’ view is that he says “God 
chooses, eternally, that the universe would bring forth biological life.”   In that 55
one word, “eternally,” he opens up all the complexities of interaction between 
time and eternity.  It might be possible, for example, that God could eternally 
intend something which––from the vantage point of a timeless observation 
point––already exists, but seems only a remote future possibility from our 
current perspective.  However, all the language Edwards uses implies the usual 
pattern of intention-action-result: “God wants a world of diverse living creatures 
to evolve on our planet and acts in all the regularities and contingencies of the 
natural world to bring this about.”   Without a discussion of the nature of time 56
and eternity Edwards uses the language of a temporal agent at work (such as 
“intends,” “wants,” and “brings about”) in ways that could be seen as deeply 
misleading, since he does not actually mean that God acts in any such way.  57
 An argument of SDA entirely through secondary causation is too non-
specific to be useful, for it does not tell us how God acts in the world, where 
God acts, or even if God is at work in any particular situation.   The view 58
becomes simply a proclamation of faith in light of certain favourable outcomes.   
 Polkinghorne, Science & Theology, 79.54
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 Stoeger is more careful, and upholds the freedom of creation to act as an 
agent, yet does so at the expense of saying that God only works 
“metaphorically” in and through the laws of nature.   Stoeger explains, “When 59
we refer to God or God’s action we can do so only ‘symbolically’ or 
‘analogically.’”   Once again, we are left in a place where nothing can be said of 60
divine action that would help one recognise it or allow us to speak meaningfully 
of special divine action rather than the providential divine action of upholding 
being.  Ultimately, the differentiation between God’s overall creative action 
(which may include initial boundary conditions that constrain the possible paths 
of history toward certain overall aims) and SDA is lost.   In which case, we may 61
call creative action “special,” but we are really only redefining semantics and no 
longer talking about SDA.  No act is special precisely because every act is. 
Special Divine Action in Quantum Indeterminacy 
 In pursuit of a model of divine action with more traction, several 
theologians have attempted to find ways for God to be involved in the world in 
objectively physical but non-interventionist ways, also known as NIODA.  
Nancey Murphy, Robert Russell, Thomas Tracy, George Ellis, Keith Ward, and 
John Polkinghorne are all examples of scientist-theologians who have searched 
for a “causal joint” in creation that would allow for SDA to engage with and 
change the nature of physical events without intervening in such a way as to 
overthrow the integrity of the natural world processes. 
 William R. Stoeger, S.J., “The Big Bang, quantum cosmology and creatio ex nihilo,” in 59
Creation and the God of Abraham, eds. David B. Burrell, Carlo Cogliati, Janet M. Soskice, and 
William R. Stoeger, S.J. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 173.
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 For Murphy, Russell, Tracy, and Ellis, God is thought to be able to 
influence the outcome of indeterminate quantum events to bring about desired 
physical outcomes through the causal openness of certain chance processes.  
There is disagreement over how involved God is: whether God controls all 
quantum events (Murphy), some (Tracy), or even only those events that would 
affect non-sentient beings (Russell).    62
 Two major problems have emerged from the line of enquiry on divine 
action in quantum realms.  First is that the “basis of quantum theory is a 
paradigm deterministic theory... [therefore] incompatibilist SDA is not possible in 
a non-interventionist sense.”   Nicholas Saunders shows convincingly that for 63
God to determine purposeful outcomes toward a desired end would, in the 
Copenhagen interpretation, involve just as much intervention as a macroscale 
act of intervention.   Even if it were possible, the outcome of indeterministic 64
systems at quantum levels of scale do not have macroscopic effects.   65
Therefore, the outcome of these quantum events do not have the desired 
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theological importance, since there are few ways these effects can be amplified 
into macroscopic events.   Saunders states his final conclusion bluntly “on the 66
terms of our current understanding of quantum theory, incompatibilist non-
interventionist quantum SDA is not theoretically possible.”  67
Special Divine Action in Complex Systems 
 To avoid the difficulties of bridging quantum and non-quantum worlds, 
John Polkinghorne has pursued the idea that God could act in non-
interventionist ways through macroscopic complex or chaotic systems.   68
Supported by Polkinghorne’s formula that epistemology models ontology, he 
holds that the unpredictability of complex systems speaks to an “emergent 
property of flexible process, even within the world of classical physics”  within 69
which God could be at work without overturning natural law.  However, chaotic 
systems are still deterministic even if they are unpredictable.  It is unclear, 
therefore, how God could affect these systems toward desired outcomes 
without intervention, unless (as suggested by Tracy ) the highly-sensitive initial 70
conditions were involved with the uncertainty in quantum systems and amplified 
 One good example of this kind of critiques is Timothy Sansbury, “The False Promise of 66
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through the chaotic system.   In the end we are still left with an unsatisfactory 71
model that is highly limited in its outcomes. 
Special Divine Action in Mental Events 
 If we move away from the concept of God working to bring about the 
divine will from a bottom-up approach, there is still room for God to be at work in 
the world through “top-down” approaches.  One way this could happen is 
through the influencing of mental events. 
 Philip Clayton and Stephen Knapp advance a theory that revolves 
around the nonlawlike nature of mental events, which depends entirely on 
Donald Davidson’s concept of “anomalous monism.”   Clayton and Knapp 72
categorise mental events as a form of emergent complexity.  According to them, 
the underlying laws of physics and chemistry no longer determine the outcome 
of events in these highly complex processes.   Instead, mental events are open 73
to divine interaction because they do not rely directly upon the physical 
processes that make them possible.  Despite this being a very limited model of 
divine action, Clayton and Knapp insist it is necessary––from a mechanistic 
perspective––because scientific understanding gives such complete 
explanations of the universe’s interactions that God could not undertake SDA 
without overthrowing those interactions. 
 Clayton and Knapp also argue from a moral perspective that such a 
limited view of divine action is necessary is based on the premise that if a good 
and benevolent God could have averted such profoundly evil events as the 
 Keith Ward does not choose between the quantum and chaotic systems, but allows both to be 71
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Indonesian tsunami of 2004 or the Holocaust, God would have done so.  Since 
God did not avert them, God must therefore not be able to intervene in the 
physical world.  Clayton and Knapp’s first argument presupposes there is a 
certain type of response to evil that God “ought” to do.  Yet, God’s ways of 
defeating evil are rarely transparent.  In the Incarnation, for example, God’s 
action was seldom obvious or predictable, despite being physical and 
“interventionist” in the sense of directly changing human history.  Jesus’ way of 
responding to evil, most notably in the cross, did not at all meet expectations of 
how people thought the coming Messiah should encounter their oppressions.  
So there may be room for divine action in the physical world in response to evil, 
beyond simply averting the evils in question, which is what Clayton and Knapp 
assume God would have to do. 
 What can God do?  According to Clayton and Knapp, God can only 
interact with the world through the mental states of creatures, although those 
messages can be resisted or ignored.  “What God cannot do,” they write “if the 
problem of evil is answerable, is to give us thoughts or feelings that compel an 
automatic or reflexive response, because if that was the way God acted in the 
world, God would have an obligation to prevent or correct our mistakes and 
other failures whenever they might occur.”   But it seems from their position 74
that God does not even need to make it clear to the recipient of this divine 
action that anything out of the ordinary is taking place, since they say these 
messages can take place on a subconscious level.   If it is subconscious, the 75
divine action is neither accepted nor rejected by the agent and has no way of 
being discerned by the agent themselves.  This is a point that Clayton and 
Knapp acknowledge: “There is no reliable way, then, to separate the divine from 
 Clayton and Knapp, Predicament of Belief, 62.74
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the human contributions to any particular instance of divine-human 
interaction.”   Nor can God impart information directly, in this view, but can only 76
introduce axiological lures or a sense of divine presence, for the direct 
impartation of information would override creaturely freedom and introduce a 
moral dilemma.    77
 Problematic from a scientific perspective, Clayton and Knapp’s view is 
founded upon the assumption that mental events are not reducible to physical 
brain events, a step which has come under criticism.   Ultimately, it leaves the 78
theologian with one more possible place where further scientific discovery might 
edge God out of the picture if further neuropsychological study should find that 
minds do in fact work on nomological principles.  79
  Problematic from a theological perspective, the model leaves no clear 
distinction between divine and creaturely action, and a very limited sphere for 
divine action.  The outcomes of Clayton and Knapp’s approach may resonate 
more or less with the divine values of love, but it does so at great cost.  The 
most troubling aspect of this line of thought is that the Incarnation itself, as 
classically understood, would be ruled out as a possible distinctive divine action, 
and with it, all the theodicies built on Christological foundations.  
  
Conclusions on Divine Action Models 
 In the end, the search for a mechanism, or the “place,” of divine action 
falters.  No one system stands out amongst the rest as a better possibility for 
 Clayton and Knapp, Predicament of Belief, 63.76
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the location of SDA.  All of them struggle with the same problems: if the action is 
non-interventionist, can it still be powerful enough to bring about divine goals 
and intentions?  How does SDA interact with our understanding of deterministic 
systems?  And, most crucially, when should something be considered SDA?  In 
light of these challenges, many theologians have chosen instead to investigate 
the character and the nature of SDA.  Christopher Southgate observes, “the 
divine action debate is ever more markedly being framed not in terms of 
mechanism but morality.”   The rest of this chapter will do just that: look at the 80
character and nature of God’s action in the world without focussing on the 
mechanisms of divine action. 
Character of Special Divine Action 
 My proposal is that divine action should not be reduced to just one type 
or level of action, but instead recognise that SDA happens in multiple realms, in 
various ways.  Brian Hebblethwaite writes: “It will be apparent that God’s action 
in relation to any one human being at any one time will be a multi-faceted and 
multi-level business.”   The same is true of divine action in relation to any 81
particular non-human animal, and by a different scale of measure, to 
evolutionary history as a whole.  To do justice to the complexity of divine action, 
we must avoid the temptation of saying that God is always and everywhere 
doing one and the same thing.   Southgate warns: “It is best not to limit God’s 82
action to a particular locus––or indeed to focus on efficient causation as the 
 Southgate, “A test case: divine action,” 299.80
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sole way of thinking of God’s acting.”   I want to propose four different ways of 83
understanding SDA which, together, form a robust whole: SDA as the gift of 
being, as divine presence, as divine lure and invitation, and as participation in 
creation. 
Gift of Being 
 The gift of being is perhaps the least obvious category to be listed as 
“special” divine action, since traditionally the provision of being would have 
been labelled as GDA––along with the upholding, sustaining, and empowering 
of creation.  I argue that the gift of being––that is, the gift of allowing something 
to be rather than letting it fall into non-existence––becomes an act of SDA in the 
case of living beings.  The ongoing existence of rocks or stars do not require 
SDA, only general divine sustaining action.  The gift of being to an individual 
creature (whether human or non-human) involves––to borrow language from 
Christopher Southgate––the gifts of the Logos and of the Spirit: form and 
particularity.   As each creature participates in the life of which God is the 84
source, it is a particular instance of special divine action for that creature to be, 
and to have the room to be, what it is.    The gift of being in the instance of 85
living creatures is the special provision of the particularity of the individual, the 
upholding of its being, and the creation of the possibilities that its life might 
 Southgate, “A test case: divine action,” 299.  In the same place, Southgate quotes Thomas 83
Tracy’s opinion that “what is needed is not so much a theory of divine action as an array of 
coherent possibilities that can be called upon as needed to articulate the claims of a particular 
religious tradition.”  I hope to present such an array of coherent possibilities below.
 Southgate, Groaning of Creation, 62.  I am not assuming the idea of form relates to the 84
species of the individual as Southgate does.  Instead, it may relate to the best form of 
flourishing that individual can attain.
 In similar ways, John Haught and Jürgen Moltmann also both speak of the letting-be of 85
creation, but they do so by advocating for the absence or self-restricting of God in creation.  
Haught calls this kenotic withdrawal, and Moltmann advocates for the kabbalistic notion of 
simsum.  Jürgen Moltmann, God in Creation: A New Theology of Creation and The Spirit of 
God, trans. by Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), 88-89; John Haught, God 
After Darwin: A Theology of Evolution  (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2000), 47-56.  See also the 
discussion of Ruth Page and Gelassenheit in chapter 2, p. 81-82.
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have.  The gift of being to a living individual is received and participated in in a 
way that is not true of an inanimate creature.  There are two gifts here: the first 
allows a creature to exist (the ontological sustaining of being), the second gives 
it the power to act according to its own agency.  It is this giving of the power of 
agency that makes living beings unique recipients of this SDA.  A rock does not 
have any independent agency––it accesses only the first gift.  Elizabeth 
Johnson uses similar imagery in her panentheistic vision of creation: 
To be imaginative for a moment, it is as if at the Big Bang the Spirit gave 
the natural world a push saying, ‘Go, have an adventure, see what you 
can become.  And I will be with you every step of the way.’  In more 
classical language, the Giver of life not only creates and conserves all 
things, holding them in existence over the abyss of nothingness, but is 
also the dynamic ground of their becoming, empowering from within their 
emergence into new complex forms.  86
 General providence sets the ordering of the initial cosmos in place, and 
continues to sustain and uphold it, while a particular type of SDA gives 
uniqueness and relational freedom to every living individual.   The non-animate 87
world is constrained by the initial conditions of the universe to certain 
configurations, thus partially creating (and limiting) the conditions and 
possibilities for life.  In this way, God acts in generally providential ways––
through giving being to the physical boundaries of the universe––to create only 
certain corridors or avenues through which the universe must develop and out 
of which life might emerge.   This GDA works in concert with the SDA each 88
living creature is given in form and particularity. 
 Johnson, Ask the Beasts, 150.86
 Precisely what constitutes an individual can sometimes be ambiguous (as in the case with 87
slime mould), but it is not really an important question until a creature has a sense of self, at 
which point the definition of an individual is usually clear.  It is also true that one could 
conceivably classify the giving of free-process/free agency as a general rather than a special 
divine act.  However, since I see it as a particular act of love from God toward the individual, it is 
better classified as SDA even though something very similar could be conceived under the 
rubric of GDA, where creatures automatically have this sort of freedom.
 Arthur Peacocke, Evolution: The Disguised Friend of Faith? (West Conshohocken, PA: 88
Templeton Foundation, 2004), 73-74.  See discussion in Christopher Southgate, God, Humanity 
and the Cosmos, 3rd ed. (London: T&T Clark, 2011), 299-302.
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 Viewing being as a gift is problematic for those creatures whose 
particular circumstances necessarily means that there will be no chance of their 
flourishing.  Imagine a leopard born with deformed legs who will never walk, 
never hunt, never be a leopard in the full sense.  The leopard may seem a 
tragedy, but the argument could be turned on its head by pointing out that God 
does not give the gift of being generously only to those who embody the regular 
or successful forms of life, but instead abundantly bestows life upon all sorts of 
unlikely candidates.  There is a super-fecundity of being that lies at the 
foundation of the universe, reflecting the abundance of divine generosity.  
Instead of only choosing desired outcomes and then driving natural forces to 
promote those outcomes, God gives abundantly to as many lives as there are 
possibilities taking form.   
 In terms of the non-human creation this means that it is through the 
superabundant provision of life that the moment of novelty is created.  If only 
the creatures who could most perfectly benefit from life received it, there would 
be little change to life forms.  It is the abundant variation amongst creatures that 
provides the source for evolutionary development.  Syndactyly, for example, is a 
genetic disorder in humans where connective tissues between the digits remain 
fused.  Yet, in flying squirrels, this genetic anomaly has been developed to 
expand the surface area of the patagium––the flap of tissue between wrists and 
the hind limbs.   If the environmental circumstances are right, and an abnormal 89
feature is favoured, it may become the beginning of some new element of 
flourishing.  If, as is often the case, the creature is not favoured either by a 
mutation or by conditions––does not survive to reproduce and pass on a new 
 The patagium itself was likely a genetic anomaly at one point.  Humans are sometimes born 89
with similar connective tissues attaching the arms to the body.
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way of living––then God will redeem its life in ways we will explore in the next 
chapter, as well as comfort it in its suffering. 
Co-Presence 
 A second type of divine action is found in the co-presence of God with 
the creature.  Distinct from the gift of being, which creates the possibilities of 
life, co-presence allows us to dispel notions of deism and envision God as living 
with the created world.  Ruth Page proposes the term “pansyntheism” to 
describe this divine presence, drawing from the Heideggerian concept of 
Mitsein, or “with being.”   We know that it is utterly impossible for creatures to 90
live independently of a complex web of relationships: with other creatures of the 
same species, with the creatures they eat and are eaten by, with the air (or 
water) around them, and with the ground beneath them.   Always and 91
everywhere, all beings live in relationship.  God, in creating, freely chooses to 
enter into relationships as well.  God’s co-presence, or co-experience, can be 
thought of as the continual act of kenosis of the classical attributes that God 
undertakes to maintain loving, responsive relationship with creation.   Co-92
presence is the special divine act of continual re-commitment to the project of 
creation, the continual divine humbling, in the form of not exercising divine 
power, knowledge, and eternity to their full extent.  It is not a necessary 
commitment for God, but one entered into out of the fullness of love.   
 Divine co-presence is therefore closely linked to divine co-suffering.  
Because God is with creation, God also co-experiences the suffering of 
 Ruth Page, God and the Web of Creation (London: SCM, 1996),  42.90
 There may be some solitary species where the creatures do not live in ongoing relationship 91
with others of the same species.  Yet, even the most solitary creatures at one point depended 
on another of their own species, and sexually reproducing creatures would normally have 
periodic encounters for mating purposes.
 See chapter 4 for the full exploration of how these attributes relate to the nature of love.92
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creation.  Too often, theologians have understood God as distant.  Holmes 
Rolston famously said that “if God watches the sparrow fall, God must do so 
from a great distance.”   Completely transcendent, God watches the cosmic 93
drama from the heavens, while creatures are left to whatever fate might fall.  If 
the work on love developed in chapter 4 is correct, and love requires the desire 
of union, then Rolston’s God cannot be one of love.  In the 2001 movie Shrek, 
the Lord Farquaad brilliantly encapsulates this distant sort of rulership.   At one 94
point, as Farquaad stands on a balcony far above the gathered knights below, 
he makes his will known that they should embark on a perilous journey to 
rescue the lovely princess Fiona so that Farquaad can marry her.  “Some of you 
may die...” he says as the audience murmurs in sadness and worry, “but it’s a 
sacrifice I am willing to make.”  Rapturous applause bursts from the crowd. 
 The picture is not very far from what many theologies have suggested is 
the purpose of the suffering of non-human creatures.  God, standing aloof from 
the danger and hurt of creation, voices God’s plans that the universe should 
produce life, which would one day include human beings whom God would take 
as an eschatological bride.  But God does not engage with the process of 
evolutionary formation until humans arrive.  Just as Lord Farquaad sends others 
into peril to rescue Fiona, so God sacrifices numberless creatures in the pursuit 
of the realisation of humans with free moral choice.   To glorify God for such a 95
creation is morally repugnant; as absurd as the crowd’s applause at Lord 
Farquaad’s declaration.  But if God is instead with the creation, accompanying it 
and co-suffering with it, the objection fades. 
 Holmes Rolston III, Science and Religion: A Critical Survey, 2nd ed. (West Conshohocken, PA: 93
Templeton Foundation, 1987/2006), 140.
 Shrek, DVD, Directed by Andrew Adamson & Vicky Jenson (2001; Glendale, CA: Dream 94
Works).
 This is precisely what Michael A. Corey proposes, as we saw in chapter 2, p. 36.95
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 Does divine co-presence actually do anything for the suffering 
creation?   For humans, it has often brought a great deal of comfort to those 96
who suffer.  The notion that they are not alone, but that God suffers with them, 
can alleviate some of the mental suffering they experience.   We do not know if 97
the same is true of the non-human animal creation.  Christopher Southgate,  
drawing on the work of Jay McDaniel, reflects on this eloquently: 
When I consider the starving pelican chick, or the impala hobbled by a 
mother cheetah so that her cubs can learn to pull a prey animal down, I 
cannot pretend that God’s presence as the ‘heart’ of the world takes the 
pain of the experience away; I cannot pretend that the suffering may not 
destroy the creature’s consciousness before death claims it.  That is the 
power of suffering, that it can destroy selves. 
I can only suppose that God’s suffering presence is just that, presence, 
of the most profoundly attentive and loving sort, a solidarity that at some 
deep level takes away the aloneness of the suffering creature’s 
experience.  98
If divine presence changes a non-human animal’s experience of suffering and 
death, it will do so in a way that is inaccessible to us.  Having said that, we 
should not imagine that the presence has to be consciously acknowledged to be 
effective: babies respond to, and are comforted by, a mother’s presence long 
before they can grasp abstract concepts like “self” and “mother” and “love.”  
Perhaps the most important thing is that the concept of divine co-presence and 
co-suffering radically alters our understanding of the type of world we live in.  It 
is not a world in which we are left alone to struggle through whatever mayhem 
 David Clough challenges the co-suffering argument in the following way: “The pain inflicted 96
on an individual by a surgeon, for example, may or may not be judged to be justified on the 
basis of benefit to the patient or to others, but if the surgeon decided to inflict the same pain on 
themselves, it would not materially alter the judgement one way or another.”  David Clough, On 
Animals, Vol.1 (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2012), 124.
 A classic example of this is found in the life of Julian of Norwich, whose visions of the crucified 97
Christ comfort her in her own physical suffering, and turn her illness into an experience of God’s 
love.
 Southgate, Groaning of Creation, 52.  See also Southgate’s newer analysis on presence and 98
encouragement in “Does God’s Care Make Any Difference?  Theological Reflections on the 
Suffering of God’s Creatures,” in Christian Faith and the Earth: Current Paths and Emerging 
Horizons in Ecotheology, eds. Ernst M. Conradie, Sigurd Bermann, Celia Deane-Drummond, 
and Denis Edwards (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2014), 110-112.
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may come, like Lord of the Flies made large.  It is instead a world where 
perilous journeys must be undertaken, but in which God is accompanying the 
creation every step of the way.  Rather than Lord Farquaad, we might imagine 
God as a historical midwife attending creation’s labour pains.   Before 99
anaesthetics, the midwife could not take away the pain of the mother, nor even 
significantly lessen it, but instead she accompanied, encouraged, embraced, 
and sat in solidarity with the suffering (and sometimes dying) mother.  
Therefore, in the venture of theodicy, God’s presence in creation goes a long 
way toward understanding a creation that suffers through to new life, even if 
God’s presence does not necessarily alleviate creation’s pain or brutality.  100
Lure 
 Another type of SDA is present in the divine lure.  This lure can be 
parsed in several different ways.  First, it is found in the lure toward the good 
and harmonious that is so central to process thought.  Ian Barbour, John Cobb, 
David Ray Griffin, John Haught, and Jay McDaniel are the major recent 
representatives of this approach to divine action.   God does not coerce 101
creation into pre-formed plans.  Instead, God lures every entity of creation 
toward greater inter-relational harmonies and goods, and every entity of 
creation has the power to either accept or reject this divine lure.  Insofar as the 
creation is self-determining and holds creative autonomy, entities may diverge 
 Note the birthing imagery in Romans 8:22.99
 A further point might be that the acceptance of a temporal frame of reference makes possible 100
the occurrence and the redemption of gratuitous evil.  See the section in chapter 4 on time and 
gratuitous evil, p. 200-204.
 Ian Barbour, Religion and Science: Historical and Contemporary Issues (San Francisco: 101
HarperCollins, 1997), 284-300; Barbour, Religion in an Age of Science: The Gifford Lectures 
1989-1991 (London: SCM, 1990): 232-234; John B. Cobb, Jr., God and the World (Philadelphia: 
Westminster, 1969); John B. Cobb Jr. & David Ray Griffin, Process Theology: An Introductory 
Exposition (Louisville, TN: Westminster John Knox, 1976), 48-54; McDaniel, Of God and 
Pelicans, 38-39.  Haught, God After Darwin, 165-184.  Historical defenders of this position 
include Alfred North Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne.
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from the divine invitation to order and novelty.  The great strength of process 
thought is that it explains evil in the world as those moments when entities resist 
the divine lure toward the good, and so explains evil without creating a dualism 
or leaving evil without any explanation.  Another strength is that process 
theology is rooted in the concept of God’s unfailing love for each and every part 
of creation.   102
 A major challenge posed for process theology by classical theology is 
that process theology offers no guarantee of good triumphing over evil, no 
certain annihilation of evil.   God can never decisively destroy evil, nor (if the 103
track-record of the world is any evidence) is there a guarantee that creatures 
will one day respond positively toward divine suggestion.  There exists only the 
long, slow, uncertain lure toward the good which may or may not result in 
harmony and goodness.   
 How far does this lure extend?  For process theists who adhere to the 
concept of panpsychism, the divine lure extends to every conceivable “entity” of 
creation: to quarks and electrons just as much as to humans and hippos.  I do 
not follow them in this reasoning, and would argue that the extent of lure is 
similar to the extent of love (discussed in chapter 4).   Lure is an idea loaded 104
with personal concepts such as desire and fulfilment.  As such, I would restrict 
the objects of divine lure to living beings.   It might be objected that personal 105
categories are just as inappropriate when applied to bacteria as to stone.  From 
a human perspective, that would be true: since I cannot know a bacterium, 
 McDaniel, Of God and Pelicans, 35-41.102
 Barbour, Religion and Science, 326.103
 See chapter 4, p. 164-165.104
 Ian Barbour notes that not all aggregates of creation would be considered entities in 105
Whitehead’s thought.  So an atom could in principle be an entity, but not necessarily a stone.  
Religion in an Age of Science, 224-225.
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there can be no appropriate union with it in the sense of the desires of love.  
God, however, can know a bacterium intimately: can know its range of 
responses and what constitutes its good, can share a history with it, and can 
share an office of love with it––at the very least––as Creator and creature.  
Therefore, the concept of lure can also presumably apply, although it would not 
be lure towards a choice of moral good (as it would be for humans) but simply a 
lure toward actions for its own good and the good of the rest of creation.   
 The process paradigm also highlights one of the paradoxes we have 
been struggling with all along: the violence we wish to reject is the seed of the 
novelty we admire.  On the one hand, one is tempted to say that the 
Ichneumonidae’s parasitic eggs planted within caterpillars are an evil 
expression of the gift of life that God did not design and does not intend.  Their 
survival tactic is allowed, tolerated, rather than rejoiced in.  On the other hand, 
the life style of the wasp demonstrates skill, complexity, and ingenuity.  Their 
reproduction can be a saving grace for the trees and shrubs that the caterpillars 
would otherwise destroy.  It is a constant temptation to put the “peaceable 
elements”––the bunny rabbits, the swallows, and the autotrophic life––in one 
category of “God approved” evolutionary developments, and snakes, lions, and 
parasites into another camp of “not approved, violent” developments.  But this is 
too simple.  The “peaceful” species rely upon the violent species for their own 
flourishing, and the “peaceful” species only exist because they have entered 
into competition in their own ways with other species.  Even autotrophic 
organisms compete with those around them for resources, squeezing out other 
organisms in the race for space and sunlight.  Therefore, instead of having two 
categories in our minds of “violent” and “peaceful” creation (pace Messer), or 
even “wheat” and “tares” (pace Hoggard Creegan), we must see the creation as 
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one community.  As a whole, it stands as God’s very good creation, including its 
components of violence and suffering.  Creation is, as Southgate reminds us, 
“both good and groaning.”   The wheat, as wheat, inflicts its own forms of 106
violence on the organisms which surround and relate to it.  Therefore, if God is 
the God of all of creation, then violence too must be part of God’s creation 
(pace Messer).   Until we encounter humans and moral decision-making 107
(possibly also present to some degree in some of the other most complex forms 
of life) the only category of creation is the “very good.”  So the conclusion is that 
while the divine lure may indeed be toward the good, we cannot characterise 
that good as being exclusively the harmonious or the peaceful, as process 
theists do, and thus blame every instance of violence on resistance to the divine 
lure.   Equally, an attempt like Sarah Coakley’s to point to inter-species 108
cooperation as evidence of goodness and altruism in evolution falls short.  It 
would be like talking about the coordination of gang members as evidence of 
human cooperation and love: cooperation happens because it leads to greater 
strength as a unit, which then competes against other units, usually violently.  
Instances of true altruism are surpassingly rare in the non-human realm, if 
evidenced at all.  109
 A better proposal than the process lure toward harmonious relationships 
comes from Christopher Southgate who speaks of the divine invitation to self-
 Southgate, Groaning of Creation, 2.  Italics original.106
 Neil Messer, “Natural Evil After Darwin,” in Theology after Darwin, eds. Michael S. Northcott 107
and R. J. Berry (Milton Keynes: Paternoster, 2009): 139-154. 
 In chapter 6 I will expand on one sense of what this “good” might entail in the form of 108
redemptive eschatological patterns.
 See Christopher Southgate’s critique along the same lines in “Does God’s Care Make Any 109
Difference?” 107-108.  Southgate (in this same place) also acknowledges with Coakley that 
there may be a “natural praeparatio in the process of selection for the potential later heights of 
saintly human self-sacrifice.”
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transcendence.   This self-transcendence in humans involves the call to 110
altruism, to self-sacrificial love, but in the non-human realm self-transcendence 
is the Spirit’s work helping the individual in “growing to maturity in the form of its 
species, and in the sense of its possible explorations of new behaviours, going 
beyond what was previously the character of that species.”   In neither of 111
these instances is self-transcendence linked to what we might consider the 
“good” or “pleasant” aspects of creation.  The parasitic wasp growing to maturity 
is just as much the work of the Spirit as is the bunny rabbit.  The work of the 
Spirit is active in the moment when the wasp stretches its wings to fly for the 
first time, when it wrestles an insect and feeds, or when it explores new territory.  
In each moment the Spirit lures the wasp toward self-transcendence, toward its 
own characteristic “selving,” and toward playing its role in the unfolding history 
of life.  Therefore, creation is not divided up into the “good” and the “evil.”  All 
creatures are invited to self-transcendence.  Sometimes, Southgate would note, 
the answer to this invitation does result in cooperation and symbiosis, but is not 
limited to those outcomes.   The basis of the ability for creatures to explore is 112
found in “deep intratrinitarian kenosis” where a creature “is conforming to the 
pattern offered by the divine Word, and begotten in the Spirit out of the perfect 
self-abandoning love of the Father.”   In this sense, the lure of God is also 113
intrinsically linked to God creating the possibilities of action as well, or in other 
words, creating the fabric of the fitness landscape the creature explores. 
 A different sort of proposal of divine lure altogether comes from Robert 
Farrar Capon.  Instead of assuming that the divine lure is something situated in 
 Southgate, Groaning of Creation, 61-62.110
 Southgate, Groaning of Creation, 62.111
 Southgate, Groaning of Creation, 161.112
 Southgate, Groaning of Creation, 63.113
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the action of God, as if God were trying to actively lead creation down certain 
paths, Capon proposes that desire for God is intrinsic in creation.  Capon writes 
colourfully: “What [God] does to the world, he does subtly; his effect on creation 
is like what a stunning woman does to a man... She doesn’t touch his freedom, 
and she doesn’t muck about with the constitution of his being by installing some 
trick nisus that makes Harry love Martha.”   Creation is not led along fortuitous 114
paths like a donkey lured by a carrot and coaxing words, rather the very stuff of 
creation is attracted to the divine being the same way the earth is attracted to 
the sun, or (in Capon’s personal example) a man is attracted to a beautiful 
woman.  Both the sun and the woman simply exist, and are attractive.  No 
further action is necessary, and we don’t have to search for the particularity of 
how God lures, for example, by implanting thoughts in the tradition of Clayton 
and Knapp.  Divine goodness is its own explanation for why creation pursues it.  
And the effect on creation is marked: it is drawn toward God-likeness, most 
evidently in humans.  The explorations of creation––the bio-diversity and 
increase of complexity––can all be seen as creaturely attempts to pursue the 
satisfaction of that elusive attraction. 
 A fourth type of lure is the model advanced by Philip Clayton and 
Stephen Knapp where SDA is active in mental events, explored earlier in the 
chapter.   Less metaphysical than either Southgate’s or Capon’s models, they 115
say that “it is possible that the lure is highly differentiated, calling different 
individuals to different types of action or response” by direct action on the mind 
of the individual.  116
 Robert Farrer Capon, The Third Peacock: The Problem of God and Evil in the 3-book 114
compendium The Romance of the Word (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1995), 201.
 Clayton and Knapp, Predicament of Belief, 53-65.115
 Clayton and Knapp, Predicament of Belief, 63.116
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 Each of these models of divine lure, particularly those of Southgate, 
Capon, and Clayton and Knapp, give us helpful ways to talk about the 
directionality of evolutionary pathways without looking for intervention.  They 
also include robust accounts of God working in and with the non-human 
creation in ways that extend well beyond simply sustaining action. 
  
Participation 
 Finally, we come to SDA as participation.  In an important way, all the 
other forms of divine action investigated so far are also participation in as much 
as they are descriptions of God at work in the world.  The gift of being, the 
divine accompaniment of creation, and the divine lure are all types of action that 
place us firmly in the camp of theism.  However, in using the word participation, 
I want to bring our attention to at least two ways in which God acts that are not 
covered by these other ways of thinking: embodiment and the shaping of 
meaning. 
Participation: Embodiment 
 God’s action of embodiment in creation is primarily evidenced in the 
Incarnation.  This stands in contrast to the proposals of Sallie McFague or 
Grace Jantzen that the world can regularly be thought of as God’s body, with 
God’s spirit as the body’s mind.   In the Incarnation, God was significantly 117
present––uniquely united to the world––in one man, Jesus Christ. 
 Denis Edwards has worked a great deal on the impact of the Incarnation 
for reflecting on how God acts.  Drawing from the parables of the Kingdom, 
Jesus’ acts of healing, his keeping an open table, and the character of his 
 Sallie McFague, The Body of God: An Ecological Theology (London: SCM, 1993); Grace M. 117
Jantzen, God’s World, God’s Body (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1984).
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community, Edwards concludes that God’s love leads to divine action with a 
“radically participatory character”  characterised by two central aspects.  First, 118
God actively and lovingly waits upon creation, and second, that God’s love 
results in divine vulnerability.   In the death of Jesus, we see that God awaits 119
creaturely response and does not overwhelm creaturely action even when it 
means the crucifixion of Jesus.  In the forgiveness and resurrection of Jesus, 
we see that God still can achieve the divine purpose in, through, and with 
creaturely choices, even when those choices are evil.   Although God remains 120
unchanging in constant love and faithfulness, God can still suffer and is 
vulnerable to creaturely action, as exemplified in the cross.  God is not left at 
the mercy of creatures, however, because God can always “bring all things to 
their promised fulfillment.”   According to Edwards, “the true nature of divine 121
power is revealed in the vulnerability of the crucified––and in the resurrection of 
the crucified.”   It is both God’s ability to suffer, and God’s ability to redeem 122
suffering (especially, perhaps, the suffering caused by evil), that reveals the full 
extent of divine power.  Edwards’ reflections on the Incarnation resonate with 
my own explorations of the philosophical nature of love found in chapter 4.  In 
addition, reflection on the Incarnation gives a strong reason to maintain that 
SDA occurs as something very different from GDA, and that divine participation 
is more involved than we might otherwise believe, even to the point of becoming 
one cause amongst others in the physical world.   
 Edwards, How God Acts, 24.118
 Edwards, How God Acts, 26.119
 Edwards, How God Acts, 29.120
 Edwards, How God Acts, 30.121
 Edwards, How God Acts, 31.122
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 Many theologians, particularly those who are advocates for God’s action 
through secondary causes, shy away from the idea that God could act as one 
agent amongst others.  Take the example of Roman Catholic theologian 
Elizabeth Johnson: “The living God,” she writes in response to the causal joint 
thinkers, “is not part of the causal nexus of the created world.  Inserting divine 
action into indeterminate systems reduces holy Mystery who creates and 
sustains the whole to a bit player.”   Yet, in the Incarnation, God inserts 123
Godself into human history, and seems satisfied to reduce holy Mystery to a 
helpless babe.  Denis Edwards, who reflected above so helpfully on the 
Incarnation, seems to overlook the Incarnation when he states: “God is never 
found as a cause among other causes in the universe.”   David Burrell also 124
rejects the possibility of God becoming one agent amongst others.  He writes, 
commenting on Aquinas’s metaphysical assertion that God is the cause of being 
rather than a being, “it would be idolatry to think one could speak of the creator 
bereft of so powerful a metaphysics, for it would then become one being among 
others, however large or powerful.”    125
 In GDA, I would agree that God does not act as a cause among causes: 
God sustains all creation equally and (we might say) invisibly.  However, the 
scandal of the Incarnation is that God became just one person amongst others, 
that God fully participated in the joys and constraints of humanity by becoming 
 Johnson, Ask the Beasts, 168.  The same could be said of David Burrell and Denis Edwards.  123
David B. Burrell C.S.C., “The act of creation: theological consequences,” in Creation and the 
God of Abraham, eds. David B. Burrell, Carlo Cogliati, Janet M. Soskice, and William R. 
Stoeger, S.J. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 48.  
 Edwards, How God Acts, 47.  It is unclear in Edwards’ approach how this coincides with his 124
view that in the Christ-event God is “acting in Jesus, in his words and deeds, in his death and 
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195.
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fully human.   If we take the Incarnation as the prime exemplar of SDA, we 126
see God joining creation while not overriding it.   Jesus did not compel those 127
around him to listen or obey, he simply and seamlessly joined the world of 
causal agents. 
 There are, to be sure, different models of the Incarnation which 
accentuate or mute the scandal of God incarnate to various degrees.   128
Trenton Merricks’s view of the Incarnation, for example, where the divine person 
literally becomes a human body (as necessitated by Merrick’s essential 
physicalism) represents the most extreme example of God directly becoming a 
causal agent.    129
 Aquinas’s compositionalism is a mediate approach.   In his model, the 130
divine nature is hypostatically united to the human nature, and it is the human 
nature of Jesus that interacts with the world.  So God does have a causal effect 
in the world, but only as mediated through the human nature of Jesus.  Brian 
Leftow has used the analogy that the Son’s relationship to the world is like that 
of a diver in a dry suit to the ocean: the diver’s contact with the ocean is 
 I hold here, as do Edwards and Johnson, to an orthodox model of the Incarnation, as 126
advanced in Nicene and Chalcedonian Creeds.
 I realise that not every aspect of the Incarnation is necessarily representative of divine 127
action.  We should not, for example, assume that God’s action has to be male or Jewish 
because the particularities of the Incarnation included those aspects of Jesus’ life.  
Embodiment, however, is the main action that is undertaken.  How that embodiment happened 
is contingent.  Therefore, in the Incarnation the embodiment is central, whereas the 
particularities of that embodiment were contingent.  See Wendy Farley, The Healing and 
Wounding of Desire: Weaving Heaven and Earth (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 
2005), 102.
 For an overview of different models see Jonathan Hill, “Introduction,” in The Metaphysics of 128
the Incarnation, eds. Anna Marmodoro and Jonathan Hill (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011), 1-19.
 Trenton Merricks, “The Word Made Flesh: Dualism, Physicalism, and the Incarnation” in 129
Persons Human and Divine, eds. Peter van Inwagen and Dean Zimmerman (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 281–300.
 For an in-depth investigation of Aquinas’s account of the Incarnation, see Eleonore Stump, 130
“Aquinas’s Metaphysics of the Incarnation,” in The Incarnation: An Interdisciplinary Symposium 
on the Incarnation of the Son of God, eds. Stephen T. Davis, Daniel Kendall S.J., and Gerald 
O’Collins S.J. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 197-218.
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mediated by the suit, or, in the Son’s case, the second person of the Trinity is 
mediated through the body and soul (i.e. the human nature) of Jesus.   Still, 131
the diver does have a direct causal relationship with the suit, and the suit has a 
direct causal relationship with the ocean.  Therefore the diver does have a 
direct causal effect on the ocean, it simply takes one more step to get there.  In 
the same way, in so far as the Son has a direct causal effect upon the created 
human nature of Jesus, which then interacts directly with the world, God 
remains one agent amongst others in the Incarnation.   
 Further along the spectrum lie those models of the Incarnation which 
propose that Jesus was simply a man who found a unique connection with God, 
or was simply a regular human who happened to be perfectly concurrent with 
God’s actions.  Examples include the models of Schleiermacher and John Hick.  
This last set of models is what Brian Hebblethwaite calls “non-incarnational 
Christologies” since they do not actually affirm that the second person of the 
Trinity assumed a human nature in Jesus.   If one holds to these models, it 132
could be coherently maintained together that God never acts as a cause 
amongst causes and that the Incarnation happened.  However, supporters of 
secondary causation––particularly Edwards, Johnson, and Burrell––do not hold 
to these non-Incarnational Christologies.  Instead, they each affirm either the 
Nicene or the Chalcedonian Creeds which advance an orthodox model of the 
Incarnation.  133
 Brian Leftow, “A Timeless God Incarnate,” in The Incarnation: An Interdisciplinary 131
Symposium on the Incarnation of the Son of God, eds. Stephen T. Davis, Daniel Kendall S.J., 
and Gerald O’Collins S.J. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 273-299, 292.
 Brian Hebblethwaite, The Incarnation: Collected Essays in Christology (Cambridge: 132
Cambridge University Press, 1987), 6-7.  See also: John Hick, ed., The Myth of God Incarnate, 
2nd ed. (London: SCM, 2012); Lori Pearson, “Schleiermacher and the Christologies behind 
Chalcedon,” The Harvard Theological Review 96:3 (July 2003), 356; John Macquarrie, Jesus 
Christ in Modern Thought (London: SCM Press, 1990), 206-207.
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 Elizabeth Johnson clearly states that “the doctrine of the Incarnation... 
[is] the belief that the living God who is utterly beyond comprehension has 
joined the flesh of earth in one particular human being of one time and place.”   134
Later, she emphasises again that “All emphasis in this gospel text [John 1:14, 
“the Word became flesh and lived among us”] is on the entry of the Word who is 
God into this mortal realm of earthly existence.”   David Burrell equally affirms 135
an orthodox conception of the Incarnation: “Jesus could not be a mere visitor.  
So from the beginning, if Jesus was divine, he could be none other that the 
‘Word through whom the world was made.’”   Denis Edwards is equally explicit 136
in his avowal of the Word becoming flesh.   In none of these definitions do we 137
find a hint of either Nestorianism (that the Incarnation is simply a union of two 
wills) or a model like Schleiermacher’s which denies any true Incarnation.  Yet, 
for these orthodox thinkers, there does not seem to be any recognition that their 
acceptance of the Incarnation stands in direct contrast with their statements 
about the possibilities of divine action.  If God can become one agent amongst 
others in the Incarnation, why should we consider it impossible in every other 
situation?  I therefore argue that the theologians who argue that God became 
incarnate in Jesus according to an orthodox formula can have no reason to 
deny God’s ability to become one agent amongst others in creation. 
Incarnation and the Character of Divine Action 
  In the Incarnation, the other forms of divine action become the principles 
or character of God’s embodied acts rather than the actions themselves.  Take 
 Johnson, Ask the Beasts, 194.134
 Johnson, Ask the Beasts, 195.135
 Burrell, “Incarnation and Creation,” 214.136
 Edwards, How God Acts, 41.137
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divine lure, for example.  Ruth Page, in exploring Jesus’ action as a type of 
concursus, speaks of how “the power exercised in relationship is that of 
attraction, of drawing the attention and concern of the other without 
extinguishing that other’s freedom... [Jesus] was there among the people; his 
words and actions were there for any who would hear or see.”   Now, Jesus’ 138
type of lure in preaching on hilltops is qualitatively different from the sort of lure 
that God might be seen to be making in the invitation to self-transcendence.  Yet 
they both reflect the same character because they are both rooted in the nature 
of God’s love. 
 My interest in embodied forms of divine action is not motivated by the 
claim that there are numerous instances of divine embodiment: indeed, I think it 
likely that such instances are exceedingly rare.  At the same time, it is 
necessary to acknowledge all the exceptions we can in order to allow for as full 
an account of SDA as possible.  If God is able to become one human being 
amongst millions of others in the Incarnation, then the objection to God ever 
being seen as one agent amongst others in creation must be problematic.  If we 
open the door to God being one agent amongst others in creation (even once) 
through participatory human embodiment, then perhaps God is able to engage 
with creation through other forms of embodiment as well.   
 The Hebrew Bible theophanies which visualise God’s presence as pillars 
of cloud and fire (Exodus 13:21), then, become something more than simple 
imagery, and may be seen as instances of God actually participating in the 
world in physical ways.   In other passages God is equally described as 139
having physical forms, such as Moses being able to see God’s backside 
 Page, Web of Creation, 60.138
 Benjamin D. Sommer, The Bodies of God and the World of Ancient Israel (Cambridge: 139
Cambridge University Press, 2009).
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(Exodus 33:17-23), Jacob wrestling with God at the ford of the Jabbok (Genesis 
32:22-32), and appearing to Abraham as the three strangers (Genesis 18:1-2).  
I will not speculate long on how God might participate in these ways, since to do 
so would involve a much longer discussion of the historical and theological 
reliability of these texts in light of critical methods of reading.   If we were to 140
speculate at all, we might imagine God taking up––inhabiting––the air 
molecules in a particular place, rearranging the concentrations of gases or 
molecules to suit the action that God wishes to take.  After all, in Jesus, God did 
embody carbon, and nitrogen, and all the other assorted atoms that make up 
the human body.    141
 The mechanism of God’s action is less important than its nature.  The 
action must be reminiscent of God’s gracious action in incarnating the divine 
form in human form; bearing the non-coercive and power-in-weakness stamp of 
love.  God, in this view, can interact physically and particularly in history in the 
same physical sense that the second person of the Trinity did by becoming 
Jesus.  The embodied view of God’s work opens the door to interaction with the 
world that is more than just sustaining or concurrent. 
 In some ways, advocating that God can participate in the world in 
physically embodied––and thus physically causative ways––opens up many 
more problems than it solves in regard to theodicy.  Clayton and Knapp argue 
(as we have seen before) that “a benevolent God could not intervene even once 
without incurring the responsibility to intervene in every case where doing so 
 For more, see Terence Fretheim, “The God Who Acts: An Old Testament Perspective,” in 140
Theology Today 54:1 (1997): 6-18; and Nicholas Saunders, Divine Action and Modern Science, 
1-12.
 Pointed out in particular by the advocates of “Deep Incarnation”:  Niels Gregersen, “Cross of 141
Christ in an Evolutionary World,” dialog 40:3 (Fall 2001): 192-207, 205; Celia Deane-
Drummond, “Who on Earth Is Jesus Christ? Plumbing the Depths of Deep Incarnation,” in 
Christian Faith and the Earth: Current Paths and Emerging Horizons in Ecotheology, eds. Ernst 
M. Conradie, Sigurd Bergmann, Celia Deane-Drummond, and Denis Edwards (London: T&T 
Clark, 2014): 31-50.
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would prevent an instance of innocent suffering.”   For God to have the ability 142
to participate in an embodied way that could conceivably change the fortunes of 
a creature caught in innocent suffering, and for God to rescue in some cases 
and not in others, does raise a serious charge. 
 Two responses can be made.  The first emerges directly from the 
discussion of the nature of love that was explored in chapter 4.  Emerging out of 
a Thomistic view of love, it was concluded that love is necessarily particular, 
historical, and unique to the office of love shared between the lover and the 
beloved.  As such, the action taken in each case need not be identical.   The 143
not-even-once principle, on the contrary, assumes that every instance of 
innocent suffering is problematic in the same sort of way.  But there are as 
many different types and circumstances of suffering as there are instances.  
Someone stubbing their toe and a seal being eaten alive are both instances of 
innocent suffering, but they should not be compared: they exist in totally 
different realms.  Clayton and Knapp don’t agree with this assertion.  Although 
people see differences in suffering, they argue “God sees no such dichotomy 
but a vast continuum of suffering far more pervasive, intense, and immediate in 
its need for relief than we could ever allow ourselves to appreciate.”  144
 Let us, for the sake of the argument, run with Clayton and Knapp’s idea 
that there is only a grey-scale of suffering, no black and white.  It does not 
follow that if intensities of suffering exist on a continuous scale in creation, that 
instances of suffering in an individual’s life are likewise scaled.  In fact, we see 
just the opposite: many instances of suffering help us to grow and develop as 
an individual (in physical even if not in spiritual ways).  But some instances of 
 Clayton & Knapp, Predicament of Belief, 49.142
 See this discussion at length in chapter 4, p. 161-163.143
 Clayton & Knapp, Predicament of Belief, 51.144
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suffering are key turning points in the life of an individual, forever crushing any 
sense of self.  This is most obvious in death, but can exist in other ways as well, 
such as a crippling accident.  So it is not necessarily with the intensity of 
suffering that we should be concerned, but with the effect of the suffering.  
When an innocent creature has their selfhood destroyed by suffering, this 
makes a different sort of appeal for divine action than the suffering which will not 
destroy a self.  A differentiation can be made, especially for God who will be in 
the best position to anticipate what sort of impact any one instance of suffering 
will have. 
 With the recognition (established in chapter 4) that love does not have to 
treat all objects of love in exactly the same way in order to still be equally loving 
to all, the possibility opens to acknowledging that God could prevent an 
instance of suffering without being morally required to do so in every case.  For 
example, God would not be morally required to prevent an instance of suffering 
that did not lead to the destruction of a self, if in another case, God did prevent 
such suffering.  Why, then, does God not observably end the many instances of 
innocent suffering of creatures, if God can?  The question takes one more step 
back and has to ask if the office of love of Creator to a particular creature ever 
ought to mean that God should prevent such suffering.  When Austin Farrer 
asks the question of why, if we are moved to put severely injured animals out of 
their misery, God is not moved to do likewise, he answers “the question is 
amiable, but it is confused.  God loves his animal creatures by being God to 
them, that is, by natural providence and creative power; not by being a brother 
creature to them, as he does for mankind in the unique miracle of his 
incarnation.”   For Farrer, God’s lack of prevention of suffering in the non-145
 Farrer, Love Almighty, 104.  Of course, the concept of “deep Incarnation” would challenge 145
this by pointing out that God did in fact become a brother creature to all of creation.
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human creation is not because of issues of fair play in moral responsibility, but 
because the office of love between God and the non-human creation is not the 
type that would call for it.  Miracles, in Farrer’s mind, do not happen simply to 
relieve suffering, but serve as signposts indicating the coming Kingdom of God, 
which are totally unable to be interpreted by the non-human world.    146
 For God to act to alleviate the suffering of a God-conscious human being 
is to give them an opportunity to grow closer to God, to build faith, or to 
reconstitute their personhood.   These goods would not be available to a non-147
human who had their suffering alleviated.  The arguments that the goods of 
nomic regularity, the integrity of ecosystems, and the process of evolution itself 
are greater goods than what would be achieved by relieving the individual 
creature of pain are well rehearsed.  148
Participation: Shaping of Meaning 
 The second type of participation I want to highlight is that God is active in 
shaping the meaning of events.  This is radically different from God’s embodied 
work of participation since it does not involve any sort of change in the actual 
events of history.  Rather, it recognises that the meaning of past events is not 
fixed or isolated, and that depending on new events that occur, the meaning of 
past events also changes. 
 When we think about how we have interpreted various events in our 
lives, we can see intuitively how the meaning we ascribe to––and the 
 This stands in line with the usual contemporary definition of miracle: a wonder-inspiring 146
occurrence that points to the Kingdom of God, rather than an overthrow of the laws of nature.  
Padgett, “God and Miracle in An Age of Science,” 533-542.
 See Eleonore Stump’s argument concerning human suffering to this effect in Wandering in 147
Darkness (Oxford: Clarendon, 2010).
 See Murray, Nature Red in Tooth and Claw, 130-192 and the property-consequence GHAs in 148
chapter 2, p. 30-36.
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interpretation we have of––one event can become closely tied to events that 
may be quite distant from the original occurrence in time or place.  Equally, we 
may revise the meaning of an experience: what seemed like a fortuitous event 
at one time becomes a tragic turning point at another distant time, and vice 
versa.  This is perhaps most famously demonstrated in the story of the Taoist 
Farmer: 
There once was an old man and his son who owned a horse which 
provided their only source of income.  One night the horse ran away.  
The next day, all the villagers trotted out to the old farmer’s and said: “Oh 
no!  This is the worst thing that could have happened to you.” 
The old farmer quietly answered, “It’s too early to tell.” 
Soon thereafter the horse returned with five others.  The next morning all 
the villagers trotted out to the farmer and said, “Congratulations!  This is 
the best thing that could ever happen to you.” 
But the old farmer quietly said, “It’s too soon to tell.” 
Shortly thereafter, his son tried to ride one of the new horses.  The horse 
was wild, and threw him into the corral fence.  He was left with a 
permanent limp.  The next morning the villagers came again and said, 
“This is the worst tragedy that could ever happen to you.” 
But the farmer said quietly, “It’s too soon to tell.” 
A year later, the army came through the village to take all the healthy 
young men off to war.  The old farmer’s son was of no use to them and 
was left behind.  None of the other young men ever returned.  149
No doubt most of us have similar stories we could tell where we have jumped, 
like the villagers, at the meaning of an event only to find that with the passage 
of time, it has come to mean something else entirely.  Meaning is not inherent in 
an event: it changes as we change, and see it from different perspectives. 
 Traditionally, Christianity has not held such a view of the meaning of 
history because it was assumed that, from God’s eternal vantage point, there 
was an objective point of view which could perfectly interpret all events in light 
of both past and future.  However, if the nature of love demands libertarian 
freewill, and if the possibility of that sort of freewill demands (at the least) a 
 This is the story as taught by Lao Tzu.  Retold by Kenneth Kramer in World Scriptures: An 149
Introduction to Comparative Religions (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist, 1986), 118.
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kenotic descent into time for God,  so that God does not know all that will 150
happen, then we cannot imagine that there is any such objective viewpoint from 
which to determine the meaning of events.  God, with perfect knowledge of the 
past and the present, will certainly be best placed to understand events as they 
occur, but even to God the meaning of events is not fixed.  Therefore, God can 
have an active hand in crafting and shaping the meaning of events by 
interpreting them with other events in time and evoking unforeseen conclusions 
from them.   We might, poetically speaking, say that God is telling and re-151
telling the narrative of creation.  As the history of the world unfolds, there is no 
limit to the creativity that God can bring to the unfolding process. 
 The advantage to theodicy of this sort of view is that God does not ordain 
events to happen, but God can redeem disvalues within the scope of history as 
well as beyond it.  There is no one corridor down which God must force events 
for them to find redemption, but rather God can creatively bring about good in a 
variety of ways.  What this implies is that no evil or disvalue is ordained by God 
to happen, but when they happen gratuitously,  God will work to ensure that 152
they do not remain gratuitous by creating meaning out of their occurrence.  How 
this works in terms of redemption will be explored in a more explicit way in the 
next chapter. 
 See argument in chapter 4.150
 An example is that the death of a dinosaur could be directly responsible (in a very long line of 151
causes) for the composition of one of Mozart’s symphonies.  Without the dinosaur’s death, 
Mozart would not have been born.  Therefore, the dinosaur’s death has new meaning in light of 
the beauty and significance of The Violin Concerto #3.  This will be explored at greater length in 
chapter 6.
 In a sense, even gratuitous events, such as the impact of an asteroid or the chance injury of 152
an animal from a falling tree limb, is not gratuitous in a property-consequence sense.  However, 
they may be gratuitous in an instrumental sense in the life of an animal.  That is, had the deer 
been standing five feet to the right when the tree branch fell, world history would have continued 
happily on.  There was no foreordained plan needing to be fulfilled by the the death of the deer 
at that point in history.  See the discussion of gratuitous evil in chapter 4, p. 200-203.
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Primacy of Biological Telos? 
 Another issue that needs discussion at this juncture is an exploration of 
creaturely telos.  Where does a creature’s life find meaning?  What is its final 
end?  In Darwinian terms, the meaning of a creature’s life is found in survival 
and reproduction.  If it passes on its genes, its life has been successful.  Thus, 
for many creatures––spiders and praying mantises, but also octopi and 
salmon––one or both parents die in the act of reproduction.  It is the grand 
finale after a life of winning the odds in a battle for survival.  But should we 
assume that this type of biological flourishing is the only worthwhile end, the 
only––or even the primary––creaturely telos? 
 For humans, it is clear that this is not the case.  Human life has many 
other good and worthwhile ends.  We have to look no farther than Jesus to see 
that this is true.  As the paradigmatic human being, Jesus demonstrated what it 
means to be fully human.  Yet Jesus had no children,  nor did he live to a 153
grand old age.  He lived to maybe a third of what a regular human body can 
ultimately sustain.  Biologically speaking, Jesus was a failure.   Yet he was the 154
one who perfectly fulfilled the human vocation.  Many others throughout the 
ages have set aside childbearing in order to pursue other vocations.   
 The question of creaturely value and the meaning of life becomes even 
more poignant when we consider serious illness.  John Swinton, for example, 
writes about dementia and the loss of a person’s memories.   He chastises 155
theologians for having “hyper-cognitive theological assumptions” of what it 
means to be human, where dementia is seen as the loss of personhood entirely, 
rather than only the loss of memories.  Swinton rejects outright the usual 
 At least, as far as historical records attest.153
 Niels Gregersen, “Cross of Christ in an Evolutionary World,” 203.154
 John Swinton, Dementia: Living in the Memories of God (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 155
2012), 1-15.
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practice of adopting medical and societal evaluations of the worth of a person’s 
existence rather than rooting the person’s worth in theological considerations.  
He writes: “At a very basic level, well-being within Christianity is not gauged by 
the presence or absence of illness or distress... Theologically speaking, well-
being has nothing to do with the absence or reduction of anything.  It has to do 
with the presence of something: the presence of God-in-relationship.”   If there 156
is the presence of God-in-relationship, then there is the presence of worth and 
well-being.  For humans, at least, we must concede that reflections on Jesus’ 
life and on the lives of those who suffer severe illness reveal that there is far 
more to life than Darwinian success.  157
 Can we legitimately extend this thought beyond humans into the non-
human realm?  From a theological perspective, I think we can (with Swinton) 
reasonably put forward other reasons for being: to live in relationship with 
others and to participate in the divine gift of life.  All creatures are necessarily in 
relationship with those around them: being sustained by and sustaining others.  
Ruth Page reminds us that this relationship provides a different telos: 
“Fellowship, concurrence or relationship among creatures and between 
creatures and God is the greatest good of creation.  The possibility of such 
relationships is what creation is about.”   For Page, relationship is not simply a 158
great good, but the greatest good.  If a creature has participated in relationship, 
then it has achieved a meaningful life.  Having a meaningful life does not mean 
that a creature has participated in every possible creaturely good. 
 Swinton, Dementia, 7.  Italics original.156
 Similar conclusions have been reached by parents of children with severe illnesses.  See 157
Andrew Solomon, Far From the Tree: A Dozen Kinds of Love (London: Chatto & Windus, 2013), 
167-217; Sarah C. Williams, The Shaming of the Strong: The Challenge of an Unborn Life 
(Vancouver, BC: Regent College, 2007); Frances M. Young, Face to Face: A Narrative Essay in 
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 As above with the argument on divine shaping of the meaning of history, 
the question is less about the events of a creature’s life and more about what 
they mean.  By redefining what is meant by a purposeful life, we can expand the 
number of creatures who fulfill that category, and thus lessen the burden that 
the theodicist carries.  The penguin chick who has spent many months being 
nurtured by doting parents (up to 13 months for the King penguin) and 
congregating with other young and then is killed, within a matter of moments 
upon entering the water, by a leopard seal, is not nearly the hardest case.  It 
has experienced rich relationship, even if only briefly.  The much more difficult 
case is that of the second pelican chick who is denied primary relationships with 
sibling and parents, while all the while the majority of its life experience involves 
the suffering of starving.  Even that chick, however, is involved in a complex 
ecosystem of relationships, and it is not denied a relationship with God, and it 
will (as I will argue in the next chapter) receive the gift of redemption in the new 
life.  As the burden of my argument begins to hint more heavily toward themes 
of redemption, it is perhaps time to move onto those subjects in a more 
straightforward way. 
Conclusion 
 In the first half of this chapter I investigated the divine action debate.  I 
looked at why the concept of intervention has been almost universally rejected, 
and then surveyed models of divine action that have been formulated to avoid 
the problems of interventionism.  Models that rejected the ontological division 
between GDA and SDA included those that deny SDA altogether (Wiles, 
Kaufman), those that consider all divine action to be SDA (Gregersen), and 
those that see God as setting up the initial conditions of the universe in such a 
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way that the later unfolding of the universe gives the impression of SDA 
(Davies, Knight).  Models that work with the distinction between GDA and SDA 
proposed models of SDA that include God working through secondary causes 
(Edwards, Stoeger, Johnson, Burrell), quantum indeterminacy (Russell, Tracy, 
Murphy, Ellis), complex systems (Polkinghorne), and mental events (Clayton, 
Knapp).  The inability to find a conclusive “place” for divine action prompted an 
investigation into the character of divine action rather than its mechanism.  The 
second half of the chapter, therefore, proposed models of SDA without 
reference to their mechanisms in the world. 
 In the second half of the chapter, I argued that divine action is a multi-
faceted phenomenon, ranging from divine co-presence and sustenance to 
physical embodiment.  Instead of embracing a divine uniformitarianism where 
God is always thought to be doing the same thing in the same way, I proposed 
that there are multiple ways in which God can be understood as acting, and that 
each of these different ways of acting have various implications for the issues of 
theodicy. 
 The gift of being implies that God creates the possibility of possibilities 
and allows creatures to explore the paths that they choose.  The result is a free 
process characterised by significant freedoms and a superabundance of diverse 
forms of being that explore the created possibilities.  The co-presence of God 
ensures that no creature dies alone, separated from God’s consolation and co-
suffering.  The concept of divine lure can be seen as either an invitation to self-
transcendence, or as creaturely attraction to the divine.  The second in 
particular begins to offer some explanation for how one can have teleology 
without control; desired outcomes without preordained paths.  Finally, two types 
of participation round out my picture of special divine action.  The concept of 
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embodiment allows for the mighty acts of salvation history and the Incarnation 
in a human context without necessarily widening the sphere of this special 
involvement to all creatures.  The shaping of meaning, to be explored further in 
the next chapter, provides another non-interventionist way to speak about divine 
action from a narrative perspective.  Most of these positions do not envision any 
sort of intervention on the part of God, except the embodied form of 
participation.  The gift of being, the co-presence of God, the divine lure, and the 
shaping of meaning all work in and through natural means, or (in the case of 
shaping meaning) beyond the physical realm, on a metaphysical plane.  
Embodiment allows an avenue for how God might be more directly active, even 
intervening, and the particularity and purpose of such acts may offer a reason 
for why God would intervene in one case and not another.  Woven throughout 
all these concepts of divine action lies the central act of redemption which 
deserves a chapter all of its own. 
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Chapter 6: Redemption 
“It is the divine act of redemption that determines what creation will have meant, 
and this can be determined only eschatologically.” 
-Ted Peters and Martinez Hewlett  1
 In the last chapter, the themes of divine action moved ever more strongly 
toward the necessity of redemption for a comprehensive account of theodicy.  
Without redemption, without the completion of God’s work, creation stands 
without a coherent logic: the story remains unfinished.  Nor can the suffering of 
creation find final resolution without redemption.  It is the task of this chapter to 
explore the type and scope of different redemption models, and see how each 
helps to justify the suffering of the individual.  In addition, I will propose an 
image for how several of these models of redemption can work together to 
provide a more robust account of redemption––especially in light of the Christ 
event.  I will move from four models of redemption, to the redemptive image of a 
photo mosaic that incorporates three of the models, and then investigate how 
this picture can be understood in light of the Christ event. 
Models of Redemption 
 Redemption of the non-human world has long been debated.  Scripture 
gives only a few hints and those are often far from straightforward.   Various 2
guesses have also been made in the works of later thinkers.  Thomas Aquinas 
did not think that non-human animals had the aptitude for resurrection, because 
they did not have immortal rational souls.   John Wesley, to the contrary, not 3
 Ted Peters and Martinez Hewlett, Evolution from Creation to New Creation: Conflict, 1
Conversation, and Convergence (Nashville, TN: Abingdon, 2003), 160.
 Romans 8:19-22, Colossians 1:17-19, Isaiah 11, 35, 65, and Revelation 21-22 are all 2
examples.
 Paul Griffiths, “What Remains in the Resurrection?  A (Broadly) Thomist Argument for the 3
Presence of Nonrational Animals in Heaven,” delivered at Blackfriars, Cambridge, 31 January 
2013.
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only thought that non-human animals would be included in the general 
resurrection, but that their capacities would increase so that they would have 
the ability to be able to understand the full implications of the gift they would be 
given: 
May I be permitted to mention here a conjecture concerning the brute 
creation?  What, if it should then please the all-wise, the all-gracious 
Creator to raise them higher in the scale of beings?  What, if it should 
please him, when he makes us ‘equal to angels,’ to make them what we 
are now, -- creatures capable of God; capable of knowing and loving and 
enjoying the Author of their being?    4
 Yet, there has been far less reflection in the tradition on the fate of the 
non-human world than might be expected or desired.  More recently, there has 
been an increase of speculation on the scope of non-human redemption.  In the 
first part of this chapter, I will explore various contemporary concepts of 
redemption.  I shall organise this exploration by analysing what is proposed as 
the content of redemption (what redemption will look like), the scope of 
redemption (what creatures will be redeemed), and the motivation of 
redemption (why those who are redeemed will be redeemed). 
 What is redemption?  Andrew Elphinstone has remarked that what is 
often meant by the term is nothing more than “creative results brought from 
discouraging events.”   Jay McDaniel lays out four possible meanings: 5
It can mean (1) freedom from the consequences of sin, in which case it 
applies almost exclusively to humans.  But it can also mean (2) freedom 
from what distresses or harms, (3) contribution to lives beyond one’s 
own, and (4) transformation into an improved state of existence.  6
All of the categories of redemption below will exclude definition (1) since it 
applies only to humans (pace Clough and Hoggard Creegan), and all of them 
 John Wesley, “The General Deliverance: Sermon 60” available online at http://new.gbgm-4
umc.org/umhistory/wesley/sermons/60/, accessed 18 October 2013.  See also the section on 
resurrection in chapter 2, p. 84-88.
 Andrew Elphinstone, Freedom, Suffering and Love (London: SCM, 1976), 19.5
 McDaniel, Of God and Pelicans: A Theology of Reverence for Life (Louisville, KY: Westminster 6
John Knox, 1989), 42.
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will include (2).  (2) alone, however, is not sufficient.  If a creature dies, it is 
indeed freed from the circumstances that distresses or harms it, but it could 
hardly be considered redeemed.  (Biblically, the notion of redemption as 
liberation is usually used in reference to freedom from slavery.   A slave who 7
dies in chains is not redeemed, while one who is redeemed is not only released 
from slavery, but allowed to live free.)  One must not only be freed from but 
redeemed to some reality in which some sort of benefit is seen in the 
redemption.  My focus in this chapter will therefore be primarily on definitions (3) 
and (4).  What is redeemed from the life of the suffering of the individual, and 
how is that accomplished? 
 The content of redemption can be divided up into two categories: this-
worldly and other-worldly.  These can be further divided into four sub-
categories: in this-worldly, as immanent or ecological; in other-worldly, as 
objective or classical.   
Immanent Redemption 
 This-worldly redemption, as the name implies, refuses to see the 
redemption of suffering as occurring in some distant time or place, or in another 
dimension or world order altogether.  Its proponents do not think that 
redemption is an eschatological category, but a present one.  The first sub-
category, immanent redemption, is represented by Ruth Page who finds 
redemption in the present moment, a notion she calls “Teleology Now!”  Page 
writes: 
Neither the purposes of God nor the judgment and apotheosis of creation 
have to wait for some end-time when the books will be balanced.  Rather, 
they are continually happening now, from moment to moment, and from 
 Oxford Dictionary of the Bible, 2nd edition, ed. W. R. F. Browning (Oxford: Oxford University 7
Press, 2009), online version, accessed 2 June 2014.
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possibility to possibility....when God is believed to be present, then every 
moment becomes eschatological.   8
Like a song, or a dance, the meaning of the activity is found in the doing of it, 
not in arriving at its end.   Once a song is finished there is no further scope for 9
redemption––no way early faults can be made up for.  It is finished.  However, 
while a song is still being played, there may be scope for redemption within the 
song itself.  Imagine a jazz trio composed of a master musician and two 
novices.  As they play, the novices make outright mistakes, interrupting the flow 
and progression of the music with discordant, unintended notes made worse by 
bad timing.  In response, the master musician improvises so that these 
mistakes become intentional thematic foci later in the song.  The maestro wraps 
the mistakes into resolutions and appropriate timings so that what was an 
unintentional mistake becomes part of the necessary structure of the song.  For 
Page, the content of redemption is in the immediate possibilities of relationship 
offered by the creative, dynamic nature of the world.  “As far as creation is 
concerned,” she writes, “the Kingdom of God is the synthesis of those moments 
where freedom and love become actual, while the achievement of these 
purposes of God for the world are always among current possibilities.”   The 10
scope of immanent redemption is broad: all things in relationship are offered 
redemption simply by their participation in life, so no creature is left out. 
 One problem is that Page’s view does not actually guarantee any of 
McDaniel’s four definitions of redemption, and so it could be questioned 
whether she is advancing a view of redemption at all.  I think she would respond 
that redemption is always offered in new moment-to-moment possibilities, but is 
 Page, God and the Web of Creation (London: SCM, 1996), 63.  Page does actually have a 8
category of future redemption as well.  See below, p. 273.
 This is an analogy Page borrows from Peter Geach.  Page, Web of Creation, 63.9
 Page, Web of Creation, 65.10
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not always realised.  The unscripted ending of creaturely narratives always 
offers the chance of redemption, and where that possibility is seized, it becomes 
a moment of immediate redemptive power, as well as a place where future 
redemption can be reaped.  When this happens, that moment becomes a place 
where love is actualised and freedom from harms and distress are realised. 
 Page does not hold entirely to a this-worldly view, as she links the 
concept of redemption with an eternal “harvest of creation” in the joy of God.  
Present redemptive moments are caught up into God’s very being and are there 
preserved.  Acts of selfishness are judged as evil by falling into oblivion.  In this 
way, Page holds two views on redemption: her immanent redemption, and a 
form of objective immortality (which we will explore below).  Together, they 
gather everything into the scope of redemption except for those instances 
“where there is no concurrence, or where there is no renunciation of consuming 
selfishness, [because] there is nothing to harvest.”   The motivation of Page’s 11
scheme is clear: “A distant teleology goes with belief in a distant God who will 
sort everything out in the end.”   Immanent redemption is found in the logic of a 12
radically immanent God, even if this is sometimes at the cost of the individual. 
 There is much to be admired in Page’s view.  The insistence that 
redemption should not be relegated only to some hoped-for future, reminds us 
that the Kingdom of God is a present in-breaking reality.   It opens up our eyes 13
to the ways in which God is currently at work, and helps us to picture a God 
who is immanent, and therefore can co-suffer with creation.  Still, Page’s 
immanent redemption alone eliminates the chance to allow for any future hope 
 Page, Web of Creation, 65.  There is here an unacknowledged debt to process theism.  11
Christopher Southgate points out the similarity in The Groaning of Creation: God, Evolution, and 
the Problem of Evil (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2008), 69.
 Page, Web of Creation, 63.12
 Cf. Jürgen Moltmann, God in Creation: A New Theology of Creation and The Spirit of God, 13
trans. by Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), 164-166.
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for those whose lives have held little but suffering and neglect, where 
relationships were perhaps forged, but not given time to be fruitful.  Even with 
the addition of her objective “harvest of creation,” the whole of creation is not 
redeemed.  Evil is not redeemed in the senses of definitions (3) and (4) 
above––it is not transformed into something of benefit––it is only forgotten or 
made nihil.  But the story of Jesus is not that the cross is forgotten, but that the 
tragedy of the event is transformed by the glory of the resurrection.  Page’s view 
of redemption does not help us understand how this happens. 
Ecological Redemption 
 Ecological redemption, the other category in this-worldly redemption, is a 
view advanced by Holmes Rolston III.  He suggests that while there may be no 
redemption for particular individuals who die in ways full of pain and suffering, 
their lives will be redeemed in the ongoing fruitfulness and creativity of the 
evolutionary process.   For example, the second white pelican chick lives a 14
short life full of neglect, but, because it does, white pelicans as a species 
continue to exist since they are almost always able to raise a chick into 
adulthood.  More than that, the body of the chick who dies is not wasted: it is 
eaten by a passing fox, or decomposed by a variety of insects and 
microorganisms that then go on to feed other organisms, which drives the 
evolutionary process into further achievements.  When translated into 
theological terms, the evils are redeemed by the ongoing story of evolution.   15
Since all life is caught up in the evolutionary process, the scope of this 
redemption is perfectly universal.  Unlike Page’s system, there is no 
unredeemed act lost in judgment or excluded from the harvest of creation, no 
 Holmes Rolston III, “Does Nature Need to be Redeemed?” Zygon 29:2 (June 1994): 205-229.14
 Rolston, “Does Nature Need to be Redeemed?” 213.15
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wasted life, because every event ripples into the far distant future where it finds 
redemption.  Rolston’s view of redemption is motivated by the fact that it can be 
equally affirmed by both theologians and biologists: one need do nothing more 
than to look at the history of evolutionary development to see the blueprint of 
redemption.  The model does not depend on any future act of God being 
different from what God has already historically done in the creative process of 
evolution.   
 Rolston, like Page, does not rule out the possibility of another-worldly 
redemption, but does not think other-worldly models are the primary loci of 
redemption.  Where Page chooses an objective immortality model, Rolston 
speculates instead about classic redemption:  “Perhaps there is some 
eschatological sense in which there will, in the further future, come an ultimate 
redemption of both heaven and earth, of culture and of nature.  I am not sure I 
know what that means.”   His preference seems to be for a more metaphorical 16
interpretation of the biblical language: “If we place Paul’s image [of the body as 
a seed of resurrection] on an evolutionary scale, you can plant a protozoan and 
get, a billion years later, a person.  If we plant persons, and wait a million years, 
what might we get?”  17
 There is a great deal of value in Rolston’s approach, but it does not give 
much hope of redemption for the suffering individual themselves.  They are part 
of a bigger scheme, but they do not find any personal redemption.  This is a 
critique raised by Christopher Southgate and Jay McDaniel.  However, it is 
rebutted by Lisa Sideris who considers their concern for the individual 
anthropocentric; projecting on to non-human animals the sort of justice we 
 Rolston, “Does Nature Need to be Redeemed?” 227.16
 Rolston, “Does Nature Need to be Redeemed?” 228.  See also: Holmes Rolston III, 17
“Naturalizing and Systematizing Evil,” in Is Nature Ever Evil?  Religion, Science and Value, ed. 
Willem B. Drees (London: Routledge, 2003): 67-86.
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would wish to see in human communities.   I disagree with Sideris because I 18
think she, ironically, falls into her own trap of anthropomorphism.  Neither 
Southgate nor McDaniel ever raise the complaint that the suffering of individuals  
in the evolutionary process is a matter of “injustice.”  Instead, they point out the 
difficulty of reconciling the care of God for these creatures in their suffering with 
God’s power and apparent ability to alleviate their pain.  They do not defend that 
non-human animals have a right to not suffer, they only point out that God’s 
benevolence and omnipotence are called into question by the tragedy of 
sentient suffering and the untimely death of so many. 
 Rolston’s approach also raises the question of what kind of redemption 
would be available if the ongoing story were to end quite suddenly.  If we plant 
persons, and they plant enough hydrogen bombs or release enough carbon 
dioxide, it may be that in a million years we only get a completely desolate 
planet devoid of life.  What hope is there then for ecological redemption?  It 
seems that if redemption is God’s work, it must have a reality that cannot be 
trumped by cosmic accident or human stupidity and greed. 
Objective Immortality 
 Moving to other-worldly redemption, we begin with John Haught who 
represents the category of objective immortality.   Usually advanced by 19
 Lisa Sideris, “Writing Straight With Crooked Lines: Holmes Rolston’s Ecological Theology and 18
Theodicy,” in Nature, Value, Duty: Life on Earth with Holmes Rolston, III, ed. Christopher J. 
Preston and Wayne Ouderkirk (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer, 2007): 77-101.
 John F. Haught, The Promise of Nature: Ecology and Cosmic Purpose (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist 19
Press, 1993), 131.  Haught borrowed the term from Alfred North Whitehead.
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process theists, going back to Charles Hartshorne,  Haught’s proposal is that 20
while the individual creature does not experience a new life, “everything 
whosoever that occurs in evolution––all the suffering and tragedy as well as the 
emergence of new life and intense beauty––is ‘saved’ by being taken eternally 
into God’s own feeling of the world.”   In another place, he likens God to a 21
foundational registry upon which all things that occur––all things that have 
truth––are written and therefore preserved.   The scope of this redemption is 22
universal, but, as with the other forms of redemption, it does not do much for the 
individual.  Haught, contrary to other supporters of objective immortality, 
acknowledges that a fulfilment of human striving, at the least, would entail that 
“beyond our own deaths the pursuit of meaning, truth, goodness and beauty 
that orients our specifically human lives would be open to a conscious, 
experiential fulfillment.”   However, the rest of his writing seems to say that this 23
conscious, experiential fulfilment does not belong to the human individual but to 
God.  It is God who experiences the bringing together of all things into a 
harmonious whole: “In God’s assimilation of the events that make up our 
personal lives, biological evolution and cosmic process, things that appear 
 Charles Hartshorne, Omnipotence and Other Theological Mistakes (Albany, NY: State 20
University of New York, 1984), 117. John B. Cobb Jr. and David Ray Griffin, two of the most 
prominent process theists, have actually affirmed the possibility of the soul’s survival of bodily 
death and the possibility of personal life after death (albeit the temporarily), and so I cannot use 
them to illustrate this position that is usually held by most process theists.  David Ray Griffin, 
“Process Theology and the Christian Good News: A Response to Classical Free Will Theism,” in 
Searching For An Adequate God: A Dialogue between Process and Free Will Theists, eds. John 
B. Cobb Jr. and Clark H. Pinnock (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2000), 3.  Cf. John B. Cobb Jr., 
A Christian Natural Theology: Based on the Thought of Alfred North Whitehead (London: 
Lutterworth, 1966), 63-79; John B. Cobb Jr., “The Resurrection of the Soul,” Harvard 
Theological Review 80:2 (1987): 213-227; John B. Cobb and David Ray Griffin, Process 
Theology: An Introductory Exposition (Belfast: Christian Journals Ltd.,/Westminster, 1976), 
124-125; Granville C. Henry, “Does Process Thought Allow Personal Immortality?” Religious 
Studies 31:3 (September 1995): 311-321.
 John F. Haught, God After Darwin: A Theology of Evolution (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2000), 21
43.  See also p.114ff.
 John F. Haught, Deeper Than Darwin: The Prospect for Religion in the Age of Evolution 22
(Boulder, CO: Westview, 2003), 152.
 Haught, Deeper Than Darwin, 154.23
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irredeemable from our narrow perspective may contribute to the limitless depth 
and breadth of God’s own life.”  24
 Haught’s motivation is to find a hope beyond death, but where 
Christianity has traditionally anticipated “personal, subjective survival beyond 
death... in an age of science, it has become more difficult than ever to believe in 
such a prospect.”   Haught seeks to find a solution that acknowledges and 25
soothes human existential angst while maintaining the scientific predictions of 
the end of life in the universe. 
 Ernst Conradie presents a slightly modified version of objective 
immortality, which he calls “material inscription.”   In this model, every act 26
throughout history is being inscribed into the multidimensional material reality of 
the cosmos.  Like writing in a book, the story of creation is being written––not in 
a book with words––but on the three dimensions of space and the added 
dimension of time.  God, from the supra-time/space dimension of eternity, 
encapsulates and holds these dimensions (and thus everything in them) in 
existence and they can be retrieved in the eschaton.   Evil events can be 27
judged and put forever away, while good events can be brought forward and 
celebrated.  Since these are inscribed in four dimensions (the same number of 
dimensions they initially took place in, rather than a two dimensional video), the 
 Haught, Deeper Than Darwin, 159.24
 Haught, Deeper Than Darwin, 150.25
 Ernst Conradie, “Resurrection, Finitude, and Ecology,” in Resurrection: Theological and 26
Scientific Assessments, eds. Ted Peters, Robert John Russell, and Michael Welker (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2002), 292.
 Conradie explains that in the same way that a square both encapsulates and transcends a 27
line, and a cube contains and transcends a square, so God’s dimension of eternity contains and 
transcends our 4-dimensional existence.  Eternity is not the negation of our existence, but is its 
transcendence.  Conradie, “Resurrection, Finitude, and Ecology,” 288-290.
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“retrieval of these events would be as real and concrete as the original lived 
experiences.”  28
 Insofar as Conradie’s proposal involves the re-telling of the world’s 
narrative in redemptive terms, it is similar to my own proposal explored below.  
In addition, Conradie allows for a subjective experience of life for those who are 
redeemed: the re-playing of the celebrated parts of life will be just as real as 
they are now.  While Conradie does not dwell on non-human resurrection, if 
everything that has ever happened is inscribed as outlined above, then one can 
safely assume that every non-human being is also present in this redemptive 
form.  What is not clear in Conradie’s picture is how healing can be extended to 
those who only experience neglect and suffering.  The insurance pelican chick, 
for example, would not have many, if any, moments worthy of being recalled 
since it has had no experience of love, joy, or peace.  Conradie indicates that 
for humans, through the “mediation of our own embodied human 
consciousness”  there is scope for finding healing for the “unfinished business” 29
of earth.  It is unclear how this can be the case without novel experiences also 
being introduced: how can business be wrapped up by endlessly re-
experiencing the same event?  It is even more unclear how this sort of 
resolution could be achieved for the non-human animal creation.  What is 
missing from the pelican chick’s redeemed life on the Conradie model is 
precisely the experience of flourishing that was alien to its earthly life.  The new 
life ought to include some sort of possibility for extending to it a fully flourishing 
life. 
 Haught’s views also struggle with explaining how the evil of events can 
be transformed.  If only all that is good, true, and beautiful is registered into the 
 Conradie, “Resurrection, Finitude, and Ecology,” 295.28
 Conradie, “Resurrection, Finitude, and Ecology,” 294.29
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life of God, we are left with no concept of what happens to the evil.  Redemption 
seems to be little more than a sort of universal divine nostalgia.   The second 30
pelican chick, whose life consists of neglect, starvation, and death does not 
seem to have much worth saving, while the life of the successful older chick, 
who has already had the joyful experiences of care and growth, would have 
much more to save into God’s life.  The lack of flourishing in the second 
pelican’s life is not solved by objective immortality, it is enshrined eternally. 
Classical Resurrection 
 Finally we come to the classical view of redemption: the resurrection of 
the body.  This model holds that there will be a subjective experience of 
harmony, peace, and new life by individuals after death.  It has been developed 
most prominently by Jay McDaniel and Christopher Southgate, but is held to 
various degrees by others as well.   It is not traditional that this form of 31
redemption––physical resurrection––should extend to the non-human creation.  
Here, perhaps more than in the other three categories, the scope of redemption 
is closely linked to the motivations for redemption. 
 For Paul Griffiths, non-human animals might be present in the new 
creation only because they are a benefit to human well-being, and not because 
they have any place there on their own merit.   Therefore, it is not necessary 32
for all creatures to be resurrected, but only those needed for human enrichment.  
For C.S. Lewis and John Polkinghorne the motivation for non-human 
resurrection is that some creatures (particularly those we tame) have been 
 I am indebted to one of my students in the class “Evolution, God, and Gaia” 2013 at the 30
University of Exeter for this apt phrase.
 McDaniel, Of God and Pelicans, 44-47; Southgate, Groaning of Creation, 78-91.  The work of 31
other proponents of this view will be explored below, including Paul Griffiths, C.S. Lewis, John 
Polkinghorne, and Denis Edwards.
 Paul Griffiths, “What Remains in the Resurrection?”32
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“humanised” by interaction with us.   Therefore, they are involved in 33
resurrection by merit of their link to personhood in and through humanity.  I am 
tempted to call this the “Velveteen Rabbit” model of redemption.   Lewis only 34
confesses ignorance as to the fate of those who do not have this happy link with 
humanity, while Polkinghorne speculates that perhaps there will be 
representatives of other species there as well, either for human or divine 
benefit.   Polkinghorne has argued that in terms of resurrection, with the 35
exception of pets, “animals are indeed to be valued, but more in the type than in 
the token... I think it likely, therefore, that there will be horses in the world to 
come, but not every horse that has ever lived.”  36
 For Christopher Southgate, the motivation for a renewed life is threefold: 
“specific scriptural texts, a general sense that human life at its richest will be set 
in the context of relationship with other creatures, and the need to marry a 
sense of the goodness of God with the evident lack of blessedness in the lives 
of many creatures.”   Since the texts give little detail of the new life, the second 37
two concerns are the primary informants.  Southgate argues that the human 
need for relationship does not require that all creatures be included in the 
redeemed life, and that the goodness of God can be satisfied with the 
 C. S. Lewis, The Problem of Pain (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 1940, 1996), 143-147; John 33
Polkinghorne, The God of Hope and the End of the World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2002), 123.
 The Velveteen Rabbit: Or, How Toys Become Real (New York: George H. Doran, 1922) is a 34
children’s story by Margery Williams in which a toy rabbit is turned by a fairy into a living rabbit 
because a little boy loved it.  Toys that are not truly loved by humans do not become real in the 
story.
 John Polkinghorne, The God of Hope and the End of the World (New Haven: Yale University 35
Press, 2002), 123.
 John Polkinghorne, Science and the Trinity: The Christian Encounter with Reality (New 36
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004), 152.  In another place he writes “What are we to 
expect will be the destiny of non-human creatures?  They must have their share in cosmic hope, 
but we scarcely need suppose that every dinosaur that ever lived, let alone all of the vast 
multitude of bacteria that have constituted so large a fraction of biomass throughout the history 
of terrestrial life, will each have its own individual eschatological future.” The God of Hope, 122.
 Southgate, Groaning of Creation, 89.  See also page 82.37
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redemption of all the creatures who consciously suffered.  Therefore, Southgate 
concedes that simple organisms who may possess “little distinctive individual 
experience or agency” may only be represented in the eschaton by a type.   38
However he goes on to warn against such an attitude towards all non-human 
creatures, especially the higher animals who are centres of consciousness.  Of 
these higher animals, redemption is most urgently needed for those who have 
not experienced any flourishing.   For those creatures that do not suffer or who 39
have experienced flourishing, Southgate advises a position of bold generosity 
and trust that there will be, in God’s grace, abundant provision for all.  40
 The advantage of Southgate’s approach, even as opposed to the 
positions of Griffiths, Polkinghorne and Lewis, is that it finally addresses the 
question of the suffering non-human individual.  There is full redemption for 
those who have innocently suffered.  But I wonder if it goes far enough? 
 From my perspective, the scope of redemption is shaped, not by 
compensation or by anthropocentric concerns, but by the motivation of God’s 
love.  The scope of redemption is completely universal because a universal 
redemption is required by the universal love of God.  If what I have argued in 
chapter 4 about the irreplaceability of the beloved has any traction, then the 
main issue at stake is simply “Does God love each creature?”  If God does love 
each creature individually, then a creature cannot be adequately represented by 
a token, no matter how little distinction lies between it and another individual of 
the same species.  God’s interest with that individual includes a unique history 
and a unique relationship in time and space that cannot be held by any other.  
Therefore, I propose that not only will non-human animals exist in the 
 Southgate, Groaning of Creation, 84.38
 This is a view Southgate shares with McDaniel.  McDaniel, Of God and Pelicans, 46.39
 Southgate, Groaning of Creation, 85.40
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resurrection, but that every individual of every species will be included, because 
of God’s great love for each.  I am led toward Moltmann’s position, that “true 
hope must be universal, because its healing future embraces every individual 
and the whole universe.  If we were to surrender hope for as much as one 
single creature, for us God would not be God,” for God would not be the lover of 
every being.    41
 One of the regular objections that arises from conjecturing that every 
creature will be raised is that it might seem redundant.  “Surely,” it is thought, 
“there could not be any use for every bacteria, or every beetle, that has ever 
lived to be raised?”  John Wesley once addressed this question: 
If it be objected to all this, (as very probably it will,) "But of what use will 
those creatures be in that future state?" I answer this by another 
question, What use are they of now? If there be (as has commonly been 
supposed) eight thousand species of insects, who is able to inform us of 
what use seven thousand of them are? If there are four thousand species 
of fishes, who can tell us of what use are more than three thousand of 
them? If there are six hundred sorts of birds, who can tell of what use five 
hundred of those species are? If there be four hundred sorts of beasts, to 
what use do three hundred of them serve? Consider this; consider how 
little we know of even the present designs of God; and then you will not 
wonder that we know still less of what he designs to do in the new 
heavens and the new earth.  42
The thousands of species of Wesley’s day have been expanded to the tens of 
millions today.   We also have a better answer for what use such diversity is 43
today: they exist because of the great evolutionary project.  However, Wesley 
makes a useful admonition that we should not be too quick to evaluate a 
creature’s worth to God by reference to its use to us.  The new life will be 
 Jürgen Moltmann, The Coming of God: Christian Eschatology, trans. by Margaret Kohl 41
(London: SCM, 1996), 132.  The one exception to this might be creatures with significant moral 
freewill, such as humans and, possibly, demons.  The nature of love demands significant 
freedom, and therefore if one were to knowingly, intentionally, persistently reject the gift of life,  I 
believe that God would respect that choice.  However, it may be that the gentle, creative, loving, 
and enduring call of God may eventually convince all to receive the gift of life freely.
 John Wesley, “The General Deliverance: Sermon 60” available online at http://new.gbgm-42
umc.org/umhistory/wesley/sermons/60/, accessed 18 October 2013.
 The tens of millions of species alive today only represent about 1-2% of all species that ever 43
lived, meaning an estimate of billions of species throughout all history.
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theocentric, not anthropocentric, and so our imagination should be shaped by 
the abundance of God’s love and the (already evident) surprising scope of 
God’s creativity.  Nor (to meet another common objection), in a world without 
death or decay, can there be a lack of space or resources for these numberless 
creatures.  There is no reason to think that all should have to co-exist within the 
present terrestrial boundaries, nor that the present laws of physics which cause 
those boundaries will apply.  44
 One cautionary note is whether or not the new life offered to creatures is 
given as compensation for suffering experienced here.  Southgate implies that, 
to some extent, it is to be thought of as compensation, since it is meant to 
answer the question of the goodness of God in light of a suffering world.   45
Further evidence is that he suggests redemption is most important in the lives of 
those creatures who experienced little or no flourishing, and leaves it an open 
question as to whether or not such creatures might fade away after a period of 
heavenly flourishing, “if the new life is only a compensation for previous lack of 
fulfillment.”   McDaniel also holds that the new life is offered so “that they 46
[unfulfilled creatures] live until they enjoy a fulfillment of their needs as 
creatures.”   Yet, biblically at least, redemption (whether earthly or heavenly) is 47
always seen as a gift of grace, not as compensation.  To suggest that God owes 
a certain quality of life, and then has to make up for what was not received (as 
the concept of “compensation” implies) is to mistake the gift of being for an 
 Southgate, Groaning of Creation, 85.44
 Southgate, Groaning of Creation, 82-85.45
 Southgate, Groaning of Creation, 85.  Southgate actually makes a critique of conceiving 46
future life as compensation in Christopher Southgate and Andrew Robinson, “Varieties of 
Theodicy: An Exploration of Responses to the Problem of Evil Based on a Typology of Good-
Harm Analyses,” in Physics and Cosmology: Scientific Perspectives on the Problem of Natural 
Evil, eds. Nancey Murphy, Robert J. Russell, William R. Stoeger, S.J. (Vatican/Berkeley, CA: 
Vatican Observatory/CTNS, 2007), 82-84.
 McDaniel, Of God and Pelicans, 46.47
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entitlement.  In contrast, to see redemption as the free gift of God is to avoid 
that mistake while still answering the objection about the goodness of God.  
Redemption is far more than compensation, and we could say that one who 
receives redemption will be more than compensated for their sufferings.  But it 
would be a grave mistake to see redemption as a mere balancing of the scales 
of justice.  That would be to turn gift into transaction; love into economics. 
 I have explored four models of redemption: immanent, ecological, 
objective, and classical.  Many of the proposals that have been described do 
not belong entirely to one sort or another.  We saw how both Rolston and 
Haught speculated about the possibility of classical redemption.  Denis 
Edwards, who writes movingly on redemption, also combines several different 
views.  His model, which he calls “inscription in the life-giving Spirit of God” (in 
contrast to Conradie’s material inscription) has five points: 
1.  The future of creation remains obscure and shrouded in mystery.  The 
promise does not give a clear view of the future.  48
2. Individual creatures are inscribed in the eternal divine life through the Holy 
Spirit.  The Spirit’s current embrace of all creatures is the promise and the 
means of their inclusion in the divine life.  49
3. Individual Creatures find Healing and Fulfillment in Christ.  The judgment of 
Christ assures us that no good thing will be lost, but all will be redeemed in 
Christ.  The scope is universal.  50
 Denis Edwards, “Every Sparrow that Falls to the Ground: The Cost of Evolution and the 48
Christ-Event,” Ecotheology, 11:1 (2006), 117.
 Edwards, “Every Sparrow that Falls,” 118.49
 Edwards, “Every Sparrow that Falls,” 118.  Capitalisation in the title of this section is original 50
to Edwards.
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4. Redemption in Christ will be specific to each kind of creature.  With McDaniel 
and Southgate, Edwards affirms that in redemption “God relates to each 
creature on its own terms.”  51
5. Some individual creatures may find redemption in the living memory and the 
eternal life of the Trinity and the Communion of Saints.  Some creatures may 
share in physical resurrection, while others may be simply remembered by 
God and the Communion of Saints and find a sort of resurrection in that 
way.  52
Edwards combines elements of immanent redemption (the present embrace of 
the Spirit), with objective immortality (being held in the memory, or inscribed into 
the divine life), and also classical redemption (that some may be physically 
resurrected).  These models are not mutually exclusive, and can be pieced 
together––nested––into resonant images of the profound mystery of 
redemption.  The next section will explore my own proposal for how various 
models of redemption can form a compound whole. 
The Fractal Mosaic of Redemption 
 I want to suggest a picture of how we might think of three of these 
different models of redemption working together to give a richer picture of God’s 
final work.  Immanent, ecological, and classical resurrection models can be 
combined in the image of a fractal mosaic.   Most people are familiar with 53
photo mosaics: those computer-generated images where each pixel of the 
larger pictures is actually another whole photograph.  Together, hundreds or 
 Edwards, “Every Sparrow that Falls,” 119.51
 Edwards, “Every Sparrow that Falls,” 119.52
 The concept of fractal narratives is explored in Eleonore Stump, Wandering in Darkness: 53
Narrative and the Problem of Suffering (Oxford: Clarendon, 2010), 219-26, 466-67.  She 
explores how a fractal narrative of redemption works out in various biblical narratives, 
particularly in the book of Job.
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thousands of pictures combine into a greater picture, which may or may not be 
related to the component parts.  The photo mosaic preserves meaning on 
different levels, and one level is not diminished by being part of another.   
Figure 1  54
!  
 Compare the fractal mosaic to the classic tapestry analogy: all events 
and all people are like threads in a giant tapestry God is weaving, and while 
everything is a mess of knots now, God will one day flip over the carpet and 
reveal the fabulous design that was being woven the whole time.   The 55
problem is that a thread is not worth very much, nor is one thread very different 
from another.  In the photo mosaic, each pixel is a whole in itself, and has a 
unique meaning, composition, subject, and so on.  Each is a valuable whole in 
itself.  Still, it contributes to part of a greater whole once it has been suitably 
 Image created by Bethany Sollereder through www.picartia.com.54
 This imagery is found in Markus Mühling-Schlapkohl, “Why Does the Risen Christ Have 55
Scars?  Why God did not immediately create the Eschaton: Goodness, Truth and Beauty,” 
International Journal of Systematic Theology, 6:2 (April 2004): 185-193.
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arranged.  Another advantage is that the photo mosaic is not limited to two 
levels.  Each pixel could itself be a mosaic, or the larger picture could also form 
a pixel of a yet greater mosaic.  Numerous levels of meaning all operate at 
once.  
 All creatures, during their lives, are creating a picture, from the greatest 
human to the humblest bacterium.  This is the first level, Page’s level, of 
immanent redemption: each creature standing in relationship with others, 
making overlapping narratives that touch one another.  Zoom out far enough, 
and one begins to see Rolston’s level of ecological redemption emerge from the 
complex interaction of these first relationships.  The individual life of each 
creature contributes to the beauty and wholeness of the ecological system and 
the process of evolutionary development itself.  At the end of time, these 
mosaics are disassembled.  Yet, out of these former identities––these former 
pictures––God resurrects all creatures and assembles them into a final picture 
of harmonious life: the peaceable kingdom of eternity.  This is the level of 
classical resurrection.  Each creature who died will have a new, personally-
experienced life restored to it in a new body, in community with a whole new 
creation.  This is the general resurrection on a cosmic scale.   
 How will creatures live in this new community?  Will the lion lay down 
with the lamb?  Or will there be, as Southgate suggests, an eternal ecosystem 
“involving an experience for the redeemed prey-animal that delights in the 
beauty and flourishing of the predator, and vice versa?”   We can only 56
speculate at an answer.  My guess would be that the identities of creatures, the  
“pictures of being,” worked out at this top level will contain all the essential 
elements of identity that made the creature what it was at the bottom levels of 
 Southgate, Groaning of Creation, 89.56
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the mosaic.  The lion will still pursue the gazelle.  Yet, as Southgate suggests, 
the hunt will not involve terror or pain.  Or, perhaps the lion will stalk and 
pounce, but without the use of claws, so that the lethal hunt becomes a game of 
play.  Perhaps the gazelle, equally redeemed, will be perfectly able to avoid the 
lion, and so the hunt and flight will simply go on forever.   
 Whatever picture of the future life we use, it must incorporate (if my 
analogy is to hold) some elements of the levels below.  The individual living 
creature once formed one picture.  Its relationship to its ecosystem provided an 
arrangement of relationships that provided another picture one level higher.  
That ecosystem influenced surrounding ecosystems in both time and space, 
which had an effect on the creatures living in them, changing the dynamic of 
their life pictures.  In the final resurrection, God resurrects every identity found 
at the bottom level of individual lives––starts over with those pictures––and can 
arrange them in any fashion, using any of the resources of meaning held in the 
higher levels to create a final mosaic. 
 Throughout earthly history, God’s ongoing work of redemption is to 
arrange each higher level out of the components of the lower levels in such a 
way that each higher level also shows a picture of redemption.  In this fashion, 
each upward level carries the self-similar signature of God’s redemptive 
purposes, and the whole image becomes a fractal of grace.  At the end of 
history, the level of eschatological new creation is made, and it takes apart and 
remakes the mosaic entirely.  So, everything is old: it is still composed of the 
same pictures that have been forming meaning all the way along, and 
incorporates the higher-level images that were themselves mosaics during 
history.  Yet, everything is new: every picture, every creature, every ecosystem, 
every relationship, is placed in a new arrangement that faithfully captures, 
!290
redeems, and completes their experience.  This redemption, this participation in 
the peaceable kingdom, is fully experienced by each creature. 
 The fractal mosaic image helps answer questions about how each life is 
related to the models of its own redemption.  Whereas for an objective 
immortality model of redemption, the future existence is completely 
discontinuous from the present life, the picture mosaic shows how the classical 
redemption incorporates the present reality, as the “picture” of the creature’s life 
is now used to create the new creation.  In objective immortality, the creature 
does not retain a body or have any centre of self any longer.  There is no 
continuity between the creature and its redemptive form.  Similarly, an 
ecological approach to redemption cuts ties between the present self-conscious 
experience of a creature and the redemption that they find in ecological 
harmonies in later evolutionary development.  Those later harmonies may share 
some genetic material with the creature who died, or molecules of their body, 
but no experiential link is maintained.  Therefore, although the life is not wasted 
in an ecological model, there is no experience of redemption for the individual 
itself. 
 The picture mosaic shows that each life, past and present, is actually a 
primary building block of ecological harmonies and of the new life to come.  God 
could not have simply created the larger mosaics without all the previous 
compositions.  So the suffering of all creatures contributes directly to those 
redemptive outcomes, and each life has a greater meaning than is apparent 
from seeing the life in isolation.  A creature’s death has more meaning when we 
understand it in the context of evolutionary development.  The process 
contextualises the suffering so that we see that seemingly-senseless loss is not, 
after all, wasted.  Likewise, the new creation is formed out of all the resurrected 
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identities of each creature.  It is a picture of glory directly related to what came 
before.   
 Because each greater level of meaning is directly dependent on the 
levels below, the glories of the whole are reflected back, are directly attributable, 
to each component piece as well.  Every hurt, every broken life, every life cut 
short by a predator or a natural disaster will be used to create this new 
kingdom.  I think that the loving attention of God to each individual in the 
resurrected life will communicate something of the part they played in that 
kingdom building back to them, in whatever capacity is appropriate to each.  
Each creature will directly and experientially participate in the new picture of the 
peaceable kingdom that they themselves helped to create. 
 The image of a photo mosaic may also be conceived in dynamic terms, 
as a video mosaic.   Each creature’s life is a video that, combined with others, 57
makes a large-scale video.  Of course, in real life, these are not carefully acted 
and scripted pieces, but rather (consistent with God’s temporal existence) 
dynamic real-time improvisations.  They are narratives that are being built, not 
simply pictures taken at one point in time.  The course of each individual video, 
as well as the large-scale videos, are created as each of the actors explores his 
or her own freedom and response to divine lure in his or her own capacity.  God 
works with the texture and reality of each of these individual narratives and 
works them into the larger-scale ecosystem video which is influenced (but not 
determined) by each pixel of its makeup, and so on, up through history and the 
various levels of meaning we can imagine.  God interacts at each level of the 
 There are computer programmers working on developing video mosaics.  One example is the 57
video mosaic developed by Allison Klein, Tyler Grant, Adam Finkelstein, and Michael F. Cohen, 
“Video Mosaics,” NPAR 2002: Second International Symposium on Non Photorealistic 
Rendering (June, 2002): 21-28.  An example of a video mosaic they produced by the method 
described in the paper can be viewed online at: http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/um/people/
cohen/npar2002.m1v.  Accessed 16 May 2014.
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mosaic,  luring and creating relationships between disparate narratives to bring 58
about God’s purposes at every level in redemptive form.   
 The picture of redemption as a dynamic video mosaic allows us to see, in 
part, how small stories could build up into a meta-narrative without sacrificing 
the individual uniqueness and worth of each story.  It allows us to see how this-
worldly and other-worldly models of redemption can be held together.  A single 
creature’s narrative––a centre of worth in itself––contributes up into an 
ecological narrative.  That ecological narrative is one smaller part of the world 
history narrative, which forms its own mosaic.  Each of these levels contributes 
to God’s ultimate composition of the new creation.  59
 Ernst Conradie recognises the ongoing and interactive nature of our life 
narratives: 
My own life story is not completed with my death.  My story continues as 
long as my life is still honored in the memory of subsequent generations 
and as long as the material impact of my work is still evident... However, 
even then the story has not reached its narrative conclusion.  My story 
forms part of the larger (hi)story of the particular genealogy, culture, 
species, planet, and galaxy in which I participate.  My history will in this 
sense be completed only when the history of the cosmos comes to an 
end.  60
Conradie points out that individual stories are not complete on their own.  
Instead, stories can gain new meaning with the occurrence of new events.  
Stories of suffering are transformed by subsequent stories into narratives of 
God’s love and power.  The example of the cross is central here: the innocent 
suffering of Jesus on the cross is tragic.  Yet within the context of salvation 
history and the resurrection, the event of the cross becomes the focal point of 
heavenly worship: 
 In all the multiple ways explored in chapter 5, p. 238-266.58
 God’s final narrative may include the history of other worlds, other universes, and other non-59
physical beings (such as angels and demons).
 Conradie, “Resurrection, Finitude, and Ecology,” 283-284.60
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 ‘You [Jesus] are worthy to take the scroll 
     and to open its seals, 
 for you were slaughtered and by your blood you ransomed for God 
     saints from every tribe and language and people and nation; 
 you have made them to be a kingdom and priests serving our God, 
     and they will reign on earth.’... 
 ‘Worthy is the Lamb that was slaughtered 
 to receive power and wealth and wisdom and might 
 and honour and glory and blessing!’  61
If, as Rolston says, the creation is “cruciform,”  then it is cruciform in this 62
sense: the stories of the innocent suffering of creatures will be transfigured into 
narratives of glory, and these narratives will be reflected back on the individual 
by being honoured through God’s love, attention, and communication, just as 
Jesus’ suffering was transfigured in the resurrection and honoured by the 
Father’s glorification of the Son.  We could, to use poetic imagination, say that 
God will tell the redemptive narrative of creation to each creature in light of its 
life, thus honouring it and bringing it glory. 
 The result of this type of perspective is that the individual and the 
“greater whole” are not set against each other competitively, as is so often the 
case in reasoning about suffering and redemption.  The suffering of the 
individual is not brushed aside in light of the “greater good” or justified by merely 
pointing to some eschatological order that will make sense of it all.  Some good 
is found directly in the life of the creature itself: its participation in life and in 
surrounding relationships.  The individual pixel––that is, the narrative of the 
here and now of each creature––is kept in sharp focus as a centre of worth.  All 
its complexity and meaning is maintained.  At the same time, a view of ongoing, 
ever-building, mosaic narratives allows us a glimpse into the possibilities of 
 Revelation 5:9-10, 12, NRSV.61
 Holmes Rolston III, “Kenosis and Nature,” in The Work of Love: Creation as Kenosis, ed. 62
John Polkinghorne (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2001), 58-61.
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what impact a life might have ontologically, as its actions ripple through the 
course of history.   
 The question of the relationship of the present earthly existence to the 
future new creation existence is one of continuity.  We are physical now, we 
shall be physical then.  We exist in relationship now, we shall exist in 
relationship then.  The new creation reality is precisely the present reality 
extended and transformed into that future reality in such a way that a different 
reality is created.  In chapter 5, I explained that one way of understanding God’s 
participation in the world is through the shaping of meaning.  The new creation 
mosaic is the final outworking of God’s shaping of meaning.  God brings new 
and different meaning to events by placing them within the context of other 
events.  By arranging the pixels of individual creaturely narratives into a larger 
picture with other narratives, a whole new meaning is created that is not 
inherent in the lower level of photos.  It is because of God’s work at various 
levels that the new meanings that emerge are ones of heavenly glory rather 
than of hellish despair. 
 As each narrative joins other narratives, the composite meaning of what 
is seen can change.  In a photo mosaic, one pixel may be a picture of a cat.  
Yet, in the larger scale picture, it forms part of a human finger.  In yet another 
larger scale, the human finger forms part of an icon of the Trinity.  Each level 
forms a whole that contains its own meaning.  The meaning of the arrangement, 
colour, and shade of each image changes depending on the scale.  Similarly, 
God takes the multi-levelled world narratives of tragedy and triumph and 
arranges them into ever-redemptive forms, changing their meaning.  No 
suffering, then, is left unredeemed, and each individual’s experience in the 
larger whole becomes an experience of redemption.  These upper levels of 
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meaning are not automatically generated from the lower levels: they are 
carefully constructed by God’s ongoing work.  One could use the same set of 
photographs to create a mosaic of Raphael’s “The Transfiguration” or one of 
Heironymous Bosch’s disturbing images of hell.  It is God’s work that creates 
one instead of the other. 
An Example 
 Let us take a look at a more concrete historical example to help flesh out 
concepts that are opaque in the abstract.  Some 65 million years ago, dinosaurs 
were the dominant species on earth.  Each creature had its relationships; its 
narratives of flourishing or suffering.  At Page’s level, each creature made its 
own contribution to the makeup of the earth.  At the end of the Cretaceous 
period, a meteorite hit the Yucatan peninsula causing climate change and 
widespread environmental disruption.   Dinosaurs could not survive the 63
changes and were wiped out, while mammals, who until that time had been 
minor players in earth’s history, suddenly flourished in the new environments 
without the competition of the dinosaurs.  When dinosaurs no longer created 
new pictures or videos (their own narratives), their extinction caused gaping 
holes in the ecological level of the mosaic.  These holes would be filled by 
others, and the ecological narrative would continue through the narratives of 
mammals and birds, building into Rolston’s level of redemption.   
 The meteorite was a major plot turn in the ongoing narratives.  The plot 
of the second-level ecological mosaic took a turn toward the diversification of 
mammals, which eventually ended up in the emergence of Homo sapiens and, 
centrally, in the incarnation of God in the person of Jesus Christ.  In one sense, 
 New research continues to confirm this theory.  See Paul R. Renne, et. al., “Time Scales of 63
Critical Events Around the Cretaceous-Paleogene Boundary,” Science 339 (February 2013): 
684-687.
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then, the event of Christ taking on human flesh is attributable in part to the 
extinction of the dinosaurs which allowed for the emergence of mammals––an 
attribution that it is only possible to make in retrospect.  
 The essential point to grasp is that the meaning of an individual 
dinosaur’s life was not fixed when it died.  All that finished was the composition 
of its own small narrative pixel.  How that pixel would then contribute to other 
levels of meaning is something under ongoing development.  Its life holds new 
meaning with every passing day.  As our stories continue its story, there is an 
added providential twist, because in each act of divine lure in the present––and 
in the choices that are made today––the open possibilities of new meaning in 
the life of a now long-dead dinosaur are either realised or closed.  The wonder 
of human architecture, the transcendence of music, or the capacity of human 
love are all bound up with the meaning of the death of past creatures we never 
knew.   
 We could also express this concept by counterfactual: had the dinosaurs 
not gone extinct, Bach might never have been born.  The world would never 
have experienced his transcendent music.  Instead, because of the extinction of 
the dinosaurs creating the foundation for contemporary stories (the birth of 
Bach), our present stories expand upon and enrich the outcomes of the 
dinosaurs’s stories (they lived in a world that eventually produced Bach’s 
music).  Each story serves the others, and while we benefit now from their 
contributions, our contributions will be experienced by them in the new life.  By 
merit of the dinosaurs’ extinction we are here, and our retrospective vision 
allows us to interpret their deaths as having been meaningful in a way that (if 
we can imagine) an intelligent observer at that time could not have foreseen.  
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Other equally meaningful and fruitful possibilities of redemption along the road 
of time were, no doubt, not explored in order that our road might be.   
 God’s work of redemption is to continually interact with the world in order 
to see that good is realised.  As a moment occurs, the narrative lines leading up 
to it converge and are either enriched with new meaning or diminished by 
tragedy in the passing event.  God’s present action is constantly working to 
redeem the lives of the past by leading creation toward ends that will reflect 
back greater glory on the individuals now passed away; a glory that they will 
experience (in whatever way is most appropriate to them) in the new creation.   
 This concept of mosaic redemption can meaningfully be extended to all 
living creatures.  It is possible to see the ongoing history of evolution, 
comprising as it does of ever increased complexity and interrelations, as one 
way that God’s redemptive work is being carried out in a this-worldly sense.  
The death (both individually and corporately) of the dinosaurs is a loss, and yet 
the flourishing of the mammals ends up contributing to the meaning of the 
dinosaurs’ extinction.  A further redemption in an other-worldly sense will build 
upon and extend the redemptions already crafted by God. 
 An analogy to this ongoing sense of redemption may be drawn from the 
end of Hebrews 11.  After the long line of heroes of the faith is listed, the author 
states the following: “Yet all these, though they were commended for their faith, 
did not receive what was promised, since God had provided something better 
so that they would not, without us, be made perfect.”   The passage goes 64
straight on from this statement into the paraenetic portion of the epistle, 
beginning with: “Therefore, since we are surrounded by such a great cloud of 
witnesses let us...” followed by instructions on how to live.   The saints of the 65
 Hebrews 11:39-40, NRSV.64
 Hebrews 12:1a, NRSV.65
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Hebrew Bible recounted in the chapter had lived and died long before, but the 
author of Hebrews seems to think that they cannot be made perfect without the 
actions and faith of current believers.  Although the saints are long since dead, 
part of the promise of their lives is realised in the present; a possibility of 
fulfilment that would not come to fruition if present believers chose not to “lay 
aside every weight and the sin that clings so closely...”  66
 Another example might be how the legacy of Abraham is enriched by the 
later reality of Christ.  We do not consider Abraham as a simple means to an 
end, but rather as a man who had an important part to play in the ongoing story 
of God’s relationship with the world.  Abraham’s obedient actions (as well as his 
numerous disobedient actions) are wrapped into the narrative of salvation, and 
his life is given a greater glory, a greater meaning, because of the subsequent 
history that followed in Christ.  We can imagine that the resurrected Abraham 
would be joyful at this, thus sharing in some sense in the glory of Christ. 
 For a human, it is at least plausible that conscious involvement in the 
large-scale narratives of redemption could indeed be a personal experience of 
redemption as well.  Is it plausible for the non-human animal creation?  In 
attempting an answer to such a question, one must first acknowledge the vast 
amounts of speculation involved.  If we accept the already fuzzy notion of non-
human redemption, we must also accept that the form that the fulfilment of 
redemption takes for other creatures will probably not be fully understandable to 
humans.  If, for humans, conscious recognition is what is needed, then that is 
presumably what they will receive.  It may be, for other creatures, that 
redemption looks entirely different.  Jay McDaniel insists upon this point: 
Let us be clear about this hope.  The hope is not that all creatures share 
in the same kind of fulfillment beyond death.  Rather it is that all 
 Hebrews 12:1b, NRSV.66
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creatures share in that kind of fulfillment appropriate to their own 
interests and needs.  What a pelican chick might know as a fulfillment of 
needs would have its own kind of harmony and intensity, one quite 
different from what we humans might know.  If there is a pelican heaven, 
it is a pelican heaven.  67
Add to the complication of our speculation that a pelican with a new resurrected 
body might have quite different needs from the needs it has now in a this-
worldly body (as 1 Corinthians 15:35-44 strongly implies), and we are left with 
very little clue as to what the needs of the pelican chick might be.  Nor do we 
know what the new capacities of the chick might be.  If they do have new 
capacities post mortem, the proposal I have given above––that recognition of 
one’s place in the greater narrative is itself a form of personal redemption––
would by no means be absurd. 
Excursus: Can the dead be benefitted? 
 There is a long philosophical discussion that is of some interest at this 
juncture.  While not forming a crucial part of the argument (it can be included or 
excluded with little difference), it offers an interesting parallel to my concerns.  
The discussion is about whether the dead can be benefited or harmed.  
Beginning with Aristotle and continuing through to contemporary thinkers, many 
philosophers have affirmed that the dead can be harmed and benefited by the 
living.   One example is that the dead can be harmed by defamation, as 68
Michael Ridge explains: 
The idea that one can wrong the dead by defaming them... has an 
impressive legal and philosophical pedigree.  Kant, for example, argues 
that spreading falsehoods about someone after the person’s death is 
morally dubious.  The idea is even legally recognized in some contexts.  
 McDaniel, Of God and Pelicans, 45.  The point is also insisted upon by Edwards, “Every 67
Sparrow that Falls,” 119.
 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, I.10-11, trans by David Ross (New York: Oxford University 68
Press, 2009); Michael Ridge, “Giving the Dead Their Due,” Ethics 114:1 (October 2003): 38-59; 
Robert C. Solomon, “Is There Happiness after Death?” Philosophy 51:196 (April 1976): 
189-193.
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In Germany, Holocaust denial is criminal because it involves the 
‘defamation of the memory of the dead.’  69
The idea that the dead can be harmed even extends to those who think that 
death constitutes the complete end of being for the individual.   Some of these 70
are certainly stretched: George Pitcher, for example, argues that it is only the 
ante-mortem self of the dead person (the description of the dead person before 
their death) that can be harmed and not the post-mortem self (the mouldering 
dust that remains).   However, if––as I have argued––there is a subjective 71
other-worldly experience of life for creatures, then the idea that the dead can be 
harmed or benefited is much more plausible, as there continues to be a living 
self that continues after death.   
 Robert Solomon advances the idea that there are two different kinds of 
desires which affect our happiness or determine our harm before and after 
death.  There are “personal desires, whose satisfaction depends upon my being 
alive, and transcendent desires, whose satisfaction does not depend upon my 
being alive.”   Solomon gives the following illustrations for personal desires: to 72
see a new movie, or to taste a certain dish.  One can only do these things when 
alive.  If a person dies before they are accomplished, there is no chance that 
the desire could ever be fulfilled.  A transcendent desire might be to have one’s 
child live long in prosperity and wealth.  It is a desire that very well may only find 
fulfilment after one’s own death.  When applied to the non-human world, the 
 Ridge, “Giving the Dead Their Due,” 43.  While Holocaust denial also harms the living, it is 69
significant that the law points to the memory of the dead, rather than the effect on the living, as 
the reason for making it criminal.
 Joel Feinberg, "The Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations," in Philosophy and 70
Environmental Crisis, ed. William Blackstone (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1974): 
43-68; Joel Feinberg, "Harm and Self-Interest," in Law, Morality and Society: Essays in Honour 
of H. L. A. Hart, ed. P. M. S. Hacker and J. Raz (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977): 284-308; 
George Pitcher, “The Misfortunes of the Dead,” American Philosophical Quarterly 21:2 (April 
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personal desires are evident: the desire to survive, to reproduce, to find and 
keep food and shelter, to avoid pain and pursue pleasure.  For more social 
animals, it may also be to hold a certain standing in the group hierarchy or to 
perform certain tasks within the group.  Non-human animals can also have 
transcendent desires.  A sentinel vervet monkey, for example, may desire the 
safety of its group from predators such as lions and eagles.  These sentinels will 
stand at the edges of the foraging group, keeping watch for predators while at 
the same time placing themselves in greater danger.  If a monkey makes a call, 
but is caught themselves by a predator, they may die before their desire to see 
the rest of their group safe is realised.  73
 More interestingly, Scripture holds several references to the desires of 
the non-human creation.  The most important is in Romans 8:19-23: 
For the creation waits with eager longing for the revealing of the children 
of God; for the creation was subjected to futility, not of its own will but by 
the will of the one who subjected it, in hope that the creation itself will be 
set free from its bondage to decay and will obtain the freedom of the 
glory of the children of God. We know that the whole creation has been 
groaning in labor pains until now; and not only the creation, but we 
ourselves, who have the first fruits of the Spirit, groan inwardly while we 
wait for adoption, the redemption of our bodies.  74
“The creation waits with eager longing... in hope that the creation itself will be 
set free...”  This desire of the creation is what Solomon would call a 
transcendent desire.  It is a desire for the full potential of both humanity and of 
the non-human creation to be realised, for decay to be no more.  Because of 
Christ’s work reconciling “to himself all things” (Colossians 1:20), all things are 
also drawn into peaceable relationship with one another and with God.  The 
 We could also perhaps infer transcendent desire for long life in one’s offspring in elephants, 73
who will return to the spot where a young elephant died and perform mourning rituals years 
after the event.  Yet, I think we must be cautious, since the attributing of desires can easily 
become overly anthropomorphic.
 Romans 8:19-23, NRSV.74
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heavenly vision in Revelation 5:13 vividly pictures this unity as centred around 
God’s praise: 
Then I heard every creature in heaven and on earth and under the earth 
and in the sea, and all that is in them, singing, 
“To the one seated on the throne and to the Lamb be blessing and 
honour and glory and might forever and ever!”  75
The realisation of the creation’s desire and longing is the praise and worship of 
God.   The desire to experience this eschatological community of praise, then, 76
is also a transcendent desire, and one that can be satisfied in the individual long 
after their earthly death.  The satisfaction of that desire is another way we might 
think of the final redemption of the individual, of the glory of the whole reflected 
back on the individual.  Redemption becomes more than the simple satisfaction 
of personal biological needs.  Many members of that final community will only 
exist because of the actions of some other member, so each one exists as a 
tribute to the life of the other.  The complex and webbed nature of history 
guarantees that the implications of every life are felt far afield.  The reward of 
the new life will be to have all those relationships recognised and transformed 
into ones of perfect harmony. 
 The fractal mosaic idea of redemption, while being a highly speculative 
and highly imaginative account, contributes to a compound evolutionary 
theodicy as it helps one to see how the necessary harms of the evolutionary 
process can be redeemed in both a this-worldly and an other-worldly sense, 
 Revelation 5:13, NRSV.75
 Richard Bauckham imagines that this praise is found in creature’s being themselves, 76
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without the loss of meaning in either place.  It is important to note that the 
meaning is not immediately present after a disvalue has occurred.  Indeed, if 
what I have said about God creating new meaning in far distant events is true, 
some disvalues will be utterly gratuitous and unredeemed for a long time after 
they happen, since the conditions for their redemption have not yet been made.  
Once again, the temporal nature of God’s experience of time is a necessary 
component for this image.  God creates the redemption out of the past and 
present, rather than a Moltmannian-type model where the already-existing 
eschatological future breaks into the present. 
Why Not Create Heaven First? 
 All this talk of redemption necessarily raises the question of why God did 
not simply create the new world first?  If there is no suffering there, yet it still 
retains embodiment and relationships, God would seem at fault for not creating 
that world first.  Wesley J. Wildman, in particular, claims that to articulate a 
“coherent eschatology would only be theological disaster” since “God would be 
flagrantly morally inconsistent” in creating this world when that idealised world 
was possible all along.   Southgate meets this challenge by claiming that just 77
as he argues that the evolutionary process is the “only way” to “give rise to 
creaturely selves” in this world, it is perhaps also the only way to create selves 
which could populate heaven.  He writes: “Our guess must be that though 
heaven can eternally preserve those selves, subsisting in suffering-free 
relationship, it could not give rise to them in the first place.”  78
 Wesley J. Wildman, “Incongruous Goodness, Perilous Beauty, Disconcerting Truth: Ultimate 77
Reality and Suffering in Nature,” in Physics and Cosmology: Scientific Perspectives on the 
Problem of Natural Evil, eds. Nancey Murphy, Robert Russell, and William Stoeger S.J.  
(Vatican/Berkeley, CA: Vatican Observatory/CTNS, 2007), 292.
 Southgate, Groaning of Creation, 90.78
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 If, by “creaturely selves,” Southgate means “physically embodied 
creaturely selves,” I would agree with him.  However, Christianity has had a long 
tradition of affirming the existence of non-embodied creaturely selves, angels 
and demons, who populated heaven before there were embodied creatures.  
Therefore, we cannot say that the evolutionary process is the only way to give 
rise to creaturely selves, unless we add the caveat “physically embodied” to the 
creaturely selves under discussion. 
 In addition, I would add to Southgate’s response that there are certain 
values that are present in this world that no one ever imagines will be part of the 
new world.  Southgate, who creatively explores possibilities of the new life, 
speculates that there may still be hunting and predator/prey relations, though 
stripped of their pain, terror, and destruction.   Yet he does not include, nor 79
does anyone else include, reproduction as a possible activity of the new 
creation.  If God simply populated the new creation with fully-formed selves, the 
chance to participate with God in forming new life by giving birth would be 
removed.   
 We also often assume that efficiency and the perfection of the final 
outcome are the primary considerations in God’s work.  Yet, approached from 
the motivations of love, it is often the participation of the other that makes the 
work worthwhile.  No one who has created an art project or done baking with a 
young child would say that their work was more efficient or more perfect 
because of the partnership.  Yet many would say that the sloppy lines in the 
painting and the lopsided cupcakes that emerged were more worthwhile than 
the perfect efficiency that they might have achieved on their own.  In the same 
way, my guess would be that while there may have been another less painful 
 Southgate, Groaning of Creation, 87-90.79
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way to produce embodied creaturely selves, there was no way apart from 
evolution to produce them in partnership with the creatures themselves. 
 What other values would be lost, or never be expressed, in the new 
creation?  It is hard to know, but values like courageous self-sacrifice are hard 
to imagine there.  Like the sentinel vervet monkeys described above, or mother 
birds, many creatures voluntarily place themselves in harm’s way in order to 
protect others.  It is precisely because they do this in the face of fear and 
danger that the action has value.  While the new creation may in fact involve 
one unending act of self-giving on the part of its creatures, they will not 
surrender with the fear of consequent pain. 
 I do not mean to say that the expression of values like self-sacrificial 
courage fully justify the suffering world God has created.  If they did, we would 
have no use for a future world without their existence.  These values are 
temporary values (that is, they won’t necessarily be exercised in a world without 
fear and suffering), but perhaps they add one more small reason why God did 
not simply create the ideal new creation first.  If God is creating a great mosaic, 
these temporary values may add some colours, textures, and shades that will 
deepen and enrich that future existence. 
The Place of the Christ Event 
 What place does the Christ event have in the development of our image?  
Robert Russell, reflecting on the importance of Christ’s resurrection for non-
human theodicy, writes: 
Hence I propose that the only possibility for an adequate response to 
natural theodicy is to relocate the problem of sin and evil beyond a 
theology of creation into a theology of redemption––the kenotic suffering 
of God with the world together with the eschatological transformation of 
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the universe in the new creation beginning proleptically with God’s new 
act at Easter in the bodily resurrection of Jesus.  80
Russell points out that the suffering of Jesus on the cross and the event of the 
resurrection are turning points in our understanding of evil and of eschatology.  
Vernon White, in Atonement and Incarnation, struggles with the seeming 
impossibility of understanding the traditional belief of atonement: that a 
particular historical event affected the whole of universal history.   Trends in 81
theology, he argues, move towards either a total historical particularisation of 
Christ’s work on the cross, such as in the moral exemplar theory where it 
provides little more than one revelation of a good example of a human life, or 
toward an individualisation where salvation is only effected for individual souls.   82
Instead, Vernon White argues for an atonement model that embraces both the 
necessity of the particularity of Christ’s work on the cross as well as its universal 
significance.  He writes: 
God in Christ takes into his own divine experience that which qualifies 
him to reconcile, redeem, and sanctify in his relationship with all people 
everywhere.  To adapt one of Fiddes’ pictures: it is something like a 
mountain guide who first crosses a difficult terrain himself, in order to 
equip himself to take across all who will follow him.  83
White acknowledges, along with Paul Fiddes,  that for the atonement to be a 84
historical event with universal significance, the cross and resurrection must 
allow for some sort of change in God: God is able to do something which God 
was unable to do before.   In White’s argument, it is that now Christ can lead 85
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people through the path of salvation, as an explorer can become a guide once 
he has crossed the unknown terrain himself. 
 Can the fractal mosaic image of redemption I proposed earlier fit this 
same set of criteria, affirming both the necessity of the historical Christ event 
and its universal consequences of salvation?  I believe it can.  In the mosaic 
image, we must imagine the events of the life, death, and resurrection of Christ 
as the central pixel, the mosaic’s organising point at the lowest level of personal 
narrative.  It is the event around which all other events are arranged, like a 
cornerstone or foundation stone from which the greater image is built.   The 86
Christ event also acts as the algorithm that arranges and aligns the pixels with 
one another: the same upside-down Kingdom power and logic that brought 
Jesus to the cross and leads him out the other side of death is the power and 
logic that places each creature in redemptive relation to all others.   
 The Christ event is both the starting point and the organising principle of 
the photo mosaic.  To borrow the language of Colossians 1:20, “through [Christ] 
God was pleased to reconcile to himself all things.”  In Christ, and because of 
Christ, all other events coordinate to create the upper-levels of redemptive 
imagery.  The Christ event is not only revelation in the sense of showing that 
evil can be defeated by enduring in sacrificial love beyond it; it is also the 
revelation that shows us in microcosm the type of redemption that God will 
ultimately effect in macrocosm.  Christ is the “firstborn” from the dead, the 
cornerstone of the new creation.   
 There results, with this mosaic image, almost a pun on both the Hebrew 
and Greek conceptions of sin as something that has “missed the mark.”  In the 
 The cornerstone, or foundation stone, was the first stone laid down in ancient stone 86
architecture.  Every other stone would, therefore, be set in reference to this first stone.  Every 
other stone derived its place in the building because of the positioning of the cornerstone, and 
the entire structure was positioned in reference to this first stone.
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redemption picture I offer, the re-alignment of personal narratives around the 
narrative of Christ represents a true reconciliation of sin, since the narratives of 
fallen humans are now aligned in right relationship to Christ, other people, and 
all of creation.  The broken relationships caused by sin are now healed and 
rebuilt.  In the uppermost level of the new creation, all of creation will be 
transformed.  For the non-human world, transformation will involve a 
rearrangement of narratives into a larger redemptive image.  This is 
“justification.”  For humans, transformation will involve both justification and 
sanctification.  To push the analogy, human pixels alone will need, in addition to 
reordering, the restoration of their true colour and essence––like a digital 
remastering.   
 It is in the stage of sanctification that the other human atonement 
theories––propitiation, vicarious substitution, ransom, etc.––can be invoked.  I 
am perhaps pushing the boundaries of imagery, but I find that this picture of 
alignment illustrates how Christ had to come for the whole cosmos since every 
narrative pattern requires a central focus and pattern around which to form.  We 
do not, therefore, have to follow David Clough in his assumption that because 
Christ came to reconcile the entire cosmos, that the non-human world is 
somehow subject to sin.   We can give an account of non-human 87
eschatological justification that does not require redemption from sin, although it 
may indeed involve redemption from the secondary and tertiary effects of 
human sin. 
 Moreover, the idea of Christ’s narrative forming the central pixel ensures 
that we hold to the importance of the particularity of Christ’s historical life.  Since 
the lower level mosaics are formed of earthly events, we need something like 
 David Clough, On Animals, Vol.1 (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2012), 125.87
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the Incarnation in order for God to be able to have a foundation in history from 
which to start building.  Without the Incarnation, without God’s true presence in 
history, God could not be part of the mosaic.  God could only be the organising 
architect, rather than a participant.  Without the Incarnation, the whole narrative 
structure of history would lose its central organising feature, its cornerstone and 
foundation stone. 
 Gregory of Nazianzus famously claimed that “only what is assumed by 
the Word in the Incarnation can be redeemed.”   Niels Gregersen’s concept of 88
“deep incarnation” has brought to light that, in Elizabeth Johnson’s words, there 
was a “radical divine reach through human flesh all the way down into the very 
tissue of biological existence with its growth and decay.”   Building upon this 89
concept, Johnson suggests that the idea of “deep resurrection” similarly 
affiliates all of creation with Christ’s resurrection.  Christ is the firstborn from 
amongst the dead, and all of creation will form part of that final resurrection.  
Johnson writes: 
 The reasoning runs like this.  This person, Jesus of Nazareth, was 
composed of star stuff and earth stuff; his life formed a genuine part of 
the historical and biological community of Earth; his body existed in a 
network of relationships drawing from and extending to the whole 
physical universe.  If in death this ‘piece of this world, real to the core,’ as 
Rahner phrases it, surrendered his life in love and is now forever with 
God in glory, then this signals embryonically the final beginning of 
redemptive glorification not just for other human beings but for all flesh, 
all material beings, every creature that passes through death.  The 
evolving world of life, all of matter in its endless permutations, will not be 
left behind but will likewise be transfigured by the resurrection of the 
Creator Spirit.  90
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 The act of the Incarnation makes God part of the material mosaic.  The 
algorithm informing the organisation of the mosaic, however, was not created in 
the Christ event, but existed before in the attitude God held toward creation.  
Thus the universal scope of the Christ event (the organising algorithm) finds its 
first expression and historical anchor in the particularity of the death and 
resurrection of Jesus. 
 The picture of Christ as the central position of creation’s mosaic and the 
“organising algorithm” of redemption is reminiscent––a small echo––of the great 
scene in Revelation 5.  John stands in the midst of the throne-room of heaven, 
looking for the one who is worthy to open the scroll and bring history to its final 
conclusion.  No one in all of creation is found worthy.  John weeps amidst the 
praise of heaven until he is told by one of the elders, “Do not weep.  See, the 
Lion of the tribe of Judah, the Root of David, has conquered, so that he can 
open the scroll and its seven seals.”   John turns to behold this great Lion, and 91
sees instead “a Lamb standing as if it had been slaughtered...He went and took 
the scroll from the right hand of the one who was seated on the throne.”    92
 John imagines that at the centre of heaven stands the Lamb, who had 
been slaughtered, holding the scroll with the instructions for the final judgment 
of history.  I imagine the central pixel of creation’s mosaic as the crucified and 
risen Christ, and he is the algorithm of reconciliation.  Both images emphasise 
the centrality of the Christ event in the whole scheme of world history.  Both 
images recognise that the suffering taken into the heart of God at the cross is 
the central organising principle for the outworking of eschatological fulfilment.  
The creatures who once suffered are drawn into the work of the cross, and 
aligned with all other creatures into a dynamic mosaic of praise.  All hurts are 
 Revelation 5:5, NRSV.91
 Revelation 5:6-7, NRSV.92
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healed, all relationships mended, and all creatures––whether by direct 
expression, or by simply being what they are ––live out the praise of God. 93
Then I looked, and I heard the voice of many angels surrounding the 
throne and the living creatures and the elders; they numbered myriads of 
myriads and thousands of thousands, singing with full voice, 
‘Worthy is the Lamb that was slaughtered 
to receive power and wealth and wisdom and might 
and honour and glory and blessing!’ 
Then I heard every creature in heaven and on earth and under the earth 
and in the sea, and all that is in them, singing, 
‘To the one seated on the throne and to the Lamb 
be blessing and honour and glory and might 
for ever and ever!’  94
Conclusion 
 Redemption as the transformation of evil, harm, and disvalue into the 
love, harmony, and diversity of the kingdom of God remains one of the most 
important elements of an evolutionary theodicy.  I began this chapter with an 
exploration of four different models of redemption: immanent, ecological, 
objective, and classical.  I then introduced how a fractal mosaic image could 
help us picture the interrelations between the first two redemption models and 
the classical model.  Each individual narrative holds meaning in itself 
(immanent), but also contributes to a greater picture in world history 
(ecological).  Both of these together constitute the building blocks of God’s 
eschatological redemption in Christ (classical).   The glory of the overall 
narrative is returned upon the good of the individual through the care and 
attention of God.  Finally, I explored the place of the Christ event in the picture 
of redemption, showing how Jesus’ narrative constitutes the central organising 
 See the possibilities of creaturely praise in Mark Harris, “The Floods Clap Their Hands.”93
 Revelation 5:11-13, NRSV.94
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focal point for the whole structure of redemption.  In so far as the world is 
redeemed, it is redeemed in, through, and around Christ. 
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Chapter 7 - Conclusions 
“In the ominous light of suffering, all theology is a kind of agonized writhing”  
- Wesley J. Wildman  1
 The process of evolution has both created the potential for and caused 
vast amounts of suffering, pain, and untimely deaths for countless non-human 
sentient beings.  The traditional Christian solutions for suffering cannot be 
applied in these cases: these creatures could not be benefited morally by this 
suffering, nor can we blame their suffering on the corruption of the natural order 
by humanity, Satan, or any other kind of primordial defect or evil.  Yet we wish to 
affirm with the Christian tradition that the world is the creation of a good, loving, 
and powerful God.  Furthermore, the evidence from the natural sciences insists 
that it is particularly these harms––the suffering and death of individuals––that 
drives the development of skill, complexity, and new forms of life. 
 Previous attempts to solve this problem were explored in chapter 2.  
Philosophical approaches are usually developed along the lines of either a 
developmental or property-consequence Good-Harm Analysis (GHA).  These 
arguments are most effective at the level of ecological systems or species as a 
whole: they show that the possibility of suffering of the individual often 
contributes to or makes possible the whole scheme of life.  Package deals, 
logical constraints, and “only way” type arguments provided the first major plank 
in my compound evolutionary theodicy: 
1) God was limited by the logical constraints imposed by creating a physical 
world.  There was no way to create a physical world and advanced sentient 
beings inhabiting that creation without the possibility of suffering. 
 Wesley J. Wildman, “Incongruous Goodness, Perilous Beauty, Disconcerting Truth: Ultimate 1
Reality and Suffering in Nature,” in Physics and Cosmology: Scientific Perspectives on the 
Problem of Natural Evil, eds. Nancey Murphy, Robert Russell, and William Stoeger  (Vatican/
Berkeley, CA: Vatican Observatory/CTNS, 2007), 267-294, 267.
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 The rest of the project did not stem from trying to provide a GHA in direct 
relation to creaturely suffering.  Instead, it asked “What kind of world does a 
God of love create, and how does God act in that world on behalf of those who 
suffer?”  It is, in a sense, a property-consequence argument derived from the 
nature of God’s love. 
 The philosophical exploration of the nature of love found that the most 
satisfying account of love came from Eleonore Stump’s appropriation of the 
Thomist definition: that love is the outcome of the desire for the good of the 
beloved and the desire for union with the beloved.  Incorporating the historical 
aspect of Kolodny’s argument produced the results that love was individually 
suited to the capabilities of the beloved, unable to be substituted for another, 
faithful in light of change, and vulnerable to the actions of the beloved.  In 
addition, the actions of love would be patient, freedom-giving, and devoted to 
the good of the other.   
 In fact, the freedom-giving aspect would be so important that it would 
involve a non-deterministic world and significant creaturely freedom.  For God to 
be able to bestow this sort of freedom would involve the voluntary kenosis of 
certain divine qualities, such as omnipotence, simple eternity, omniscience, and 
causal status.  The giving up of these attributes would provide freedom for the 
creation to explore its own “selving” process, but would also allow the 
occurrence of gratuitous harms and disvalues.  This creates the second plank of 
my theodicy: 
2) While there is no opposing force acting against God’s purposes in creation, 
the nature of God’s love involves kenotic self-limitation and granting 
possibility for creaturely autonomy, resulting in a creation that does not 
always reflect God’s own loving character.  The paths of evolutionary 
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development were open to creaturely innovation which, as in the case of 
parasitism, may capitalise on disvalues. 
 The freedom of creation to explore its own paths of development, its own 
means of survival, opens the possibility of experiencing gratuitous suffering.  
This world is not the “best of all possible worlds” in a philosophical sense, where 
everything is carefully balanced, and only those ills occur which are calculated 
to lead directly to greater goods, or to directly prevent greater harms.  Rather, it 
is a world created by the gift of love.  W. H. Vanstone describes love’s work this 
way: 
Love may be ‘frustrated’: its most earnest aspirations may ‘come to 
nothing’: the greatness of what is offered in love may be wholly 
disproportionate to the smallness of that, if anything, which is received.  
Herein lies the poignancy of love, and its potential tragedy.  The activity 
of love contains no assurance or certainty of completion: much may be 
expended and little achieved.  The progress of love must always be by 
tentative and precarious steps: and each step that is taken, whether it 
‘succeeds’ or ‘fails’, becomes the basis for the next, and equally 
precarious, step which must follow.  2
In creating a world out of love, God made a world with its own creative potential, 
a world where love and altruism would be an eventual, desired result of the 
chaotic and tumultuous process of evolution.  That the world did not initially 
develop by cooperation and love is not a sign that things went wrong in God’s 
plan, but simply shows that love was not something that could be fashioned de 
novo.  It had to emerge out of the refining and transforming of passions, 
themselves developed through the competition and strife of evolution.    3
 Violence and competition in the non-human realm are not evil, just as 
earthquakes and tsunamis are not evil, though both result in sometimes 
gratuitous suffering for creatures.  The possibility of gratuitous evil is closely tied 
 W. H. Vanstone, Love’s Endeavour, Love’s Expense: The Response of Being to the Love of 2
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to the concept of temporal experience for God.  If God did not have a temporal 
reference, either nothing could be understood as gratuitous (for God would 
already know how it would be resolved), or gratuitous evil would stand eternally 
unresolved.  God’s voluntary revoking of the vantage point of simple eternity 
allows the third plank of my theodicy: 
3) The work of God does not leave suffering unaccompanied or unredeemed, 
but continues to make gratuitous suffering not gratuitous after all. 
How does God accompany and redeem suffering?  Why does God not simply 
eliminate all evil, or constrain life towards only desired ends?  The fourth plank 
of my theodicy explains: 
4) The nature of God’s love means there are only limited ways in which the 
unlimited divine power can be exercised, which prevents God’s unilateral 
annihilation of evil and disvalue. 
 God cannot simply eliminate evil or the possibility of disvalue.  It does not 
mean, however, that God is unable to respond to disvalues and suffering.  In the 
fifth chapter I explored how God can act, in light of God’s love, in the world.  I 
argued for four main avenues of special divine action: the gift of being, co-
presence, divine lure, and participation.  Of these four, the last three are the 
most important in relation to the suffering of creatures.  Co-presence is the 
compassionate attention given to each creature, so that no creature suffers or 
dies alone.  The divine lure draws creatures towards the good, and towards 
God.  It is the invitation to self-transcendence that draws creatures toward 
evolutionary innovation, and in humans, towards love and self-sacrifice.  The 
divine lure is the force that persuades creation into redemptive forms, creating 
value out of disvalue, and good out of suffering.  Finally, participation as 
embodiment allows God to fully experience the suffering of creation as a 
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creature, and to interact with creation directly.  Sometimes this may involve 
alleviating suffering, as it did in the Incarnation.  God’s participation is not only 
physical, though, as it is also present in shaping the meaning of events. 
 I have proposed that the final, ontological meaning of events is not 
determined at the time they take place.  Instead, meaning can change in light of 
new events.  God’s special divine action in the world, particularly in the realms 
of divine lure and embodied participation, allows God to change the meaning of 
what was once gratuitous suffering.  Thus, the fifth plank of my theodicy: 
5) The meaning, and therefore the value, of a life is only determined 
eschatologically.  What value we ascribe to a life is an intrinsic part of the 
venture of theodicy, since great suffering with great value is usually 
considered reasonable for God to allow.  Therefore, God works to redeem 
every life in such a way that its life is considered worthwhile even in light of 
the suffering the creature has undergone. 
 The “butterfly effect” is one of the classic examples used to show how a 
very small event can be transformed through chaotic systems into titanic 
effects.  A butterfly flaps its wings, thus determining a hurricane’s path on the 
other side of the world.  Similarly, every creature has, I propose, numberless 
effects on the course of earth history.  God uses these effects to promote 
redemption, both in this life and the life beyond, leading to my last theodical 
plank: 
6) Redemption for creatures, in the ongoing outworking of history and in new life 
after death, is a key component of what makes suffering comprehensible.  
Various models of redemption can be held together in the image of 
redemption as a fractal mosaic, composed of nested layers of redemptive 
meaning. 
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 Redemption for non-human creatures is multi-faceted.  It involves the 
redemption of meaning when there has been little observable value.  It involves 
contribution to the ongoing evolutionary development of life.  It involves 
personal transformation and fulfilment in the new creation.  I have suggested 
that this redemption is completely universal because of the particularity of divine 
love.  I have also suggested that the redemption of meaning that is offered to all 
creatures will be visited back upon the individual in such a way that they benefit 
from it.  Such a reality may involve an increase in non-human capacities so that 
they can receive such a gift, or it may simply exist on a pre-conscious level in 
the form of experienced peace, joy, and love. 
 There seems to be a problem, though, with contending that the 
evolutionary process is both part of God’s very good creation, unfallen and 
uncorrupted by sin, and still affirming that it needs to be redeemed.   Though 4
violence and competition in the natural world are not evil, I affirm with the 
biblical tradition, that in the new creation violence will either not exist or will be 
so transformed that it will hold none of the disvalues it holds here.   I suggest 5
that there is a helpful parallel in the now-and-not-then between violence in the 
non-human realm and our current physical embodiment.  Christian orthodoxy 
has long affirmed that our physical embodiment is good, not evil.  It is good that 
we have (or, perhaps better, are) bodies.  Apart from a few theological outliers, 
such as Origen, it is usually assumed that our embodied physical state is part of 
God’s good intention.  Yet, it has also affirmed that in the new creation, our 
bodies will be changed dramatically, and that the transformation will also be 
 Readers will recall that the redemption of creation was David Clough’s reason for believing 4
that something like sin could be extended to the non-human animal world.  See chapter 2, p. 70.
 Christopher Southgate affirms this too, speculating that there may be hunting in heaven (for 5
what would a lion be without its instinct to hunt?) but that it will be stripped of all its terror and 
suffering for the prey.  Christopher Southgate, The Groaning of Creation: God, Evolution, and 
the Problem of Evil (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2008), 88-90.
!319
good.   Affirming the present state of affairs as God’s good creation does not 6
mean that it is perfect, or that it is the desired end.  Nor is affirming the future 
state as good a quiet admission that God couldn’t quite get things right the first 
time around. 
 Evolution is God’s process for creating, and it is full of suffering, 
extinction, untimely death, and disvalue.  In addressing the theological problems 
associated with the above problem, I have tried to show that there are multiple 
helpful approaches, both in terms of setting up the problem and in solving it.  I 
have argued for a compound theodicy, which holds several lines of argument at 
once, and even within that, I have argued that various models of divine action 
and redemption can be held at once without self-contradiction.  I have tried to 
do all this in the form of what Thomas Tracy calls a “thick defense” which 
“attempts to weave a narrative that explains how suffering is consistent with 
beliefs held about God.”   I have woven a narrative of a God of love who 7
creates, sustains, suffers with, and redeems a most beloved creation. 
 The major contributions of this work include the exegetical work in 
Genesis 1-9 as applied to the question of the fallenness of the non-human 
world, the development and application of a Thomist definition of God’s love for 
the non-human living world, a multi-faceted approach to divine action in 
response to the suffering of creatures, a fractal mosaic picture of redemption, 
and the particular combination of my compound theodicy. 
 Christopher Southgate has written that all theodicies “arise out of protest 
and end in mystery.”   The journey we have taken in this work began on a dark 8
 1 Corinthians 15:35-44 is a particularly strong articulation of this theme.6
 Thomas F. Tracy, “The Lawfulness of Nature and the Problem of Evil,” in Physics and 7
Cosmology: Scientific Perspectives on the Problem of Natural Evil, eds. Nancey Murphy, Robert 
Russell, and William Stoeger (Vatican/Berkeley, CA: Vatican Observatory/CTNS, 2007), 152.
 Southgate, Groaning of Creation, 132.8
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night in the Rocky Mountains, troubled by the cries of a suffering fellow 
creature.  We then waded through the marshlands of philosophical and 
theological positions, saw the biblical panorama of an unfallen world, climbed 
the lofty peaks of love, and crossed the open plains of creaturely freedom.  We 
hiked through the mixed forests of divine action and enjoyed the other-worldly 
beauty of redemptive landscapes.  And now, finally, we find ourselves on the 
shores of the ocean of mystery, still with questions, but questions reframed if 
not resolved.  I trust that the reader will not be disappointed with such a final 
destination (some, after all, seek only Mt. Resolution or the Glaciers of 
Certainty).  Though we have not come to a place of complete satisfaction in 
regard to a suffering world, I hope––at least––that our journey will have been 
considered worthwhile. 
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